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I am always bothered by the Western arrogance, by its assurance that it 
knows all the answers and can quite readily fix everything so that the 
tropical peoples can live happily ever after, if only they will listen. This 
philosophy underlies all of the various programs of international technical 
assistance that are so popular these days, and especially the programs of 
the United States which are aimed at the uplift of practically everybody 
else 
Marston Bates in Where winter never comes: a study of man and nature in the tropics (1950) 
All critical examinations of the relations to nature are simultaneously 
critical examinations of society 
David Harvey in Justice, nature and the geography of difference (1996) 
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Abstract 
Focusing on coral reef policy, this thesis challenges orthodox understanding of international 
environmental policy, studying environmental crises as political assemblies, and policy endeavours as 
power-filled networks. This requires first rendering the subject accessible for critical research by 
constructing a 'multiperspectival' base from which to view it, thus elucidating how a Foucauldian 
discourse of modernisation hides the politics of orthodox understandings of international environmental 
policy. The thesis then investigates the efforts of a suite of science/policy/conservation agencies to save 
coral reefs from a perceived global crisis. It analyses how coral reef policy arises as an instrument of 
international governance, articulating with the Fiji Islands, a South Pacific archipelago. This reveals 
how global truths are created and translated into policies and action plans, enrolling places and people 
into a global network largely outside the formal interstate treaty system. Understanding these networks 
and the various modes of power operating within them-from seduction to coercion and 
hegemony-necessitates understanding how actors in both developed and developing counties exhibit 
similar agency, co-opting discourses to suit their interests. 
The final section argues that this political assembly around ecological crisis represents a deepening 
integration of humankind in which ecology has become a model for the practice of development under 
the control of ecological technocrats. The West continues to dominate the Third World, however. Both 
environmental policy discourse and the universals through which policy travels the globe-the moral 
imperative to look after the planet plus science~based universals positioning coral reefs as a problem of 
common concern to humanity-contribute to this relationship of domination. Indeed, hegemony is 
predicated upon the universal of international cooperation as much as those of science and 
neoliberalism. Technical practices and expert technologies accepted as commonsense help sustain an 
asymmetrical relationship; practices used in creating global reports of coral health, capacity-building 
projects, ecoregion planning technologies and the rhetorical style used in scientific papers all 
contribute. 
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Part I 
Readying the Subject for Study 
CHAPTER LAYOUT 
The Study 
THE AIM 
Chapter One 
Aim, Rationale and Argument 
RATIONALE FOR CRITICALLY INTERROGATING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM TO BE CHALLENGED 
STRATEGIES FOR TRANSCENDING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Rationale for the Focus on Coral Reef Policy 
The Central Argument: Summary 
The Study 
THE AIM 
This thesis investigates environmental policy as an instrument of international governance. 
Concentrating on one particular environmental subject, coral reefs, it examines how issues arise, how 
policies are formed, and how people and organisations transfer policy ideas across the world. It also 
analyses how we-people interested in environmental problems troubling the planet, who follow 
international attempts to tackle these problems-understand these processes, the conceptual 
frameworks we use to make sense of them. 
We tend to think of international environmental policy as a cooperative moral campaign to save the 
planet. This thesis challenges that normative orthodoxy. It has a dual aim: (1) to examine how 
environmental policy arises as an instrument of international governance, opening up space for seeing 
environmental crises as political assemblies around that notion; and (2) to investigate whether the 
transfer to developing countries of Western environmental policy ideas may be a form of hegemonic 
control. This entails more than just ascertaining whether, embedded in policy prescriptions and 
practices, there are any hegemonic relationships mixing coercion and consent sensu Gramsci. The way 
we think about international environmental policy processes might be contributing to any such 
hegemony and should also be investigated. 
This question over hegemony is the primary question investigated throughout the thesis. The general 
inquiry into the politics of international environmental policy is a stepping stone, albeit a necessary 
one, towards this ultimate question. 
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The extent of hegemony in international policy (the capacity of a dominant group such as a social 
alliance or geographical bloc to exercise control through the willing acquiescence of those being 
dominated) has not been systematically investigated across a range of environmental policy issues, 
although there are some studies of specific issues and organisations (reviewed in Chapter Three). Yet 
international environmental policy could conceivably entail hegemonic political projects and social 
alliances; it involves a myriad of people from a diverse range of groups and agencies and is 
characterised by complex political and social relationships crossing the First World-Third World divide 
(as characterised by, for instance, Yearley 1996 p. 63-64; Hajer 2003 p. 177-181). 
RATIONALE FOR CRITICALLY INTERROGATING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
My interest in exploring hegemony in environmental policy compelled me to start researching from a 
position that privileges not the West but what I understand to be the situation in the geographical 'non-
West' of interest to me, the South Pacific. I became interested in the inequities associated with 
international environmental policy during the time I lived in the Pacific Islands, 1999-2004. 
Throughout those years I studied development and environmental management, observing the way 
many Pacific Islanders willingly adopt western terminology, environmental programmes and 
aspirations without considering their wider political implications. I also noted the influence that 
expatriate and overseas-trained professionals had on environmental policy advanced in regional Pacific 
intergovernmental agencies and in international conservation nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) 
operating there. This spurred my interest in investigating how environmental policy arises as an 
instrument of governance, the actuality not the generalised descriptions found in many accounts. 
I would like to see a more pluralist stance on environmental issues, a greater diversity of perspectives. 
Too much current debate overlooks difference-different ways of thinking about nature and problems, 
different economic and cultural systems, and different aspirations held amongst governments, 
communities and other social groups and political organisations-concentrating instead on issues 
depicted as international and common to all peoples. I am concerned about the degree to which certain 
environmental policy stances of western origin masquerade as objective, natural and technocratic 
truisms (sensu Peck and Tickell 2002)-even amongst people whose cultures and histories are very 
different to New Zealanders and other Westerners. I want to challenge this by de mystifying how, in 
drawing Pacific Islanders into their orthodoxy, common contemporary policy stances on environmental 
issues are able to have such power. It is not my intention, however, to align myself with particular 
political interests in the Pacific Islands, nor with any particular constructions of Fijian society (the 
'local' selected for study), such as the constructions promoting indigenous Fijian nationalist interests, 
class or economic interests amongst political elite, or those aiming to promote the interests of rural 
Fijian communities (constructions and agendas discussed in, for instance, Ravuvu 1991; Ratuva 2000; 
Robertson 2000; Halapua 2003). 
REUBEN JOHN SULU'S CHALLENGE 
This masquerade is something that Reuben, a Pacific Islander whose professional work straddles the 
boundary between the international and the Islands, faces every day. People in this position are 
important in any study of how 'outside' policy ideas connect with the local. Reuben is important in 
this research for another reason-his willingness to make known his discomfort when he feels that 
he or his Pacific Island colleagues are being treated as ill-educated, ignorant or lacking the skills to 
manage their own lives and countries. In challenging this, he prompts me to try and understand the 
power of discourses. Reuben also reminds me that people involved in international policy are 
positioned for better or worse, not always in agreement with the approach they are taking. Aldlough 
he regularly attends international meetings, this does not mean he is comfortable with the orthodox 
policy discourse these meetings regurgitate. I got to know Reuben while living in Suva. A Solomon 
Islander, Reuben studied marine science at University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva, graduating 
MSc. Returning home for 18 months, he worked for the World Wide Fund for Nature (W\'VF) then 
Solomon Island Fisheries Department before moving to USP's Institute of Marine Resources in 
Suva, where he helped co-ordinate the Southwest Pacific node of the Global Coral Reef Monitoring 
Network (GCRlYIN) between 2002 and 2005. Reuben is aware that this work was not connecting 
with the reality of people's daily lives in his home village on Ngella and elsewhere in the Pacific 
Islands. In 2005, he took a job at the USP centre in Honiara, Solomon Islands. 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM TO BE CHALLENGED 
In exploring hegemony in international environmental policy, this study seeks to challenge 
conventional wisdom about this policy field. As Chapter Two discusses, we tend to view international 
environmental policy as being ideologically neutral and non-political statements, developed and 
implemented through cooperative, scientifically-based processes. Two key elements of this 
conventional wisdom must be transcended if this field of policy is ever to be viewed critically: the bias 
introduced by common understandings of the politics of nature; and the instrumental way in which 
policy and policy processes are usually viewed. In addition, taking a critical perspective requires 
moving beyond our conventionally poor understanding of various aspects of international 
environmental policy processes. It means rectifying the paucity of suitable tools for researching the 
nature of hegemony in these policy endeavours. In the remainder of the section, I describe these four 
challenges and outline the strategies I use in this thesis to move beyond them and view international 
environmental policy critically. 
Distorted views of the politics associated with international environmental 
policy 
The interpretation of the politics of nature that dominates our conceptions of international 
environmental policy has been labelled as 'ecologism' (Vincent 1995). Although ecologism has 
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political extremes, most of its political positions are intermediate, underpinned by human 
anthropocentric arguments and sharing common themes: a belief in the systematic interdependence of 
species and the environment; thinking in terms of the whole ecosystem; a reasonably positive attitude 
to nature; a tendency to be minimally sceptical about the supreme position of humans on the planet; a 
general anxiety about what humans, via industrialised civilisation, are doing to the planet; and a 
questioning of the limits of economic growth in industrialised societies (Vincent 1995 p. 218-219, 
221). Groups occupying this middle political ground also subscribe to the belief that the present nation-
state and its legal structures, modified to a greater or lesser degree by environmental consciousness, are 
adequate, indeed necessary, for meeting the requirements of environmental ideology (Vincent 1995 p. 
225). 
The tendency to interpret the politics of the contemporary field of international environmental policy as 
ecologism introduces certain biases into the study of these politics and of the power relationships 
associated with these policy processes. For example, it is not necessarily coincidental that the 
appearance, over the past four decades, of political ecologism has paralleled growing international 
cooperation in economic and political domains, and the internationalisation of environmental 
governance, despite interpretations to that effect (such as Berkhout et at. 2003 p. 3). The practical 
politics of ecologism are rooted in liberal institutionalist values of cooperation and knowledge sharing; 
liberal institutionalism views international regimes as benevolent, voluntary and cooperative and 
regards global governance as the solution to global problems such as environmental degradation and· 
development (Litfin 1994 p. 190; Ford 2003 p. 120). Ecologism is thus a distorted lens through which 
to view the politics associated with the field of international environmental policy. 
Much of the character of these politics remains hidden because of the depth to which views of 
international environmentalism are normative. Prominent contemporary paradigms-global 
environmentalism, sustainable development, global environmental change, environmental 
managerialism, and biodiversity conservation-tell us that not only that environmentalism is a global-
level phenomenon but that it should be so. The way that science is regarded as an appropriate way of 
identifying environmental problems is also normative, and along with the idea that international 
cooperation and the transfer of knowledge and expertise from developed to less developed countries 
are appropriate responses to those problems. Normative theories do not, however, explain how 
international efforts are made to seem locally relevant, or how various local efforts become 
internationally relevant. Instead, they become enmeshed in the charismatic attraction of the global. 
Tsing (2000 p. 330) points out how it is too easy to assume that globalist projects and dreams remake 
the world just as they want it. As a result, we may fail to recognise how the metaphors and other 
discursive devices legitimising globalism can serve certain political programmes and how, in doing so, 
they may hide contradictions, ambiguities and complexities of socio-political reality. Moreover, as 
Escobar (1995), Jasanoff (1996), Yearley (1996), and Goldman (2004) have all pointed out, we may 
overlook inequalities such as the distribution of power, costs, profits and responsibilities. We may 
overlook how information about the state (health) of nature in various parts of the world is a 
representation, possibly even an ideology that supports relations of domination on an international 
scale. We may even neglect to observe shifts in the claims being made and in coalitions formed. 
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Instrumental understandings of policy 
Conventional understanding of international environmental policy is derived from two models of 
policy: the rational problem-solving model-with its normative view of how to approach 
problems-plus a political model of governance associated with territory and based upon the notion of 
hierarchical tiers operating cooperatively with interested NGOs. In the latter model, successive tiers of 
political governance and jurisdiction, from the supra-national or intergovernmental organisation, 
through the national, state or region, community, down to the household, conduct policy making and 
planning as a hierarchical process. Policies set at international level are subsequently brought to 
national agendas as general principles; from there, they reach sub-national and local level as more 
detailed and concrete actions (Peuhkuri and Jokinen 1999 p. 142). According to this model, the 
different layers of rules are commonly regarded as hierarchical in legitimacy and authority; failures for 
higher level rules to be followed at lower levels are usually ascribed to a lack of enforcement, rather 
than to belief in any alternative conceptualisation of political authority. 
This instrumentalism extends to the definition of policy, which Titmus (quoted in Shore and Wright 
1997 p. 5) defined as the principles that govern action directed towards given ends. Yet policy is highly 
political. In shaping, guiding, managing and regulating peoples' conduct, policy is, to use Foucault's 
expression, an instrument in the conduct of conduct (Foucault 1991; Dean 1996 p. 47). Policy conveys 
the aspirations those in authority have about how they want society to be-whether at local, national or 
international scale-and how they want people to be governed. In this, policy usually serves social as 
well as political functions-addressing conflicting aspirations and views, ruling out disagreements, 
enabling compromise, promoting cooperation among different groups of people. Yet, in the social 
function of planning the future, policy contributes to instrumental rationality in the activities of groups 
of people by promoting concepts such as efficiency and effectiveness. 
Poor understanding of international environmental policy 
Although it can be difficult to escape this instrumentalism, there have been some critical studies of 
international environmental policy (for example, the World Bank's crusade of neoliberal 
environmentalism (Goldman 2001; 2004), and various critiques of international conservation (such as 
Brosius 2004». But, in general, environmental policy is treated as if it were politically and 
ideologically neutral, and a reflexive attitude is little valued (Broadhead 2002 p. 5). The extent to 
which contemporary ideas about appropriate environmental management are codifying and transferring 
social values and norms across that space, although recognised, are only beginning to be investigated 
systematically (e.g. Marcussen 2003; Brosius forthcoming). Furthermore, the various modes of power 
exercised through international environmental policy processes connecting with developing countries 
are generally unclear. 
A review of conventional and critical understandings of international environmental policy (in 
Chapters Two and Three respectively) reveals a limited understanding of several other aspects of those 
processes. These include: (1) how the environment is constructed as an international problem requiring 
intervention on an international level to solve, how various locales are discursively drawn into the 
global problem specifications, and how this construction leads to certain policy responses; (2) the 
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various actors involved, their interests, and how and why they cooperate, including (3) the contestation 
occurring, and modes of power being exercised, under an outwardly cooperative framework; and (4) 
the socio-political role that science and scientists play. 
A paucity of tools for researching the nature of hegemony 
There are few analytical tools available for investigating hegemony in international environmental 
policy. Hegemony is usually understood as a deliberate strategy for winning and maintaining power, 
requiring leadership and direction. This may be achieved not simply by coercion or by direct 
imposition of ruling ideas but by subtle manipulation, in such a way that "the power of the dominant 
groups appears both legitimate and natural" (Hebdige 1993 p. 366). Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, 
with whom the concept is nearly always linked, identified a situation in which a dominant power gains 
consent to its ideology through everyday norms and institutions, exercising control in a way not always 
readily visible. This is domination as the exercise of power in a mode whereby individuals voluntarily 
acquiesce but do not experience that power as conflicting with their interests. 
There are, however, different ways of reading hegemony in international policy, some seeing it as good 
and some as bad, as Chapter Four explores. Some analyses (particularly those assuming the nation-state 
to be a territorial container of hegemonic struggle) stress hegemony as consensual power, others 
(especially global-scaled approaches based on world systems theory) stress it as coercive power 
(Sparke 2004 p. 779). Thus the theoretical and normative threads of hegemony need to be unravelled. 
before it can be used as a critical tool for analysing policy. 
Furthermore, maintaining hegemony is not necessarily a deliberate strategy. Hegemony may occur 
through the reproduction of orthodox discourse, of everyday commonsense for instance, or of expert 
discourses found in various fields of academic and research endeavours (Ford 2003 p. 121-122). This 
opens up a suite of questions about the relationship between human intentionality and social order. Is 
there an intention, in hegemonic practices related to international environmental policy, to maintain the 
existing social order, for example? 
In contemporary political and social analyses, identifying an intention to dominate is difficult without 
employing psychological analyses. As Carnric (1986 p. 1040) has pointed out, modern sociology does 
not address this matter at all well; in so far as claims are made about human conduct, what prevails in 
modern sociology is a model of action that has variously been called purposive, rational, voluntaristic, 
or decisional. This is akin to the concept of the rational actor that dominates contemporary political 
science and economics. 
According to this widely used model, action is a process arising from various utilitarian, 
moral, affectual, or other motives-motives formed of calculation, belief, attitude, and 
sentiment-that define ends that an actor then intentionally pursues by choosing, from 
among available alternatives, the means that appear most appropriate when judged by 
norms of efficiency, duty, familiarity, and so on (Carnric 1986 p. 1040). 
This lack of suitable tools for investigating hegemony in international policy situations poses another 
challenge for a critical interrogation of environmental policy. Before using hegemony as an 
investigative tool, one must first develop a theoretical and analytical framework (which Chapter Four 
does). 
STRATEGIES FOR TRANSCENDING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
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The key to transcending conventional wisdom about international environmental policy is to employ a 
broad concept of politics, one looking beyond an instrumental view of nature as resources to be used to 
support human life and further human interests. Carter (2004 p. 187) advocates such a view, 
recognising how the interdependence of natural and social phenomena shape political activity. So too 
does Bruno Latour (2004 p. 4), who argues that in modern society, nature becomes knowable through 
the intermediaries of science and politics, how, when thus known, it is represented in policy, also how 
that representation is a political act. Latour (2004 p. 244) suggests that since the idea of nature and of 
politics both depend upon a certain conception of science, a critical rethinking must tackle all three 
ideas; only then can that which has been externalised (i.e. politics) be taken into account again. Latour 
calls this exercise of rendering the political visible 'ecological critique'. 
As well as a broad conception of politics, I also take a broadly inclusive approach to the study of 
policy, encompassing 'policy-talk' and 'policy practice', with a particular emphasis on the way policy 
is being conceptualised and conceived, framed and advocated (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996 p. 6). I 
characterise policy connections across national boundaries as 'endeavours', 'ventures' or 'processes' 
that are part of the 'arena' of 'international policy'. That terminology fails, however, to reflect how 
international environmental policy is created in places which are themselves local (discussed further in 
Chapter Four). This is an example of the many semantic problems I encountered throughout the study, 
current terminology sometimes proving inadequate for designing the research and constructing a 
theoretical argument. In Chapter Four, I explain my strategy for dealing with other problematic terms. 
In taking this broad conception of policy, I concentrate on the realm of public policy. There is some 
debate about what is public policy, compared to non-public or private policy (Parsons 1995 p. 8-9). 
Rather than attempting to define this, I take an inclusive approach. I regard all international policy 
processes, whether they involve governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, 
as public and within the scope of this study, and any links between these organisations and local ones 
on matters of policy as public policy concerns. 
Another strategy I use is to divorce this study from the modernist conception that the purpose of 
acquiring knowledge is to "influence for the better the human condition"-to assist in the pursuit of the 
improvement in human lives and progress of humankind implied by modernity (Jones 1993 p. 21). This 
removes any sense of teleology, including the idea that environmental management efforts are being 
shaped by an overall purpose such as saving the planet; it allows me to explore different strategies and 
occurrences in policy transfer, including the extent to which they are intentional. I am able to do this 
because the knowledge gained from this study is not intended to be part of the ongoing project of 
improving environmental management. It is, instead, a step removed, intended to create new 
consciousness about international environmental governance and policy. I have based the study upon a 
Nietzschean perspective of knowledge (knowledge being the sets of ideas that a social group or society 
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of people accept as real). Nietzsche saw knowledge as political, the historically contingent product of 
linguistic and social practices of particular communities of interpreters. In this view, power and 
knowledge cannot be separated, knowledge being an assemblage of drives and interests reflecting the 
interests of its knowers (Edgar and Sedgwick 1999). This view underlies Foucault's work (and is also 
found in Marxism), and opens the door to inquire into the knowledge encountered in environmental 
policy processes in a Foucauldian manner-into the social, historical and political conditions under 
which statements come to count as true or false. In the Foucauldian perspective, truth in environmental 
policy matters is not confined to being the product of science and scientific methods, as commonly 
regarded in contemporary western society. The conditions under which supposed scientific truths are 
produced therefore become a matter for inquiry, as does the political employment of knowledge and 
ideas as resources in policy processes. 
Yet no single discipline offers a suitable analytical framework for a critical study of international 
environmental policy addressing policy practices, political motivations, the exercise of power and its 
interface with knowledge and discourse. Furthermore, as I discussed earlier in relation to liberal 
institutionalism, discourses from various disciplines have helped shape how we understand the 
contemporary reality of international environmental policy matters. In seeking to understand these 
disciplines' influence and discursive power (and thus their contribution to hegemony), I therefore use a 
trans-disciplinary approach. I canvas theoretical perspectives and research from various disciplines, 
exploring geography (geographies of critical policy, globalisation and relational power), political 
science, international relations, political ecology, development studies, sociology, anthropology, and 
science and technology studies. Additionally, I interrogate geo-bio-physical descriptions of reefs 
employed in policy processes. As a result, it is difficult to characterise this research as belonging to any 
particular branch of investigative endeavour in the social sciences. Rather, it employs a disciplined 
'multiperspectival' eclecticism as Layder (1994 p. 222) recommends. 
To a Nietzschean perspective of knowledge, a post-structuralist view of discourse, and Latour's (1993; 
2004) modern ecological critique, I add social constructionist understandings of science as an 
endeavour shaped by the social, political and historical conditions under which it occurs plus an 
anthropological line of enquiry. The latter is influenced by Latour's observations on modernity and 
science, by anthropology of science and technology of a radical bent (as advocated by Hess (1997», 
and by global ethnography's notion of modes of cultural interconnection that tie people in far-flung 
places or travel with them across the world sensu Gille and 0 Riain (2002 p. 287). Chapter Four 
explains this disciplined eclecticism further. 
levels of inquiry 
I inquire critically into policy at three different levels, summarised in Table 1. The first level examines 
the international connections, flows of information, policy ideas and funding that constitute the reality 
of international coral reef policy processes. This is similar to Shore and Wright's (1997 p. 14-16) 
concept of policy as webs and relations between actors and discourses across space and time. It is also 
akin to a geographical study of globalisation-of contemporary environmental governance crossing 
national boundaries in a globalised world (Robertson 1992 p. 7). This type of inquiry entails analysing 
various ways in which coral reefs have featured in international policy, the issues associated with 
them-climate change, rising sea-level, overfishing, physical destruction, and pollution-and the 
groups of people seeking to address those issues. 
TABLE 1: THE THREE lEVELS OF INQUIRY 
1 Connections between international coral reef policy endeavours and those in the Fiji 
Islands: relations between actors, funding flows, discourses that connect people 
across space and time 
2 Critical analysis of these connections, analysing their political nature, the modes of 
power being exercised, and the way agency and discourse intersect 
3 Reflexive epistemological and sociological inquiry into how contemporary 
intellectual frameworks of inquiry and epistemic practices produce certain views of 
the world and colour our understandings of how environmental policy arises 
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This study of connections is a necessary prelude to the second level critically examining these policy 
processes. This uses contemporary social science perspectives that treat policy not as the politically or 
ideological neutral subject of policy analysis but as a technology of power and expression of social 
relationships. I examine normative claims that define a problem in a particular way while closing off 
other ways of thinking. While locating accounts of the biophysical nature of coral reefs in policy, I 
question the way those depictions have been constructed, the metaphors they employ, the values 
embedded in these, and the way these are used in policy processes. Moreover, I examine the mobilising 
metaphors and narratives that cloak policy with the symbols and trappings of political legitimacy . 
To undertake this analysis, I need to adopt particular frameworks of inquiry, which is where a third 
level of inquiry is needed. In the course of examining global-local links in international coral reef 
policy, I also critique the dominant frameworks of inquiry and epistemic practices that provide a 
starting point for this study. Both anthropology and postmodernism suggest that in order to study the 
links between policy, subjectivity and governance, to interrogate the supposed natural or axiomatic 
'order of things' , it is necessary to detach and reposition oneself sufficiently far from the norms and 
categories of thought that give security and meaning to the moral universe of one's society (Shore and 
Wright 1997 p. 8). This level of inquiry also involves recognising the normative theory approach of 
much policy literature (whether found in policy science, economics, political science, sociology, 
international relations or development theory), and taking a skeptical approach to it-looking for the 
political basis of theories, arguments, and narratives and for the way those may benefit entrenched 
interests. This is the basis of a further strategy-the interweaving of empirical investigation with 
reflexive critique throughout the thesis. 
In this highly reflexive critique, I first uncover and denaturalise the subject to make it ready for study. 
This entails unravelling the multiple threads that collectively constitute our orthodox understanding of 
international environmental policy, examining their historical influences (Chapter Two), identifying the 
extent of problems in conventional understandings and designing a set of questions to guide the 
empirical study (Chapter Three); and building a theoretical and methodological base from which to 
proceed (Chapter Four). Only then do I analyse the research subject, international coral reef policy 
endeavours. 
METHODOLOGIES 
A series of text boxes, similar to this one, is interspersed throughout the chapters (and listed in the 
Contents). These explain the different approaches used to investigate topics; anyone wanting to 
know my entire research methodology should read these in sequence. 
Rationale for the Focus on Coral Reef Policy 
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I selected coral reefs as suitable natural phenomena on which to focus this study of environmental 
policy for several reasons, not least of which was the widespread belief amongst the community of reef 
scientists and managers that reefs are under severe threat globally, in a state of crisis. Several 
authoritative scientific publications have emphasised the inescapability of the crisis, including papers in 
two widely-read weekly science journals Science and Nature. Popular articles direly spelling out the 
damage to reefs inflicted by humans have become common (e.g. Chadwick 1999; Tickelll999; 
Denecke 2001; James 2001; Hodgson and Liebeler 2002). This concern, detailed in Chapter Five, is 
two-fold. There is apprehension about global environmental change, based upon a hypothesised 
connection between greenhouse gas emissions, enhanced global warming and recent widespread coral 
bleaching. Reefs are also believed to be suffering large-scale anthropogenic degradation as a routine 
consequence of modernity. 
Predictions about the future of coral reefs are ominous. Reporting to the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2000, the Executive Secretary of that convention's secretariat observed 
that: 
The latest global predictions suggest that a further 14 percent of the world's coral reefs will 
be lost by 2010, and another 18 percent in the 20 years following, without reductions in the 
current human-induced stresses on reef ecosystems from growing coastal populations and 
economies. This means that 59 percent of the world's reefs are under immediate loss within 
several decades (Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity 2000b p. 13). 
In 2001 the Economist reported some scientists fear global warming will bleach most of the world's 
coral reefs to barren skeletons within 50 years (Economist.com Global Agenda 2001). They may even 
cease to exist in a few centuries, according to some. Thomas Goreau, president of the Global Coral 
Reef Alliance has warned that the world's coral reefs are well on the way to being the first ecosystem 
to undergo mass extinction caused by global warming (Global Coral Reef Alliance ™ 2002). 
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Greenpeace Australia has claimed that if current rates of climate change continue then the world's coral 
reefs might be wiped out in 100 years (Union ofInternational Associations 2000). 
Several international policy initiatives focus on coral reefs, a key one being the International Coral 
Reef Initiative (ICRI), which promotes sustainable use and conservation of reef resources. Formed in 
1994, ICRI brings representatives from developing countries together with major donor countries, 
development banks, intergovernmental organisations, scientific associations, and NGOs (Drake 1996; 
Mieremet 1996; Dight and Scherl 1997). International NGOs lead other international coral reef 
protection initiatives. (Chapter Seven analyses these various initiatives). 
Coral reef policy is influenced by key contemporary environmental paradigms. Thus, studying 
international coral reef policy processes provides an opportunity to interrogate the socio-political 
construction of these paradigms, global environmental change included. Global environmental change 
is not just a bio-geo-chemical process; it is also a social process and a policy issue, and is stimulating 
questions about how the world's socioeconomic system can sustain its development without 
compromising irreversibly the geospheric and biospheric conditions necessary to the survival of the 
human species (Prades 1999 p. 13, and as discussed in Chapter 12 of Moore et at. 1996, for example). 
As a natural phenomenon of much contemporary interest and value, coral reefs are an interesting focus 
for a study of international environmental policy. In many countries, reefs provide not only the protein 
and nourishment that coastal populations need to survive, but also income through fisheries and 
tourism. They provide building blocks of land, extreme examples being atolls in the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans built solely by coral reefs (Done et at. 1996 p. 397). Coral reefs provide natural protection 
against hurricanes, wave damage, and erosion; they protect embayments historically important in the 
development of human transportation and commerce (Reaka-Kudla 1997 p. 84; Cesar 2000 p. 14-15). 
Bioerosion of carbonate reef framework and the calcareous shells of reef organisms provide almost all 
the sand on tropical beaches, popular with tourists and holidaymakers (Reaka-Kudla 1997 p. 84). Coral 
reefs are also valued for their biodiversity. Habitat for thousands of species, they are often called "the 
rainforests of the sea" (Adey et al. 2000). In addition, coral reef plants, animals, and microbes are rich 
in unusual organic compounds, including anti tumour compounds, whose medical and pharmaceutical 
potential is just starting to be defined (Done et al. 1996 p. 397; Reaka-Kudla 1997 p. 84). 
Despite their interest to humankind, coral reefs have received little academic attention from social 
scientists. In the journal Coral Reefs, founded in 1982, virtually all the papers have originated from 
natural and physical science; furthermore, none of the journal's editors are social scientists. Yet, for a 
social science researcher, coral reefs are a readily identifiable unit on which to work (as are forests and 
urban environments for instance). Moreover, since coral reefs occur largely in developing regions, a 
study of international coral reef policy reflects First World-Third World issues, perspectives and 
tensions. It facilitates a study of hegemonic control across that divide. A focus on coral reefs also 
enables me to study environmental policy in a region closely linked to New Zealand-about forty 
percent of the planet's coral reefs are in the Pacific Ocean (Table 2). 
1,290 square kilometres of coral reefs are in New Zealand's freely associated states (Cook Islands and 
Niue) and another 50 square kilometres around Tokelau (Spalding et al. 2001)-see Table 3, also map 
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1. Although the New Zealand Government takes a substantial interest in Pacific Islands' environmental 
policy, it has accorded little attention to coral reefs (various interviews, New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) June 2003). One of the secondary benefits of this research will be 
to make information about these policy initiatives more accessible to New Zealand government 
policymakers. 
TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF CORAL REEF AREA WORLDWIDE 
Region Area of coral reef (km2) % of world total 
Indo-Pacific 261,200 91.8 
Pacific 115,900 40.8 
Southeast Asia 91,700 32.2 
Indian Ocean 32,000 11.2 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 17,400 6.1 
Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea 4,200 1.5 
Eastern Pacific 1,600 0.6 
Atlantic and Caribbean 21,600 7.6 
Caribbean 20,000 7.0 
Atlantic 1,600 0.6 
TOTAL 284,300 
Source: Spalding et at. (2001 p. 17) 
ACCURACY IN CALCULATIONS OF THE AREA OF CORAL REEFS 
The source of statistics in Tables 2 and 3, the World Atlas of Coral ReefS, contains up-to-date 
calculations of coral reef area. There are, however, no estimates of accuracy included: "true error 
terms cannot be calculated" (Spalding et al. 2001 p. 402). The area of Pacific reefs is likely to be 
overstated in Table 1, and that of Indian Ocean reefs correspondingly understated. In their 
regional calculations, the autllors included reefs around the west and north of the Australian 
mainland in the Pacific figures (Nlark Spalding, World Conservation IVlonitoring Centre (\V'CMC), 
principal author of the atlas,pers. ,·omm. October 2003). Although I asked Spalding (by email) for a 
breakdown of the Australian reef areas by location, he merely suggested that "probably 70-80 
percent" were in ilie Pacific Ocean. This illustrates how statistics about coral reefs are often less 
accurate ilian iliey appear, a recurring ilieme in this study. 
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TABLE 3: AREA OF CORAL REEF IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN BY ISLAND GROUP 
Island group 
Australia (including some in the Indian Ocean) 
Papua New Guinea 
Fiji Islands 
Marshall Islands 
French Polynesia 
New Caledonia 
Solomon Islands 
Federated States of :Micronesia 
Vanuatu 
Kiribati 
Tonga 
Hawai'i 
Palau 
Cook Islands 
Wallis and Futuna 
Tuvalu 
Samoa 
American Samoa 
Guam 
Johnston Island 
Niue 
Pitcairn Islands 
Nauru 
Northern Marianas 
Tokelau 
Source: Chappell (1999); Spalding et al. (2001) 
A focus on the Fiji Islands 
Reef area 
(km2) 
48960 
13840 
10020 
6110 
6000 
5980 
5750 
4340 
4110 
2940 
1500 
1180 
1150 
1120 
940 
710 
490 
220 
220 
220 
170 
<100 
<50 
<50 
<50 
Political status 
Independent nation-state 
Independent nation-state 
Independent nation-state 
Freely associated state (USA) 
Dependent territory (France) 
Dependent territory (France) 
Independent nation-state 
Freely associated state (USA) 
Independent nation-state 
Independent nation-state 
Independent nation-state 
State of the USA 
Freely associated state (USA) 
Freely associated state (NZ) 
Dependent territory (France) 
Independent nation-state 
Independent nation-state 
Dependent territory (USA) 
Dependent territory (USA) 
US territory (uninhabited) 
Freely associated state (NZ) 
Dependent territory (UK) 
Independent nation-state 
Commonwealth of the USA 
Dependent territory (NZ) 
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While a focus on coral reefs provides a suitable topic for investigating international policy concerned 
with environmental crises, a focus on how Fiji, as a small island developing state, is connecting to the 
international through policy endeavours permits an investigation of hegemony in those matters. I first 
investigate how international coral reef policy arises in sites outside the Fiji Islands (covered in Part II, 
Chapters Five to Eight), then explore the mUltiple policy connections that people in the Fiji Islands 
concerned with reef policy have with people in other parts of the world (Part III). In other words, I 
examine the nature of contemporary connections between the Fiji Islands and international policy 
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endeavours (partly in Chapter Eight but principally Chapters Nine to Thirteen). This reveals the messy 
nature of reality. 
The territory of the Fiji Islands consists of an archipelago, centrally located in the Pacific Ocean with 
some outlying reefs to the south and east, plus Rotuma a small group of outlying islands 5000 \an north 
(for pragmatic reasons the latter plays little part in this study). The archipelago, shown on Map 2, lies 
between 15°S and 23SS (Minerva Reef), and 176°E (Conway Reef, shown on Map 3) and 178OW. The 
archipelago contains hundreds of islands, islets and cays, over 110 of which are inhabited. The 
country's population, estimated at 830,000, is the third largest of all Pacific island groups (excluding 
Australasia), after Hawai'i and Papua New Guinea (Lal and Fortune 2000 p. 566-567). 
The archipelago has extensive coral reefs: 10,020 square kilometres of reef surround 18,272 square 
kilometres of land (Table 3). As well as being the most complex coral reef system in the world, this is 
also one of the largest (Andrefouet 2004). In the region, only Australia and Papua New Guinea have 
larger systems. 
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The Central Argument: Summary 
Running through this thesis is a theoretical argument about the way in which a Foucauldian knowledge 
system, which I call the 'global environmental policy discourse', enables and constrains contemporary 
environmental policy. This argument is situated within a wider one about how the diffusion of 
environmental policy through science/policylconservation networks is further integrating the world. 
These networks operate within and around formal state organisation at national and international level, 
forging connections with what is often taken to be 'civil society', creating global truths and translating 
them into global policy. They represent a political assembly around the notion of global environmental 
crisis (political in the broad sense discussed earlier). 
I argue that this deepening integration of humankind represents a new era of human history, one in 
which ecology has become not only an ideological statement about how the world is meant to be, but 
also a model for Third World development. As a strategy for humankind's future, development is no 
longer necessarily progressive and unidirectional, it is ecological and adaptive under the guiding hand 
of ecological technocrats. I show how these experts are actively drawing the Pacific-itself blending 
traditional, community-based society and post-colonial national society-into a global ecological 
society, a phenomenon I call 'developmental environmentalism'. In this, the West continues to 
dominate the Third World. Environmental policy networks that draw the Third World into western 
imaginings of the environmental crisis are premised on the notion of western superiority in institutions, 
governance systems, technical skills and policy prescriptions. Their politics aim to maintain the 
existing political order between the blocs of industrialised and non-industrialised countries. 
I start to build this argument about the deepening, hegemonic integration of the world by describing the 
nature and origins of the global environmental policy discourse, including its close relationship with 
modernisation theory (in Chapter Two). I show how this discourse is shaped by the same legacy of 
Enlightenment thought that has resulted in development being labelled as technocentric: faith in 
rational planning and in science's ability to identify and solve environmental problems, and a belief in 
the West's technical and intellectual superiority. Although of western origin, this discourse 
masquerades as universal, enrolling nature, and those concerned about it, around the globe. 
The particular political contexts from which this discourse's supposedly universal norms and values 
have arisen are disguised in technocratic language and generalisations. So too is the political agenda it 
justifies and the political manoeuvrings it legitimises. This is the 'orthodox' version of the discourse, a 
counter-reading of which is required to expose its politics. It is difficult to step outside this orthodox 
version and see its political content. The concept of the environment as a problem and policy as the 
solution to that problem pervades both mainstream and critical environmental thought to such an extent 
that it is difficult to perceive the environment and policy in other ways. Stepping outside orthodoxy 
requires the sort of 'multiperspectival' analysis described earlier, in order to analyse policy 
situations-the modes of power being exercised, interests, technical practices of experts, and the 
appeals to the universal that enrol people and places around the globe. It requires reflexive analysis, 
developing theoretical arguments and testing whether they shed light on the situations being analysed. 
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In such an analysis, I show how the outwardly cooperative framework of global environmental issues 
disguises the modes of power used to enrol local sites such as the Fiji Islands. It disguises how Island 
'experts' co-opt the narratives, storylines and metaphors characterising policy texts for the same 
purposes as those who create these situations for international, expert intervention: to maintain their 
own legitimacy, to pursue professional opportunities, and to maintain certainty and order in their world. 
The asymmetrical relationship between developed and developing countries, which international 
environmental policy establishes and maintains, persists despite such co-optation. It is, however, a 
relationship predicated on more than a belief in western superiority and a blindness to local policy 
approaches that deviate from western models-it is biased towards seeing developing counties as the 
cause of global environmental degradation. Furthermore, developing countries are so overcrowded with 
western policy solutions, there is little time and space for them to develop local policy approaches and 
technologies. 
In revealing international coral reef policy as political, bringing back into account what has been 
externalised from modern accounts of environmental policy. I am also critiquing and undermining 
modernisation theory and its status as a meta-narrative. Modernist doctrine, along with the 
phenomenon of universalised expertise in environmental policy-a broad range of experts who speak 
for a universalised nature as a result of science's shift into environmental policy-is coalescing in 
hegemonic policy. This belies the assumption of universal benevolence embedded in modernisation 
theory's concept of development, through which environmental policy prescriptions are being 
promoted in Third World countries such as the small island states of the Pacific. Moreover, it raises 
doubt about the ability of international efforts to address, through scientific reason, instrumental 
rationality and international cooperation the challenges posed by widespread environmental 
degradation. This doubt arises partly because both modernisation and globalism see international 
development as an inevitable rather than chosen process; they are thus teleological (Marcuse 2004 p. 
816, footnote 4, discusses globalism's teleology). (Teleology, according to the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition 1976, is a view that developments are due to the purpose 
or design that is served by them.) Modernisation has a teleological rationality that configures particular 
contexts as cases within a unilinear, evaluative scale of modern-ness and development. Doubt also 
arises because of the simplistic caricatures of the complex social world of those using and governing 
reefs in developing countries. This reflects the blindness of this theory's metaphor of the modernisation 
process: as long as there is a strategy for the modernisation of countries not yet in that position, there is 
little need to understand their societies' intricacies since addressing simplistic lists of failures and 
shortfalls will suffice to propel them up the slope to modernisation. 
Casting doubt upon the optimism of modernisation underlying international environmental policy 
discourse and revealing this asymmetry between developed and developing countries, this thesis 
demystifies how, by drawing Islanders into their orthodoxy, common contemporary policy stances on 
environmental issues are so powerful: they disguise politics and hegemony as technical programmes 
and build on the promise and allure of development. In revealing this, the thesis begins to open up 
space for political interventions so that in future, alternatives may be envisaged. 
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Chapter Two 
The Orthodoxy of International Environmental Policy 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the knowledge/power system within which contemporary international 
environmental policy operates. In the main body of the chapter I follow a Foucauldian-style exercise, 
treating the discourse of global environmental policy as a "monument to be described in its character-
disposition" (McHoul and Grace 1998 p. 49). I first describe how the discourse is based upon a sense 
of global consciousness of nature and of looming environmental crisis, and how that crisis is seen as a 
problem arising out of the ordinary practices of modernity. I then describe the standard solutions that 
characterise this policy discourse. From there, I sketch out how, through discourse, developing 
countries are being drawn into both the global problematic and policy solutions. Finally, I examine the 
discourse's conditions of existence, the political operations that permitted its formation. This 
establishes its relationship to modernisation theory. It also allows me to examine, in later chapters, the 
operations exercised by different discoursing subjects. 
The Character of the Discourse 
NATURE AS A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 
PERCEIVED SOLUTIONS TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS SITES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTION 
History and Context of the Discourse 
SITUATING THE DISCOURSE 
FACTORS CRUCIAL IN THE DISCOURSE'S FORMATION 
Conclusion 
The Character of the Discourse 
NATURE AS AN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 
Global environmental consciousness and a sense of crisis 
Underlying contemporary international environmental policy is both a looming sense of crisis and a 
growing global environmental consciousness. Since the 1960s, there has been a resurgence of concern 
about all things 'green', which has become increasingly global in outlook (Bayliss-Smith and Owens 
1994 p. 122). Local problems have become global ones, threatening to affect the human race on a scale 
we have not previously experienced, and demanding action. This sense of global environmental 
consciousness is captured in metaphors that reflect shared vulnerability to, and responsibility for, 
global insecurities, such as 'our common future', 'the common heritage of mankind' and the idea that 
the international community should, on behalf of nature in different parts of the planet, act as 'global 
citizens' (Bonnett 2003). 
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The paradigms that occupy the centre ground of contemporary international environmental 
debates-sustainable development, global environmental change and conservation-are underpinned 
by the notion that global environmental problems are in some way solvable through globally-co-
ordinated action. Similarly, 'global' narratives about significant environmental problems such as 
deforestation, desertification, loss of biodiversity, and climate change not only depict these as problems 
of global scale, they suggest the necessity for global-scale solutions and international cooperation 
(Adger et at. 2001 p. 684). In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
(also known as the Brundtland Commission) argued that environmental problems had become so great, 
the global community must join forces in a common strategy for growth and development based upon 
sustainability. The environment has thus become a problem for humankind, one that can only be solved 
through certain measures and through one big united effort; a global community is thus being forged on 
the basis of a new and more powerful kind of interdependence than was previously the case (Hajer 
1995; Bonnett 2003 p. 558). This, in brief, is the orthodox version of the discourse of global 
environmental policy, a version that presents an apolitical face yet reflects the politics of ecologism 
described in Chapter One. 
Modern science is implicated in this emerging global environmental consciousness and sense of 
looming crisis. Science's ability to elucidate facts about the functioning of the natural world, to detect 
global environmental change phenomena such as climate change and to predict future changes, has 
given it a central role (e.g. Taylor and Buttel1992 p. 405; Jasanoff 1996). Scientific investigation, 
assessment and monitoring using improved technology-instrumentation, computerisation (particularly 
number crunching), and improved mobility, whether scuba or satellites-have facilitated global-scale 
scientific predications. Science has let us recognise how humans may be pushing the limits of the 
biosphere's functions; that recognition is credited with speeding up the process of transnational 
cooperation reflected in the proliferation of environmental agreements since the 1960s (Jasanoff 1996 
p. 174). Moreover, science has allowed policy makers, lobbyists and intellectuals to speak universally 
about the planet's environmental problems, analysing these in objective and authoritative ways that 
transcend national differences and political interests (Shackley and Wynne 1995; Yearley 1996 p. 100). 
The formation of international organisations has also played a role. For example, Miller (2001 b) 
describes how the creation of the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and its worldwide 
climate observation network, allowed scientists to investigate the atmosphere as a global system and 
thus to see it as a global commons. 
The media has also played a role in disseminating and reinforcing belief in a looming global 
environmental crisis, keeping stories such as global warming in constant circulation. Through the 
media, particularly images on television and in newspapers, environmental problems in developing 
countries have entered into popular consciousness in developed countries (Bayliss-Smith and Owens 
1994 p. 122). Moreover, media coverage of environmental issues, along with official publications from 
governments and the United Nations, NOO advertising campaigns, and the logos of environmental 
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groups, repeatedly draw public attention to images of an imperilled global environment (Yearley 1996 
p. viii). 
Academia is also implicated, the notion of a global environmental crisis appearing in many academic 
accounts ranging from the mainstream (e.g. the geography text Global environmental crises: an 
Australian perspective by Aplin et al. (1999)) to the radical (e.g. Carolyn Merchant's Radical Ecology 
(1992)). In these accounts, whether they have a critical or a positivist basis, the notion of the planet 
being in environmental crisis is accepted as objective fact. 
This conceptualisation of the environment as a problem has become a truism. Adger et at. 's (2001) 
analysis of global environmental discourse illustrates this well. Examining deforestation, 
desertification, biodiversity use and climate change, the authors identify first a major discourse 
(narrative) on each issue which advocates global environmental management of that issue, then a 
contrasting populist narrative that portrays locals as victims of external interventions (eight narratives 
in total). Everyone of these eight, whether managerial or populist, encompasses belief in impending 
environmental crisis (Adger et al. 2001 p. 703). The authors suggest that discourses denying the global 
nature of environmental problems are less influential (Adger et at. 2001 p. 707). 
Interconnectedness: recognising the environmental crisis as global 
In ecologism, Nature as 'the environment' has become not just as a myriad of unrelated local problems 
but a looming environmental crisis of global scope. This derives partly from the interconnectedness of 
humans and from Nature found in humanist perspectives (such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring 
(c.1962), partly from advances in science and technology that have enabled the extent of environmental 
degradation to be plotted, and from scientific cooperation that has allowed these to be investigated and 
addressed on an international scale. 
Contemporary awareness that practices in one part of the world can affect the environment in 
others-phenomenon such as acid rain do not stop at state boundaries-has also helped turn the local 
into the global. While much of the early analysis of environmental problems assumed problems 
occurred at state level, there has been a shift towards analysing many issues as transboundary ones. 
Recognition of the global nature of biospheric and atmospheric systems underpins the phenomenon of 
global scale environmental change, manifested as increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere 
and ozone depletion. By definition, global environmental change is assumed to have consequences for 
all peoples on the planet; it also means that some of our actions will impact upon future generations. 
One of its key metaphors is Boulding' s (1966) image 'spaceship earth', which so emphatically conveys 
the impression of a fixed natural-resource base, and which inspired the 1970s environmental 
movement (Leach and Mearns 1996 p. 4). 
With the success of the newly industrialised countries, and with the shift of many industries from 
developed to developing countries, the environmental impacts of industrialisation are no longer 
confined to rich western countries. As the scale of industrialisation and urbanisation expands in 
developing countries and recently industrialised ones, so too do detrimental environmental impacts. 
Furthermore, lifestyles in rich countries are now recognised as detrimentally affecting the environment 
in poor countries, either directly through the export of waste for example, or indirectly when 
consumption in rich countries drives demand for natural resources from poorer ones. 
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Underlying this is the idea that environmental dynamics are ultimately linked into an overarching 
unity-a connectedness. From this has come the fear that the ecological costs of globalising 
omnivorous consumption may drastically destabilise the biosphere; the earth's resources may not be 
sufficient for all societies to emulate western consumption patterns (Banuri 1990a p. 31; Dalby 1998 p. 
312). From it also comes the fear that in an expansionist economy and society, efforts to respond to one 
environmental problem invariably exacerbate others (e.g., Ophuls 1977 p. 24-25). This, then, is the 
global environmental crisis that policymakers are attempting to address through international 
cooperation, science, and planning. 
Environmental degradation as a problem arising out of modernity 
Ecologism sees the ordinary and standard practices of modernity as causing large-scale and systematic 
environmental degradation (Saurin 1993; Vincent 1995). Both mainstream and radical accounts 
perceive a contemporary global environmental crisis rooted in the dynamics of modern industrial-
capitalist societies. For instance, Dryzek (1997), in setting out his typology of modern environmental 
discourses, sees environmentalism largely as a reaction to the problems of industrialism. Hence, he 
organised discourses according to how they engage with, and how they choose to address, perceived 
problems of industrialism, whether through gradual problem-solving or more radical actions (Table 4). 
TABLE 4: DRYZEK'S CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSES 
Type of action required 
Envisaged departure from industrialism Radical Reformist 
Prosaic Survivalism Problem Solving 
Imaginative Green Radicalism Sustainability 
Source: Dryzek (1997 p. 12-14). 
As Forsyth (2003 p. 271) noted, most environmental theorists present environmental degradation as 
resulting from social oppression associated with capitalism andlor the instrumental reason of 
modernity. Within environmental sociology, major theoretical traditions stress the potency and 
immutability of forces heading modern societies towards that degradation (ButteI1996). So too do 
Marxist based accounts, in which the notion of environmental crisis derives from the second 
contradiction of capitalism. Marx identified nature as a condition of production which capital cannot 
produce for itself as a commodity; in an effort to maintain capital accumulation, the state therefore 
mediates, thus politicising conflicts around those conditions (Peet and Watts 1993 p. 240). The same 
view of the capitalist system being the cause of many Third World environmental problems drove early 
political ecology research. Researchers, explaining situations ranging from soil erosion to herding 
practices, linked social and economic inequality, political and cultural oppression, economic 
exploitation and natural resource depletion to capitalism's 'laws' (Peet and Watts 1993; Bryant 2001). 
In social science, the idea that modernisation (the advance of capitalism, development, and 
industrialisation) is causing environmental degradation has assumed the status of a meta-narrative 
(Forsyth 2003 p. 272). 
The representation of Nature underpinning this view of the environment 
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The contemporary notion that the environment is a problem is based upon a much older representation 
of nature as a hostile and unruly force, an Other to be controlled and managed (Dalby 1998 p. 295). 
According to White (1967), that view dates back to the destruction of pagan animism in Europe 
through the spread of Christianity. Technology such as the plough separated humankind from nature, 
allowing its exploitation; by destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature 
in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects (White 1967). It made nature controllable 
and manageable. Christianity's spread was followed by the Scientific Revolution and the growth of a 
market culture; these eclipsed a view of Mother Nature as caring and bountiful, replacing it instead 
with one of nature as a fearsome, wild woman who must be controlled by knowing her (Merchant 
1980). 
The related idea of nature as a villain recurs in anthropocentric western thought. In this reading, Nature 
is a potentially unruly and threatening entity, something which must be conquered, controlled, 
manipulated and exploited for human ends. In ecological writings, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes and the 
Enlightenment make frequent appearances as the perpetrators of this attitude (Vincent 1995 p. 221). 
In contrast, in contemporary thought, the idea of humans being able to manage nature is intertwined 
with the notion of nature as being of value and in need of rescue. The latter derives from prominent 
ecological critiques of modernity dating back to the mid-1960s, particularly Carson's Silent Spring. 
According to Toulmin (1990 p. 160-167) in Cosmopolis: The hidden agenda of modernity, those 
ecological critiques represented the reinsertion of humanism into modernity, showing nature and 
humanity as ecologically interdependent. In another interpretation, those critiques are populist 
manifestations of the changing character of ecology: the insertion of mechanistic concepts of science 
which see nature as a cybernetic system with limits. Kwa (1987) describes how, in notions about 
ecosystems, the metaphor of nature as an automatic machine, and human relationships with nature as 
those between an engineer and his machine (explained in the text box below), became dominant in the 
environmental movement in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. Here, the general theme is nature 
as a system in steady state, the same theme that appears in the belief that if we humans fail to respect 
this steady state and the limits it imposes on our activities, then we bring about the downfall of the 
world and of ourselves (Kwa 1987). There are, in this representation of nature, two sub-themes: a 
complex whole in which everything is connected to everything else, and a whole that will break down 
once its vital feedback mechanisms are damaged or when humankind loses control. 
SYSTEMS ECOLOGY: LOOKING AT NATURE IN TERMS OF SELF-REGULATED SYSTEMS 
In the 1950s, HT (tom) Odum took existing ideas about ecology and ecosystems and linked 
them to the physiological concept of homeostatis in a cybernetic formulation (taylor 1988). 
Odum reformulated ecosystems as cybernetic systems with self-regulatory feedback loops 
maintaining that homeostasis, and hypothesised that ecosystems diversity means stability-the 
more diverse the ecosystem is, the more feedback loops there will be (Kwa 1986 p. 168-170). In 
analysing representations of nature in this cybernetic formulation, Chunglin Kwa highlighted its 
implications for environmental management and policy. Although Kwa undertook that analysis in 
the mid-1980s, it is just as relevant today because the influence of cybernetic ecology continues. 
Systems ecologists reconceptualised humans' interference in nature through pollution and 
overexploitation, using the idea of a control trajectory. This trajectory incorporates the notion 
that control over stability has limits-if disturbances go beyond that limit, they take possession of 
the ecosystem. These limits thus form thresholds of prime importance for ecosystem 
management. Below the upper threshold, overfishing (as an example) is taken as permissible; 
above, as a major threat to the environment (Kwa 1986 p. 170). Optimalising harvests of fish can 
be interpreted as adjusting the set point of a cybernetically controlled system. Above a certain 
grade of fisheries exploitation we speak of overfishing, below inefficiency and waste. The same 
view can be taken of pollution. Although conceptualising ecosystems as machines suggests a set 
of instruments by which we may control nature, preventing its collapse and securing its optimal 
exploitation-allowing us not just to exploit nature but to preserve and repair it- this 
conceptualisation also has a downside. "Either we succeed in maintaining the delicate control 
mechanism of nature, or we fail and cause its breakdown" (Kwa 1986 p. 171, 183). Thus the 
cybernetic representation of nature offers only two future scenarios, either sustaining the nature 
in which we live, or its destruction (Kwa 1986 p. 182). 
26 
K wa (1987) noted that while, in 1962, Rachel Carson was mocked for her idea of the balance of nature, 
by 1970, the idea had become part of the general wisdom. 
The concepts of holism and of impending disaster permeate all environmental thinking of 
this era, although the primary causes of the impending general catastrophe may differ from 
one another. So Commoner blames world-wide contamination, Ehrlich overpopulation and 
Dennis Meadows, in his 1972 Limits to Growth, reports on a variety of interrelated factors 
including the previous two and overexploitation of the world's resources (K wa 1987). 
K wa attributed the acceptance of this idea of nature, and of humans' need to control and manage nature 
within its natural limits, to the rise of systems ecology as an academic discipline and to its political 
acceptability; an argument that Sachs (1992) adopted in his critique of environment in The 
Development Dictionary. Cybernetics ecology became politically acceptable in the US in the 1960s 
during proposals for the International Biological Programme (IBP), ecology's venture into 'Big 
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Science' (Kwa 1987). Its appeal came from its conceptions of nature and from its belief about the way 
in which controlling nature was perceived as both feasible and desirable, conceptions already shared by 
science-policy bureaucrats, scientists and the general public (Kwa 1987 p. 415). "It offered an image of 
society as a closed system that could be controlled and manipulated from a position outside or superior 
to the system ... [an idea] already part of a more general cultural repertoire, with a specific history 
among science politicians" (Kwa 1987 p. 425-426, drawing upon Lilienfeld's history of cybernetic 
ecology). That idea entered policy as ecosystems theory, providing a moral imperative for 
environmental policy and management: to gauge Nature's overload capacity and adjust her feedback 
mechanisms (Sachs 1992 p. 31, 32). Moreover, using the machine metaphor for nature supports the 
view that efficiency, modernisation and 'progress' are highly valued and the cure for perceived 
inefficiencies is technology (Miihlhausler 2003 p. 135). In other words, this view of nature confirms 
the central promises in modernisation theory. It also envisages humans finding solutions to the 
environmental problems caused by modernisation. 
PERCEIVED SOLUTIONS TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 
In modernisation's meta-narrative, the environment is conceptualised as something which can be 
addressed through organised and concerted human endeavour, and as an appropriate focus for policy, 
showing confidence in humankind's capacity for planning and control, a characteristic of modernist 
thinking. If a problem exists, then it can be analysed and addressed through planned, co-ordinated 
approaches: policy formulation followed by action. Yet, the perceived cause of environmental 
degradation reflects broad-based concerns about the domination of human nature by science, 
technology and industrialisation rather than more nuanced explanations taking into account social 
divisions such as gender, caste and age (Conca 2003). This shapes the range of policy solutions being 
envisaged, in ways I discuss in this section. 
The discourse of international environmental policy has modernisation theory's optimism that 
environmental problems, even those caused by the process of modernisation, can be solved through 
further modernisation. Having emerged over the two decades following World War II (WWII), when 
there was a mood of optimism that western countries could help the nations of the Third W orId 
'improve and grow', modernisation theory assumes that Third World nations can move up a 
development continuum and ultimately reach the pinnacle of development, an emulation of the way in 
which western societies have developed (Harrison 1977 p. 59-60, 149; Hulme and Turner 1990 p. 37). 
Banuri (1990a p. 35) categorises this optimism that environmental problems can be solved through 
further modernisation as an 'internal critique' of modernisation theory, one that serves to strengthen 
rather than weaken the theory. The concept of sustainable development has the same optimism and is 
the product of the same internal critique of modernisation theory (Pretes 1997 p. 1424). As the extent 
of environmental problems caused by modernisation has been revealed, 'Western society' has 
responded by mutating the sustainable development storyline, incorporating arguments without 
fundamentally altering the nature of its conceptions (ibid). 
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According to Banuri's categorisation, which I use in this chapter to analyse the relationship between 
various environmental policies and modernisation theory, while an internal critique serves to strengthen 
modernisation theory, an 'external critique' would call into question the validity and moral basis of 
modernisation theory as a strategy for humankind's future. It would question the theory's idea of 
development as unlimited, continuing and endless progress and its optimism of this as the future 
awaiting humankind. I return to this point about the relationship between the discourse and 
modernisation theory at the end of the chapter, after analysing the various ways in which the discourse 
seeks to address the perceived environmental crisis. 
Addressing the crisis through science 
One of the favoured solutions is science. The combination of scientific advances, the rise of global-
scale scientific endeavour, and the "scrupulous discourse" of science has made global-scale solutions to 
significant environmental problems appear both feasible and desirable (Yearley 1996 p. 100). 
Moreover, many commentators credit scientific knowledge with creating the momentum for worldwide 
cutbacks on the production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals, and for wider multilateral consensus 
on marine pollution, greenhouse gases, biodiversity, and deforestation (Jasanoff 1996 p. 186). So, 
despite concerns about the effects of technoscience and questions about whether modern science has 
contributed to widespread environmental degradation, science is widely regarded as being an 
appropriate way of addressing international environmental problems. Conventional wisdom among 
environmentalists is that scientific knowledge communicated to people and political leaders will lead to 
ecologically sustainable societies (Litfin 1994 p. 198). Thus, the conventional response to the charge 
that science and technology is contributing to environmental degradation is to find better science. 
One reason why science is accorded such a central role in solving contemporary global environmental 
problems is its expert nature: expert knowledge and know-how deemed essential for managing pressing 
problems such as environmental decay. Another reason is science's claim to value-neutrality; it seems 
to provide the only forum where nations can set aside differences in favour of a common rationalist 
problem-solving approach. By cooperating, technical experts can shape and even pre-empt state action. 
This is the basis for Peter Haas's influential argument that 'epistemic communities', actuated by 
common professional norms and shared holistic definitions of environmental problems, have set the 
agenda for international negotiations and have pressured governments towards agreements. 
This faith in science is paralleled by a faith in instrumental rationality, seen in the widely-held idea that 
introducing science, and the objective information that science can provide, into policy processes will 
facilitate rational policy solutions (efficacious means selected to meet previously-given ends) (Cortner 
and Moote 1999 p. 77; Sarewitz 2000). This particular view of science rests on the epistemological 
notion of scientific realism, the idea that scientific knowledge is based upon direct, impersonal, and, in 
that sense, objective observation of the natural world providing knowledge that we are able to know as 
the truth (Demeritt 2001 p. 26). Scientific realism not only assumes that there is a 'real' physical world 
or universe that exists independently of our awareness of it but, by and large, we can know which 
judgements of this are true (Papineau 1996 p. 2; Audi 1998 p. 239). In other words, we can test that 
knowledge empirically by referring to how the world actually is (Demeritt 2001 p. 26). 
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Environmental planning and control: the realm of the professional expert 
There is, in global environmental policy discourse, confidence in humankind's capacity for planning 
and control, as a means of subjugating nature's unruly force (the latter discussed in Dalby 1998 p. 295). 
The same confidence can be seen in the practices of modern, scientific fisheries management. 
MODERN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: FAITH IN PLANNING AND CONTROL 
Modem fisheries management is premised on the idea that, through concepts such as Maximum 
Sustainable Yield and Maximum Economic Yield, humans can manage fish extraction to optimise 
economic benefits. This idea arose in the second half of the nineteenth century but came about slowly 
and only after the acceptance of two interconnected assumptions: the idea that human activity is a 
primary determinant of the state of fish stocks, and acceptance of the possibility of quantifying human 
impact on fish stocks (Holm 1996). It was not until well after \V'\V'II that a theoretical model 
representing the fishery was completed, allowing conceptualisation and intellectual analysis of various 
ways of managing fish stocks (Smith quoted in Holm 1996 p. 179). Modem, scientific fisheries 
management has thus been built on faith in nature's benevolence and on confidence in humankind's 
capacity for planning and control. It flourished in the post-war era, state and science combining to 
discipline industrial capitalism, which left unchecked threatened to destroy the fishery resource 
through the race to fish (Holm 1996 p. 186). In the 1970s, when increased fishing pressure threatened 
fisheries, states negotiated a new regime based around 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones, replacing 
the regime of iVIare UbmftJl and promising to install nation states as responsible fisheries managers, in 
an effort to end the race to catch the last fish in the oceans (Holm 1996 p. 177). In tIus revitalised era 
of order and rationality, fisheries policy first focused on biological regulation, designed to protect fish 
stocks from overexploitation and potential collapse. As fisheries management flourished, it then 
adopted the mission of removing open access regimes and creating private property rights over 
fisheries, sometlllng justified as addressing inefficiencies (Kahn 1998 p. 304). It recreated commercial 
fishers as stakeholders with an interest in the coastal zone and oceans, major players who wanted a 
key say in state-managed processes addressing pollution of fishery habitat and conflict between user 
groups (tllls started in New Zealand in the 1980s). 
In the contemporary age, apocalyptic global environmental images warn that current production and 
consumption trends threaten humanity's survival (Holm 1996 p. 185). Despite this, and despite the 
fact that much of the earlier optinllsm and faith in progress has vanished, modern fisheries 
management is still buoyed by a confidence in humankind's capacity for planning and control. 
Supported by modernisation theory's confidence that nature can be rescued, modern fisheries 
management has reinvented itself through new international agreements and by adopting new 
concepts such as ecosystems management, marine protected areas, co-management, and quality 
management. The work of improving the science of fisheries management continues, for coral reef 
fisheries (e.g. as described in Polunin and Roberts 1996; Sale 2002 [1991]) as well as for inshore 
temperate fisheries and deep sea fisheries (e.g. Kahn 1998 p. 458). 
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Conceptually, planning is based on the idea of rationality, whereby reality can supposedly be structured 
and controlled, changed at will (with some external help or force) and the outcomes predicted 
(Marcussen 2003 p, 2). This is the premise behind a flood of national environmental strategies prepared 
in developing countries during the 1990s. The idea for these strategies dates back to 1980 when the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in their World Conservation 
Strategy Caring for the Earth, suggested that countries should prepare such strategies (IUCN et at. 
1991). National environmental planning did not, however, become routine in developing countries until 
their emphasis on national planning shifted, under the influence of structural adjustment lending, from 
macro-economic planning (once common in the form of national development plans), to sectoral 
planning (Marcussen 2003 p. 3). Large international development agencies funded and co-ordinated a 
flood of national environmental strategies in developing countries; the World Bank and various 
collaborating agencies, including USAID, initiated them in Africa. In the Pacific, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and IUCN funded 
government agencies in thirteen island states to prepare such strategies (Boer 1992; IUCN 1993). 
This faith in science and planning as the appropriate way to address global environmental problems 
represents a technocratic orientation, also seen in the UN's approach to these matters since the late 
1960s. For example, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) first made a resolution on 
development and the environment in December 1971, it emphasised the importance of rational 
utilisation of natural resources, rational management of the environment, and rational planning 
procedures balancing development, environmental enhancement and preservation (resolution 2849 
(XXV!), 2026th plenary). Moreover, after the Stockholm conference on the human environment and the 
decision to found UNEP, both in late 1972, the UNGA sought to focus international environmental 
cooperation towards technical assistance, training, exchange of information and financial resources for 
developing countries (UNGA Resolution 2849 (XXVI) 20 December 1971). This perspective reflects 
the modernist commitment to problem-solving, in which knowledge is not pursued as a goal in itself 
but to help resolve particular societal problems (Hajer 2003 p. 177). 
This technocratic approach has long coloured studies of international environmental policy and 
environmental regimes, including geography studies (Redclift 1994; Bryant and Wilson 1998; Castree 
2002). It also appears in policy science, as a perception that international policy is a problem-solving 
endeavour, rational in nature, requiring cooperative arrangements amongst various stakeholders (for 
instance, Anderson 1984 p. 3; Coleman and Perl 1999 p. 697; Hajer 2003 p. 181, 187). This 
techno centric mode of environmentalism, defined by progress, rationality, and a sense of optimism and 
faith in humankind's ability to understand and control nature, is the realm of the professional expert 
(O'Riordan 1976 p. 11-19). As both a problem and a global commons, the environment requires 'global 
experts' (Goldman 1998 p. 2-4). 
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The roots of the technocratic orientation to policymaking 
O'Riordan specifically linked the rise of a professional elite, and the attendant regulatory bureaucracy 
in environmental matters, to Roosevelt's Progressive Era in the USA at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and to the rise of the rational management movement in that era. This is, however, only one of 
several roots suggested for the contemporary technocratic orientation to environmental issues. Others 
have suggested that in the UN's efforts to centralise international environmental policy, and those of 
major conservation organisations to modernise international conservation through science and rational 
planning, one can see the legacy of the strong belief in scientific and technical progress associated with 
the industrialisation of Western Europe and North America from roughly 1830 until World War I (see 
Escobar 1992 p. 134; also Scott 1998 p. 89). 
Radical critics of modernity have linked this technocratic orientation to policy to the Enlightenment, 
whereby science since Bacon and Descartes has enshrined a manipulative division between human 
beings and nature (Vogler 1996 p. 17). This reflects policy-making's legacy of Enlightenment 
rationalism and positivism, schools of thought that seek to develop detached, scientific knowledge to 
improve human conditions. Rationalism and positivism are based on the belief that society's problems 
ought to be solved in a 'scientific' or rational manner by gathering all relevant information on the 
problems, identifying possible alternative solutions to them, then selecting the best alternative. Because 
of its problem-solving orientation, this approach is known as 'scientific', 'engineering', or 
'managerialist' (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 p. 140). This is policy serving the function of planning and 
controlling the future. There are similarities in the idea of bureaucratic rationality, which dates back to 
early US and British attempts to establish a science of organisational behaviour and public 
administration, and is now formulated as the sociological theories of organisation and industrial society 
found in contemporary management science (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 p. 139; Parsons 1995 p. 399, 
428). 
Several notions sharing this technocratic orientation have dominated the discipline of policy science 
over the years, starting with Herbert Simon's post-World War II idea of examining decision-making as 
a series of rational stages. Simon's ideas evolved into a model depicting a top-down instrumentalist, 
linear decision-making process with defined stages (agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-
making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation) (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 p. 9-12; Parsons 
1995 p. 77-78). This was based on the belief that policy-makers go about solving problems in a very 
systematic and more or less linear fashion, an idea that influenced later models which combined 
rational stages and systems approaches, and which still dominate policy analysis (Parsons 1995 p. 24). 
These models are predicated on problems first being recognised, then addressed. This same view can 
be seen in the notion that the process of integrating science into policy is necessarily linear and 
progressive, starting with the identification of a problem and proceeding through scientific research and 
predictive modelling, whereupon policies are developed and solutions reached (as described in 
Sarewitz 2000). 
The idea of policy as rational justification is derived in part from idea that government could, by 
making policies, 'solve' problems, something John Maynard Keynes promoted (Parsons 1995 p. 17). 
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Keynes legitimised the view that the state should have a more interventionist role in social and 
economic problems: government should address those aspects of society and economy that cannot 
'technically' be done by individuals, and should do so in the public interest (Parsons 1995 p. 8-9). This 
notion underpinned the welfare state with its suite of government policies intended to shape society and 
the economy, common in developed countries after World War II. Thus the rational, state co-ordinated 
approach to policymaking reflects the preoccupation of the state with national security, development 
and, post-war reconstruction. But, probing deeper, Nandy (1992) argued that the idea that the state 
represents scientific rationality is one of the major themes in the ideology of the state. Furthermore, the 
idea that the state represents scientific rationality rationalises the action of the state which is, in turn, 
seeking to rationalise the society it lands over. 
A cooperative approach 
As well as science and technological rationality, international cooperation also looms large in 
contemporary approaches to the perceived global environmental crisis. The WCED report, the Hague 
Declaration of 1989, and the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) all singled out international cooperation as a key determinant of sustainable development. 
These and many other reports on global environmental problems uncritically accept international 
cooperation as part of a natural quest for planetary order. This has been the dominant view in 
mainstream International Relations theory, at least until the US government of George W. Bush lost 
interest in leading the international community on environmental issues (Vogler 1996 p. 7-8; Ford 2003 
p. 121-122; Wapner 2003 p. 7-8). This uncritical acceptance of international cooperation as the way 
things are is also found in policy science, in the view that cooperation among states, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental agencies is a way of overcoming environmental problems and coordinating 
'management' of the global environment through the harmonisation of interests, assumed to be 
beneficial for all (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 p. 1999). 
In international environmental policy documents and in mainstream accounts of these policy 
endeavours, it has been unusual for this cooperative approach to international environmental issues to 
be expressed explicitly in the language found in International Relations' analyses of security 
(Sutherland 2000 p. 187). Since the 1980s, there has, however, been a growing body of literature that 
analyses international environmental issues in those terms (recent examples include Dalby 1996; 1998; 
2003; Litfin 1999; Sutherland 2000; and Elliott 2004b; 2004a). These analyses make clear that the 
dominant approach being taken to managing global environmental problems is cooperative security 
based upon recognised interdependence and commitment to joint survival, fostered by promoting 
dialogue and encouraging both multilateralism through international regimes and compliance with 
international strategies (Sutherland 2000). WCED, the 1995 report of the Commission on Global 
Governance, the Declaration of the UN's Millennium Development Summit in 2000, and the 2002 
Johannesburg Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) all promoted 
this view in various guises (Commission on Global Governance 1995; Elliott 2004a). Liberal, 
institutionalist International Relations literature fosters it. 
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One manifestation of this cooperative approach to collective environmental security is the number of 
inter-state environmental agreements signed since the 1960s, now numbering around 500 0N apner 
2003 p. 6). Broadhead (2002 p. 23) labelled these multilateral efforts to form collaborative agreements 
that establish bureaucratic controls limiting human action in the interests of environmental protection, 
as 'green diplomacy'. This regime-based approach is premised upon belief that incremental change, 
achieved through multilateral diplomacy, with arguments based on solid knowledge, is the best 
approach to achieving an ecologically sound world order: from incremental change will come a new, 
norm-rich, sustainable world (Broadhead 2002 p. 1). Largely technocentric, this approach treats the 
environment as a problem needing to be solved, environmental issues often being framed solely in 
terms of the problems to be addressed, separated from any consideration of social and economic 
processes (Broadhead 2002 p. 16). These are the politics of ecologism described in Chapter One. 
As well as international regime formation, solutions to a perceived global environmental crisis have 
taken three other main forms (1) policy diffusion, lesson-drawing and capacity-building; (2) projects 
combining conservation and development; (3) neoliberal, market-based approaches. All require 
international cooperation. I address each in turn. 
Interstate and intergovernmental organisation-state cooperation in policy matters commonly takes the 
form of lesson-drawing, particularly when developing countries are involved. By learning from 
overseas, governments may orient their own policies to what is already being practised in other 
countries, a phenomenon also called policy diffusion (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 p. 40; Jorgens 2001 p. 
122). Both policy science and development studies describe international policy as a lesson-drawing 
(learning) venture for developing countries, entailing learning appropriate responses to problems and 
reproducing appropriate institutions to address those problems. Developed countries and international 
organisations-those with expert knowledge and experience in addressing issues-help developing 
countries characterised as lacking experience, knowledge, and political will. These concepts were the 
basis of the Bretton Woods settlement establishing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank, organisations that are having a significant impact on environmental policy in developing regions. 
Lesson-drawing is believed to be playing an important role in contemporary development; aid 
programmes often aim to transfer policies and institutions to developing countries. The concept of 
capacity-building is similar. 
In order to spread their particular approach to green science and environmentally 
sustainable development, Northern aid agencies and banks have invested in 'capacity 
building' in bon-owing countries. These funders have given birth to or helped support 
research institutions, training centres, and national science and policy agendas ... Enormous 
flows of money (relative to GDP [gross domestic product]) stream into borrowing countries 
to restructure and 'modernise' state agencies and institutions (Goldman 2004 p. 71). 
Placed on the development aid agenda in the 1990s (its history summarised in Degnbol-Martinussen 
and Engberg-Pedersen 2003), the capacity-building project was originally preoccupied with building 
national institutions. It has now been extended to include civil society-NGOs, grassroots 
organisations and research agencies. 
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Contemporary paradigms of both development and international environmentalism promote policy 
diffusion, lesson-drawing and capacity building as a way of assisting developing countries to better 
manage their environment-people trained in developed countries teach those in developing regions 
appropriate policy, methods of environmental management, and techniques in everything from research 
and information management to planning and community consultation. Through their development aid 
programmes, United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank and other aid agencies have promoted 
this policy of building institutions and reinforcing national capacities and professional skills. Applied 
to the environment, this blueprint approach has been labelled as 'environmental managerialism' 
(Reddift 1994; Adger et at. 2001 p. 701-705). 
In the Pacific Islands over the last fifteen years, considerable international efforts in this vein have been 
directed at improving technical aspects of environmental management and policy. There have been 
projects for developing national environmental laws and guidelines; institutional strengthening of 
national agencies in order to implement these laws; capacity building aimed at improving skills of 
people in government agencies and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through training and 
education; and, latterly, community conservation-encouraging communities to establish conservation 
measures. These are described in Boer (1996), Alley (1999), Herr (2002), SPREP (2002), Baines 
(2002) and Veitayaki (2003). Capacity building, in particular, often occurs after these island countries 
have signed multilateral agreements that provide for the practice and establish funding for it. 
The practice of capacity-building, as well as the diffusion model of policy, reflects modernisation 
theory's concept of a universal and natural developmental sequence through which all cultures must 
pass but through they can be assisted (originally described in Rostow 1956). "The oft-noted implication 
is that the velocity of this unfolding modernisation can be increased through 'aid' and 'assistance', 
coming from those already having traversed this path" (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002 p. 104). 
This practice of supplying green aid has broadened beyond the ambit of UN agencies and state 
agencies from developed countries. Quasi-independent international science-based agencies are also 
involved, an example being the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
group. This informal association of sixty-three independent public and private sector members was 
created in 1971 and is sponsored by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO), UNDP and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD». 
Furthermore, policy approaches being developed by conservation NGOs now feature on an 
international environmental policy agenda previously dominated by UN agencies and their advisers in 
science-based agencies. This has come about as a result of the greening of international aid since the 
1970s when environmental considerations became an integral part of many development aid 
programmes and the focus of specific projects. This led multilateral and bilateral development agencies 
to form partnerships with environmentally-focused NGOs with the required skills to deliver 
environmental programmes to developing countries (Hardie-Boys 1999 p. 187-188). Additionally, the 
recent practice of representing NGOs as a global civil society, a credible voice that educates the public 
about issues of importance and mobilises concerned citizens, has helped these organisations enter this 
international policy arena. Their approaches also favour international cooperation. 
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One such example is the attempt to reconcile human development needs with conservation actions and 
the conservation of natural systems, which became fashionable amongst major conservation NGOs in 
the late 1990s. Echoing topical ideas from development discourse, efforts to marry conservation and 
development have taken various approaches including meeting the basic needs of local communities 
and searching for alternative livelihoods. The following box describes WWF's approach to marrying 
the two concepts by searching for the root causes of biodiversity loss. The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) and WWF-US' macroeconomic office developed that idea, drawing upon the work of Timothy 
Swanson, a Cambridge economics lecturer (Wood et at. 2000). 
MARRYING CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE WWF EXAMPLE 
\'\7WF describes its efforts to marry conservation and development as tackling poverty and looking 
for ways to sustain and/ or improve the livelihoods of local communities. 
W\V'F has long believed that poverty cannot be eliminated in the long term without 
protecting the environment and that the environment cannot be protected \vithout 
tackling poverty ... W\V'F \vill work in partnerships that reduce poverty inequity while 
also tackling biodiversity loss and environmental degradation. This will be achieved 
through building the capacity oflocal communities and NGOs, mainstreaming 
environment in planning and policies, and promoting environmental awareness and 
education (\V\V'F South Pacific 2003b). 
\'\7WF has linked discourse about meeting human development needs with the idea of identifying 
root causes of biodiversity loss, creating a single mission. It categorises root causes as being either 
demographic change, poverty inequality (between developed and developing regions), 
[inappropriate] public policies, macroeconomics policies and structures (an argument for neoliberal 
policies), or social change and development. 
Behind the proximate causes of biodiversity loss and environmental degradation, lie a 
variety of social, economic and political and cultural factors that influence resource-use 
decisions at local level. To successfully halt biodiversity loss, one must understand and 
address these underlying root causes. These socio-economic root causes can be 
primarily focused into five main areas: demographic change, poverty inequality, public 
policies, macroeconomics policies and structures, and social change and development. 
\V\V'F can, by utilising an analytical approach to identify the root causes, describe 
various parts of the complex puzzle ... that linked together drive biodiversity loss and 
environmental degradation in a particular area (\V\V'F South Pacific 2003b). 
The concept of searching for root causes of biodiversity loss is based upon the positivist assumption 
that the aim of natural and social science is to identify causal relationships in an objective world; 
positivism 'pretends' cause and effect can be known in such matters. This is a modernist approach: for 
modernists, the application of reason, exemplified by science, enables humans to discover the truth 
about the nature of reality, to understand the causes of social life in the same manner through which 
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natural science has revealed the workings of Nature (Jones 1993 p. 109 emphasis in the original). In 
Banuri's language, this shift in the approach of international conservation towards a marriage of 
conservation and development is another internal critique of modernisation, designed to strengthen 
modernisation theory's theoretical basis in the face of the challenge posed by Third World resistance to 
'locking up areas' as parks and reserves. 
Another mainstream approach to addressing shared environmental crises is that of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberal approaches to environmental policy assume that market structures, if properly managed, 
will respond to the problems of environmental degradation, by developing responses along ecologically 
sustainable lines (Broadhead 2002 p. 23). Contemporary international examples of this approach 
include industry-based voluntary environmental measures, some based upon the International 
Organisation for Standardisation's ISO 14000, as well as other third party certification schemes such as 
that of the Forest Stewardship Council. These schemes do not appear magically out of the marketplace; 
developing and instituting them on an international scale requires cooperation, often between states and 
specialist organisations set up for the purpose. 
Neoliberalism has its roots in liberal orthodoxy, and shares the latter's view of the expansion of 
modernity and the acceleration of global processes of development as the solution to numerous global 
problems. Neoliberalism thus subsumes into modernisation theory the threats to progress posed by 
industrialisation and consumerism, turning them into challenges which modernity can overcome. It, 
too, is an internal critique of modernisation theory, as Banuri (1990b p. 39, 63) identified: "a 
reassertion of the ideological purity [of neo-classical development thought] which has been lost during 
piecemeal concessions to alternative views". Whilst it may be difficult for some to see neoliberalism as 
a policy tool advocated by modernisation theory, it shares that theory's faith in progress and 
development through economic growth believed to follow once the 'right' policies are implemented. 
Indeed, all these policies normalising cooperation in matters of international environmental 
policy-green diplomacy, policy diffusion, capacity-building, government-industry-NGO partnerships 
efforts to marry conservation and development, and neoliberal policy approaches-can be construed as 
a defence of modernisation theory against criticism of the environmental effects of modernisation. 
They all depict environmental problems as capable of being addressed through cooperative human 
endeavour, organised under a rationally-derived, co-ordinated policy framework, and aided by science 
and technology. Accusations of failure are disregarded as resulting from weakness not in the theory of 
modernisation but in the application: the endurance of backward behaviour, values and institutions; 
inefficiency, self-interest or venality of politicians and bureaucrats; or too much state intervention in 
domestic economic matters such as control over foreign investment (Banuri 1990a p. 30). 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS SITES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTION 
Modernisation theory is being used to imagine the environmental problems of developing countries as 
requiring international intervention. Complex and variable global images as well as arguments about 
security posed by environmental degradation and the need for sustainable development and universal 
human rights contribute to this imagination (Sutherland 2000). So too does pervasive 
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developed/developing and North/South imagery-the poverty-stricken, eager-for-development 
countries of a stylised global South contrasting with the affluent, industrialised, democratic countries of 
an equally stylised global North (Conca 2003 p. 81). In addition, developing countries are being 
created as sites for western, expert intervention through arguments about the need for, and right to, 
development despite its effect on the environment, and arguments about the environment being a 
matter of common responsibility (or similar concepts). In this section, I dissect those arguments. 
Modernisation theory as a justification for intervention 
Explanations of the relationship between environmental degradation and the stages of modernisation 
that developing countries occupy are inconsistent. In the early 1970s, shortly after the UNGA first 
linked environment and development issues in a single agenda, that body critiqued modernisation as 
causing environmental degradation in developed countries. At the same time, it attributed 
environmental problems in developing countries to a lack of modernisation-specifically a lack of 
economic resources for dealing with the environment in an appropriate way (see UNGA Resolution 
2849 (XXVI) 20 December 1971). In 1987 the WCED report, adopted by the UNGA, propounded this 
view. Many commentators, before and since, have expounded and refined it, arguing that as long as 
people live in poverty or in unjust and inequitable societies, they will have little alternative but to put 
increasing pressures on the environment. In particular, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development reiterated the WCED's link between poverty and environmental degradation. 
This attitude is one of blaming the victim. Sachs (1992) observes that this attitude has allowed the 
recipe of growth to be extended-growth being seen as the solution to the environmental problems of 
deforestation and desertification in poor, undeveloped regions of the world. "Since growth was 
supposed to remove poverty, the environment could only be protected through a new era of growth" 
(Sachs 1992 p. 29). Thus in the 1980s, the idea of development being an essential precondition to 
environmental sustainability entered an international aid agenda previously focused on stimulating 
economic growth (Overton 1999; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003 p. 25-28). 
Contrast this with the widely-held belief that the process of modernising developing countries is 
causing environmental degradation, a belief found in intellectual disciplines ranging from 
environmental sociology to neo-Marxist political ecology, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This is 
fear of the geographical march of modernisation-a Northern anxiety that, in the South, rapid scientific 
and technologically-induced changes on humans and the environment will induce environmental 
degradation on at least as great in scale as that when the North industrialised (as discussed by Darier 
1999 p. 2). 
Thus, both a lack of modernisation, and the ongoing process of modernisation serve to justify 
international intervention in environmental problems of developing countries-reflecting, alternately, 
nature as unruly and hostile, and nature in need of rescue, views discussed earlier. In both these 
arguments, the South is blamed for its environmental problems. In contrast, the discourse of Third 
Worldism blames the North, specifically the latter's patterns of resource extraction, industrialisation 
and consumption. 
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Third Worldism came to the fore at UNCED, in the Rio Declaration. Principle 7 of that declaration 
states: "The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility they bear in the international pursuit 
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their society place on the global environment and 
of the technologies and financial resources they command". This is further supported by Principle 8 in 
the same declaration, which states that States shall reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption. This Third Worldism grew out of the 1960s 'dependency school', a 
loosely defined grouping of intellectuals from various disciplines who shared opposition to 
modernisation theory and to US policy, plus a sympathy for Third World liberation struggles (Rist 
1997 p. 109-110). In the 1970s the idea of a New International Economic Order focused attention on 
the gap in living standards between developing and industrialised countries, its Third World proponents 
arguing that this gap must be bridged (Rist 1997 p. 169-170). More recently, attempts by dependency 
theorists to blame environmental degradation of the South on the North have faced significant 
opposition from the North. Several industrialised states, the US included, do not consider the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility to be a general norm of international law imposing any 
duties between states (Maggio and Lynch 1997). At WSSD, US representatives attempted to water 
down the legal implications of those principles agreed at UNCED. 
Thus, modernisation theory again reigns supreme in the discourse of global environmental policy, the 
cause of environmental degradation being the process of modernisation, and the solution being 
international cooperation, rational planning, technocratic solutions and so forth. The North are heroes 
because they are dealing with it through their technology, their research, their regulations, their legal 
and education systems and so forth, while any southern countries that resist northern solutions are 
regarded either as a bit backward and slow or as villains for mounting such resistance. 
Moreover, linking development with environmental management has created developing countries as 
sites for intervention and has given the UN a general mandate for intervening in the environmental 
problems of developing countries. There was, and still is not, any comparative general mandate for 
intervening in developed countries, as the South Centre recently pointed out: 
[Developing countries] find themselves on the defensive and under increasing pressure and 
scrutiny by the North-its governments, its businesses, its civil society, its media-and by 
multilateral institutions often under the impulse of the North, regarding environment-related 
policies. At the same time, except for the domestic pressures of their own increasingly 
influential civil society groups, specialising in given aspects of environmental policy, or of 
the green political parties, the developed countries themselves are well-sheltered, and for all 
practical purposes are out of multilateral reach and disciplines as regards their own actions 
and obligations, with the countries of the South, individually or collectively, having no 
leverage on them at all (The South Centre 2002 p. 5). 
(The Centre is an intergovernmental organisation of developing countries, formed in 1995 to promote 
South solidarity, consciousness and mutual knowledge and understanding; it is based in Geneva.) 
The issue of security 
Images of an endangered planet (nature in need of rescue) position developing countries as subjects of 
global environmental concern (Sutherland 2000). This is seen in the articulation of environmental 
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degradation as being a threat to national security because it (supposedly) prompts conflict, large scale 
migration and refugee movements, an articulation described in Dalby (1996) and in Sutherland (2000). 
This positioning is also seen in the neo-Malthusian fear that rising populations in the South are driving 
global change and will deleteriously spillover onto the North (Dalby 2003 p. 40). 
In this view, the areas variously labelled as the 'South', the 'Third World' or 'less-developed regions' 
are a potent source of new dangers and destabilisations. This is difference posited as both inferiority 
and danger, found in many places (Slater 1999 p. 65-66, 77). This view of the environment as a 
security threat has been topical since the Cold War, particularly in the US (Dalby 1996). Combined 
with a conviction that external threats can be overcome through the spread of development, this 
thinking justifies international intervention in developing countries. It echoes the thoughts of those 
who, in designing the post-war project of 'development' and 'modernisation', saw that project as a 
barrier against the de stabilisation of the fluid, expansionist ideology of Communism (the latter 
identified in Slater 1999 p. 76-77). 
The environment as a matter of common concern 
The third way in which the environmental problems of developing countries are being positioned as 
global problems is through the notions of the environment being a matter of common concern to 
(hu)mankind, the common heritage of (hu)mankind, and a matter of common responsibility, ideas that 
are reflected in international environmentalla w. Of these, the concept of the environment as a common 
responsibility entered international law first, as described in the text box below. 
THE CONCEPT OF COMMON RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
The concept of common responsibility-the shared obligations of two or more states towards the 
protection of a particular environmental resource- has evolved from an extensive series of 
environmental laws since 1949. In that year, tuna and other fish were described as being of common 
concern to certain parties by reason of their continued use. Later examples include outer space and 
the moon, described as 'the province of all mankind'. \'\Taterfowl are described as 'an international 
resource'; the conservation of ,vild animals is described as 'being for 'the good of mankind'; and the 
resources of the seabed and ocean floor are 'the common heritage of mankind'. NIore recent 
examples are in the Climate Change Convention which acknowledges that 'changes in the Earth's 
climate and its adverse effects are a common concern to humankind'. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity aff1tffis that 'biological diversity is a common concern of humankind'. 
Source: UNEP web site at 
Sustainable Development Law (2002) 
lCllt1WnrS Basler (1998); Centre for International 
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In 1967 the Maltese delegate to the UN, Ambassador Arvid Parvo popularised the concept when he 
suggested to the UNGA that the deep seabed and ocean floor and its resources be declared the common 
heritage of mankind (Basler 1998 p. xix). Parvo was using the term in the context of international areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. A bloc of developing states subsequently employed the concept to 
promote inter-spatial equity and benefit-sharing (amongst people of the present generation) in an effort 
to get rid of the shackles of colonialism and underdevelopment (Basler 1998p. 277-278). This notion 
of the common heritage of (hu)mankind revived a medieval sense of mankind predating the emergence 
of the law of nations when the Holy Roman Empire broke down (Basler 1998 p. 8-9). It reflects the 
idea that all guidance for men can be found in higher value and ideas, in the conscience of man, in the 
eternal will or divine commandment, in justice, human values and international solidarity (ibid). It is 
also found in late 18th to early 19th century Kantian and Hegelian liberal concepts of 'universalism', 
discourses that instilled a sense of universal identity in people of different nations (Frid 1998). 
From the early 1980s, the phrase 'the common heritage of mankind' became a tool for international 
lawyers to protect the global environment (Basler 1998 p. 277). They used it in the same sense as 
environmentalists and politicians: to refer either to all living and non-living resources wherever they 
are, or to the global environment at large as a transnational ecological entity (Basler 1998 p. 280). This 
use is seen, for instance, in the argument that all biodiversity must be protected through international 
efforts because it represents the common heritage of humankind. Used in this way, the concept depicts 
states as custodians of the environment, under the obligation to protect resources within their 
jurisdiction for the benefit of all: a sharing of responsibilities rather than benefits. Since many of the 
areas being labelled as biodiversity hotspots are in developing countries, this argument-that the 
biodiversity of many developing regions is special and the common heritage of humanity-has served 
to draw those regions into the international policy sphere (Peuhkuri and Jokinen 1999). It has created a 
mandate for outside experts to intervene in the name of biodiversity protection. 
Since the early 1980s, the idea that nature of biodiversity is the common heritage of humankind has 
been used to restrain those in developing nations seeking to exploit their own natural and cultural 
resources. This has been done in the name of sustainable development, the human right to environment, 
and intergenerational justice. Yet, the idea conflicts with the belief that sovereign states have the right 
to formulate their own policies. In 1971 in its preparations for the Stockholm conference on the human 
environment, the UNGA affirmed the sovereign responsibility of states. Resolution 2849 (XXVI) 
stressed that each country has the right to formulate, in accordance with its own particular situation, 
and in full enjoyment of its national sovereignty, its own national policies on the human environment. 
It cautioned that in the exercise of such rights and in the implementation of such policies, due account 
must be taken of the need to avoid producing harmful effects on other countries. The 1972 Declaration 
of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Principle 24) further affirmed this sovereign right, 
as did the 1992 Rio Declaration (Principle 2). 
Green diplomacy has yet to successfully address this conflict between the idea of state sovereignty over 
territorial environments and the idea that, through international cooperation transcending political 
boundaries, we can address problems threatening the planet. Instead, there has been a trend towards 
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using softer terms, with lesser legal baggage, to convey much the same notion (Basler 1998 p. 314). 
This can be seen in the preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which proclaims 
that biological diversity is a 'common concern of humankind'. Although the preamble recognises that 
states have sovereign rights over their own biological resources, it affirms their responsibility for 
conserving their biological diversity and using their biological resources in a sustainable manner. 
Both the notion of capacity-building, and WSSD's concept of partnerships sharing skills and expertise, 
are helping bridge this conceptual and legal gap between state sovereignty and nature as the common 
concern of humankind. A topical example is the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate, formed by the US, Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea, announced at Association 
of South-East Asian Nations summit in July 2005. Instead of the fixed targets and caps of the Kyoto 
protocol, the UN treaty on climate change, this partnership promises technology transfers from 
developed to developing countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (The Economist 2005). The 
approach of 'marrying development with conservation', described earlier, is also helping bridge this 
conceptual and legal gap between state sovereignty and nature as the common concern of humankind. 
These approaches justify international cooperation in policy matters as well as operational projects. 
Intellectually, they challenge the potency and immutability of the forces heading modernising societies 
towards environmental degradation. Morally and politically, they affirm the right of developing 
countries to development, expressed in the Rio Declaration (principle 3). This is yet another example of 
how modernisation theory has assimilated the challenges posed by environmental degradation. 
History and Context of the Discourse 
SITUATING THE DISCOURSE 
To recap, our conventional perceptions of international environmental policy are being shaped by a 
discourse that sees global environmental problems as solvable through globally co-ordinated action 
drawing upon science and rational planning and utilising the approaches of green diplomacy, policy 
diffusion, capacity-building, partnerships efforts to marry conservation and development, and 
neoliberal policy approaches. This discourse is similar to another contemporary policy-oriented 
discourse of environmental politics, ecological modernisation, a discourse described by Hajer (1995). 
Ecological modernisation identifies the institutions of modernity not only as the main cause of 
environmental problems in industrialised countries but also as the principal instruments of ecological 
reform. There is an associated body of theory which argues that, in these countries, the institutions of 
modernity are being transformed through the process of ecological restructuring (Mol 2003 p. 309). 
This theory draws on the concept of reflexive modernisation, brought into present-day social theory by 
sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. Ecological modernisation is interpreted as the 
reflective organisation of industrial society's institutions to cope with the ecological crisis (ibid). The 
discourse of global environmental policy can be seen as applying the precepts of ecological 
modernisation to the Third World. It has arisen because industrial society sees not just itself, but the 
entire developing world as it modernises, as a risk society sensu Beck. Western experts set out to 
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critique and reform not just western society but the rest of the world. Ecological modernisation and 
international environmental policy are thus part of the same family of discourses about modernisation. 
As in other discourses, there are internal tensions and contradictions. Market-based neoliberalism 
contends with sustainable development, for instance (Dryzek 200 I p. 15). There is also tension 
between, on one hand, the rights based approach (the common good), which reflects humanist elements 
in modernist thinking and, on the other, the rationalist thinking reflected in rational planning and the 
logical positivist search for certainty search in root causes. And the need for international cooperation 
may no longer be so taken-for-granted now the US government has lost interest in, or has seen its own 
national interest opposed to, collective environmental well-being (Wapner 2003 p. 7). In its first term 
alone, George W. Bush's administration pulled the US signature from the Kyoto protocol, attempted to 
disavow agreements negotiated at the Cairo Summit on population, attempted at WSSD to water down 
the legal implications of principles agreed at UNCED and weakened many domestic environmental 
regulations that articulate with global ones (Wapner 2003 p. 7-8). Nevertheless there is a strong internal 
consistency in the discourse's central themes. Furthermore, its history is clear, as are key conditions of 
existence, the political operations that permitted its formation, as I show next. 
The context: developmentalism 
This global environmental policy discourse expresses the dominant philosophy of the modern world-
system, 'developmentalism'. The constitutive processes of developmentalism are modernisation, 
economic growth and nation state building; its core metaphors are progress, growth and development 
(Adams 2001 p. 149-150). Developmentalism is rooted in the rise of the West, in the history of 
capitalism, in modernity, and in the globalisation of Western state institutions and cultures (Crush 1995 
p. 11). It has an evolutionary perception of development, seeing it as directional and cumulative, 
predetermined and irreversible, and necessarily progressive (Adams 2001 p. 150). This derives from 
the original idea of development, which according to Cowen and Shenton (1995 p. 29), was invented 
amongst the throes of early industrial capitalism in Europe as a counterpoint to 'progress' when the 
latter was seen as creating disorder. The concept of development emerged to create order out of the 
social disorder- rapid urbanisation, poverty and unemployment-apparently caused by progress. 
While progress was seen as a complex, cyclical tableau of processes of improvement and deterioration, 
development provided a more optimistic account of humankind's interaction with the environment. 
Human history could thus follow the arrow, rather than the cycle of, progress; social order could be 
restored (Cowen and Shenton 1995 p. 29; Crush 1995 p. 11; Hughes 1995 p. 5). Thus, development 
provides an alternative account of history, telling how humans can overcome the limitations of their 
natural environment, of how nature can be controlled and improved to enhance the quality of human 
life, and problems can be solved given human ingenuity, resources and time (Miihlhausler 2003 p. 110-
Ill). In development theory, this view of development has been translated into modernisation theory. 
Modernisation theory was out of favour for a time after dependency theorists recognised that Third 
World countries go through different development stages to those of the First World and argued that 
the West's capitalist development was causing Third World underdevelopment. Latterly however, the 
view of modernisation as a progressive, evolutionary process encompassing the Third World has been 
on the resurgence. Increasingly common since the putative end of the Cold War, it appears in claims 
that globalisation is formenting a global civil society; it also appeared in pre-September 11 assertions 
of a spreading liberal zone of peace (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002 p. 103-104). 
Global environmental policy discourse as a critique of modernisation 
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Although the discourse conceptualises the environment as a problem, it has modernisation theory's 
optimism that environmental problems, even those caused by the process of modernisation, can be 
solved through further modernisation. The discourse is optimistic about addressing the challenges that 
development poses to the environment, through strategies for sustainable development and 
environmental management, linking conservation to development aspirations and practices, and by 
using such approaches as capacity-building and neoliberal instruments. This optimism was reinforced 
by the shift in the aid agenda in the 1980s, towards blaming poverty in undeveloped countries for 
global environmental degradation, which confirmed modernisation theory as containing the panacea for 
that degradation. Thus, efforts to find ways of addressing the problem of environmental degradation in 
the Third World have strengthened rather than weakened modernisation theory. 
The global environmental policy discourse exhibits not just modernisation theory's view of 
international development as an inevitable rather than a chosen process, but also the same teleological 
notion of universal benevolence as the metaphor of globalism. Globalism sees development in the 
'developing world' as inevitably following the superior path of development pursued by the 'developed 
world' (Marcuse 2004 p. 810). 
In its optimism, modernisation theory combines the allure of development-the vision of unlimited, 
continuing and endless progress-with the charismatic, utopian promise of a unified humanity 
transcending past environmental problems and limitations. This is attractive not just to those fearful of 
disintegrating environment in developing regions and concerned to save the world's biodiversity. It is 
also attractive to those in the Third World chasing their right to development. Being so universally 
appealing, this vision helps reinforce global order, for, as Dryzek (2001 p. 15) noted, order in 
international systems is the product of discourses. 
FACTORS CRUCIAL IN THE DISCOURSE'S FORMATION 
Foucault suggested discourses are distinct because they have distinct histories (McHoul and Grace 
1998 p. 49-50). Certainly, the post-WWII theorisation of modernisation in the USA, with its idea of 
development as continuing, unlimited and endless progress, was crucial for the formation of the global 
environmental policy discourse. Although modernisation theory is a post-war phenomenon, the 
development project certainly is not. Drawing on historical accounts, Goldman (2005 p. 11-13) 
describes how development was an important colonial question phrased in terms of 'how to improve 
the colonial subject' in order to serve the metropole more productively and how the Bretton Woods 
institutions were built upon prior colonial and imperial architecture. 
As an antecedent of modernisation theory, the colonial development project laid the foundation for the 
global environmental policy discourse. Indeed, in the Pacific, many countries became independent after 
the discourse was formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Colonialism set the scene for this discourse 
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in another sense as well, through post-colonial attitudes. By a process of internalisation, colonised 
subjects experience inferiority not just in external terms but in a manner that affects their sense of their 
own identity (a manner described by Fanon (1989». These attitudes have rendered Third World people 
the victims of environmental problems in their own countries, incompetent in matters of their own 
infliction and in need of expert help. 
In the late 1960s, two different sets of events at the UN were seminal in the formation of the discourse. 
The first relates to decisions taken during the preparations for the conference on the human 
environment held in Stockholm in 1972, specifically the decision of the UN Economic and Social 
Council and later the UNGA to combine environment and development. At a preparatory committee 
meeting at Founex in Switzerland in June 1971, a committee of 27 experts sought to allay the concerns 
of developing countries about the economic effects of environmental protection policies. The panel 
proffered assurance that environmental protection would not go against their interests and would not 
affect their position in international trade (e.g. by anti-pollution barriers), and that rapid 
industrialisation could still be pursued but in such a way that its most adverse effects were avoided 
(Adams 2001 p. 55). The so-called Founex panel of experts produced a report which made it clear that 
environmental considerations should be an integral part of the development process (Founex 1972). 
This was something the UNGA affirmed at its 26th session in December 1971 (resolution 2849 (XXVI) 
discussed above). 
The second set of events centred on Parvid's success in persuading the UN to incorporate the concept 
of the common heritage of mankind in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea; from this has sprang 
ongoing debate, lobbying, and negotiations about equity and inequity, common responsibility and 
special treatment, and common heritage. Those political decisions at the UN led to the proliferation of 
environmental treaties since 1972, treaties based upon the belief that environmental problems could be 
addressed through the formation of environmental regimes. 
The development of cybernetic ecology, and its acceptance into western environmental politics was 
another factor crucial for this discourse's formation. In ecology, the marriage of reductionist 
science-a positivist methodology and a search for general laws of nature-lent scientific credibility to 
the mission of saving the planet (Sachs 1992 p. 30-31). Furthermore, the notion of ecosystems as a 
complex of interconnected entities allowed the focus of both environmental science and politics to 
expand from a national to global level (Dalby 1998 p. 296-297). The concept of apocalypse inherent in 
the cybernetic representations of nature laid the foundations for requiring international cooperation in 
the mission of securing collective security threatened by the potential collapse of ecosystems: 
cooperative security based upon recognised interdependence and commitment to joint survival. 
Conclusion 
This is the starting point for the argument running through the rest of the thesis-recognition that a 
normative, orthodox discourse of modernisation shapes the way we conventionally conceive the nature 
and practices of international environmental policy. This is discourse not only in the sense that Hajer 
(1995 p. 44) used it, a configuration of ideas and categories through which meaning is given to 
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phenomena, but discourse as a modernist regime of knowledge and disciplinary power sensu Foucault 
(distinctions discussed in Gasper and Apthorpe 1996 p. 2-4). It represents a system of power relations 
producing domains of objects and rituals of truth (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996 p. 4). In this discourse, 
international environmental policy is portrayed as a cooperative, politically-neutral venture that 
employs scientific and technical means to address global environmental problems. This socio-culturally 
produced perspective of western origin entails a particular relationship between, on one hand, 
developing countries and, on the other hand, developed countries and intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organisations dominated by people from those developed countries. This relationship 
is based upon a belief in the West's technical and intellectual superiority. Experts playa central part in 
this discourse. 
In thus describing, analysing and critiquing the discourse of global environmental policy, I have 
established the basis for an external critique of modernisation theory, in the sense in which Banuri used 
this term-a critique that rejects the theory's suitability as a strategy for the future of Third World 
societies by calling into question the supposedly universal benevolence of western environmental 
policies. In the next chapter I begin such a critique by constructing an alternative reading from 
perspectives found in social science literature. 

Chapter Three 
Power and Interests: an Alternative Reading of 
International Environmental Policy 
Introduction 
This chapter starts to 'denaturalise' the field of international environmental policy by looking for 
counter-readings in the social science literature. It begins by examining the limited concepts of 
hegemony associated with these policy processes, raising the question of how the highly normative, 
orthodox expression of modernisation theory that forms the dominant discourse in this field may be 
hindering its recognition. The chapter then examines the conception of actors found in the discourse 
and ideas about why those actors cooperate, discussing how these understandings may also be 
restricted by the dominant discourse. Table 5 at the end of the chapter summarises these insights, 
comparing them with orthodox perspectives in the previous chapter. 
Hegemony in international Environmental Policy 
CRITIQUES WHICH IDENTIFY HEGEMONY 
READING CAPACITY-BUILDING AS HEGEMONY 
The Actors 
THE DIVERSITY OF ACTORS 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL STANCES, INTERESTS AND MOTIVATIONS 
Explanations of Why Cooperation Occurs 
Conclusion 
Hegemony in International Environmental Policy 
CRITIQUES WHICH IDENTIFY HEGEMONY 
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In the social science literature, there are two broad suggestions about how hegemony might be 
operating in international environmental policy; both view hegemony as undesirable. One sees the 
centralised technocratic management (described in the last chapter) as eco-fascist, an eco-imperialist 
effort to establish a world order, which environmentalists often inadvertently support in their zeal to 
monitor and encourage managerial responses to crises (Dalby 1998 p. 312-313). The other sees 
hegemony as derived from capitalism in its modern neoliberal form of governance, the latest insidious 
chapter of the larger post-war history of the expansion of western reason and economic thought (Watts 
1999 p. 89). In these critiques, accusations of imperialism, eco-fascism, and neoliberal hegemony are 
often intertwined. So too are environmental and development issues, which is not unexpected, given 
views such as those of the South Centre (2002), which contends that the global environmental agenda 
cannot be separated from the conflict between Northern industrial nations and Southern developing 
countries because social conflict is part of the environmental problematique. 
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This section fleshes out various notions from social science literature that bear upon the idea that 
international environmental policy may be hegemonic in character. As well as charges of eco-fascism 
and eco-imperialism, it examines interpretations of neoliberalism and of capacity-building as 
hegemony, and various practices of hegemonic cultural modernisation such as rational planning for 
environmental problem-solving. 
Critiques of neoliberalism 
Most of these accounts of hegemony position North against South, regarding the hegemony of the 
North as undesirable. Taylor and Buttel (1992 p. 406), for instance, argued that global constructs of 
environmental issues involve a universalising discourse that steers us away from the difficult politics of 
enduring structural inequalities and differentiated interests, towards techno-managerialist remedies, 
preferred and constituted by Northern-based scientists and bureaucrats. Activist Vandana Shiva has 
argued that the global creates the moral base for green imperialism against the poor in countries like 
India (Jamison 1996 p. 236). Moreover, according to Gorg and Brand (2000 p. 372), amongst 
developing countries there is a general perception that western beliefs continue to prevail in 
environmental regimes, reflecting rather than redefining the international distribution of power. 
Critics of neoliberal global environmental governance, found mostly in the disciplines of geography 
and political economy, see hegemony as embedded in the neoliberal global political economy. They 
posit too cosy an arrangement between international environmental policy initiatives and the neoliberal 
interests, Northern neoliberal states and big business, as expressed through agencies such as the World 
Bank and GEF (Escobar 1995; Goldman 2001). This is hegemony in a neo-Gramscian sense, dominant 
power relations being maintained by consent as well as coercion (Ford 2003 p. l20-l21). As Peck and 
Tickell (2002) observed, the hegemony of neoliberalism is most evident in the ways in which 
profoundly political and ideological projects have successfully masqueraded as a set of objective, 
natural, and technocratic truisms. There are, however, few detailed studies of how neoliberalist policies 
aimed at solving environmental problems impose hegemony on developing countries. In one such 
study, Goldman (2001) described how the World Bank has fostered a 'newly emerging art of 
government' in Laos, introducing science, regulation and capital investment within the frame of a 
global environmental scientific discourse. Opening up access to the Mekong, the Bank's efforts are 
constructing an 'environmental[ly responsible] state' and making it accountable to the global 
community through a politicised ethics. Goldman judged the forms of rationality and science that the 
Bank was institutionalising, particularly its brand of assessment, as hegemonic: in the push to construct 
'universals', alternative (unspecified) knowledge was being submerged, co-opted, or deemed 
illegitimate. 
In the case of resource-rich and capital-poor borrowing countries such as Laos, natural 
wealth and natural-social relations are being transformed through proliferating scientific and 
political processes under the mantle of environmentally sustainable development. Based on 
actual practices however, it should be renamed green neoliberalism, a political rationality 
that has fostered the scientization, governmentalisation, and capitalisation of some very 
hotly contested eco-zones (e.g. the Mekong, the Amazon) (Goldman 2004 p. 536, emphasis 
in the original). 
Goldman also describes the subjugation of the knowledge of 'non-experts', the 'millions of people 
perceived and the object of study and of development', who become legible and accountable only 
within the context of a specific capital investment and culture of development capital, and only as 
objects for interrogation and betterment (Goldman 2004 p. 68). 
Surveys typically construct and then characterise populations based on very simple (but 
enduring) social categories, classifying people as fisher, hunter or swidden cultivator when 
many people can be all or none at different times of the year. Some studies define 
'downstream' as being just a few miles away from the dam or project and hence make 
invisible the ecological and social 'downstream' of large projects, which can include 
hundreds of miles and whole groups of people (ibid). 
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A different example of how neoliberalist policies aimed at solving environmental problems impose 
hegemony on developing countries comes from Africa (e.g. Tanzania and Kenya), where the economic 
reforms of the IMF have emphasised wildlife tourism as the cornerstone of economic development. 
Those reforms have given private investors considerable control over both the tourist industry and 
protected areas. Historically, the establishment of parks and preserves in southern Africa created new 
categories of criminal activity, outlawing entire livelihood systems practiced by local groups (Neumann 
1995). In the 1990s, when neoliberal reforms emphasised the wealth creation potential of protected 
areas, those managing the reserves sought to increase their effectiveness, by enlarging them, annexing 
adjoining land to create buffer areas, and linking areas through wildlife corridors. In doing so, those 
managers identified a whole new suite of technically defined management issues and a new classes of 
perpetrators, labelling subsistence and petty commodity production activities as 'poaching', and 
instituting a crackdown on those practising them (Neumann 1995; Schroeder 1999). This form of 
neoliberalism uses biodiversity protection as a new regime of accumulation, reinvigorating coercive 
tendencies that have long been part of much western conservation (described in Peluso 1993, for 
instance). In accounts of this phenomenon, the hegemons are seen as an international alliance of state 
agents and wildlife managers, including major conservation NGOs such as WWF (Schroeder 1999). 
Critiques of the neoliberal form of global environmental governance, which position North against 
South, are similar to, and sometimes overlap, the alternative perspective of development labelled as 
post-development. Post-development perceives development as threatening diversity, homogenising 
local traditions through the apparatus of state (investment, measurement and planning), and eclipsing 
the local through general conceptual categories and western assumptions. For instance, Sachs (1992 p. 
33-36) railed against a 'global ecocracy' with 'survival as its raison d-etre', which reduces ecology to a 
set of managerial strategies for resource efficiency and risk management. With its broad philosophic 
sympathies towards post-structuralism, post-development resists the West's universalising discourses 
including neoliberal and Marxist meta-narratives of development (as described in Watts 1999 p. 89). 
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The work of Arturo Escobar (1995) links post-development thinking with environmentalism. Escobar's 
critique is staunchly anti-modernist, decrying modernisation and 'development' as intrinsically unjust 
projects concocted after World War II by entrenched global trade and financial institutions (Flitner and 
Heins 2002 p. 320). Escobar is, in effect, questioning whether the construction of modernisation theory 
and its positioning as a dominant paradigm, is the result of hegemonic influences in a socially 
constructed international system. Escobar's critique of modernisation is an external one sensu Banuri, 
questioning its moral basis and rejecting its suitability as the future for Third World societies. In 
contrast, neoliberal policy responses to environmental degradation are the products of an internal 
critique of modernisation theory, strengthening the theory (Banuri 1990 p. 57-58). 
Foucauldian insights leading to charges of eco-fascism and eco-imperialism 
Goldman and Escobar are two critics using Foucauldian perspectives to challenge contemporary 
western notions of appropriate environmental governance. Another is Timothy Luke. In warning of the 
moral anarchism of ecological crusaders, Luke judged both deep ecology and sustainable development 
to be hegemonic. Luke (1994 p. 160) postulated that eco-philosophies and supposedly wholesome 
moral technologies may be co-opted in the pursuit of political power and maintenance of an 
advantageous political order. He criticised the prevalence of 'green hustlers', misguided opportunists 
who have become intent on making the world 'a better place to live' in order to get themselves political 
power (Luke 1993 p. 141). "Believing that they must do anything and everything to protect Nature, 
they transform environmental protection into a moral crusade ... the ecological crisis becomes the 
hunting grounds of eco-opportunists, hustling Nature in search of power" (ibid). Examining deep 
ecology, Luke portrayed it as a Foucauldian strategy of power for normalising new ecological subjects, 
both human and non-human, warning that it "provides the essential discursive grid for a few 
enthusiastic ecosophical [eco-philosophical] mandarins to interpret nature and impose its ecological 
dictates on the unwilling many" (Luke 1988 p. 85). 
These critics judge various organisations as eco-fascist-particularly intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) with a high profile in environmental policy matters. Some of these agencies under the UN 
umbrella, the World Bank and the GEF in particular, are also the villains in of neoliberalist critiques. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, they have been charged with environmental managerial ism-
blueprint approaches to environmental problems, requiring technological and resource transfers 
(Redclift 1994; Adger et at. 2001 p. 701-705). 
Since the late 1960s, the UN has been attempting to extend its system of international environmental 
governance to include all countries. Those attempts include the summit conferences at Stockholm 
(1972), Rio de Janiero (1992) and Johannesburg (2002); the founding ofUNEP and the extension of 
the agenda of other UN agencies to include environmental issues (not only the World Bank but 
agencies such as UNDP and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP»; 
and, last but not least, the inclusion of environmental issues on the agenda of the Global Conference on 
the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (GCSDSIDS) at Barbados in 1994 and 
the 2005 follow-up at Mauritius (BPoA+lO). There are some similarities between these UN efforts and 
historical efforts in western Europe to extend urban power over the countryside and increase control of 
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the non-urban space (the more 'natural' environment) and the population living in that territory, in 
order to guarantee state 'security'. Foucault analysed those efforts, seeing the domestication of nature 
as part of a system of power relations among humans which had the objective of maintaining a given 
social order (Darier 1999 p. 23-24). There is a parallel in UN's attempts to extend, under the guise of 
environmental policy, the system of social control in developed countries to include those in 
developing ones. The UN efforts' echo earlier European history, albeit on a grander scale. 
This suggests that, as potential hegemonic sites, IOOs merit careful, detailed analysis, as do civil 
society groups operating internationally. As Ford (2003 p. 123) observed, the groups regarded as 
constituting global civil society comprise a "fairly exclusive club, which cuts the grassroots off'. 
Neo-Gramscian insights into civil society organisations 
Ford (2003 p. 123) suggested that global civil society may be a site for maintaining as well as 
challenging hegemony-entrenching and legitimating hegemonic global environmental governance, 
rather than challenging it. Seen from a neo-Oramscian perspective, global civil society is a discursive 
space that reproduces global hegemony, legitimising hegemonic global environmental governance 
(Ford 2003 p. 129). "The more institutionalised NOOs that are actively engaging with global 
environmental governance, work largely within the framework of technical-rational knowledge thereby 
arguably contributing unintentionally to the reproduction of orthodox global environmental 
governance" (Ford 2003 p. 125). Lal (2000) describes large international environmental NOOs as eco-
imperialists forging new sources of moral authority outside the nation-state. He charges them with 
being on a modern-day secular Christian crusade of saving Spaceship Earth, which prevents economic 
development in poor countries such as India. Lal identified the culprits as 'Oreens' organised into 
NOOs, acting as the 'self-proclaimed voice of an international civil society', and pushing their agenda 
through various transnational organisations like UNEP, the World Bank and World Health 
Organisation (Lal 2000). 
These general criticisms provide good reasons for exploring whether the policies and practices of 
international conservation organisations are hegemonic. Conservation is not just an end, as defined in 
the IUCNIUNEPIWWF World Conservation Strategy: "the maintenance of essential ecological 
processes and life-support systems, the preservation of genetic diversity, and the sustainable utilisation 
of species and ecosystems" (IUCN et al. 1991). It is also an intervention, a social and political process 
by which natural resources are managed to maintain biodiversity (Alcorn 1995 p. 15). 
The increasing professionalisation of environmental NOOs, which Jamison (2001) has described, may 
be contributing to hegemony in developing countries where these organisations work. Large 
environmental NO Os have commercialised and privati sed concern for protecting the environment; 
many are more like business firms than social movements (Jamison 2001 p. 144, 175). International 
conservation is expensive and for organisations like WWF to survive they need to be able to see where 
the funding for their work is coming. The combination of funding structures needed for these large-
scale interventions and the managerial tools of these large-scale and top-down initiatives inevitably 
privilege 'big conservation' (transnational conservation organisations) at the expense of grassroots or 
even national conservation organisation (Brosius and Russe112003). Wolmer (2003 p. 4) suggested that 
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the massive funds necessary for large-scale conservation initiatives are leading conservation 
organisations like WWF to develop funding strategies in conjunction with multilateral development 
banks and building corporate linkages, causing them to become more business-like. But this can be 
read as the reverse: WWF and other m~or conservation NOOs decided to become more business-like 
then searched for suitable tools to achieve this. This is an intentional strategy. WWF is using the tools 
of the corporate world to repackage conservation as an investment opportunity for corporate bodies. 
The organisation is also attempting to cement its authority on matters of global environmental 
governance. 
One of the few researchers investigating the efforts of major conservation NOOs to consolidate their 
authority over global conservation practices is anthropologist Peter Brosius (e.g. Brosius 2004; Brosius 
forthcoming). Brosius's criticism parallels Escobar's critique of modernity, except that it is specifically 
directed at conservation groups using tools formerly monopolised by the state. Those organisations 
have, Brosius argues, incorporated into the managerial apparatus of conservation, tools and 
approaches-Brosius calls them 'administrative technologies'-that originated as emancipatory moves 
(Brosius 2004 p. 16). The text box below summarises Brosius's critique of one such practice, ecoregion 
planning, a practice I explore in some detail in Chapter Eleven. 
BROSIUS'S CRITICISM OF ECOREGION CONSERVATION 
Since the late 1990s, several major conservation organisations, including \V'\W and The Nature 
. Conservancy (TNC), have scaled up previously local conservation projects to cover entire regions, 
using map-based land-use planning and prioritisation approaches under the rubric of ecoregion 
conservation planning. Brosius charges that, by linking these exercises to another invention 
'conservation finance', and reframing the conservation enterprise in the neoliberal terms of an 
investment portfolio, those NGOs have made local people accountable to the foreign donors of 
conservation dollars (Brosius 2004 p. 16-17). In developing proprietary databases, maps and lists 
of 'significant areas', they have created new centres of calculation SeI!StI Latour (1987), essential for 
acting at a distant upon unfamiliar places, people and events. In establishing their expertise with 
such technologies, they get taken for granted as methodological gatekeepers. 'Increasingly 
conservation has become a gated community that one can enter only by accepting the 
methodological terms promulgated by major conselvation organisations' (Brosius 2004 p. 16). 
Notions of hegemony in international environmental policy: a summary 
To recap, there is some evidence of hegemony in international environmental policy. Various Third 
World political ecology and environmental anthropology studies describe physical displacement 
occurring in the name of international conservation and forest protection (e.g. Ohimire 1994; Nygren 
2001). This can limit opportunities for local economic development by preventing local access to land 
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and resources. The process of modernisation may also, through neoliberal schemes, set up new regimes 
of accumulation that benefit (either existing or new) elite. In specifying the course of development that 
should be followed-or which should not be because of its environmental effects-efforts at 
globalising environmental and conservation policy may change the distribution of costs and benefits 
without explicitly acknowledging that change. They are thus hegemonic in their silences. 
Accounts of such domination and hegemony in international environmental policy are, however, short 
on detail about what else of the local is being displaced or eclipsed. Furthermore, international 
environmental policy, when transferred to developing countries, seems to entail a faceless 
hegemony-it is difficult to pin down who benefits from its policy practices. This is perhaps because 
these practices constitute a form of cultural hegemony, eclipsing the local, its knowledge, culture, 
traditions. This phenomenon occurs when one or more group dominating others to the extent that 
cultural perspectives are skewed in favour of the dominant group; as a result, other cultural beliefs, 
values and practices become submerged and partially excluded (Wikipedia c.2004). At whatever site a 
dominant culture emerges, the naturalisation and routinisation of its values and practices provide the 
ground for the unequal deployment of power (Johnston et al. 2000 p. 333). 
Efforts to modernise the Third World by institutionalising rational planning practices and better 
(western) science through the medium of international environmental and conservation projects may be 
exerting cultural hegemony. So, too, might a problem-solving orientation to Nature, in societies where 
humans are regarded as part, rather than set apart from nature (for the Fijian view on this, see Chapter 
Nine). This is Escobar's critique expressed in the semantics of cultural politics. Sachs recognised this 
source of cultural hegemony when he labelled the contemporary modernist commitment to rationality, 
centralised control and planning as 'global ecocracy'. That commitment can be seen in efforts to 
institutionalise the use of problem-solving tools such as rational planning techniques, state 
environmental strategies, environmental management plans and ecoregion planning in developing 
countries. These planning exercises reflect a faith that borrows the legitimacy of science and 
technology yet is unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for comprehensive planning and 
intervention to save the environment and allow human progress on a global scale (Scott 1998). This is a 
manifestation of contemporary 'high modernity', in which the expert and the professional have 
considerable status (as Simon 1998 p. 227 described). But, once again, these accounts of Third World 
modernisation as cultural hegemony are generally short on empirical details, restricted perhaps by the 
limitations that the orthodox interpretation of the global environmental policy discourse places on our 
ability to comprehend hegemony. 
Yet, the similarity between the discourse of global environmental policy and that of globalism 
(discussed in the previous chapter), suggests that the discourse of global environmental policy may be 
hegemonic in the way that it legitimates globalism and sees development in the 'developing world' as 
following the superior path pursued by the 'developed world', an inevitable rather than a chosen path 
which is ultimately beneficial for all. Marcuse (2004) identifies globalism as a hegemonic concept by 
forming an analogy with Edward Said's analysis of Orientalism (Said had showed how Orientalism, 
elaborated in academic writings and popular discourse, achieved virtually hegemonic status). 
"Globalism is to really[ -]existing globalisation as Orientalism is to colonialism. Globalism is the 
hegemonic metaphor through which the actual process of globalisation is seen/presented" (Marcuse 
2004 p. 810). This is particularly pertinent when one considers the central role that capacity-building 
and lesson-drawing play in contemporary international environmental policy endeavours. 
READING CAPACITY-BUILDING AS HEGEMONY 
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In international environmental matters, capacity-building and lesson-drawing can potentially be read as 
hegemony, but rarely are. To critics of the philosophical basis of modernisation and development, 
capacity-building and lesson-drawing are problematic concepts because of the assumptions upon which 
they rest. They assume that western countries have superior technical skills and intellectual capacity in 
matters of governance and policy, and that people from developed countries are therefore morally 
justified in helping those with inferior skills and capacity. It is this belief in the superiority of Western 
achievements, institutions and values, a deeply-embedded belief in Occidental superiority over the non-
West, that cultural critiques of modernisation rail against (Banuri 1990 p. 59; Slater 1999 p. 77). 
The storyline underlying capacity building, along with its material practices of development aid, 
predisposes people of developing countries to cooperate in donor-funded projects, engendering 
cooperation across national boundaries. It does so by depicting those people as incapable of managing 
their environment, at the same time legitimating the authority of those funding and delivering capacity-
building to teach them how to do so. There are overtones of environmental imperialism in the way the 
capacity-building discourse portrays the environment as a series of problem then assigns the blame for 
those problems to developing countries. Several commentators (e.g. Grove 1993) have described a 
'first wave of environmental imperialism' associated with colonialism-imperialism that arose from 
the Enlightenment doctrine of continuous progress and the idea that the resource base of European 
countries needed to be expanded and unruly marginal subjects controlled. Capacity building appears to 
be a post-colonial form of environmental imperialism. Experts from developed countries are specifying 
what less developed countries must do to save their environment of behalf of humankind-ie on behalf 
of those living in industrialised countries which historically decimated their own biodiversity. In 
spelling this out, they are also specifying what course development should not take (the need to avoid 
pollution, loss of biodiversity etcetera). 
Postcolonial environmental imperialism is not the coercive agenda of development-oriented state and 
allied organisations jeopardising the interest of local people in the name of environmental conservation 
(e.g. as described in Peluso 1993, mentioned above). It is, instead, a form of imperialism being 
presented in a cooperative guise-perhaps a form of neo-Gramscian hegemony, in which the leaders 
and officials of developing countries willingly participate. For the notion of capacity-building rests, in 
large part, on the idea that development is a right that must fulfilled equitably, expressed in the Rio 
Declaration: "The right to development must be fulfilled" (Kiss 1994 p. 62). The Rio Declaration 
expresses not the just right to, but the need for, development. This is incorporated into Principle 5 
concerning the eradication of poverty, principle 6 which claims special priority to the needs of 
developing countries, and into Principle 9 concerning strengthening endogenous capacity-building for 
sustainable development by improving scientific understanding (Kiss 1994 p. 62). 
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Yet, the political agenda behind capacity-building reflects more than developing countries' search for 
equitable development. According to The South Centre (2002), the notion of capacity-building is part 
of a plot by powerful players in the North to weaken, challenge and roll back the multilateral 
conceptual/policy framework agreed during the Stockholm conference on the human environment, a 
framework that accorded a central and decisive role to intergovernmental action. That framework, 
which The South Centre contends underpinned three decades of North-South understanding on 
environment and development, was worked out at a time "when the underlying paradigm of 
international cooperation drew its strength from such notions as solidarity, differentiated 
responsibilities, special and preferential treatment for the countries lagging in their development 
process, and the need to shape the political and economic environment through government and 
intergovernmental action in order to attain set goals" (The South Centre 2002 p. 5). The Centre 
contends that, in the rising tide of neoliberal globalisation, powerful players in the North are now 
demanding developing countries improve their domestic governance and draw, not on multilateral 
assistance from formal intergovernmental agencies and the secretariats of international environmental 
regimes, but on the technical assistance (capacity-building) of private businesses and transnational 
corporations from the North (The South Centre 2002 p. 9). WSSD established close to 300 such 
partnerships between governments, industry and NGOs, in the pursuit of sustainable development 
(Wapner 2003 p. 3). This focus on technical assistance recreates a political issue as a technical one. 
This is one of the ways on which Third W orldism has been subsumed into modernisation theory, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. In capacity-building, the technical language, the dichotomy of developed/ 
developing country, and the stylised North-South imagery all serve to disguise its political basis. The 
stylised dichotomy ignores the billions who live, work, and consume in ways that fit neither the 
extremes of overconsumption or poverty-induced ecological marginalisation (Conca 2003). Use of 
these dichotomous terms disguises social divisions such as gender, class, race and age, and in doing so, 
may serve certain political agendas, not only at the end providing assistance but also at the end taking it 
- that way that political and economic elite in the South use the capacity-building discourse to feed 
their lifestyle and consumption for example, something discussed in Turnbull 2004, and something that 
the South Centre's general diatribe against the North does not mention). 
Capacity-building efforts can be read as potentially hegemonic in two regards. First, the solutions that 
westerners are imposing on developing countries through capacity-building are biased towards 
attaining a contemporary western style of modern society. One of the likely results is that insufficient 
space is being created for alternative futures and policy approaches designed to reach that future, to 
emerge from Third World societies. This presumably was what Hajer (1995) meant when he argued 
that while using the image of the planet is instrumental in the formation of a political consensus on the 
need for comprehensive and centralised global action, it is also disempowering to more situated or 
indeed social understandings of environmental problems and its solutions. This is also Escobar's 
concern about the local being eclipsed, as well as Goldman's concern about the World Bank's 
environmental governmentality, summarised above. Second, contemporary efforts at globalising 
environmental and conservation policy are trying to put today's developing regions onto a different 
(shorter) trajectory towards modernisation than that which industrialised countries followed, without 
explicitly acknowledging how this alters the distribution of costs and benefits. 
There are, however, few interpretations of capacity-building as hegemony. The key matter to be 
resolved is the extent to which the desire to dominate, intimately rooted in discourses of presumed 
superiority, mission and negative essentialisations of the Other, is coalescing in capacity-building, 
creating hegemonic policy (cf. Slater 1999 p. 67). To what extent do capacity-building efforts merely 
reflect a problem-solving orientation, an occidental faith in humankind's capacity for planning and 
control, without any intentional exercise of subordinating power? I return to this question of 
intentionality at several points throughout the thesis, including the next chapter and Chapter Eight. 
The Actors 
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THE DIVERSITY OF ACTORS 
The orthodox discourse of global environmental policy lacks any conception of hegemony, thus 
precluding any study of this phenomenon. It further limits our understanding of these policy processes 
by representing cooperation as a norm that is beneficial for all (as I investigate later in the chapter). 
Additionally, the discourse suppresses knowledge of the range and diversity of actors participating in 
these policy processes, in ways I discuss below. 
There are few detailed studies of those involved in such processes. Neither the full diversity of actors· 
involved, their modes of interaction, nor the differentiation within large groups and organisations is 
well documented. Yet, as the situation in the Pacific Islands illustrates, there is a wide range of groups 
cooperating in international environmental endeavours; this is both a personal observation, and one 
derived by perusing the annual reports of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). 
Foreign groups working on environmental endeavours in the region include intergovernmental 
organisations, non-governmental ones, foundations and philanthropic bodies, scientific organisations, 
governments, development assistance agencies and private businesses. They collaborate in a wide 
variety of environmental ventures including projects, workshops, and training initiatives. These range 
widely, from collecting data on the state of the environment and making it available internationally 
(e.g. assessments and reports required under treaties), managing environmental information (e.g. 
through library systems and databases) and even constructing facilities for those purposes. The funders 
include multilateral development assistance agencies such as the GEF, the ADB and European Union; 
unilateral development assistance agencies; large international NGOs run as businesses (e.g. WWF); 
national NGOs from developed countries; and philanthropic foundations. The range of technical 
partners is enormous. The local groups involved may be government agencies, academic and research 
organisations, or NGOs, whether oriented to development, environment, conservation, science, 
fisheries, or education oriented. 
Difficulty in recognising the diversity of actors involved in international environmental policy, and in 
differentiating amongst them, is partly due to the models of policy incorporated into the discourse of 
global environmental policy. The hierarchical model of international governance limits our 
understanding of the diversity of actors, assigning them to pre-selected categories, coloured by the 
belief that intergovernmental forums convened by sovereign nation-states provide the official setting 
for international politics and policy-making. Its companion, the problem-solving model of policy, 
restricts our understanding of their roles. Conventional political science and policy science have 
promoted this view, both disciplines being involved in facilitating the stability of the political 
institutions of the western nation state during the post -WWII era, and thus the stability of global 
intergovernmental organisations (Hajer 2003 p. 177-178). 
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Yet, commentators on the field of International Relations now acknowledge that non-state actors 
(scientists, NGOs, international organisations and industries) have driven the proliferation of 
environmental treaties since 1972 and that NGOs carry out various functions within the UN system at 
both policy and operational levels (e.g. Wapner 1995; Morphet c.1996 p. 142; Jasanoff 1997; Litfin 
1999; McCormick 1999; Vig and Axelrod 1999). Other commentators acknowledge how rapidly the 
nature of global environmental governance is changing. New cooperative governance arrangements are 
emerging, including privatised governance, corporate-NGO arrangements, formal collaborations 
between non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations and deterritoralised practices whereby 
business and social movements negotiate rules without territorial states to enforce them (Paterson et al. 
2003 p. 6). There seems to be general agreement that this trend is best understood in terms of the 
emergent dominance of network forms of social organisation (Coleman and Perl 1999; Castells 2000; 
Paterson et al. 2003 p. 6). 
The interface of science and policy 
In understanding the diverse groups involved in international environmental policy, a particular 
difficulty arises at the interface of science and international environmental policy. Accounts of science 
in international environmental policy often distinguish policy decision-makers from researchers 
advising on policy and those interpreting science to help decision-makers (the latter often called 
knowledge brokers or info-brokers) (e.g. Litfin 1994; Hajer 1995). This distinction accords with the 
notion, discussed in Chapter Two, that the process of integrating science into policy is linear and 
progressive, starting with the identification of a problem and proceeding through scientific research and 
predictive modelling to reach policy solutions. This is a view entrenched in both policy and political 
science. It is, however, an interpretation based on a specific western political culture, particularly 
prominent in the US. Miller (2001a p. 480) describes this as being 'hyperdifferentiated' science and 
policy. His research into climate change policy shows that there is not necessarily such a clear 
distinction between science and policy in the arena of contemporary international environmental 
policy. 
Until recently most research in the field of international policy viewed science and policy as separate 
regimes. Work on their interface concentrated on identifying what demarcates science from non-
science, how scientists maintain the boundaries of their community against threats to its cognitive 
authority (e.g. fraud and pseudo-science), on boundary objects (e.g. patents), and boundary 
organisations (novel institutional forms such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the IBP, which mix science and politics) (Guston 2001). Since 2000, this field of research 
has moved towards describing, in an increasingly sophisticated way, the relationship between science, 
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politics, and global environmental policy (e.g. Miller 2001 a; a case study in Chapter Three of Keeley 
and Scoones 2003; Mitchman and Frodeman 2004 p. 4; Shaw and Robinson 2004). Using the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change'S Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (UNFCCC SBSTA) as an example, Miller (2001a p. 495) argued that the 
institutions, material artefacts and discourses that populate all three domains (science, politics, and 
policy) are hybrids, complex mixtures of facts and values. Moreover, new institutional forms in the 
field of international environmental policy (e.g. scientific assessments, expert advisory committees, 
research management agencies) rely upon amalgamations of social practice drawn from the worlds of 
both science and politics (Miller 2001a p. 483). They operate under different standards and procedures 
than some other scientific activities such as publishing in scientific journals (ibid). In these efforts to 
more accurately describe the social and institutional landscape and to construct alternative geographies, 
the notion of boundaries, relatively narrow lines differentiating neighbouring entities, no longer seems 
appropriate; it serves, instead, to undermine these efforts (Miller 2001 a p. 497, note 4). 
International science/policy organisations 
Worldwide networks of scientists have been a feature of post-WWII internationalism; in many 
scientific fields, including marine science, physics, and economics, they have been an accepted part of 
the international landscape for forty or more years. The present meteorological network, for example, 
dates back to the 1950s (Miller 2001b). There is, however, little theory reflecting the changes being 
wrought by recent globalisation, or how the emerging dominance of network forms of organisation in 
international environmental governance has affected, and been affected by, these scientific networks. 
This raises questions for the study to address (in Part II in particular). 
UN agencies working on science/policy issues (including environmental matters) generally concentrate 
on intergovernmental harmonisation, technical assistance and international coordination of scientific 
research. Rather than being the logical outcome of science's politically neutrality, these types of 
endeavour are, according to Miller (2001b), the result of a highly political set of circumstances dating 
back to the early post-WWII era when the first of these agencies was being established. Promoting the 
idea that technical organisations would not abridge states' sovereign rights, US foreign policymakers 
insisted that the priorities of sovereign states take precedence within these international institutions 
(Miller 2001 b p. 208). Miller (2001 b) describes how that insistence shaped the kinds of observational 
networks and institutional capabilities that the WMO, an early example of this type of organisation, 
could build. Moreover, according to Miller, (2001b p. 172-179), the notion that the production, 
validation, and use of scientific and technological knowledge and skills could contribute to 
international peace and a free, stable, and prosperous world order convinced US foreign policymakers 
to create such regimes in the post-war era, shaping their organisation and activities (Miller 200lb p. 
209 quoting Burley). These policy-makers implicitly linked the pursuit of science to the success of a 
liberal world order (Miller 2001b p. 173). Although Miller's study concentrates on US rather than 
European influence, as he points out, by looking across a variety of regimes it is possible to detect 
consistent patterns in post-war political mobilisation of expertise that correspond broadly to ideas being 
articulated by American foreign policy makers (Miller 2001b p. 214-215, note 1). 
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According to Miller (200 I b p. 209), many of the same ideas about science and technology continue to 
influence the beliefs that both International Relations scholars and influential US policy-makers hold 
about these international institutions. Thus, a discursive (policy) framework limits the directions that 
international science cooperation can take (Miller 200 I b). This framework is as much political as 
technical despite its apolitical face, because these modes of interaction prescribe legitimate interactions 
between expert and political cooperation. "They provide not only the instrumental and symbolic basis 
for legimating particular kinds of scientific expertise, knowledge and activity but also the authority to 
use that science to support the maintenance of public order and social trust within particular political 
systems" (Miller 200lb p. 207). 
Political commentators conventionally point out how doctrines recognising scientific reason and 
growth as timeless virtues with universal applicability-as liberalism does-promote widespread 
desire for international cooperation in matters of environmental science/policy (e.g. Scholte 2003). The 
converse also applies: widespread international cooperation in science and technology popularises 
certain (liberal) doctrines as explanations of the world. 
This discussion of international science/policy organisations sets out another of this thesis's points of 
departure from the normative project dominating descriptive and analytical social science of 
environmental policy. Although international organisations charged with promoting international 
scientific cooperation may appear 'above' politics, they have, within their own history, set-up, norms, 
and practices, limits on their politics. Historically they have been limited to matters of peace, prosperity 
and the maintenance of social order, ie, to control and management of the environment for the purpose 
of modernisation, development, and peace. This has been a political act reflecting modernisation 
theory, modernisation being imagined as a global process spread through a liberal zone of peace and 
scientific cooperation (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002 p. 103). 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL STANCES, INTERESTS AND MOTIVATIONS 
Understanding science as politicised 
Jasanoff, in an analysis of epistemic communities, observed that many academics, in supporting how 
scientists and interpreters of science take control of many areas of international environmental policy, 
are prepared to leave by the wayside virtually everything they know about the contingency and 
plurality of knowledge. They overlook the complexity of the interplay between knowledge and politics, 
and the immense efforts and shared political commitments required to hold together global networks of 
technical practices and beliefs (Jasanoff 1996 p. 186). This reflects the depth of faith in science 
advancing the cause of global environmental policy. There have, however, been few empirical studies 
of how, in international environmental matters, science is being used as a political tool. Those analyses 
have concentrated on ozone, global environmental change, biodiversity, biotechnology, and climate 
change (e.g. Litfin 1994; Shackley and Wynne 1995; Takacs 1996; McAfee 1999; Demeritt 200Ib). 
In modernity, science is regarded as objective and neutral-'value-neutral' (a concept whose utility I 
discussed in Chapter Two). The claim that, in matters of policy, science is politically neutral is now in 
doubt, partly due to constructionist studies of science such as Latour and Woolgar (1979), Latour 
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(1987) and others. These have showed how the scientific method, far from being a paradigm of non-
local universality, is nothing more than a locally situated form of practice that is rooted in local social 
action (Sardar 2000 p. 41). Furthermore, feminist scholars have charged that that science is patriarchal 
and discriminates against half the world's population (women) (Sardar 2000 p. 48-51). Taylor (2003 p. 
99) offers other insights into the politicisation of science, pointing out that scientists' social status, 
politics, and social locations determine their preferences for some kinds of social action and politics 
over others; this in turn can influence their scientific analyses, and the policy solutions they favour. 
Some working in the field of cultural studies argue that 'science is politics by other means', insisting 
that scientific inquiry is profoundly shaped by ideological concerns, something being explored by some 
Third World political ecology researchers who have showed the idea of desertification in West Africa 
is not simply a false construction of nature but also an ideological one designed to conceal the 'true' 
situation behind a smokescreen of purportedly objective science (Fairhead and Leach 1995; Demeritt 
200la p. 26-27). Fairhead and Leach (1995) describe how social science has been complicit in 
producing a view of history as one of increasing tension from a harmonious past, and of a future in 
which the role of the outsider in the control of rural resources is imperative. They describe how, in 
producing this future imperative, colonial-era stereotypes are alive and well in the social sciences being 
applied to produce environmental policy for Africa (Fait'head and Leach 1995 p. 1031-1032). 
Latour (2004) calls the way in which modernity depicts science-not as 'politics by other means' but 
as neutral-as being a division of work that distributes functions between the sciences and politics. In 
Latour's view, the very invention of this absolute difference between science and politics was a 
political act (Latour 2004 p. 253 in note 9). 
Although now, with the help of these commentators, we have the philosophical understanding to 
recognise science as political and locally contingent, and the commitment to the political neutrality of 
science as being ideological, we still need to apply those perspectives in analysing international 
environmental policy processes to address questions such as: What role are scientists playing in 
identifying and constructing global environmental problems and what particular policy solutions do 
they seek? Do the expert policy technologies designed by scientists represent strategies expressing the 
interests of the elite power of professionals? The question of who benefits from science's construction 
of environmental problems is also important for any study of the potential for domination in 
international policy. Furthermore, if we see the policy process not as a venture in cooperative problem 
solving but as an inherently political process, then does identification of global environmental 
problems always precede policy solutions being proffered in international policy processes, or are some 
(politically advantageous) solutions pre-chosen? Foucault's notion of the expert production of 
discourse offers one way of investigating these questions, as I discuss in Chapter Four. 
NGO politics 
A review of the literature on NOOs, particularly those involved in international conservation, suggests 
other questions. International conservation has become a business for non-governmental organisations, 
large and small. Large environmental NOOs, with their global presence, draw considerable funding 
from developed countries and operate extensive international networks. The growth of global 
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communications networks has enabled them to expand rapidly their sphere of influence, the Internet 
making it easy to run international campaigns based around sophisticated websites as well as glossy 
publications (Sutherland 2000). Although some older NOOs such as WWF have always had an 
international focus, the greening of international aid since the 1970s has contributed to this 
internationalisation (a phenomenon discussed in the previous chapter). Since the late 1980s, NOO 
programmes around the world have incorporated neoliberal, market-based programmes in order to gain 
access to development funds which became available when development institutions, supposing NOOs 
to be more efficient at delivering aid, started bypassing the state and partnering civil society 
organisations in developing regions (Levine 2002; Townsend et al. 2003). This trend had provided the 
opportunity for many NOOs to become international players, and for people to establish new ones. 
We tend to clump most non-state actors (those not obviously industries or formally constituted 
intergovernmental agencies) into a single sector labelled as 'non-governmental', 'global civil society' 
or as constituting 'world civic politics' (e.g. Oordenker and Weiss 1995). Although there has been little 
critical examination of international NOOs with lesser profiles than WWF and Oreenpeace, it is clear 
that not all international environmental NOOs employ the same methods of tackling environmental 
issues (Wapner 1995 p. 337-338; Jasanoff 1997 p. 590). We need to know more about the 
characteristics of groups subsumed under the 'environmental NOO' title. 
Furthermore, in the field of international environmental policy, not only the politics of science needs 
investigating but also the politics of NOOs. There is little detailed knowledge of the internal workings 
of environmental NOOs working in the international sphere-of the internal processes of sites from 
which ideas emerge and are diffused, or the cognitive and institutional channels through which 
environmental problems reach international policy agendas (Jamison 1996 p. 238). There has been little 
attempt to grasp or even conceptualise either the role that non-governmental groups and movements 
have in shaping or constructing knowledge about the environment, environmental problems and 
solutions, or how they interact with accredited knowledge-producing institutions such as universities 
and scientific research organisations (Jamison 1996 p. 239). In addition, although large NOOs can be 
sites of contestation and struggle as Ford (2003) suggested for WWF, their internal processes of 
intellectual development and issue articulation, and their collective construction of social and natural 
reality, are rarely studied (Jamison 1996). Similar comments can be made about intergovernmental 
organisations. 
With its sweeping generalisation, optimistic statements about their potential for delivering development 
and solving environmental problems, amongst other matters, and instrumental treatises on building the 
capacity of local NOOs for that purpose, the literature on NOOs obscures their political stances. This 
literature idealises NOOs as disinterested a political participants in a field of otherwise implicated 
players (Fisher 1997 p. 441-442). This is not just a problem of ontology. Ford (2003) argued that in 
privileging the agency of states within an international system, seeing states as observable actors, and 
in conflating social movements with NOOs, contemporary epistemological structures obscure the role 
of certain actors and inhibit an understanding of agency. 
62 
In the sphere of international environmental policy, large professional NGOs are almost invariably 
equated with global civil society, which is usually described in liberal terms, as being fostered by the 
inter-state system and integrated world market (Ford 1999 p. 70). Wapner (1997), for instance, 
described global civil society as the domain that exists above the individual and below the state, and 
across state boundaries where people voluntarily organise themselves to pursue various aims. In this 
depiction, the 'top-down' structure demarcates the space for 'bottom-up' activity. This raises the 
question of whether liberalism is able to recognise radical movements that operate outside rather than 
within the intermediary space (Ford 1999 p. 70). Equally critically, does it on occasions mistakenly 
label as radical, that which is orthodox? Ford (1999 p. 125) warns that efforts to address environmental 
degradation-depicting environmental problems as capable of solution through technocratic 
approaches-should not be confused with radical social agency challenging the orthodoxy of global 
environmental governance. As she pointed out, many of the more institutionalised and active 
international environmental NGOs work within the framework of technical-rational knowledge, 
reproducing orthodox environmental governance rather than stimulating social change. According to 
Ford (1999), orthodox International Relations confounds this by conflating the notion of social 
movements challenging orthodoxy and hegemony in global environmental governance with NGOs. 
The nature of the various groups involved in international environmental policy, and the role they have 
in shaping or constructing knowledge about the environment, environmental problems and solutions 
obviously needs empirical research (Jamison 1996; Fisher 1997; Brosius 2004). Which groups are key 
influences; how do they define appropriate policies; are they seeking to challenge or maintain the 
orthodox version of the global environmental policy discourse? What are their political interests? 
interests and motivations 
The notion of political interests in environmental policy is neither well theorised nor much examined 
empirically. The usual interest identified in the environmental policy literature is the moral one: the set 
of sentiments and propositions that provides a 'unified moral vision' and runs in various guises 
throughout almost all ecological and green politics (Harvey 1999 p. 17). But this idea of a unified 
vision and moral agenda is problematic, as Harvey (1999 p. 18) illustrated by analysing a wide range of 
political values that underlie environmental-ecological opinion. He concluded that all ecological 
projects and arguments are simultaneously political-economic projects and arguments (and vice versa); 
ecological arguments are never socially neutral any more than socio-political arguments are 
ecologically neutral (Harvey 1999 p. 25). Moral arguments for certain environmental policies are 
therefore likely to cover political and economic interests-something that Jasanoff (1996) pointed out 
for groups of scientists involved in environmental policy. 
The interests of those participating in international environmental policy endeavours should not be 
regarded as being only of an environmental nature, something political ecology acknowledges when it 
emphasises the difference between local interests and those of states, big business and foreign interests. 
These interests should be analysed as political, and possibly economic (at both an organisational and an 
individual level). Some types of economic interest are acknowledged as playing a significant role in 
environmental policy-disputes over ownership of natural resources; capitalist ventures based upon 
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nature such as ecotourism and biotechnology; questions of intellectual property rights, for instance 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997; McAfee 1999; Parry 2002). International climate change policy provides 
another example: the fossil fuel industry is paying for sceptical critiques of climate change science and 
claims of global warming claims in an attempt to influence US policies in their favour, (Demeritt 
2001b p. 328; 2001a p. 34-35). The type of economic interests in environmental policy, is however, 
much broader than these examples suggest. 
The professional nature of environmentalism brings in other economic interests. There is a livelihood 
to be gained from the business of international environmental policy, whether one works for a state, 
intergovernmental, nongovernmental organisation, or a scientific one-and therefore competition for 
funding as well as for professional standing. As in other fields of policy, interpersonal competition for 
reputation, power, status and consultancy fees may motivate some players from academia (Peet 2004 p. 
18-19). In the USA, right-wing opponents of the Kyoto Protocol propound this type of argument, 
alleging the threat of climate change has been exaggerated by scientists with a financial stake in 
adopting an alarmist attitude about global warming (e.g., Boehmer-Christiansen 1994). Boehmer-
Christiansen (1996) suggested members of the IPCC exaggerated claims about global warming because 
creating a sense of crisis was of professional advantage. This neo-conservative criticism aims to refute 
scientific theories of global warming. The political left also recognise professional interest as a 
motivation, arguing the dominant scientific approach serves the interests of technocratically-inspired 
'environmental colonialism' (Demeritt 2001b). 
In studying the evolution of scientific research in the modern era, some social scientists and historians 
(e.g. Latour 1987) have described the connections between the material culture of scientific research 
and scientists' access to and understandings of nature. In doing so, they have stressed how cognitive 
developments depend upon the successful mobilisation of social and material resources. Thus, groups 
of scientists working on international environmental issues have a professional interest in ensuring the 
material resources they need to work, are made available. This led Latour (1987) to describe scientists 
as resource accumulators, entrepreneurs enrolling heterogeneous allies in the construction of ever-
widening networks of material flows and social influence. Miller (2001b p. 206), in his historical study 
of the international meteorological network, argued that the ability of scientists to create and shape the 
material cultures through which they produce knowledge depends upon their ability, as a group, to 
articulate connections between their work and the evolving clusters of norms and practices that govern 
the deployment of science in broader socio-political order. This applies to both scientists working in 
domestic settings and those working in international settings. 
But it is not just scientific groups that have these economic interests. So, too, do conservation and 
environmental NGOs which tend to operate as businesses. Since organisational growth and survival are 
important to NGOs, they seek a niche in the business of knowledge production, something that 
distinguishes them yet keeps them attractive to their patrons and funders. Esteva and Prakash (1998 p. 
22-23,33-34) claim that large inter-governmental organisations and 'global thinkers' such as the World 
Bank have constructed crisis narratives in order to impose global solutions, and to justify themselves as 
essential to global environmental management. This raises the question of how these economic 
interests are affecting the international policy agenda on various environmental issues. 
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Conservation NGOs, as well as scientific organisations involved in environmental policy, employ staff 
who produce environmental knowledge. These staff have professional interests. Jamison (200 I p. 163) 
described a new breed of political green expert, 'movement intellectuals' who, on an individual level, 
often think of themselves as part of a movement and yet express their opinions and offer their political 
suggestions more or less as professional experts, since they earn their living to a large extent by 
speaking and writing. These green experts may be in competition for funding and publishing contracts. 
This raises, as a potential motivation for individuals, becoming an expert and gaining access to 
resources and influence. Notwithstanding such insights, knowledge of the various interests of actors 
involved in international environmental policy is sketchy. So too are understandings of why they 
cooperate, collaborate, and form partnerships, despite professional competition. 
Explanations of Why Cooperation Occurs 
In international environmental policy matters, actors may work together, in the pursuit of professional 
advantage for instance-the emerging professional elite in developing countries may cooperate with 
overseas experts. Moreover, in the face of one or more players with significant power (hegemons), 
people may cooperate because it is easier than resisting, especially if the act of cooperation may be 
used to gain some benefit. But equally possibly they may compete or resist rather than cooperate. So 
what is it that prompts such cooperation? The suggestion, found in orthodox discourse, that actors work 
together in addressing global environmental problems in order to harmonise their interests, joining 
together to save the planet as a means of promoting common and collective security, is simplistic. It is 
also inadequate as an explanation for cooperation because it is a functional explanation, as are most 
such explanations derived from political science (described in the box on the next page). (Chapter Four, 
in its section on problematic terminology, addresses the semantic problems of finding a suitable term to 
describe the manner in which groups work together on policy issues even when they may have 
different interests or ends in mind.) 
Thus, political theory generally serves to obfuscate why actors work together in the diverse 
circumstances of international environmental policy. Not only are most of the theoretical explanations 
for international cooperation found in mainstream political science and International Relations 
functional, none is comprehensive enough to cover the diversity of situations found in international 
policy settings. Yet, it is clear that groups operating in the international sphere of environmental policy 
do cooperate. The question is why. The epistemic communities literature is no help in understanding 
this. Commentators have tended to uncritically adopt Haas's (1993 p. 178-180) notion of epistemic 
communities shaping international policy responses through cooperation. In consequence, little is 
known about the nature of political commitments that bind epistemic communities concerned with 
international environmental policy, or how they bind people from both developed and developing 
countries. Furthermore, while fracture lines have been identified-Lahsen's (2004) study of Brazilian 
experiences of the climate change regime revealed a complex domain characterised by transnational 
networks and cognitive convergence, yet with persistent divisions-these divisions are little studied. 
The next section canvases explanations from social theory, anthropology and development studies. 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY COOPERATION: EXPLANATIONS FROM POLITICAL THEORY 
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Institutionalist perspectives offer a functional explanation, theorising that if international institutions 
are to be effective they must create networks around, and within states, to generate the means and 
incentives for effective cooperation among those states (I<:eohane et al. 1993 p. 23-24). Since these 
approaches value cooperation and knowledge sharing, they assume that environmental regimes are 
benevolent, voluntary and cooperative (Litfin 1994 p. 190). The constructivist view is another 
functional explanation. For constructivists, the institutions of global environmental governance are 
expressions of subjectively shared norms, ideas and knowledge that shape identity and interests 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001 p. 406). People cooperate when they share norms and ideas- the 
assumption being that since they share norms and ideas, they have similar interests. Haas's notion of 
epistemic communities is a constructivist explanation. 
Lipschutz's and Rosenau's postinternationalism offers another functional explanation, suggesting 
that states and transnational networks of societal actors continue to coexist because there is 
sufficient reciprocal benefit from each other's presence (Litfm 1997 p. 176). Postinternationalism 
seeks to explain the recent emergence of global civil society as a response to states' declining ability 
to cope \vith problems- the 'leaking away of sovereignty' upward and downward. Social movements 
are seen as trying to work around the restrictions of nation-states by forging transnational lines of 
support (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The way many environmental issues (e.g. climate change) 
transcend political and territorial boundaries is considered to support this 'leaking upwards' of 
sovereignty. 
In contrast to those functional explanations, realism has two explanations for cooperation 
manifested as a burgeoning number of international environmental agreements: one based on 
hegemony (see Chapter Four) and one on egoistic state interests. But realism's world model, in 
which the most effective actors are states and power is both the main interest of all states and their 
means for self-preservation, is a simplistic explanation for cooperation between bodies other than 
states. The explanation of international cooperation in Marxist-based regulation theory is also 
inadequate. Focusing on how the effects of capitalism are being contained, this aclmowledges 
cooperative strategies that aim to valorise nature, especially where governments and transnational 
corporations have a common interest in enabling access to certain resources such as fish, timber, and 
minerals. Organisations may cooperate to protect themselves against crises and their after-effects, 
both on a material level (when the overexploitation and destruction of nature could be 
counterproductive) and on a socio-economic level (if social tensions threaten to get out of hand) 
(Gorg and Brand 2000). 
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Explanations from social theory 
The suggestion that people may cooperate because they are socialised into it is common in social 
theory. Furthermore, people may be socialised not just in accepting certain policy positions; they may 
even be socialised into actively cooperating in policy projects. Scientists, for example, may be 
socialised into particular epistemic viewpoints and paradigms: scientific information often rationalises 
or reinforces existing political conflicts, old cleavages simply being recloaked in new scientific garb 
and epistemic dissension downplayed (Litfin 1994 p. 186, 197). 
The idea of socialisation occurs in various strands of social theories, also some political theory. For 
both functionalists and Marxists, there is a prevailing culture in which people learn through 
socialisation, accepting prevailing ideas (Jones 1993 p. 50-51). In political theory, the concept of 
individuals being socialised into policy paradigms is found in both historical institutionalism and 
constructivism for instance (Finnemore 1996; Blyth 1997 p. 230). The concept of socialisation through 
discourse is also found in Foucauldian post-structuralism-discourse socialises people into accepting 
certain positions. Accordingly, in creating ecological oppression or liberation, particular NGGs, state 
agencies or transnational companies may not be acting autonomously but within structures defined by 
environmental discourses (HtUer 1995; Forsyth 2003 p. 271-272). Foucauldian post-structuralist 
perspectives equate the concept of individuals being socialised into policy paradigms with the 
normalisation of individuals (McHoul and Grace 1998 p. 68, 72-73). Shore and Wright (1997) suggest 
that policies operate as 'political technologies' sensu Foucault, working to socialise or normalise ideas 
(see Keeley and Scoones 1999 p. 5 for a similar perspective). Luke (1995a; 1995b) applied Foucault's 
perspective to both deep ecology and sustainability, highlighting the normalising power of both. 
Yet, social theory also accepts that individuals are rarely totally moulded by the culture of their society 
and that actors' reasons and intentions are central in the creation and recreation of social life 
(Abercrombie et at. 1994 p. 395; Layder 1994 p. 135 quoting Giddens). Individuals may negotiate and 
challenge the values and beliefs with which they are confronted, in a struggle to make sense of the 
situations in which they find themselves, to understand and interpret their own identity (Edgar and 
Sedgwick 1999 p. 363, describing the social interactionism perspective); Foucault also recognised that 
the processes of normalisation associated with disciplinary power do not necessarily produce 
conformity (McHoul and Grace 1998 p. 72). Although people may be socialised into accepting certain 
policy positions, or into cooperating in policy ventures, this does not imply that they never renegotiate 
or reinterpret those. Moreover, post-structuralism suggests that people are 'dispersed' over a range of 
multiple positions, discourses, and sites of struggle (Edgar and Sedgwick 1999 p. 302). They are part of 
a 'messy reality' of multiple identities (Peet and Watts 1993). Thus socialisation is not a sufficient 
explanation of why groups cooperate in matters of international environmental policy. 
Explanations from anthropology and development studies 
Examples from anthropology and development studies show that the practice of sharing or creating 
legitimacy, whether for oneself as an expert or for one's organisation, may also lead to international 
cooperation. In one of the few ethnographic studies of people in developing countries joining 
international policy networks, anthropologist Annelise Riles researched a group of Fijian bureaucrats 
and activists preparing for and participating in the United Nations Fourth World Conference on 
Women, part of a network called Pacific Women's Information/Communication Network 
67 
(PA WORNET). Riles (2000) showed how the participation in and existence of the network (which 
operated at national, Pacific regional and international level) became self-justifying, the network 
becoming more than the sum of its parts. The network was a formalisation of information flow and the 
dispersal of funds, for people to attend international meetings for instance (Riles 2000 p. 66-67). 
Exchanges of information between participants took on a different, more formal significance when 
conducted through the network than they would have had outside of it (Riles 2000 p. 66-67). By 
naming the network and engaging channels of communication, actors constituted it and legitimised it. 
Formalising the network shaped the pattern of activity undertaken, which centred on dispersing funds 
and on preparing documents such as the intergovernmental Pacific Platform for Action (Riles 2000 p. 
67). Riles was surprised to find that, during the course of their work, the negotiators she was studying 
failed to problematise that which "anthropologists describe under the rubric of global-local relations" 
(Riles 2000 p. 90). Instead they brought the local and global into view through aesthetic devices, a 
form of patterning that Riles likened to the layering of mats, woven from pandanus, on ceremonial 
Fijian occasions-each mat able to transmit information individually and collectively as layers are 
piled up. In constructing national and regional documents for the negotiations, the negotiators 
concentrated not on analytical rigour or political argument, but on pattern. "The work of producing 
properly patterned language was in the main a sorting exercise, in which language was cut, arranged or 
inserted to produce appropriate strings of words" and the right resonance-which included checking to 
see that phrases such as 'indigenous' appeared sufficient but not too many times (Riles 2000 p. 80). 
Riles added that concern with questions such as 'what it means to be female' and the possibilities for a 
utopian female project would seem utterly foreign to these document producers. "Rather, their interests 
would be in the document's production process, in its language and graphics, in its anticipated 
outcomes including future documents, and in of course in its funding sources" (Riles 2000 p. 17-18). 
Although not explicitly addressing motivations for cooperation, Riles' observations concentrate on 
sociality, shared codes of legitimation, and a shared culture amongst professionals working on the same 
issues that did not extend to sharing information outside their group or to extending their organisational 
connections and involving others (Riles 2000 p. 48-52). The network was, in effect a 'closed system' , 
the precise purpose of information exchange through the network rarely articulated by its members 
(Riles 2000 p. 50). In this sense, its activities were self-justifying. The network was also a mode of 
legitimation in the sense discussed here; by communicating with other NGOs, those involved shared 
not only their mutual identification as part of the network but also their codes of legitimacy. 
This illustrates how groups may cooperate in international efforts to address environmental problems 
represented as being global, in order to construct their legitimacy or to share codes of legitimation. The 
question of how organisations construct their legitimacy in order to continue influencing international 
policy is suppressed in the orthodox perspective of policymaking rooted in scientific planning, 
bureaucratic rationality, and the positivist language of cause and effect. In Development Studies there 
is, however, a theory about western agencies constructing their legitimacy through NGO networks 
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linking people in developing regions with those in developed ones. Townsend et al. (2003 p. 96) noted 
how NGO staff in rich countries and poor, working closely together and sharing interests and 
objectives, have built a community with a common vocabulary and ways of working (cf text box, p. 
52). Western-based NGOs have thus become a transmission channel for donor fashions, western 
concepts of development and for the new public management revolution with its performance 
indicators and auditing culture (Townsend et at. 2003). Expressed in the jargon of underdevelopment 
theory, they carry resources and authority from the core to the periphery, and information and 
legitimisation for donors' work from the periphery to the core (Tredt quoted in Townsend et al. 2003). 
Miller (2004 p. 83) was describing a similar phenomenon when he called technical assistance as 'a 
two-way street', citing the way international scientific data collection networks help relocalise global 
knowledge (he was referring, in particular, to meteorological networks). 
Various IGOs or NGOs may distract attention from the lack of democracy in their organisations by 
using rational planning processes to construct their legitimacy in an international system of 
policymaking. In doing so, they encourage groups based in developing countries to cooperate with 
them, through the allure (and the illusion of) being able to control, and change at will, the future. 
Conservation NGOs and scientific organisations may claim legitimacy through the traditional 
modes-representation, the law, and moral claims to promote the public interests. They may also, as 
professional organisations, claim it through competence and expertise (Edwards 2002). 
These examples, drawn from fields other than environmental policy, present a range of reasons why 
groups may work together in international environmental endeavours and suggest that cooperation and 
collaboration may not be equally beneficial for all parties. The way that various groups work 
cooperatively on international environmental policy matters therefore deserves careful empirical 
investigation, all the more so since this field of governance is believed to be changing rapidly, as 
discussed earlier. The following table summarises relevant questions on this and the other topics 
covered in this chapter. It also lists the subsequent chapters addressing each question. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the various ways in which orthodoxy (described in Chapter Two) limits our 
understanding of international environmental policy processes: in restricting understandings of the 
diversity of actors, assigning them to certain categories and roles; in assuming a distinction between 
science and policy that probably does not exist in reality; in being virtually silent about why groups 
cooperate in these policy endeavours, and in failing to recognise hegemony. In doing so, it has 
highlighted several matters which a study of coral reef policy could usefully investigate, which Table 
Five lists. This chapter has also begun to sketch out a counter-reading of international environmental 
policy, drawing on various bodies of social science literature that describe instances and types of 
hegemony, and various interests and political motivations. In the next chapter I build on these 
alternative perspectives, and on the various bodies of social theory introduced in Chapter One, to 
develop a suitable theoretical position from which to investigate coral reef policy critically. 
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TABLE 5: QUESTIONS RAISED BY TAKING A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LITERATURE 
Orthodox view (summarised Current critical thinking (in Questions raised by this Addressed 
in Chapter 2) this chapter) critical analysis in 
Chapters: 
The environment as a problem: how are problems constructed and globalised? 
International policy is a Problems are constlUcted or How are coral reefs being 8,11-13 
cooperative appropriate described in certain ways in constlUcted as a global problem 
response to a looming global order to favour certain actors requiring international 
environmental crisis; problems and policy interventions. In intervention to solve? How are 
are deemed to be global through glob ali sing problems, science locales such as the Fiji Islands 
scientific investigation and may be serving certain political being drawn into global 
scientifically-based predictions agendas problem specifications? 
What is the relationship between the identification of problems and the policy solutions proffered? 
A modernist commitment to Policies may, instead, be elite Are problems concerning coral 11-13 
problem-solving sees policy as strategies or they may be reefs identified and policy 
the appropriate way to respond ideologically based solutions proffered in a linear 
to problems; the rational model fashion, the ftrst preceding the 
of policy perceives a linear second? 
relationship 
Who do we understand the various actors to be and what do we understand heir interests to be? 
The players recognised in the People have multiple identities What groups are key influences 5-13 
model of governance as and allegiances; subjects on international coral reef 
territory are states, IGOs, dispersed over a range of policy? How do they create 
NGOs, scientists and businesses multiple positions and knowledge about the 
discourses. They constlUct dleir environment and environmental 
legitimacy in various ways problems; how do they define 
Organisations are contested appropriate policies? How do 
sites yet the literature obscures they constlUct their legitimacy? 
the political stance of various How do the images, stories, 
groups, including NGOs narratives and arguments they 
The relationship between constlUct reflect self-interest? 
professionalisation and policy How is professionalisation of 
approaches is litde studied international environmental 
policy affecting policy? 
Why do these actors work together cooperatively? 
The rational actor seeks to There is a variety of critical \Vhat social dynamics are 10-13 
harmonise interests, promote perspectives on why actors occurring within an outwardly 
collective security and save the cooperate ranging from the cooperative framework; what 
planet (or coral reefs at the simplistic idea that they are contestation is occurring and 
least). socialised into it to the what modes of power are being 
suggestion they seek to create exercised? 
legitimacy and justify 
themselves, their activities and 
their claims for support 
What socio-political roles do science and scientists play in international environmental policy? 
Science has a universal character Poor understanding of how How, in policy processes 6-13 
and there is widespread faith in science is being used to centred on particular issues and 
its ability to identify politicise policy and of the ecosystems, are people are using 
environmental problems, political commitments that expert knowledge and storylines 
account for them in a value-free assemble epistemic of science as political resources? 
way, and find solutions communities around many 
policy issues. 

Chapter Four 
A Base from which to Re-politicise International 
Environmental Policy 
I ntrod uction 
This chapter continues the process of re-politicising the field of international environmental policy, 
preparatory to the empirical analysis of coral reef policy. It first re-imagines Nature (coral reefs) then 
coral reef experts and, following that, re-conceptualises policy processes to enable these to be 
interrogated for evidence of hegemony. In these re-imaginations, several points of difficulty are 
encountered; I discuss how I address those, the theoretical tensions entailed, and points that remain 
unresolved. 
Coral Reefs at the Interface of Science and Politics 
THE REPRESENTATION OF CORAL REEFS IN SCIENCE/POLICY 
RE-IMAGINING CORAL REEF EXPERTS 
Conceptual ising, interrogating and Re-politicising Policy 
CONCEPTUALISING THE POLICY PROCESS ADEQUATELY FOR CRITICAL STUDY 
INVESTIGATING HEGEMONY 
Tensions and Difficulties 
TENSIONS BETWEEN MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST INQUIRY 
THE CONTROVERSY OF REPOLICITISING SCIENCE AND NATURE 
PROBLEMATIC TERMINOLOGY 
Conclusion 
Coral Reefs at the Interface of Science and Politics 
THE REPRESENTATION OF CORAL REEFS IN SCIENCE/POLICY 
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Using a broad notion of the politics of nature, discussed in Chapter One, allows me to investigate how 
nature (at least that part of nature known as coral reefs) is politicised through science and conservation 
in such a way that it lends support to the ideology of modernisation. The first step in this re-
politicisation sensu Latour is to describe how the notion of coral reefs found in science/policy is a 
representation produced through scientific practice. 
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Coral reefs-complex, multi-dimensional phenomena, found in varying configurations covering many 
square kilometres of coastal waters in geographically different regions-are real phenomena that 
require knowledge to describe. The following box explains how science defines a coral reef, outlining 
lack of agreement over a definition. 
WHAT IS A CORAL REEF? 
The World Atlas !if Coral Reefs suggests that recognising a coral reef is simple: 
From land or from the air, reefs are usually clearly visible, marked by a complex patterning 
of bright colours. These arrays of blues, turquoises and greens delimit a diverse and 
complex physical structure coming close to the ocean surface. The shallowest points are 
frequently shown by the brilliant white of breaking surf, and may even briefly become dry 
land during the lowest tides. From underwater tlle complexity is still more clearly shown-
reefs are typified by the presence of large stony corals growing in profusion and by an often 
bewildering array of species growing or moving among them (Spalding et al. 2001 p. 15). 
Scientists tend to describe reefs not by their appearance from above the water, but by geological and 
biological attributes (Kleypas et al. 2001 p. 427). A common description sees coral reefs as 'massive 
shallow water limestone structures with a high coral diversity' (Veron 1986 p. 27). The reef itself is an 
ill sitll build-up of carbonate matter, consolidated and cemented. Resistant to waves, it provides 
topographical relief, and a foundation for a living framework of interlocking coral and algal colonies 
along ,vith sessile organisms and fish (Kleypas et al. 2001 p. 427). Scientists also define coral reefs by 
their environmental requirements: they occur in warm seas, in well-lit locations; since corals need 
sunlight to live, they grow in shallow water where light can penetrate (Veron 1986 p. 55; Kleypas et al. 
2001 p. 427). Some count deep water coral aggregations as reefs. Although these may be large, they are 
mostly non-reef building, living ,vithout sunlight in ocean depths (Veron 2000 p. 27; Spalding et al. 
2001 p. 1). Although the degradation of some of deepwater, non-photosynthesising reefs in temperate 
areas has received international attention recently, I have limited this study to tropical and subtropical 
reefs. 
Yet in science, there is no single, definitive explanation of what a coral reef is, and where one begins 
and ends. Hence, the question of whether or not coral reefs exist is not a trite one. Could not the 
phenomenon that scientists are seeking to describe actually be a set of diverse phenomena best called 
by other names? I have, however, assumed that coral reefs do exist, because in diving and snorkelling 
around, and flying over, several islands in the South Pacific I have seen natural features which seem to 
correspond to descriptions of coral reefs in the scientific literature. Collectively tllese images give me a 
visual picture of coral reefs according sufficiently with the subjects of various discourses about coral 
reef degradation for me to consider them to be the same natural feature. 
73 
Science's inability to know the full extent of the reality of coral reefs 
Scientific survey, monitoring and experimentation can only ever reach an approximate knowledge of 
coral reefs. Elements of the biophysical remain to some degree inaccessible to science. When 
environmental problems are on the 'margins of observability', there tends to be more uncertainty and a 
potentially higher level of social constructedness (Jones 2002 p. 249). Corals reefs are certainly on 
these margins, as the following text box describes. 
THE DIFFICULTIES OF OBSERVING CORAL REEFS 
As land-dwelling, air-breathing creatures, we have limited ability to directly perceive coral reefs. In the 
early nineteenth century, the European travellers who helped amass details about the structure of reefs 
and the habits of corals-Beechey, Chamisso, Quoy and Gaimard, Darwin and others-largely 
obtained knowledge of reefs indirectly. They platched around the shallows, hung over the edges of 
small boats, dredged up specimens or caught them with hook and line, in nets, or on sticks coated with 
tallow. Darwin (1890 p. 63-8) measured water depths with a leadline, examined coral fragments cast 
ashore during storms, and studied uplifted fossil reefs. 
Today, we use specialised equipment to aid our limited sight, mobility, and inability to breathe oxygen 
from water. We can observe the calmer parts of the upper reef zone if we use a mask to keep the salt 
water out of our eyes, and a snorkel to ease breathing. \Ve can observe parts below free-diving depth, 
by using scuba gear-compressed air down to around 30 metres deep or m1.'Ced gases to 100 metres. 
But diving time is limited by the build-up of nitrogen in the blood. And not everyone has the capability 
of swimming or diving; the underwater observation of reefs is the domain of those who feel at home 
both in the water and with the equipment needed. 
Also, plankton and particles in the water often restrict visibility, and perceptions of colour, distance and 
size are different to those noted on land. In clear water, the maximum range of vision for a diver or 
camera is about 60 metres. Although most parts of a reef have clear water, visibility close to urban 
areas and river mouths is usually less than 15 metres, often as little as seven (Kenchington 1990 p. 36). 
Furthermore, human locomotion is slower in water than on land; divers cover less territory in a certain 
time than a person walking on land. Researchers have developed methods to compensate for this, 
using manta board tows or underwater scooters to cover large areas. 
\Ve can see something of a reef, taste and feel the salt water, experience the buoyancy of our body, feel 
the wave energy when surfing the crest of a reef, and the seemingly-solid reef structure if we have the 
misfortune to strike it when boating or swimming. \Ve can recognise dead corals, from hurricanes and 
bleaching for instance. Other phenomena are more difficult to recognise directly: the minuscule (the 
presence of disease organisms, the departure of zooxanthallae from corals (explained in Chapter Five)) 
the mobile (changes in density of fish species) and the hidden (cryptic species living under coral 
colonies or in crevices, including those that have nocturnal feeding patterns). 
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Psychology has provided an insight into how science informs human society about nature, and into our 
own ability to know nature through direct observation. Even when an objective reality of nature exists, 
that reality is not necessarily something that people can directly observe. Part of the reason for this is 
that certain natural features such as coral reefs are difficult for most people to observe, as discussed in 
the text box. Furthermore, the senses are not all that determine the perceptual experience that observers 
have in the act of seeing/ sensing. Two people may interpret the same visual data differently because an 
observer's perceptual experience depends on factors such as past experiences, knowledge, and 
expectations. Previous experience and learning also determine the operational definitions and language 
that are used to convey what is observed. Belief in certain scientific theories may also affect how 
people observing natural phenomena order their observations; so too may their religious beliefs and 
their concept of the relationship between themselves and nature. For these reasons, science can never 
know the full reality of coral reefs, it can only represent them to some approximate degree. 
Although there is a biophysical reality for reefs, the full extent of this is unknowable to humans-we 
cannot through science (or any other method) know it fully. This is not a position of complete 
relativism (the belief that reality has absolutely no meaning apart from what is believed to be real by 
some groups of believers) because some aspects of nature and of coral reefs are obviously not socially 
constructed-those aspects we perceive through direct perception such as the physical shape of coral 
colonies and the salty, wet nature of their seawater environment (cf. Milton 1996 p. 54). We cannot 
change some aspects of our environment by constructing different truths and meanings of it; we cannot, 
for instance, will coral reefs out of the way just as the thin hull of our yacht is about to strike sharp, 
abrasive corals. Thus the representation of coral reefs used in science/policy is just that, a 
representation of a biophysical reality, the full extent of which is unknown and unknowable to 
humans. 
The contingency of science in knowing nature 
In understanding how scientific survey, monitoring and research contribute representations of coral 
reefs to policy processes, arguments in social science about the contingency of those processes are 
important. For example, Thomas Kuhn showed how the approach of 'normal science'-working on 
minute scientific problems within established theories, using standard scientific techniques and 
procedures of gathering, sorting, processing, and applying information, all subject to peer-
review-controls both the boundaries of accepted work and its quality (Sardar 2000 p. 27, 30, 72). 
Kuhn pointed out how scientists are generally constrained in the kinds of experiments they perform, the 
questions they ask, and the problems they consider important. This is because they work within an 
established paradigm, a set of shared assumptions, beliefs, dogmas, conventions, and theories (Sardar 
2000 p. 28-29). They also work with certain concepts of nature, such as systems ecology discussed in 
Chapter Two. As a result, they produce certain representations of nature. 
This has led to some extreme arguments about the ability of science to produce true knowledge. For 
example, philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, who linked progress in science to acts of 
irrationality in the same way that Kuhn did, considered science to be only one tradition and one view 
amongst many, refusing to privilege it as a form of activity capable of producing true knowledge 
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(Oldroyd 1986 [1989 reprint] p. 336-337; Feyerabend 1993 p. viii). Rather than disputing whether 
science can produce true knowledge, others studying science (in social studies of science, social 
constructionism, and cultural studies) have concentrated on showing how scientific practice constructs 
knowledge, revealing its ideological and value-laden character. These commentators have emphasised 
the contingency of scientific practices producing knowledge of nature. 
Moreover, Latour (1987) points out that, as a discipline, science represents nature differently when it 
looks forward (to the future) and backwards (to the past). Science's backward glance shows nature 
confirming the results of science since, looking backwards, one can say that the conditions of truth 
were met because the hypotheses of science were true. In contrast, science's forward glance presents a 
very different picture in which the results that hold (e.g. under the conditions of replicated 
measurements or experiments) are called 'nature'. This tells us of the sheer contingency of the process 
in which science decides on the way things are (Feenberg 2003 p.78). Here, then, is a view contrary to 
scientific realism's suggestion that science is able to describe an objective reality for coral reefs, a truth 
that is value-neutral, based upon direct, impersonal, and, in that sense, objective observation o~ an 
independent reality. It supports the suggestion that the notion of coral reefs used in science/policy is a 
representation of reality. Chapters Six and Eight investigate these representations in some detail. 
Yet, as Demeritt (2001) observed 'socially constructed' has become synonymous with artificial and 
untrue. Yet "must because our knowledge of something is socially constructed and contingent, this 
does not [necessarily] mean that it must be false or unworthy of belief' (Demeritt 2001 p. 32, text in 
square parentheses added to emphasise the contingency). Nor does the ideology and values embedded 
in science/policy's representation of nature automatically invalidate that policy. After all, policy 
allocates values, as Easton (1953 p. 130) discussed when he defined policy as a web of decisions and 
actions. 
RE-IMAGINING CORAL REEF EXPERTS 
Having recognised 'coral reefs' in science/policy as a representation, the next step in constructing a 
theoretical argument about policy is to re-imagine coral reef experts. In this I start with the syncretism 
of science and policy. 
The syncretism of science and policy 
When investigating the social arrangements and practices internal to organisations where science, 
politics and policy mix, I treat the relationship between science and politics in matters of international 
environmental policy as one of hybridisation. Work emerging in the philosophy of science studies 
(discussed in the previous chapter) acknowledges how scientific and policy rhetoric blend into one 
another; scientific papers about coral reefs contain recommendations for management, for example. 
Rather than trying to maintain an artificial distinction based on ideal-type concepts of science and 
policy, I accept this syncretism as a reality and concentrate on its technical practices and its 
rhetoric-analysing texts and practices that lead to certain constructions. I do not attempt to draw any 
hard-and-fast boundaries between this syncretic reality and some ideal-type field of practice known as 
scientific research. 
This sets the scene for acknowledging coral reef experts who operate at the interface of science and 
policy: people labelled as scientists who are active in policy talk, in policy practices, in designing, 
refining and advocating certain policy technologies and management tools, as well as in the more 
'traditional' activities of research and publishing scientific accounts of that work. For, as well as re-
imagining coral reefs, I need to re-imagine the notion of coral reef experts found in scientific realism, 
in accounts of capacity building and in modernisation theory. 
The expert in modernity 
76 
In Western social theories, the expert is someone who can aid modernisation (efficiency, innovation 
and growth), using its standard tools (science and instrumental reason) (Banuri 1990 p. 86). 
Modernisation theory sees the legitimate purpose of international science as being limited to matters of 
peace, prosperity and the maintenance of social order. This perspective, which is derived from the 
concepts of liberal democracy and neoliberal institutionalism, legitimates networks of experts, 
transnational epistemic communities, such as those centred on environmental issues described by Haas. 
As a result of this view of science's purpose, in matters of international environmental policy, expert 
cooperation carried out in accordance with the expectations of intergovernmental harmonisation, 
technical assistance and international coordination of scientific research is widely viewed as being 
beyond and above politics (Miller 2001). 
Modernisation theory'S whole thrust is towards increasing differentiation in socio-political systems, 
expanding the expert/lay public divide (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987 p. 279). Its expert, an agent of 
modernity, relies on impersonal, universal and 'objective' knowledge and derives authority from the 
concept of abstract neutrality by referring to scientific truths and utilising cognitive or instrumental 
reasoning. This expert is a member of a profession, an institution that develops and provides scientific 
and rational solutions to social (and environmental) problems (Lo 2004). This notion of expertise 
implies a partitioning of knowledge; the legitimacy of the expert is derived from the belief that he/she 
has a claim to a superior understanding of certain phenomenon, social and/or environmental (Banuri 
1990 p. 97). Thus we have the expert in fisheries management, the aquaculture expert who can culture 
large numbers of desired organisms, the development planner, and so forth. In recognising an expert as 
an authority 'on' something, we are announcing and confirming someone who may rightly expect to be 
believed on a particular topic or item (Barnes 1986 p. 185). 
Environmental experts create elite ways of knowing about the environment and people's relationships 
to it, ways that generally cannot be used by those subject people themselves (ibid). In late modernity, 
this notion of specialised expertise has rendered ordinary people of industrialised countries 
incompetent in dealing with contemporary ecological and technological hazards (Beck 1992 p. 53-55). 
Indeed, the radical modernism of this period has produced ecopathology, which sees eco-symptoms 
breaking out everywhere in the mundane routines of contemporary society in industrialised 
countries-symptoms that need expert attention not just to treat but to recognise their significance 
(Myerson 2001 p. 50-51, 54). This is part of what anthropologists have called the citadel problem: 
prevailing modes of theorising about science, technology and medicine have displaced societal issues 
and concerns into expert and often expensive technical problems, thereby isolating participation and 
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discussion while transforming the stakes involved (Downey and Dumit 1997 p. 6). One effect of this is 
that science often appears as a culture of no culture, developed according to autonomous logics apart 
from society, researchers' deliberations free from cultural content (ibid). This reflects the diffusion 
model of knowledge: bright, well-trained people inside the academy create knowledge which then 
diffuses outside through mechanisms of education, popularisation, policy and the impacts of new 
technologies (ibid). This diffusion model of knowledge is similar to the diffusion (lesson-drawing) 
model of policy mentioned in Chapter Two; according to the latter, the learned diffuse policy to 
developing countries through capacity-building etcetera. The diffusion model of knowledge, like the 
diffusion model of international policy, accords with the theory of modernisation. 
Extending the reading of 'the expert' 
There is, however, a broader way of perceiving experts than that provided by modernisation theory and 
this acultural diffusion model. This broader conception relies upon seeing experts as people in certain 
fields of knowledge sensu Foucault, accorded a central status (a position of authority) by the factors 
that made possible the objects and concepts of that particular knowledge system in the first place. 
Analysing what those factors are reveals how certain people achieve 'expert' status. 
In addition to the theorisation of modernisation, various other factors, outlined in Chapter Two, 
permitted international environmental policy to become such a knowledge system. One such factor was 
the rise of ecology as a tool in the race to save the planet; ecology has its own experts who thus gain a 
central place as experts in environmental policy processes. Moreover, the belief that scientific 
knowledge, if communicated, will lead to ecological sustainable societies, confers the authority of 
environmental policy expertise to those who communicate scientific knowledge-the experts that 
Litfin calls 'knowledge brokers' (1994 p. 4). 
In the modern world, experts have a professional authority that is dependent upon a particular 
professional-laity relationship (Lo 2004). Post-colonial attitudes have created the particular 
professional-Third World laity relationship that underpins international policy matters concerned with 
developing countries. Those attitudes accord a central place to those who claim to be authorities in 
solving the environmental problems of developing countries. Thus we have experts in marrying 
conservation and development, for instance, who automatically become acknowledged as experts in 
international environmental policy. 
This, then, is a much broader interpretation of the 'expert' in environmental policy matters than 
modernisation theory alone allows. An expert is someone placed in that position by a particular 
professional-Third World laity relationship entailed in post -colonial attitudes and/or by the rise of 
ecology. We can also see experts as hybrid creatures operating in the hybrid field of science/policy 
(including conservation science/policy) (Chapter Three). This repoliticises science/policy experts in 
much the same way as Latour (2004) wants to repoliticise science. In using Latour's view of science as 
a highly politicised field of endeavour as a point of departure for this study, I reject the idea that 
experts only purvey scientific truths based on reliable science and accurate statistics, or only seek 
rational and scientific solutions to social problems in a neutral and objective manner. Rather, I see them 
as part of a political assembly around the notion of an ecological crisis, participating in policy 
endeavours in ways that require empirical investigation (cf. Latour and Weibel 2005). 
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Latour (1993) offers another insight into experts in modern society, writing of their 'invincibility'; his 
argument is dense and I only give an oversight here; later chapters illuminate it through empirical 
inquiry and Chapter 13 summarises those insights. "By separating the relations of political power from 
the relations of scientific reasoning while continuing to shore up power with reason and reason with 
power, the moderns have always had two irons in the fire. They have become invincible" (Latour 1993 
p. 38). They have become so by making invisible the acts of mediation and translation and the 
networks by which claims are transformed into facts These acts (explained in the box below), Latour 
(1993 p. 37) calls "the unthinkable, the unconscious of the moderns" since they are rarely thought 
about or acknowledged. This invincibility, in Latour's view, derives from the dichotomy between 
nature and society which modern society has established, explained in the following text box. 
LATOUR'S PERSPECTIVE ON MODERN SOCIETY 
According to Latour (1993), in establishing a dichotomy between nature and society, we 
(intellectuals in modem society) employ two sets of practices. Latour calls the first, 'works of 
translation or mediation', the creation of hybrids, networks and 'collectives'. The second he calls 
'the work of purification', the establishment and maintenance of the dichotomy between non-
humans and nature on the one hand, and humans, culture, society and politics on the other. 
Latour makes the point that although, when we think about dichotomies explicidy, we tend to do 
so only in terms of the 'work of purification', we overlook how that set of practices depends on 
the other set. Each set of operations (translation and purification) depends on, rather than being 
an alternative to, the other. \V'ithout translation, hybridisation and mediation, 'the practices of 
purification would be fruidess or poindess'; without purification 'the work of translation would be 
slowed down, limited or even ruled out (Latour 1993 p. 11). Latour's model of the Constitution 
of modem thought (defming humans and non-humans, their properties and their relations, their 
abilities and their groupings) helps us understand the dynamics of oppositions like nature/ society 
(also agency/structure) and how the problems with dichotomies derive from only perceiving part 
of the Constitution, rather than all of it (van Krieken 2002 p. 255). His Constitution of modem 
knowledge consists of three resultant 'guarantees': (1) even though we construct nature, nature is 
as if we did not construct it; (2) even though we did not construct society, society is as if we did 
construct it; and (3) nature and society must remain absolutely distinct; the work of purification 
must remain absolutely distinct from the work of mediation (Latour 1993 p. 32; van Krieken 2002 
p. 264). Nature and society can dlUS alternate at will between being 'hard' and 'soft', one 
determining the other, or the reverse, to suit our needs at the time and place (Latour 1993 p. 32-
26; van Krieken 2002 p. 264). This is what Latour's calls the 'invincibility of the modems' (Latour 
calls those whose life is shaped by this constitution of modem, western society, 'the modems'). 
Conceptualising, Interrogating and Re-politicising Policy 
CONCEPTUALISING THE POLICY PROCESS ADEQUATELY FOR CRITICAL STUDY 
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Re-imagining international environmental policy as a socio-political process requires more than just re-
imaging coral reefs and coral reef experts, however. This act of stepping outside the orthodox version 
of the discourse of global environmental policy requires a suitable model of the policy process, one that 
sees beyond the normative conception of international cooperation. Chapter One described how 
common model of international environmental policy processes has an instrumental view of both 
policy and the policy process. Its hierarchical view of policymaking rests on the idea of governance as 
territorial order, produced from a territorial synchrony of politico-administrative institutions, societal 
processes and cultural adherence (as described by Hajer 2003). It sees the UN's centralised, 
technocratic style of environmental managerialism as a natural quest for planetary order; similarly it 
sees international conservation efforts as cooperative problem-solving for the good of humankind. This 
model is thus unable to acknowledge how this international policymaking might be hegemonic. 
Any policy model derived from a modernist, problem-solving orientation that assumes that problems 
are objective, sees policy as rational problem-solving rather than as an exercise of power. Moreover, 
such a model defines an effective implementation process as one with methods and systems of 
controlling conflict and helping groups resolve their differences, in order to put a policy into action 
(Parsons 1995 p. 470). Such models reduce conflict and bargaining to a single teleological 
purpose-achieving shared goals-thus masking how tensions and conflict shape policy processes. 
There are, however, other models of the policy process that do not exhibit the same problems as these 
two, and which recognise relationships besides cooperation. One view, a political perspective applied 
to public policy, centres on the idea that policy is part of on-going processes of negotiation, bargaining 
and compromise amongst multiple self-interested decision-makers with differing amounts of power and 
authority (Dobuzinskis 1992). This model is based upon the idea that groups and individuals all seek to 
maximise their power and influence; decisions reached are politically feasible rather than desirable; 
they are not necessarily rational (Ham and Hill 1993 p. 67) (Parsons 1995 p. 470). 
Also insightful is the notion that policy is not necessarily the deliberate outcome of grand strategy; 
chance may also playa role-policy may result merely because certain people were in certain places at 
certain times (Coleman and Perl 1999 p. 707). March and Olsen built on this idea when they developed 
their 'garbage can' model of policy formulation. Beginning with the assumption that the level of 
intentionality, comprehension of problems, and predictability of relations often assumed among policy 
actors does not exist in reality, they argued that decision opportunities are a garbage can into which 
participants dump various problems and solutions (March and Olsen 1979 quoted in Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995 p. 144-145). This emphasises the non-rational (but not completely irrational) nature of 
policy, based on convenience and ritualised decision-making behaviour (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 p. 
139-141,144-145). 
In approaching international policy crossing national boundaries as something more than a cooperative 
and rational exercise in problem-solving, elements of both March and Olsen's and Dobuzinski's 
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perspectives are useful: policy heavily influenced by ritualised decision-making and by what is 
politically feasible-politics as the art of the possible in which chance and contingency also play roles. 
But this cannot perceive of the people involved in policy as being 'dispersed' over a range of multiple 
positions, discourses, and sites of struggle, as post-structuralism does. 
Post-structuralism and policy 
In post-structuralism, reality is a configuration of discursive practices that constitute, and exercise 
power over, subjects (Jones 1993 p. 118). The idea that policy is part of a larger discourse is the basis 
for Chapter Two's description of international environmental policy. In this, there are similarities to 
postcolonial studies' insistence on the power of the discursive (e.g. Darby 2003; 2004). 
Foucault and others have explained how discourses shape (enable and constrain) the way we think and 
talk about the world (Jones 1993 p. 106). Discourses thus both enable and constrain policy-talk and 
policy outcomes. Discourse enables environmental policy by conceptualising it as a way of addressing 
environmental problems. The global environmental policy discourse justifies the optimism that 
scientists, through policy, may be able to control nature despite the latter's complexity, thus saving the 
planet from human mistakes. The discourse justifies efforts to universalise policy and transfer it to 
areas far away, as universal panacea. In this, policy works through universals, knowledge that moves 
across localities and cultures, forming channels of communication. Universals (a term that contrasts 
with particular) are abstract properties and relations, particulars the concrete things that exemplify 
them (Bullock et al. 1988 p. 885). Universals are local knowledge in the sense that they cannot be 
understood without the benefit of historically-specific cultural assumptions. But through the forging of 
universals, policy is able to not only travel the globe-as aspirations and unfinished works, universals 
must travel across differences and distances (Tsing 2005 p. 7)-but to transcend culture. 
As well as enabling policy, the global environmental policy discourse constrains our understanding of 
how the policy-talk and policy practices of that field are political processes (Chapter Three). 
Discourses constrain policy-talk and policy outcomes, by setting an envelope within which only certain 
scenarios are visible and by providing the framework for those concepts, heuristics, stylistic devices, 
stories, narratives. They categorise both nature and people, set the context for intervention and 
prescribe suitable forms of intervention and thus of agency, and administer silences. As determinants of 
what can and cannot be thought, discourses also define the range of policy options available to policy-
makers, invoking the political activity of naming and classifying (Litfin 1994 p. 13; Shore and Wright 
1997 p. 22 quoting Apthorpe without citing a reference for his work). 
Yet, discourses, by themselves do not determine policy, agency does. Agency determines what 
concepts, stylistic devices, stories and narratives are used and how problems are framed. Although 
discourses provide the framework, agents initiate, apply and disseminate rhetorical strategies (Litfin 
1994 p. 40). When there are multiple discourses circulating in the policy sphere, agency is important in 
determining which particular problem-framings, policy approaches and solutions enter in to 'official' 
policy. Those engaged in policy practices have some choice over which discursive and stylistic devices 
they draw upon. Furthermore, interactions amongst groups of people-discussions, allocated roles, 
formal decision-making processes-all have some effect on policy framing and on outcomes. 
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Additionally, what a discourse does, whom it acts upon, the forms of resistance it meets (if any) are all 
open to transformation (McHoul and Grace 1998 p. 46). Although a multitude of acts over time by 
different agents is required to transform a discourse, discourses may change, and new discourses 
emerge. The technical practices of science and conservation, for example, shape the agency of experts 
in international environmental policy and they have the potential to transform the discourse of global 
environmental policy. 
Yet, agency is downplayed in Foucault's conceptualisation of discourses as knowledge/power 
complexes, which have little sense of the complexity of plural discourses, power relations within 
society, or the social context in which many discourses and practises proliferate; they therefore lack an 
adequate model to tease out links between different discourses, social groups and institutions 
(Swingewood 2000 p. 200). When discourse is disengaged from agency in this way, a functional and 
teleological explanation is implied, the discursive formations constituting the needs and purposes of 
modern disciplinary society (Swingewood 2000 p. 200). This produces some extreme interpretations, 
as in Escobar (1995) and Sachs (1992) who see science and its associated institutions as somehow 
monolithic and integrated, simply reproducing relations of power due to their historic location (Leach 
and Fairhead 2000 p. 36). 
Although post-structuralism is useful in examining the relationship between policy and discourse, a 
sense of agency is too important to overlook. If instead we put the people who act, rather than actions, 
in the centre of a theory of society this allows societies to be seen as networks, and policy as the output 
of those networks of people. This links back to Latour's argument that critics of modernity need to 
make visible the acts of mediation and translation and the networks by which claims are transformed 
into facts that modern thought has rendered invisible (Latour 1993 p. 37). Thus, while a post-
structuralist analysis of policy is useful, it is far more so if combined with an approach focusing on 
people, networks, connections and flows. 
The approach taken in Peet's critical policy 
One of those who draws upon, but seeks to extend, Foucault's notion of the expert production 
discourse in explaining policy is radical geographer Richard Peet. In developing a framework for 
analysing international policy, Peet is trying to move Gramscian notions of the social production of 
hegemonic commonsense in the direction of expertly-produced Foucauldian discourses (Peet 2004). 
According to Gramsci, a hegemon successfully projects their own particular way of seeing the world, 
human and social relationships, in such a way that those whom it subordinates accept this as 
'commonsense', part of the natural order (Bullock et al. 1988 p. 379). It is possible to extend this 
notion of hegemonic commonsense to cover people socialised into policy positions as Peet et at. (2003) 
attempt for international economic policy emanating from Washington DC. But more than that, when 
investigating how international policy arises as an instrument of governance, Gramsci's notion of 
hegemonic commonsense can be applied to the everyday work of those influencing policy across 
national boundaries and/or within international agencies. These agents exercise control in a way that 
projects their own particular way of seeing the world, human and social relationships with the result 
that this is accepted as 'commonsense' and part of the natural order by those who are, in fact, 
subordinated by it. 
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Peet (2004 p. 18) suggests that policy produced by experts with particular political beliefs appears as 
commonsense not only through the symbolic representations it employs, but also through the aura of 
responsibility accrued to it as an apparently pragmatic approach representing the common good. He 
(2001) attributes the hegemonic depth of a discourse to its ability to restrict serious, 'responsible' 
consideration to a limited range of topics or, more generally, to its ability to specify the parameters of 
the practical, realistic and sensible among linked groups of theoreticians, policymakers and practicians. 
In a study of international economic policy titled Unholy Trinity, Peet and his students (2003 p.17, 201-
204) explain how the economic hegemony of neoliberalism is achieved. They suggested that the depth 
of hegemony in policymaking resides in the ability of a discursive formation to specify the parameters 
of the practical, the realistic and the sensible, limiting thought and expression: 
Positive reinforcement and negative compulsions of silence are concentrated in 'discursive 
restricted spaces' -places where insider status is paramount, where only one discourse is 
effectively permitted, where critical discussion is limited to variants of a given discourse, 
where other positions are disciplined as irresponsible, and where using a different discursive 
terminology means that real critics are simply not heard (ibid). 
Peet's model rests on a neo-Marxist centre-periphery model of the world, categorising social 
interactions into the binary pattern of hegemony and counter-hegemonic resistance. In the dialectical· 
perspective of the neo-Marxist model, societal dynamics emerge from contradictory oppositions, crises, 
and social conflicts (Peet and Watts 1993 p. 242). (Possibly, this derives from European Enlightenment 
logical tradition which expresses a self searching for power over that which is 'other' (Peet and Watts 
1993 p. 229,242». Hinchcliffe (2000 p. 221) observes that this dialecticism treats areas labelled as 
resistant margins as distinct regions that are somehow (still) beyond the core, independent entities 
fighting to maintain their independence from that core. This presents the world as a collection of pre-
constituted objects, the background contexts of which somehow magically help to explain the 
shortcomings of ensuing orders rendered visible through a grid of causal powers (Hinchcliffe 2000 p. 
221). Thus the dialectical perspective of the neo-Marxist model is based upon a teleological view of a 
world where the margins, although resisting the core, are nevertheless being shaped and defined by its 
capitalism. Furthermore, this perspective precludes thinking of reality as a more complex entanglement 
of relationships-dispersed rather than centred power. 
A politics of connectivity: the concept of relational power 
A recent issue of Geografiska Anna/er addressed this difficulty by utilising the notion of relational 
space and power. Allen's (2004 p. 31) views of power as neither centred nor dispersed but as a 
relational effect of interaction able to be traced through its connections, suggests a way of investigating 
how power is exercised over space. Instead of a binary model of the policy processes that recognises 
only impact or resistance, this provides a model that conceptualises power relations exercised through a 
variety of different modes, each of which is constituted differently in time and space (Allen 2004). 
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This issue of Geografiska Annaler addresses another difficulty, that associated with analysing the 
interface between the global and a particular 'local' or locale (e.g. the Fiji archipelago). That interface 
is problematic for reasons not just semantic (as mentioned in Chapter One) and methodological (which 
I address in the manner described in the text box following). The global and the local are problematic 
because they are ambiguous concepts-scales, processes, and levels of analysis as well as places or 
locations (Escobar 2001 p. 152). As geographers are aware, scales are socially constructed as are places 
(Rankin 2003). Furthermore, as Kelly (1999 p. 396) observed: "Too often we read about global 
processes and local processes as if the two followed separate logics" -as if a dividing line could be 
drawn between these. Social processes-environmental policy processes are essentially social in 
nature-that operate at global scales do not play out separately to those at local scales. 
To address this, I have grounded the study in particular conceptualisations of the global and the local, 
in order to incorporate both an agency of place sensu Massey (2004), as well as a sense of power as a 
relational effect of social interaction sensu Allen (2004). To Massey, spatial identities are forged in a 
relational way, internally complex, essentially unbounded in any absolute sense, inevitably historically 
changing. Rather than place being concrete or grounded, Massey sees it as a meeting point, the location 
at which disparate trajectories intersect. She sees the global as local, global space being no more than 
the sum of relations, connection, embodiments and practices (Massey 2004 p. 8). 
As a spatial entity, the outer edges of reefs in the Fiji archipelago define an inside-outside boundary. 
One can imagine influences arriving from outside the archipelago: policy ideas, knowledge, 
information, and funds originating 'outside' and crossing the boundary into Fiji. The technologies by 
which they arrive may be recent innovations-the Internet and email-or older technologies such as 
journals and books published internationally, people travelling to international conferences and 
meetings, letters posted and telephone calls made. The archipelago is a defined place. But this 
boundedness does not capture any sense of a politics of connectivity. In a study of international policy 
connecting with the Fiji Islands, it is too easy to see the archipelago as the product of the global, 
moulded by global forces arriving from outside. Instead, when observed through Massey's lens, the Fiji 
Islands' locations with which international policy initiatives connect are neither the victim of 
globalisation nor a centre of resistance fighting off those forces. They are instead a moment in which 
the global is constituted, invented, co-ordinated, produced (Massey 2004 p. 11). In most of the matters 
concerned with Fijian coral reefs, Suva, Fiji's capital, proved to be the place in which international 
policy initiatives first connect with the local when they crossed the outer boundary of the reefs ringing 
the Fijian archipelago. Thus Suva represents what Amin (2004 p. 43) called a distinctive 'nodal 
formation' in a study of the politics of connectivity, a place locked into a multitude of relational 
networks of varying geographical reach. Combined with an ethnographic methodology (below), this 
provides a way of studying the connections being forged in international policy processes (Level 1 in 
Table 1). It complements a post-structuralist approach to the second level of inquiry, investigating the 
paradigms and discourses used to discuss international environmental issues, to construct values and 
identities, identify interests, and assign rights, responsibilities and roles. 
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In studying this type of international society in which physical contact may be intermittent but 
communications, discursive and material influences may be prolific, global ethnography's notion of 
modes of cultural interconnection across the world is helpful. Social studies of science, particularly the 
sociology of scientific knowledge and actor-network studies, provide another useful perspective. 
Latour suggests the utility of thinking about how, in international environmental policy, hybrids of 
nature and culture are created and mixed into networks, and those networks lengthened to enrol people 
from places near and far, while all the time the dichotomy between nature and society is shored up. 
METHODOLOGY: POLICY AS A SPATIAL PHENOMENON 
Distinguishing between the international and the Fiji arena of policy, I used different 
methodologies to explore each, to limit the research to a manageable project. I concentrated field 
research on Fiji Islands sites. In researching how coral reef policy is arising from other 
international sites (the offices of multilateral organisations, secretariats of environmental regimes, 
and policy offices of major consel"Vation NGOs for instance), I mainly examined 
documentation-meeting agendas and reports, speech notes, brochures, and published articles, 
and I attended the 10d} International Coral Reef Symposium held in Okinawa, Japan in June-July 
2004. To study the policy at the Fiji Islands end, I positioned myself not as an insider as many 
anthropologists do, but as a fringe observer, an occasional attendee at meetings, an interviewer, a 
conversationalist, and an enthusiastic seeker of written material (unpublished papers, conference 
reports, meeting minutes, brochures, project documentation)-all the time known as an 
environmental researcher working 'at home' (Evetts Place, Suva). In tllls way I was able to 
maintain a certain distance, overcoming the problem that ethnographers of globalisation face in 
researching everyday and familiar knowledge practices-the impulse to render the everyday strange 
and exotic in order that it might be apprehended as ethnography (Riles 2000 p. 5). Working from 
written texts as much as oral ones also helped provide the intellectual distance needed for tllls 
analysis. This tactic proved particularly important because, although I explained my work carefully 
to all I interviewed and met at workshops, and although I got better at distilling and 
communicating the essence of it, in three years of PhD research in Suva I never encountered 
anyone whom I felt understood what it was I was seeking to do. In the jargon of critical analysis, 
all were immersed in the orthodox version of the discourse to an extent that precluded both 
reflexive, critical self-analysis and comprehension of my approach. 
INVESTIGATING HEGEMONY 
Notions of hegemony in international relations: conflicting interpretations 
Even as the political nature of international environmental policy starts to become visible through the 
use of post-structural perspectives on discourse analysis and through Chapter Three's review of 
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anthropological and 'alternative' accounts in various social science disciplines, some fundamental 
difficulties remain in investigating hegemony. A key difficulty arises from the various concepts of 
hegemony found in certain International Relations perspectives. Walker (2002) analysed how notions 
of modern politics in this discipline express the international as a normative account of the 'proper' 
relationship between equality and inequality, with hegemony as one reading of the way in which the 
international system is constituted. Anarchy is another reading. As Walker (2002 p. 22) explains, the 
hegemony narrative in International Relations portrays the legitimacy of hegemons as a condition of 
international order as long as that order remains pluralistic; in other words, one cannot have order 
without hegemony. On occasions, this narrative takes the form of 'hegemonic stability theory', arguing 
that a dominant power or hegemon must be able to and willing to bear the 'cost' of providing 'the 
public good' of a strong international regime (cajoling and disciplining others, and preventing 'free-
riders'), in order to ensure international stability (Cox 1994). 
Discussions about international environmental governance have paid some attention to this notion of 
hegemony. Young (1989 p. 204) proclaimed that "the hegemonic stability thesis is dead" with respect 
to environmental regimes and Litfin (1997 p. 173) argued that the majority of environmental regimes 
have been established in the absence of hegemonic state interests. In contrast, Wapner (2003 p. 7) 
considers the US to have led the international community on environmental matters for many years 
until it recently abrogated that role (as mentioned in the previous chapter). Wapner's comment suggests 
there is still some notion that the US has been, and may again yet be, a hegemon in matters of 
international environmental policy. Arguments about international security and the need to address 
international environmental degradation cooperatively also reflect this view. For instance, Elliot (2004 
p. 309) argues that the US should be funding environmental aid, providing technical assistance, and 
transferring technology to Southeast Asia region to compensate for the consequences of its over-large 
'ecological footprint' upon the earth and for the externalisation of the environmental costs of its own 
economic activity. Elliot is, in effect, advocating US hegemony in environmental matters to balance its 
dominant role in causing environmental degradation. 
In International Relations, this hegemony narrative tells not only of the formal necessity of hegemony 
as a way of maintaining order in the international system, but also about the empirical impossibility of 
equality among sovereigns on a spatial ground of competing sovereigns (Walker 2002 p. 22). The 
narrative is thus a normative account of the 'proper' relationship between equality and inequality 
maintaining world order. There is, however, another interpretation in International Relations of the 
utility of hegemony. This appears in a quasi-Kantian narrative about the necessary process of state 
inclusion into the modern state system which provides a key means for legitimating states' claims of 
inequality (Walker 2002 p. 21). In Chapter Two, this alternate interpretation appears in the argument 
expounding the necessity of modernising Third World countries in order to address both environmental 
degradation and poverty (as in the WCED report, but also as widely propounded at WSSD). In this 
alternate narrative, technical assistance, financial aid and capacity-building are all seen as beneficial 
products of Western hegemony, rights due to developing countries (Chapter Two). Here, hegemony is 
interpreted as having a positive side for developing countries, a different interpretation to the value 
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accorded it in the hegemony narrative. Moreover, while this quasi-Kantian narrative seeks a process of 
inclusion and equality, the hegemony narrative depicts that process as impossible. 
These contradictory interpretations are not, however, the full story about hegemony to be found in 
International Relations. Yet another narrative, which Walker (2002) calls 'colonial/modernisation', 
tells yet another story. It "enables a temporal story about modernisation as the bringing-in of the 
undeveloped, the nonmodern, into the civilised world of statist inclusions/exclusions" (Walker 2002 p. 
22). In other words, modern theories of international relations incorporate this linear account of history 
as modernisation and 'development' into a structural account of international order which depends on 
various historical practices of exclusion and which, in turn, renders specific practices of inclusion 
necessary and natural (Walker 2002 p. 10). For Third World societies, this 'colonial/modernisation' 
narrative adds the allure of development, and hope for its fulfilment, to the narrative about inclusion. 
While not explicitly addressing hegemony, by default it adopts a positive and hopeful (for developing 
countries) interpretation. 
This positive interpretation of the utility of hegemony is at odds with that found in postcolonial theory 
seeking to decolonise the international. Darby (2004 p. 7) argues that International Relations has been 
complicit in shoring up a hegemonic world order, naturalising the terms of reference and derailing 
Third World attempts to change the currency of the debate by exposing the influence ofrace and 
resources on thinking about the expansion of international society. He describes the contemporary 
conception of global order as part of a project to globalise the Third World, efforts aided by a grand 
narrative (Darby 2004 p. 7-9). 
[This grand narrative] holds out the prospect of global management along with the promise 
of popular ratings: elements of a blueprint, yet humanised and often appealing to immediate 
need. There is also a oneness in another respect: that of one world. The vision is of people's 
everywhere, linked together, bound for a single destination (Darby 2004 p. 8). 
Darby (ibid) suggests that the appeal of this grand narrative (which Tsing calls the charismatic 
attraction of the global, as mentioned in Chapter One) comes from the way in which it meshes neatly 
with the postcolonial reassertion of Western leadership. 
In any effort to decolonise the international, the hegemony of western leadership over Third World 
societies is something that needs to be exposed and overcome. In other words, the project of 
decolonising the international must privilege the non-West rather than the West. This is the attitude 
taken in the critiques of hegemony in international environmental summarised in Chapter Three. There, 
certain philosophies, organisations and policy technologies (such as the accounts of green 
neoliberalism; fascist eco-philosophies, eco-imperialist IOOs and NOOs, and the administrative 
technologies of major conservation NOOs described in the previous chapter) are regarded as 
hegemonic, or potentially so; they are being considered undesirable instruments of domination. 
To summarise, there are, amongst International Relations' various perspectives of the way in which 
contemporary international system is constituted, tensions between interpretations of hegemony and the 
teleological promise of modernisation. These tensions impact on how we see and analyse hegemony. 
The idea of hegemony as necessary for maintaining order in a plural international system is orthodox 
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First World thinking, as is the appeal to a quasi-Kantian narrative about the necessary process of 
inclusion into the modern state system. Post-colonialist analysis suggest that these established 
conceptions of the political, along with orthodox scholarship and intellectual critique, underwrite 
Western dominance and enrol the Third World into such conceptions through their seductive allure and 
certain hope (Darby 2004 p. 3). Orthodoxy shapes the predominant forms of its critiques. Stepping 
outside orthodoxy requires new forms of critique, such as the efforts to decolonise the international that 
Darby (2004) advocates. This means going further than the interpretations of hegemony in Chapter 
Three which privilege the non-West but provide sparse detail about what of the local is being displaced 
or eclipsed and in what regard are people subordinated, disadvantaged or disempowered, and about 
who is establishing relationships of domination and how this is being effected. The empirical study of 
coral reef policy needs to address these matters. This requires a clearer idea of the nature of hegemony 
as well as a defined position from which to investigate it. 
The nature of hegemony 
Domination is one part of the relationship of hegemony; the other part entails the willing acquiescence 
of those accepting subordinate status l . There are two ways in which this domination can be perceived 
(and therefore analysed). The first is as a relationship within which forms of agency develop. Relations 
of domination can develop capacities for agency through legitimation of ideology or perhaps, through 
the legitimation of desires, imaginaries and metaphors that do not quality as fully fledged ideologies 
(Warren 1992 p. 34-35). According to Warren (1992 p. 35), this concept of domination is found in the 
writings of Weber, Gramsci and Habermas, and was hinted at by Foucault. Domination can also be 
viewed as a mode of power. According to Allen (2004 p. 28), dominating power entails constraint and 
the removal of choice further down the line. Sharpe et al.(2000 p. 2) describe dominating power as that 
which attempts to control or coerce others, impose its will on others, or manipulate the consent of 
others-power that engenders inequality and asserts the interests of a particular social group or 
political configuration at the expense of others. 
Hegemony is a particular type of domination, the capacity of a dominant group to exercise control 
through people's acquiescence to subordinate status. In political geography and geopolitics, the notion 
of hegemony is used to refer to the practices through which elites and power blocs maintain the 
dominant storylines that help consolidate existing power relations (Johnston et al. 2000 p. 333). 
The accounts of hegemony in international environmental policies discussed in Chapter Three largely 
concentrated on the domination aspect of hegemony rather than the element of acquiescence, 
suggesting the need to pay the latter attention in an empirical investigation. Those accounts also 
overlooked the question of whether there is any intention to dominate. Approaching hegemony from 
I Although Sparke (2004 p. 779) uses Stuart Hall's work on race (1980) to interpret dominance as a particular form 
of hegemony articulated (and thus both experienced and consolidated) more through coercion than through 
consent, I take a slightly different approach, interpreting domination as part of the phenomenon of hegemony. I did 
so before reading Sparke. I suspect, however, these two interpretations offer much the same analytical framework. 
Both require searching for instances of coercion and consent, and comparing those with other modes of power 
being exercised. 
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the point of view of those subordinated, Gramsci addressed not intentionality but consciousness. He 
considered the potential for collective human action to be built upon self-.conscious human groups, and 
assigned 'organic intellectuals' the role of raising consciousness (Cox and with Schechter 2002 p.W5). 
In doing so, he assigned an active role to human consciousness in the construction of the external world 
(Femia 1981 p. 128). The idea of coercion, presumably intentional, was also central to Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony. Nevertheless, the intentionality of domination remains an unclear aspect of this 
concept. It is also unclear in Peet's various analyses discussed earlier in the chapter. 
Peet (2001) suggests that hegemony begins as a prevailing rationality or sense of practicality within a 
community of experts. He argues that 'institutional complexes' produce hegemonic discursive 
formations that, in policy terms, capture the prevailing sense of practicality and responsibility (Peet 
2001). This moves hegemony away from the concept of intentional coercion towards a notion of 
discursively or institutionally-produced domination. Yet, some empirical studies have shown that the 
achievement of hegemony requires sacrifice and compromise, vigilance and hard work by elites 
(Johnston et al. 2000 p. 334). 
The question of intentionality is important because power may be the effect, not the cause of action. 
The act of domination may just be an act of ordering-arranging, organising or delegating-a way of 
gaining strength from the careful plaiting of weak ties sensu Latour (1999), without any explicit 
intention of one party dominating another. It may be the creation of pattern, intended to generate 
consensus (as with Riles' analogy of Fijian mats, discussed in Chapter Three). Patterning and ordering 
may not be carried out for power itself (as in sovereign models of power) but for a host of other 
organisational aims that are the outcome of a diversity of linguistic and material practices (Hinchcliffe 
2000 p. 223). The sociologist Elias (1997) was interested in this question, analysing the relationship 
between intentional attempts to control and transform the social world and the long-term unplanned 
processes of development within which they take place. On the other hand, Latour generally overlooks 
this question, referring at one point to unconscious thought (i.e. Latour 1993 p. 37). 
The difficulty of ascertaining intentionality in a social context 
In Chapter One I explained how social theory fails to deal with the issue of intentionality. Van Krieken 
(2002 p. 267-268) suggests that understanding the relationship between social order and intentional 
attempts to control and transform the social world requires a return to earlier social theorists' work on 
the concept of habit or habitus, something Talcott Parsons removed from modern social theory (Camric 
1986 p. 1074 ). The concept of 'habit', according to its dictionary meaning, denotes a more or less self-
actuating disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action (Camric 
1986 p. 1044). 'Habitus' is a particular term used to refer to the durable and generalised disposition that 
suffuses a person's action throughout an entire domain of life (Camric 1986 p. 1046). 
Bourdieu used a similar notion-habitus as a system of durable dispositions or properties that we carry 
around in our heads as a result of our social experience in certain kinds of backgrounds, social settings 
and circumstances-to help explain how people act. As explained by Layder (1994 p. 156), our social 
experience, predisposes us to approach the world with certain knowledge and interactional resources. 
Habitus functions as non-conscious principles which generate and organise practices and 
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representations (Swingewood 2000 p. 215). "When confronted with routine everyday situations, 
habitus tends to reproduce" (ibid). Bourdieu also divided social context into fields (e.g. education, 
religion, the arts), each with their own distinctive logic, principles and body of specialists. He theorises 
that habitus operates in these fields, which correspond to networks of objective positions that various 
agents occupy by virtue of possessing different forms of economic and cultural capital (material and 
intellectual skills, wealth, knowledge) and symbolic capital (accumulated prestige and a sense of 
honour) (Swingewood 2000 p. 212-213). People involved in a field such as international environmental 
policy therefore act through a type of second sense, socially constituted, about the field they are in and 
how the game is played. Bourdieu made the point that people become socialised into fields not through 
norms, but cognitively by a process of internalising the social structure of the field itself (Swingewood 
2000 p. 214). He argued that agents transpose the objective properties of a field (the hierarchy of 
positions, traditions, history, institutions) into 'mental structures' or 'frameworks' which then work to 
condition the ways they perceive, grasp and understand the field (ibid). 
This, then, is the combination of theoretical perspectives I employ to repoliticise coral reefs and their 
experts, to conceptualise the political nature of policy processes bound up with science and nature. 
Within this combination there are various tensions and unresolved difficulties, discussed next. 
Tensions and Difficulties 
TENSIONS BETWEEN MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST INQUIRY 
One of those tensions stems from a basic premise in this study, the Nietzschean belief that we create 
what we think of as knowledge out of our experience, that knowledge being so thoroughly dependent 
on our psychological, historical or social conditions that it cannot be considered objective knowledge at 
all. In treating power and knowledge as inseparable, this approach rejects the modernist belief that 
knowledge is divorced from political power and science transcends politics and is equally 
advantageous for all concerned (Chapter Two). This stance is often called postmodern (e.g. Edgar and 
Sedgwick 1999 p. 294-298). Although employing the perspective that all knowledge is political 
(reflecting the interests of its knowers and informed by power relations), the thesis is not affirming a 
postmodern world. Rather than viewing the society from which this policy is springing as postmodern, 
I perceive it as modern in the sense that Latour (2004) used this term: 
Not a period, but a form of the passage of time; a way of interpreting a set of situations by 
attempting to abstract from them the distinction between facts and values, states of the 
world and representations, rationality and irrationality, Science and society, primary 
qualities and secondary qualities, in such a way as to trace a radical difference between the 
past and the future that makes it possible to externalise definitively whatever has not been 
taken into account (Latour 2004 p. 244l 
2 An expression from philosophy, 'primary qualities' distinguishes the fabric of which the world is made (particles, 
atoms, genes, neurons etcetera) from representations (colours, sounds, feelings etcetera); primary qualities are 
invisible but real and never experienced subjectively; secondary qualities, visible but nonessential, are experienced 
subjectively (Latour 2004 p. 247). 
Nor am I suggesting postmodern culture as the future of Pacific Islands. Rather, I am seeking to open 
up other ways of seeing their future, which are predicated on a much greater awareness of the politics 
embedded in environmental policy projects and approaches being offered to and thrust upon them. 
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In re-imagining international environmental policy, and re-politicising it, this thesis uses both 
modernist and postmodernist modes of inquiry. Accumulating knowledge about coral reef policy 
processes, and critically analysing their rationality and logic-the employment of cognitive reason in a 
search for explanation and coherence-is a modernist mode of inquiry. These two modes of inquiry are 
at times in tension, as the above discussion revealed. They are also in tension when considering 
whether some aspects of coral reefs are socially constructed and some are not, also discussed earlier in 
the chapter. Tension also exists between post-structuralist notions of expert-produced discourses and 
Bourdieu's notions of fields of expertise and habitus, applied in Chapter Eight to explain unconscious 
repetition of standard arguments and metaphors common in coral reef policy. Bourdieu's notions retain 
a sense of structure as the external social context of behaviour while a post-structuralist perspective 
suggests that subjects are dispersed over a range of multiple positions, discourses and sites of struggle. 
I have tried to use those tensions constructively to enquire more deeply into the nature of international 
environmental policy than either a purely modernist or postmodernist mode of inquiry would allow. 
For example, post-structuralism, with its notion of expert-produced discourses, helps us understand 
how certain discourses containing an inherent notion of domination, enable and constrain policy-talk 
and policy statements. In a complementary way, Bourdieu's notions offield and habitus provide a way 
of understanding how institutionalised technical practices may build a hegemonic politics; discourse 
and institutionalised technical practices may each contribute to a relationship entailing domination of 
one social group over others. 
Other tensions remain however, between modernist and post-modernist modes of inquiry. When the 
belief that all knowledge is political is combined with the idea that science and science/policy are 
political fields of endeavour that blend into one another, a particular problem arises. How can one 
distinguish between 'good' science and 'inadequate' science used to frame environmental issues and 
promote certain policy stances? 
If environmental problems are framed in a manner appearing to be, or claimed to be, underpinned by 
science, then a modernist would expect science to conform to some notion of accepted standards in the 
pertinent scientific discipline. If the science does not so conform, it may merely be inadequate in a 
hypocritical sense, based upon sloppy or lazy work for example. Alternatively, it may be an example of 
what Latour (1993 p. 38) calls power shoring up reason and reason shoring up power, as I explore in 
Chapter 13. But the postmodern view provides no such standards for evaluating science as good or bad, 
since it regards all knowledge as the historically contingent product of linguistic and social practices of 
particular local communities of interpreters, with no assured 'ever-closer' relation to an independent 
ahistorical reality (Tarnas 1991 p. 399). How, then, can one argue that a certain framing of an 
environmental problem is inadequately researched and thus forms an inadequate basis for scientific and 
empirically-based conclusions? Such standards are modern not postmodern. This is where the tensions 
between modernist and postmodernist modes of inquiry emerge. In part, this difficulty arises from 
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treating all knowledge as political without acknowledging that, when knowledge is used in policy, it is 
not always consciously used as a political resource. 
For the purposes of this study, there is, I argue, no analytical difficulty in recognising that various 
contemporary fields of science have standards for the production of scientific arguments through 
research; scientific work can therefore be graded according to those standards-which may encompass 
degree of effort, logic, reproducibility, and verifiability, for example. Judging whether or not policy 
should be based upon work that may fail to meet those standards is another matter. That is a political 
judgement, not just a question of whether 'good' science (conforming to recognised standards) is 
valued but of the various values which people may seek to have represented in policy. For some, it may 
also be an ethical matter. In this study of how coral reef policy arises as an instrument of governance, 
what is relevant is whether in these science/policy practices, there is any intention to dominate, any 
intentional exercise of subordinating power. Since my aim is to open up space for contemplating 
alternative political futures, it is useful and sufficient to reveal, rather than judge, any such political 
interest or intent, as expressed by the actors involved. 
THE CONTROVERSY OF REPOLICITISING SCIENCE AND NATURE 
The tensions revealed above are an example of the invincibility of the moderns that Latour (1993) 
describes. The act of making the politics underlying environmental policy visible can be controversial, 
particularly when it entails revealing how environmental issues are socially constructed. Critics of 
social constructionism charge that this act of revelation amounts to a denial of the existence of 
environmental problems and does not contribute towards managing them, a criticism summarised in 
Burningham and Cooper (1999). Some natural scientists and conservationists have rejected 
postmodernist interpretations of (knowledge of) nature on the grounds that extreme relativism and an 
'anything goes' attitude is an obstacle to addressing the environmental crisis or that it leaves no 
epistemological secure foundation from which to speak truth to power (as explained in Darier 1999 p. 
2-3; Demeritt 2001 p. 28). 
The practice of demystifying the social construction of environmental issues challenges scientists to 
make known the human values upon which they base their work-those underpinning the discipline of 
conservation biology, for instance. This can be threatening because, as Demeritt (2001 p. 37, quoting 
Latour) affirmed, questions of epistemology are also questions of social order. By exposing the 
strategies and relations of power associated with scientific practices, post-structuralist analysis can 
destabilise or counter dominant (hegemonic) discourse (Jones 2002 p. 250, footnote). It thus generates 
criticism. Those who do not wish to be challenged cast those challenging them as environmental 
villains. For instance, introducing their multidisciplinary collection Reconstructing Nature? Responses 
to Postmodern Deconstruction, editors Michael SouIe (the founder of conservation biology), and 
historian Gary Lease wrote "[The contributors] agree that certain contemporary forms of intellectual 
and social relativism can be just as destructive to nature and bulldozers and chainsaws" (Soule and 
Lease 1995 p. xvi). Such criticism is one of the factors making it difficult to step outside the orthodox 
version of the discourse of international environmental policy. It is a brick wall erected by those who 
do not wish to see the political basis of international environmental policy discourses, or the social 
construction of its discursive elements, demystified and open to questions. 
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It is not the act of post-structuralist or postmodern critique per se that is threatening but the revelation 
of the political basis for environmental policy and the interests of those involved, along with the notion 
that Nature may be beyond our influence and control. As Latour (1993 p. 36-37) wrote: 'The exclusive 
transcendence [existence above and apart from the material world] of a Nature that is not our doing, 
and the exclusive immanence of a Society that we create through and through, would nevertheless 
paralyse the moderns who would appear too impotent in the face of things and too powerful within 
society". 
PROBLEMATIC TERMINOLOGY 
During the course of the research, I also encountered semantic problems in trying to describe situations 
observed and in trying to construct a theoretical argument. Sometimes these became epistemological 
problems. These problems occurred primarily when terms available to describe a particular 
phenomenon were inadequate. I cited one such example in Chapter One: the processes surrounding 
policy for which I have used 'endeavours, 'ventures' and 'processes' interchangeably, for lack of a 
more prescriptive term. This section describes other such problems and how I addressed. 
Having adopted a notion of relational power, I did not have specific language to name the plural 
collection of entities connecting, on matters of coral reef policy, with the Fijian archipelago over space 
and time. The 'overseas' was not a single locality or activity, but numerous such instances that were 
somehow connected into a sphere of activity concerned with coral reef policy on an international scale. 
I therefore referred to these collectively as 'international policy initiatives', or as 'the international 
sphere of coral reef policy' even though those expressions disguise their multi-site, temporal and 
relational nature. In empirical descriptions, it is hard to retain both Massey's sense of the global as 
local and Amin' s concept of the local as a place locked into a multitude of relational networks because 
of the lack of suitable specific terms that capture these notions concurrently. 
There are no suitable terms to describe the syncretism of science and policy either. The most common 
semantic solution, the term 'science for policy', maintains the ideal-type distinctions that I wish to 
disregard. Instead I call it science/policy. Rather than inventing a new language of hybrids to describe 
the human actors (experts) involved, which would require further (problematic) differentiation between 
science, politics and hybrids thereof, I use the labels that those generating texts use. If they call 
themselves a scientist, then so do 1. If they call their documents scientific papers then so do I, while 
noting the policy content of those papers. This strategy overcomes the problems of terminology that 
would otherwise arise. 
I found no suitable terminology to encompass the range of relationships encountered under the broad 
umbrella of cooperation in matters of international environmental policy. Part of the problem arises 
because the dictionary definition of cooperation includes the notion of working towards the same end, 
which may not be the case. On the other hand, the dictionary definition of collaboration, often regarded 
as a near synonym for cooperation in policy matters, includes the connotation of working traitorously 
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with the enemy (Concise Oxford DictionalY, 6th edition). Moreover, in aid projects the term partnership 
is often used, implying an equality that may not exist in practice. There being no satisfactory solution, I 
have used both cooperation and collaboration as general terms to cover working together on policy 
matters although not necessarily towards the same end or on an equal footing. Rather than forming 
generalisations about particular types of social relationship, I comment on the tensions and conflict 
existing in particular situations, categorising these into modes of power sensu Allen (2004). 
Sometimes existing terms were unsuitable because they had several meanings, while I wished only to 
invoke one of those. For instance, I have confined use of the term 'discourse', to cover the Foucauldian 
discourse of global environmental policy described in Chapter Two. For other discursive elements, I 
have used the terms 'metaphors', 'stories', 'storylines', 'narratives' and 'arguments'. Brosius (2004) 
referred to new approaches to policy such as ecoregion planning as 'administrative technologies'; Peet 
et al. (2003) call them (or something similar) 'expert policy discourses'. I call them 'expert policy 
technologies' in order to differentiate them from Foucauldian discourse and yet retain the notion they 
concern the technical aspects of policy transfer. 
One problematic generalisation I have been unable to avoid is the developing country/ developed 
country opposition. I use interchangeably the terms North and West, meaning Western Europe, North 
America, Japan, and Australasia; I call the remainder the South (the usual exceptions, some of the 
former Soviet bloc, do not enter into the analysis). I use the Third World as a synonym for the South. 
While the categorisation has many problems, so too do alternatives (Darby 2004 p. 2, footnote 2). 
One other term deserves explanation. While I mainly use the word 'project' to refer to aid-funded 
enterprises that label themselves as such, I occasionally used it in the broader sense of a planned, 
systematic set of activities focused on a single issue, to draw attention to those characteristics. 
Distinguishing organisations by type also proved problematic, given the exceedingly general terms 
available for this (e.g. NOO, 100, state or hybrid, as discussed in Chapter Three). I therefore tried to 
avoid categorising groups of policy participants in this manner, concentrating instead on describing 
each significant organisation in a text box-or in the case of ICRI and its subsidiaries, in half a chapter 
(Chapter Seven). These text box descriptions cover an organisation's history, governance arrangements 
and geographical bases, as well as the type of role each plays in coral reef policy. This series of text 
boxes starts in Chapter Five. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, in establishing a base from which to interrogate coral reef policy, I am acknowledging a 
particular conception of the contemporary western world in which coral reef policy is being formed, 
one that broadly follows Latour's description of nature as a politicised concept in which science and 
academia are involved. Latour (1993 p. 35-36) describes a society characterised by strenuous, ongoing, 
taken-for-granted efforts to keep humans separate from non-humans, and science separate from 
ideology, while all the time hybrids between nature and culture proliferate. This is a paradoxical world 
in which politics are not always visible or conscious but are omnipresent (Latour 1993 p. 37-43). 
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This chapter identified the collection of perspectives needed to extend the critical perspectives in 
Chapter Three and to make those politics more visible by interrogating environmental policy that 
reaches across the globe to engage people from the Fiji Islands. This melange is designed to remove 
myself from the norms and categories of thought that define how we usually think about the 
environment, science, policy and politics. On this basis, the examination of coral reef policy, set out in 
the next set of chapters, proceeds. 
Part II 
Interrogating International Coral 
Reef Policy 
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Chapter Five 
International Concern about Coral Reefs 
Introduction 
This chapter describes how concern about widespread reef degradation in tropical regions has mounted 
over several decades to become an international issue. In the 1960s, some coral reef scientists worried 
that outbreaks of the crown-of-thorns starfish in several countries presaged an end to coral reefs. This 
proved unfounded, although local outbreaks continue. Then, amongst the coral reef science 
community, the aspiration of saving reefs from the depredations of humankind concern grew steadily, 
given added impetus in the late 1990s by widespread coral bleaching during EI Nino events. Coral 
bleaching has been linked to global climate change, raising new fears about the extinction of coral reefs 
and leading to talk of a worldwide crisis. 
Initial Concerns and Responses 
THE RAPID EXPANSION OF SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS 
INITIAL CONCERNS ABOUT REEF DEGRADATION 
Efforts to Understand the State of Reefs Worldwide 
INITIAL EFFORTS TO THINK GLOBALLY ABOUT CORAL REEF DEGRADATION 
THE CATALYST EFFECT OF THE CORAL BLEACHING PHENOMENON 
INITIAL EFFORTS TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM 
late 1990s: Heightened Concerns 
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE EXTENT OF DEGRADATION 
CORAL BLEACHING AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
OVER FISHING AND DESTRUCTIVE FISHING METHODS 
LOSS OF BIODIVERSITY ON CORAL REEFS 
A Worldwide Crisis 
RECOGNITION OF A WORLDWIDE CRISIS FOR CORAL REEFS 
GCRMN AND REEF CHECK GLOBAL STATUS REPORTS 
CONCLUSION 
This account of mounting concern is written in the style of the orthodox global environmental policy 
discourse described in Chapter Two. It is orthodox in describing environmental problems seen to be 
faced by coral reefs, according science a substantive role in defining those problems, depicting 
assessment and monitoring programmes as international environmental policy responses to those 
problems, and describing the organisations and individuals cooperating in those programmes. The 
chapter's function is twofold. While providing background material for an analysis of environmental 
policy concerning coral reefs, it also forms a base from which to begin a critical re-interpretation of 
those policy endeavours. It should be read in conjunction with next chapter, which investigates the 
discursive construction of the crisis, reinterpreting the role of science and scientists in this. 
METHODOLOGY: CONCERN ABOUT CORAL REEFS 
This is not just a review of grm,ving concern about coral reefs worldwide. It is also an empirical 
investigation into what are the most visible and accessible ideas about the state of reefs-for there 
are, of course, different views amongst the world population, not all of which find their way into 
publications that I can access and read (English language accounts and to a limited extent, French 
web sites). \\1hen I went searching for English language literature expressing views on this subject, 
I found what I summarise here. To ascertain levels of concern I read scientific texts and papers on 
coral reefs, found through library catalogue and database searches. I searched Google and news 
web sites for popular articles eg BBe \Vorld, Economist, and ENN news. I hvice did systematic 
Internet searches. I also saved articles I came across when looking for at other material on coral 
reefs, or when reading magazines such as NeJJJ Srientist. To get a sense of what has spurred what, I 
placed events into chronological sequence, identified some key people and traced which events 
they had been involved at which times. For chronological accuracy, I cross-checked sequences of 
events. 
Initial Concerns and Responses 
THE RAPID EXPANSION OF SCIENTIFIC INTEREST 
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In the 1960s and 1970s scientific interest in coral reefs began to increase as scuba diving equipment 
revolutionised scientific reef research, allowing direct exploration of the upper areas of the seas. Scuba 
catalysed scientific expeditions to the tropics and stimulated long-term studies of coral reefs and reef 
organisms; these expeditions utilised newly established tropical marine laboratories in Jamaica, 
Panama, and Australia (Sapp 1999 p. 78). Scientists began to hold regular international coral reef 
meetings through organisations such as the IBP, the International Association of Biology 
Oceanography (IABO), and the Pacific Science Association (PSA) (Worthington 1975; Dahl and 
Carew-Reid 1985; Pacific Science Association Scientific Committee on Coral Reefs 1988). In 1980, 
the International Society for Reef Studies (ISRS) was founded to promote the production and 
dissemination of scientific knowledge and understanding of coral reefs; it assumed responsibility for 
organising the international coral reef symposia held every four years since the IABO initiated them in 
1969 (see Table 6) (ISRS 2001). In 1982, the Society started the Coral Reefs journal, which continues 
today. During these two decades, international scientific interest in coral reefs reflected a general desire 
to understand reefs and their functioning, and to develop suitable management techniques to address 
the reef degradation being caused by human activities (Yonge 1969; Gomez 1983; Sapp 1999). 
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TABLE 6: INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF SYMPOSIA 
# Year Location 
1st 1969 Mandapam Camp, India 
2nd 1973 MV Marco Polo cmising the waters of the Great Barrier Reef, Australia 
3rd 1977 Florida, USA 
4th 1981 Manila, Philippines 
5th 1985 Tahiti, French Polynesia 
6th 1988 Townsville, Australia 
7th 1992 Guam (US territory in :Micronesia) 
8th 1996 Panama City, Panama 
9th 2000 Bali, Indonesia 
10th 2004 Okinawa, Japan 
Source: ICRI web site at Sapp (1999) 
INITIAL CONCERNS ABOUT REEF DEGRADATION 
Crown-oi-thorns starfish, anthropogenic impacts 
The first significant issue to raise scientific concerns about the future viability of coral reefs was the 
coral-eating crown-of-thorns starfish Acanthaster planci in the 1960s (Figure 1). Population explosions 
on a scale not previously recorded, observable with scuba, were devastating large areas including the 
Great Barrier Reef in Australia and several Pacific Islands (Sapp 1999). The cause of the population 
explosions was widely debated in the pages of Science and Nature journals and in marine science 
periodicals. Some thought that the outbreaks were due to natural causes (runoff from high land masses 
after periods of dry weather creating phytoplankton blooms which provide ample food for the starfish 
larvae and enhance their survivorship). Others suggested that the outbreaks were occurring because 
humans had removed the starfish's main predators, such as the giant triton (Charonia tritonis) sought 
for its shell (Sapp 1999 p. 8-9). This controversy remains unresolved (Sapp 1999). 
Worried about the outbreaks, several scientists prophesised the end of coral reefs. Richard Chesher, one 
of the first to study the infestations in the Pacific is reported as saying in 1969 "There is a possibility 
that we are witnessing the initial phases of extinction of Madreporarian [hard] corals in the Pacific" 
(Sapp 1999 p. 204). A State of the Earth Report from the Smithsonian Institution for the Centre for 
Short-Lived Phenomena asserted that "if the starfish explosion continues unchecked, the result would 
be a disaster unparalleled in the history of mankind" (ibid). These dire scenarios have not eventuated. 
FIGURE 1 : CROWN-OF-THORNS STARFISH 
Source: Moran (1997). 
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TIle predatory crown-of-thorns starfish prefer to live in 
sheltered areas such as lagoons, and in deeper water 
along reef fronts. In an outbreak, starfish number 
thousands, even tens of thousands. Some outbreaks 
may last for four to five years while others may have 
run their course within one or two years. They cause 
high coral mortality, sometinles over much of a reef. In 
the last fifty years, outbreaks have been reported many 
places including the Great Barrier Reef, the Ryukyu 
Islands (south-west Japan), i'vlicronesia, American 
Samoa, the Cook Islands, Fiji, the Society Islands, 
Hawaii, the Red Sea, Maldives and East Malaysia. 
In addition to this uncertainty about the long-term impact of crown-of-thorns starfish (which only 
affected some reefs), scientists were, by the early 1970s, worrying about the way human impacts were 
impeding natural rates of reef recovery after cyclones, storms, disease outbreaks and sea level changes 
(Wells and Jenkins 1988 xix-xxii). Collections of black coral (especially in the Caribbean) and a new 
trade in ornamental corals mainly from Southeast Asia aroused concern. So did coastal development, 
overexploitation of various reef species besides corals, direct physical destruction from sand mining, 
dredging and destructive fishing methods, pollution and, in the Pacific, nuclear detonations (Salvat 
1980; Gomez 1983; Wells and Jenkins 1988; Morozova 2000). These anthropogenic impacts were seen 
as diminishing circles of impact spreading away from centres of human popUlation; damage was 
localised and large areas (and remote reefs in particular) were considered to be unaffected except by 
occasional fishing (Zann 1994; Bryant et at. 1998; Wilkinson p. 867). 
Concerns about coral and fish collections in Southeast Asia 
In the 1970s and 1980s the world trade in ornamental corals (commonly called the curio trade) 
increased rapidly. Collections of black coral and of ornamental hard corals in Southeast Asia in 
particular (mainly in the Philippines and Indonesia) caused concern among some reef scientists (Gomez 
1983; Lovell 2001 p. 22). As a result of their agitation, all species of black coral (i.e. all corals in the 
Order Antipatharia) were listed under the Convention on International trade in Endangered Species of 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1981, in order to regulate their international trade. In 1985 seventeen 
genera of hard corals were added, then all other species of hard corals (i.e. all corals in the Order 
Scleractinia) in 1990 (Green and Hendry 1999 p. 403). (I discuss trends in international trade further, 
later in the chapter.) 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 1. CITES 
Developed as the result of an IUCN resolution in 1963, the CITES convention entered into force 
in 1975 and by early 2005 had 167 states as parties. The convention aims to ensure that 
international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. Because 
this trade crosses borders between countries, efforts to regulate it require international cooperation. 
Conceived in this spirit of cooperation, CITES also places considerable emphasis on enforcement. 
It is a science-based treaty, justifying decisions to control trade in species through scientific 
assessment. CITES' members states meet every two to three years, as the Conference of the Parties 
(CoP). The Secretariat, based in Geneva Switzerland, receives policy advice from a standing 
committee composed of country members selected on a regional basis. Three committees of 
experts (plants, animals, and nomenclature) advise the CoP and standing committee. 
Since 1981 coral reef species had gradually been added to CITES, which now covers all species of 
stony corals, black corals, blue corals, organ pipe corals, fire corals, lace corals, giant clams, sea 
horses, the queen conch, seven species of sea turtle but only one species of fish, the giant 
humphead wrasse Chei/illus Nlldu/atus. These species are all in Appendix II which lists species not 
necessarily threatened with extinction (those are in AppendL"'{ I), but which could become so if 
trade were not strictly regulated. 
Source: web site atcitf'snrg, Green and Hendry (1999), UNEP Coral Reef Unit and W\W 
Coral Reefs Advisory Initiative (2003) 
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It was not only the level of coral extraction that was causing concern. Since the 1960s, the practice of 
using cyanide to catch fish for the aquarium trade had spread from the Philippines to other Southeast 
Asian countries and to the live food fish trade (International Marinelife Alliance 2000; McAllister et ai. 
c.1997). Cyanide kills various reef species and destroys the reef itself. In the early 1980s, sudden death 
syndrome amongst fish imported to North America created confusion among importers, retailers and 
hobbyists, US aquarist Steve Robinson subsequently linking this to cyanide fishing (Steve Robinson, 
pers. comm. July 2004). Two years later the North American pet industry, concerned to ensure a supply 
of healthy fish imports, sent a fact-finding mission to the Philippines. When the team suggested the 
American aquarium industry should encourage collectors to use nets instead of cyanide, several North 
American NOOs collaborated with a local NOO to run training programmes (Baquero 1999). 
Changes in Caribbean coral reefs 
While anxiety over the coral trade focused mainly on Southeast Asian reefs, other issues focused 
attention on Caribbean reefs. Since the 1980s, some Caribbean reefs, particularly in Jamaica, have 
changed character dramatically. Live coral cover on many Caribbean reefs is thought to have declined 
from 50 to ten percent over the previous 25 years (Wilkinson 2004 p. 14). Dominated by Acropora 
elkhorn and staghorn corals for many thousands of years, they are now dominated by algae, a 
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phenomenon commonly referred to as a 'phase-shift' (Buddemeier et al. 2004 p. 25). The causes 
appeal' to be multiple, including whiteband disease amongst Acropora since 1972, and the loss of 
herbivores through extreme overfishing (Woodley et ai. 2002 p. 266). Extensive dieback of the sea 
urchin Diadema antillarum (an estimated 97 percent loss since 1972), the result of disease, contributed 
significantly to this transition to algae-dominated surfaces because Diadema is a herbivore 
(Buddemeier et ai. 2004 p. 25). Hurricanes are also implicated; corals take relatively long to recruit and 
cover large areas, so algae and some encrusting invertebrates can more rapidly colonise disturbed space 
(Sebens 1994). Other bacterial diseases have caused significant coral mortality and sewage pollution is 
considered a contributing factor in places (Woodley et ai. 2002 p. 266; Buddemeier et at. 2004). 
Efforts to Understand the State of Reefs Worldwide 
INITIAL EFFORTS TO THINK GLOBALLY ABOUT CORAL REEF DEGRADATION 
Around the mid-1980s, as scientific concern about the scale of anthropogenic effects on coral reefs 
worldwide grew more acute, the need for more systematic data sets distinguishing anthropogenic 
effects from natural trends began to be recognised internationally. At the Fifth International Coral Reef 
Symposium in 1985, Arthur Dahl of UNEP (formerly of the South Pacific Commission (SPC» 
contended that human-induced stress on reefs was global in scope and catastrophic in nature (Dahl 
c.1985). He described Okinawan and Tongan reefs as 80 percent and 65 percent damaged respectively 
(Grigg and Dollar 1990 p. 448). 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 2. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP) 
After the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment, the UN General Assembly created 
UNEP to act as a focus of environmental activities \vithin the UN, and as a clearing house for 
environmental data and research. Unusually for a UN agency, it has no statute, charter or 
convention describing its function. That role is furnished by UNGA resolution 2997 (X.:",{VII) 
which, amongst other matters, recognises the connection between development and environment. 
Based in Nairobi, Kenya, UNEP has taken a lead role in coordinating international negotiations 
(e.g. on ozone depletion, biodiversity and desertification). It provides secretarial support for 
several conventions including CITES and the CBD, and runs the Global Environmental 
Monitoring System. In the mid 1970s, UNEP launched a regional seas programme, which now has 
140 participating states. The programme is based around twelve regional action plans that UNEP 
co-ordinates, bar the South Pacific one for which SPREP is responsible. In 2000, UNEP established 
a Coral Reef Unit under Arthur Dahl, to lead the UN's coral reef action and to manage UNEP's 
participation in the International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN). Initially based in Nairobi, 
the unit moved to Cambridge (UK) in 2003, joining ICRAN and WCMC. The US government 
funds much ofUNEP's coral reef work. 
Source: Imber (1993); UNEP (2001b p. 4; 2002b); International Coral Reef Action Network (2003 
p.8) 
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The IUCN Monitoring Centre (later to become the World Conservation Monitoring Centre, WCMC) 
subsequently published a three volume Coral Reefs of the World in collaboration with UNEP, 
examining coral reef management worldwide (UNEP and IUCN 1988). Using multiple information 
sources, including scientific papers, navigational charts, and personal communications, the authors of 
Coral Reefs of the World documented human impacts on reefs in 108 countries and reported on the 
types of information available and on management being undertaken, focusing on marine protected 
areas in particular (UNEP and mCN 1988; Wells and Jenkins 1988). This publication was the first 
international attempt to come to grips with the state of reefs worldwide. 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 3. WORLD CONSERVATION MONITORING CENTRE (WCMC) 
Established in Cambridge, UK in 1983, the IUCN Conservation MonitOl"ing Centre was 
reformatted in 1988 as an independent, non-profit entity, jointly funded by IUCN, UNEP and 
\V'\'\7F-International. In 2000, with the full support ofIUCN and \V'\'\7F as well as the political and 
financial backing of the UK government, it became part of UNEP and was renamed UNEP-
WCMC. A scientific advisory council guides WCMC's work, which entails: (1) assessing the status, 
value and management of biological diversity in various ecosystems; (2) publishing material and 
addressing enquiries about biological diversity, and (3) providing capacity building and information 
management for various conventions and organisations, acting as a clearing house so agencies can 
share data and information. Wherever possible, WCMC places its data in the public domain. 
WCMC manages CITES' database of export and import statistics, which it used in 1999 to 
produce a report on the global trade in corals. In 2001, it published the World Atlas if Coral Reifs. 
Source: web site at www.unep-wcmc.org; Green and Shirley (1999); Spalding et al. (2001) 
THE CATALYST EFFECT OF THE CORAL BLEACHING PHENOMENON 
Observations of bleaching 
Reports of coral bleaching in the late 1980s stimulated further efforts to assess the state of reefs 
worldwide. Reports of bleaching in the eastern Pacific, Panama and the Great Barrier Reef had first 
appeared in the marine science literature in the early 1980s (Glynn 1983; Harriot 1985). A handful of 
studies subsequently showed that zooxanthallae in corals were sensitive to even small temperature 
changes, leading to bleaching (Figure 2). The wave of bleaching in the late 1980s coincided with rising 
concern in the US about global climate change. At US Congressional hearings in 1990, 
environmentalists portrayed reefs as fragile sentinels warning of the dire consequences of global 
warming (a metaphor revisited in Chapter Eight). 
By the early 1990s scientists had established retrospectively that bleaching had been reported 
elsewhere in the past: three mass bleaching events between 1876 and 1979 plus, in 1979-80, four areas 
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in the Pacific and two in the Caribbean (Coffroth et al. 1990; Glynn 1991 p. 176). Further bleaching 
and mass coral mortality in the early 1990s in regions of interest to US scientists (mainly the 
Caribl1 'an-Bahamas and eastern Pacific) resulted in some of those scientists ra ising the possibility that 
this was a worldwide phenomenon related to climate change (Williams and Bunkley-Williams 1990; 
Glynn 1991; Brown and Ogden 1993; Glynn 1993 p. 496; Goreau and Hayes 1994). Several marine 
biol ogIs ts suggested that ocean warming would lead ultimately to the loss of many reef communities 
(Pen ni i 1997). 
FIGURE 2: CORAL, ZOOXANTHELLAE AND BLEACHING 
TENTACLES 
The phenomenon of coral bleaching occurs in 
corals, related cnidarians and some molluscs 
(e.g. giant clams) when they lose their algal 
symbionts (photosynthetic microalgae called 
zooxanthellae) and/or their pigments, in 
response to environmental stresses. It causes a 
loss of colour--corals first fluoresce then tum 
\,vrute. Zooxanthellae may leave tl1eir hosts 
either temporarily or permanently; If they return 
corals may recover. 
Source!. : Glynn (1996); Fitt (200 I p. 51); Buddemeier et at. (2004 p. 3) 
Within coral communities, the degree of bleaching within and among coral colonies and across reef 
communities is highly variable and difficult to quantify, thus complicating co nparisons of different 
bleaching events (Glynn 1996 p. 495). The effects can, however, be dramatic: 
De bilitating effects of bleaching include reduced/no skeletal growth and reproductive 
act ivity, and a lowered capacity to shed sediments, [and] resist invasions of competing 
species and diseases. Severe and prolonged bleaching can cause partial to total colony 
d ' a th, resulting in diminished reef growth, the transformation of reef-building communities 
Lo alternate, non-reef-building community types, bioerosion, and ultimately the 
disappearance of reef structures (Glynn 1996 p. 495). 
Arou d the same time that scientists began to associate this phenomenon with increased sea 
temperatures, the newly-created Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) started 
inve li gating the likely impact of global warming and sea-level rise on various ecosystems including 
coral ree fs (Pernetta et at. 1994; Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998). In [ate 1991, UNEP, the 
Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission (lOC) of the United Nations Scientific and Educational 
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Organisation (UNESCO), WMO and the IUCN collaborated in assembling a group of experts to plan 
long-term global monitoring of climate change on coastal areas, coral reefs included (International 
Oceanographic Commission (IOC) 1992; Pernetta et at. 1994). This was despite the fact that a few 
months earlier, reef researchers at a US workshop in Miami in 1991, sponsored by the National Science 
Foundation, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, had concluded that the gradual warming expected in the coming 
years was the least of their worries (Pennisi 1997). Most were concerned that by the time that reefs had 
to cope with global warming, those reefs would be dead-from pollution, destructive fishing, and more 
immediate threats. This was also the conclusion of the IOCIWMOIIUCN assembly of experts. 
Deciding that climate change was not an immediate threat to reefs, they stressed that coral reefs were, 
however, being seriously and increasingly stressed by exploitation and anthropogenic environmental 
changes such as sedimentation, nutrient loading and pollution, physical destruction and overfishing 
(Hulm and Pernetta 1993; Wilkinson and Buddemeier 1994 p. viii). "Reef communities are not well 
adapted to the combination of chronic and acute human (anthropogenic) stress and climate change; and 
their short-term survival is threatened by these stresses acting together" (Wilkinson and Buddemeier 
1994 p. ix). 
Establishing the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network and Reef Base 
In 1992 UNESCO-IOC proposed a worldwide network to assess and monitor coral reefs, envisaging it 
as part of a joint UNEP-IOC-WMO long-term global monitoring programmes designed to monitor 
coastal and nearshore phenomena related to climate change. This proposal lapsed when funding was 
not immediately available, but was revived in 1995 after ICRI had been formed (Wilkinson and 
Buddemeier 1994 p. vi). IOC, UNEP, and mCN decided to co-sponsor the initiative, labelled the 
Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network, GCRMN for short (Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network 
1997). Other sponsors joined later (see Chapter Seven, which describes ICRI's formation). 
In the time between GCRMN being first proposed and set up, a global database of coral reefs was 
created to facilitate monitoring of coral reef health and support reef management (Oliver and 
Noordeloos 2002). Named ReefBase, this database was the initiative of the International Centre for 
Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), based in Manila. The Commission of the 
European Union, the Government of the Netherlands and USAID helped fund the database 
development, and ICLARM developed it in collaboration with WCMC. When GCRMN finally got 
underway, ReefBase became its official database (Oliver and Noordeloos 2002). ReefBase operates at 
In assessing the state of coral reefs worldwide, GCRMN gathers information from the organisations 
that comprise its regional (supra-national) and national nodes (initially 14, now 17). Some of these are 
older monitoring programmes and activities drawn into the GCRM network when it was established in 
1995. The organisations running the nodes are responsible for training participants, monitoring, data 
analysis and reporting; they are expected to find their own operational funding, the global coordinator 
sometimes helping with funding applications (Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network 1997,2003). 
104 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 4. GLOBAL CORAL REEF MONITORING NETWORK (GCRMN) 
An informal international network operating through 17 independent nodes co-ordinated through a 
small office in Townsville Australia, GCRi\IN gathers information about the state of coral reefs in 
around 80 countries. It is run by a management group comprising representatives of its sponsors: 
mCN, UNESCO-IOC, UNEP, WMO, AIMS, WorldFish Centre, World Bank, Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the ICRI Secretariat. The IUCN chairs the group and provides it \vith 
direction, a role IOC undertook until recendy. The global coordinator Clive Wilkinson acts as editor 
for the biennial GCRi\IN global status reports and for manuals on monitoring reefs (both biological 
and socio-economic). Willcinson also publicises the network at international forums. GCRi\IN's 
global coordination is largely funded by the US government (the US Department of State, NOAA 
and US Coral Reef Task Force (USCRTF), the latter described in Chapter Six), these funds being 
channelled through UNEP (previously through UNESCO-IOC). Funding for publication of global 
status reports and other manuals, plus some regional activities, is sourced from a variety of donors. 
GCRlvIN is closely linked \vith other organisations interested in coral reef monitoring and data 
collection including Reef Check and the WorldFish Centre which runs ReefBase, used by GCRi\IN 
as its global database. GCRlvIN contributes data to two global observing systems run by IOC and 
FAO (the Coastal Zone j\,'Iodule of the Global Ocean Observing System (GO OS) and the Global 
Terrestrial Observing System (GTOS). 
Source: Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (1997); Willcinson (1998; 2000; 2002; 2004); Global 
Coral Reef Monitoring Network (2000); GCM,IN report in International Coral ReefInitiative (2004) 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 5. THE WORLDFISH CENTRE 
An autonomous, nonprofit organisation, ICLARM was set up in 1977. Since establishing ReefBase 
in 1993, it has been renamed the \'VorldFish Centre and has moved its headquarters from Manila to 
Penang, Malaysia. Governed by an international board of trustees, the centre's work is funded by 
grants from private foundations and governments. In 1992, the Centre became one of the CGIAR 
research centres, introduced in Chapter Two. Members of that informal association share the 
mission of increasing food security and eradicating poverty in developing countries through research, 
partnership, capacity building, and policy support. Initially the WorldFish Centre specialised in 
fisheries research but it has broadened dlls to cover aquatic resource conservation generally, 
including policy issues. Besides its headquarters, the WorldFish Centre has offices in 12 countries, 
including two in the South Pacific (New Caledonia and Solomon Islands). Its funding comes mainly 
from European and North American governments, the European Commission, and from 
inte1'11ational organisations such as the World Bank. Total income in 2002 was USD 12.6 million. 
Source: web site at WorldFish Centre (2003) 
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INITIAL EFFORTS TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In 1992, Clive Wilkinson (now global coordinator of GCRMN but then a scientist at the Australian 
Institute of Marine Science (AIMS)), made the first attempt to quantitatively assess the state (health) of 
coral reefs worldwide. This helped coalesce growing concern about coral reefs. In a paper delivered at 
the i h International Coral Reef Symposium at Guam in 1992, Wilkinson estimated that 10 percent of 
the world's coral reefs were degraded beyond recognition and predicted that 30 percent were in such a 
critical state that they would be lost in the next 10 to 20 years followed by a further 30 percent in 20 to 
40 years (Wilkinson 1992 p. 11, 16, 19). Wilkinson predicted that the 60 percent of coral reefs he 
categorised as either critical or threatened would effectively collapse in around two decades if no 
actions were taken and human populations along tropical coastlines continued to skyrocket-a dire 
scenario indeed. 
Wilkinson based his estimates primarily on data and anecdotes from Southeast Asia (Birkeland quoted 
in Pennisi 1997). Shortly afterwards, 122 scientists from 22 countries examining the health of coral 
reefs worldwide at another University of Miami workshop concluded that there was insufficient 
information to form a more complete picture of the status of the world's reefs; the database for 
checking on the health of coral reefs was spotty and not easily comparable (Reef Check 2002). They 
agreed with Wilkinson's figures generally, concluding that, while most areas of remote reefs had not 
been studied, many nearshore reefs adjacent to or near urban population centres were suffering 
significant ecological decline. Echoing the judgment of the earlier Miami workshop and the UNEP-
IOC-WMO group of experts, they considered the principal causes of degradation to be anthropogenic: 
overfishing, eutrophication, and sedimentation. Natural causes were thought to contribute as well: 
hurricanes, high sea surface temperatures associated with El Nino, diseases and imbalances in key 
predators (crown-of-thorns starfish, sea urchins) (Grigg and Birkeland 1997). The meeting espoused 
the need for a comprehensive assessment of coral reefs worldwide, to evaluate existing impacts (Grigg 
and Birkeland 1997). 
The seriousness of the perceived state of coral reefs worldwide was again highlighted at an inaugural 
ICRI workshop in Dumaguete in 1995 (discussed in Chapter Seven). The Call to Action resulting from 
this workshop recognised that the decline in coral reefs was likely to lead to the loss of most of the 
world's coral reef resources during the next century. It too identified human activity as a primary agent 
of degradation, and affirmed that population growth would lead to increased pollution and increased 
uses of coral resources, accelerating the decline in coral reef ecosystems. 
Late 1990s: Heightened Concerns 
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE EXTENT OF DEGRADATION 
The first GCRMN and Reef Check global reports 
In the late 1990s, two different approaches to assessing the extent of coral reef degradation worldwide 
evolved: (1) GCRMN state of the reef reports assembled by professionals in countries with coral reefs 
(four reports over seven years, viz. Wilkinson 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004); and (2) Reef Check, which 
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used data collected by volunteer divers (Hodgson and Liebeler 2002). In addition, the World Resources 
Institute (WRI) co-ordinated an exercise assessing the extent of risks to reefs worldwide, called Reefs 
at Risk (Bryant et al. 1998). These three attempts are discussed below, Reef Check's in the following 
text box. 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 6. REEF CHECK 
The coral reef scientists who had assembled at the University of ,Miami in June 1993 felt that part 
of the difficulty in assessing the global state of coral reefs was due to the inefficient and 
inappropriate monitoring methods scientists were using. These methods were designed to 
investigate community ecology and measured many parameters that might not be affected when 
coral reef health is damaged. The scientists felt that mecilods should be designed specifically to 
investigate human impacts on coral reefs. They recognised another problem with the scientific 
approach: there are only a small number of reef scientists, most busy and only able to carry out 
surveys occasionally. As a result a group of researchers led by Gregor Hodgson developed a 
protocol for a global survey of the health of cile world's reefs, carried out annually with volunteer 
help from non-scientists. This was trialled in 1996; in 1997 Reef Check teams completed the first 
global survey of coral reefs. Since 1996, over 5000 people have trained in Reef Check methods. 
Reef Check objectives are to: educate the public about the coral reef crisis; create a global network 
of volunteer teams monitoring reef health; facilitate collaboration that produces ecologically sound 
and economically sustainable solutions; and to stimulate local community action to protect 
remaining pristine reefs and rehabilitate damaged reefs worldwide. Initially run out of the 
University of Hong Kong then University of California at Los Angeles, where founder Hodgson 
was based, Reef Check became an independent NGO in 2004. Governance is provided by a 
Board; it also has an Advisory Board, membership of both reflecting its links to various US-based 
businesses. Reef Check relies on grants from US philanthropic foundations, corporate 
sponsorships, UNEP and US government aid grants, discounted services, and help-in-kind from a 
,vide range of source, to funds its global projects. By 2004 it was active in over 60 countries and 
territories, \vith 198 volunteer coordinators and scientists, and a core staff of four in Los Angeles. 
Source: web site at leek.org; Reef Check (2002); Keine (2004); Jenny 'Mihaly, Reef 
Headquarters, Pacific Palisades CA, pers. (0111111. 
The first of the GCRMN global status reports, produced in 1998, was based on papers presented at a 
session of the 8th International Coral Reef Symposium in Panama in 1996. Wilkinson subsequently 
edited these papers, arranging for some to be updated, in order present the state of knowledge on the 
ecological conditions of coral reefs worldwide (Wilkinson 1998 p. vii). While this report did not 
contain any new quantitative assessments (over and above his 1992 analysis), it did note unprecedented 
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bleaching of hard and soft corals throughout the coral reefs of the world from mid-1997 to late-1998, 
when a widespread episode of coral bleaching coincided with severe El Nino and La Nina events and 
the severe climate swings those caused. Even remote reefs previously considered pristine were 
damaged, particularly in the Indian Ocean (Wilkinson 1999 p. 868). By the end of 1998, scientists had 
recognised that the coral bleaching episodes, and subsequent coral mortality, of 1997-1998 were the 
most geographically widespread ever recorded and probably the most severe in recorded history 
(Convention on Biological Diversity 1999 p. 25). 
In the GCRMN global status report, Wilkinson categorised the severity of bleaching at places: some 
had suffered catastrophic effects with near 95 percent mortality of shallow corals (Bahrain, Maldives, 
Sri Lanka, Singapore, large areas of Tanzania) and severe effects in others (50-70 percent mortality, 
but also coral recovery in Kenya, Seychelles, Japan, Thailand, Vietnam and Belize). Many other areas 
had little or no bleaching (Wilkinson 1998 p. 11). In the report, Wilkinson (1998 p. 6) observed that: 
Recent reports from the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN), Reef Check 
and many other projects indicate that coral reefs are under considerable stress and are 
experiencing considerable damage (Wilkinson 1998 p. 5). Increases in human populations 
and economic activity in the tropics over the past 50 years have resulted in increasing 
pressures on adjacent reefs. 
Reefs at Risk 
In 1998, another exercise emphasised the degradation of coral reefs worldwide, not by monitoring them 
but by assessing the comparative risks facing reefs in different regions. In this, WRI collaborated with 
the WoridFish Centre and UNEP-WCMC to produce the Reefs at Risk report (Bryant et at. 1998). 
UNEP, The Bay Foundation, The David & Lucy Packard Foundation, The Henry Foundation, the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency all supported the analysis (Bryant et at. 1998 p. 4). Reefs at Risk was a global 
assessment of four separate factors threatening coral reefs: coastal development, marine-based 
pollution, overexploitation of marine resources, and inland pollution including sedimentation. To 
predict where reef degradation is likely to occur, based on presumed human pressures on those areas, 
analysts used proxies to reflect likely threats, based on 14 data sets as well as maps ofland cover, ports, 
settlements, and shipping lanes, plus information from 800 sites known to be degraded by people, and 
some input from reef scientists. The results indicate the level of threats to coral reef ecosystems in 
different regions; they are not a measure of actual condition or actual degradation (Bryant et at. 1998 p. 
7). The authors acknowledged that they did not assess all known threats to coral reefs, omitting damage 
due to coral bleaching and crown of thorns starfish, for instance (Bryant et al. 1998 p. 51). 
The results classified reefs in particular areas as being overall under either: 
1. high threat-if at least one of the individual threat factors were classified as under high threat 
overall 
2. medium threat-at least one of the individual threat factors were classified as under medium threat 
overall (and none of high threat) 
3. low threat-if all four threat factors were of low threat (see Bryant et at. 1998 p. 47-50). 
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The report concluded that globally, 36 percent of all reefs were threatened by overexploitation, 30 
percent by coastal development, 22 percent by inland pollution and erosion, and 12 percent by marine 
pollution. When these threats are combined, this suggested that 58 percent of the world's reefs may be 
at risk (under medium and high threat) (Bryant et al. 1998 p. 20). From this, the authors (Bryant et al. 
1998 p. 21) concluded that that 27 percent of the world's existing reefs by area were under immediate 
threat of significant damage and a further 31 percent under a medium level of risk-similar to 
Wilkinson's conclusion described on the previous page. 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 7. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (WRI) 
\Vorld Resources Institute describes itself as an environmental think tank that goes beyond 
research to find practical ways to protect the earth and improve people's lives. It is an independent 
non-profit organization with a staff of more than 100, based in \Vashington DC and governed by 
a board of directors mostly from the US. WRI explores issues at the intersection of environmental 
protection and economic development, being mainly concerned with protecting Earth's living 
systems, increasing access to information, reversing global warming, and harnessing markets and 
enterprise to expand economic opportunity and protect the environment. In 2002, \'\7RI received 
over USD 25 million in revenue, 35 percent from private foundations, 13 percent from the US 
government and the reminder from a mix of other sources. \'\7RI provides information and 
practical proposals for policy and institutional change designed to foster (in its own words) 
environmentally sound, socially equitable development. In this it claims to collaborate \vith nearly 
400 partners in more than 50 countries. \'\7RI has been influential in American environmentalism, 
its reports serving as the basis of some American legislation and policy. An WRI study first 
proposed the Global Environment Facility; \V'RI studies have been used as the basis for many 
negotiations on ozone depletion, climate change and biodiversity. 
Source: web site at Jamison (1996 p. 231) 
CORAL BLEACHING AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
By the late 1990s, the list of anthropogenic impacts facing coral reefs had become a long one (Table 7). 
But it also appeared that reefs might be facing not just a series of local anthropogenic impacts but a 
truly global threat associated with global warming. Since initial concerns about coral bleaching in the 
early 1990s, several reef researchers had questioned the possible link between regional-scale bleaching 
of corals, high sea surface temperatures, increased greenhouse gases and climate change (e.g. Glynn 
1993, as reported in Hughes et al. 2003 p. 929). 
Small-scale bleaching events can often be correlated with specific disturbances (e.g. 
extreme low/high temperatures, low/high solar irradiance, subaerial exposure, 
sedimentation, freshwater dilution, contaminants, and diseases), whereas large scale (mass) 
bleaching occurs over 100s to 1000s ofkm2 is more difficult to explain (Glynn 1996 p. 
495). 
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Shortly after 1997-98 bleaching episode, Kleypas et al. (1999) published a model which showed that 
increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide would dissolve in the sea and would threaten reefs by 
causing chemical imbalances in seawater, reducing coral calcification. With this renewed attention on 
the potential for global climate change to devastate coral reefs came dire predictions about the 
immediate future of coral reefs (e.g. Hoegh-Guldberg 1999; Wilkinson 1999) and Buddemeier (1999 
quoted in Wilkinson 2000). Kleypas et al. (1999 p. 118) predicted that between preindustrial times and 
the middle of the next century, biogenic calcification in the oceans will drop between 14 and 30 
percent; this would mainly affect coral reefs. Moreover, although the link has not been proven, the 
mass coral bleaching that occurred in most parts of the tropical world in 1997-98 and again in 2001-02 
(described in Wilkinson 1998,2000) seemed to resolve the doubts many coral reef scientists had about 
its causes. Some scientists declared the evidence for the detrimental effects of climate change on coral 
reefs to be incontrovertible (e.g. Hoegh-Guldberg 1999). 
This was supported by predictions made in the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2001. IPCC 
Working Group II, in an extensive review of evidence about global climate change, concluded that 
there were several causes associated with episodes of coral bleaching over the past twenty years, one 
being increased ocean temperatures. The Working Group authors predicted that coral reef ecosystems 
will be impacted by sea-level rise, warming sea surface temperatures and any changes in storm 
frequency and intensity. 
Future sea surface warming will cause stress on coral reefs and result in increased frequency 
of marine diseases (high confidence). Changes in ocean chemistry resulting from higher 
CO2 levels may have a negative impact on coral reef development and health (Manning and 
Nobry 2001 p. 35). 
In the same vein, a recent scientific review of the potential contributions of climate change to stresses 
on coral reef ecosystems concluded that there seems to be 'no realistic doubt' that continued climate 
change will cause further degradation of coral reef communities, which will be even more devastating 
in combination with the continuing non-climate stresses that will almost certainly increase in 
magnitude and frequency (Buddemeier et at. 2004 p. iv). The authors noted that stresses associated 
with climate change include high-temperature episodes promoting coral bleaching, reduced 
calcification, changes in ocean and atmospheric circulation, and rising sea levels, and they suggested 
these may exacerbate other stresses not directly related to climate, such as disease and predation 
(Buddemeier et al. 2004 p. iv). 
o 
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TABLE 7: TYPES OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES ACKNOWLEDGED AS CAUSING CORAL REEF DEGRADATION 
DIRECT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION TO REEFS 
Channel blasting and dredging 
Coral mining and excavation for cement production and for coral sand; materials for building 
construction and road beds; coral for septic tanks 
Shoreline projects eg sea walls, piers, reclamations, other coastal modification including roading 
War and military activities including weapons and nuclear testing and wrecked craft 
Removal of live rock for export for aquaria 
Destructive fishing: explosives and poisons 
Boat anchors and ship groundings 
Nets dragged on reefs (mainly fine mesh ones) 
Trampling: fishermen and tourists walking over shallow reefs 
Careless and accidental damage from divers (fin kicks and kneeling) 
HARVESTING, FISHING, AND INTRODUCTION OF ALIEN SPECIES 
Depletion of targeted species including high value species, large fish, shellfish for food or export 
Depletion of coral and exotic species for aquariums, curios, ornaments and jewellery 
Spearfishing removing large fish 
Tourists buying coral reef products unaware of the damage that the trade is causing 
Fishing of spawning grounds reducing recruitment below critical levels 
Indiscriminate depletion through blast fishing and poisoning 
Accidental and purposeful introductions of alien species 
DEGRADATION THROUGH ACTIVITIES THAT CHANGE WATER QUALITY AND TEMPERATURE 
High temperature outfalls eg power plant effluents 
Ship-based sources of pollutants 
Bilge water and ballast water 
Oil spills and hydrocarbons and the detergents used to clean them up 
Land-based sources of pollutants and sedimentation 
Industrial discharges, oil spills, dumping, stormwater discharges (chemicals & heavy metals) 
Agrochemical and nutrient runoff from farms and golf courses (e.g. herbicides and pesticides) 
Discharge of poorly treated human or livestock sewage 
Siltation and sedimentation from logging, deforestation, slash and bum agriculture, mining, mangrove 
clearance, harbour dredging, construction, dumping of sand for beaches, indiscriminate land clearance 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (GLOBAL WARMING) 
Sources: Birkeland (1977); Salvat (1980); Veron (1986); Greenpeace Pacific Campaign (c 1989); Crail, et al. 
(1990); Thresher (1991); Sorokin (1993); Weber (1993); Sebens (1994); Hodgson (1996); Hinrichson 
(1997); Mulvaney (1997); Willcinson (1998; 2000); Chadwick (1999); Hoegh-Guldberg (1999); Tickell 
(1999); Denecke (2001); Economist.com Global Agenda (2001); James (2001); Buddemeier et al. (2004) 
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OVERFISHING AND DESTRUCTIVE FISHING METHODS 
Just as fears about the effects of climate change on reefs escalated to a global scale in the late 1990s, so 
too did concerns about the overfishing of reefs and the effects of various international trades-in 
corals, ornamental fish and invertebrates, live rock, reef fish collected live for sale in Chinese 
restaurants, and the long-standing trade in beche-de-mer. This heightened concern came at a time when 
fishery policymakers were trying to address the vast increase in global production from marine capture 
fisheries during the last half century, which has led to over-exploitation of important fish st~cks, and 
modifications of ecosystems, significant economic losses, as well as international conflict (FAO 1995 
p. v, 1; 1996 p. 1). From about 19 million tonnes of catch in 1950, world production has increased to 
about 80 million tonnes annually since the mid-1980s (FAO 2002 p. 8 of Part 1)1. At WSSD in August 
2002, national and regional representatives decided to take steps to restore fish stocks by 2015 (Cole 
2003 p. 80). 
Fisheries are the most extensive extractive use of living coral reefs, and fishing activities, both 
commercial and recreation, and are considered a key factor in worldwide decline in coral reef 
ecosystems (MCClanahan et at. 2002 p. 6). Many scientific papers and popular articles about coral reefs 
describe how fishing, whether for domestic use or for export, or in association with tourism, is 
depleting reefs (e.g. Birkeland 1977; Greenpeace Pacific Campaign c.1989; Craik et at. 1990; Weber 
1993; Hodgson 1996; Hinrichson 1997; Mulvaney 1997; Ledua and Yuki 1998; Chadwick 1999; 
Tickelll999; Denecke 2001; Economist.com Global Agenda 2001; James 2001). Some mention how 
fishing is depleting high value species, large fish, and shellfish, and live coral and exotic species for 
aquariums, curios, ornaments and jewellery. Others mention how tourists buy coral reef products, 
unaware of the damage that this trade is causing. Yet others mention how fishermen use explosives and 
poisons that cause indiscriminate depletion and destroy reef habitat (summarised in Table 7 above). 
Concern about international trade 
Although there is some concern about local overfishing through subsistence and artisanal fisheries, it is 
the level of international trade in coral, reef fish, live rock, and other reef organisms that is believed to 
be contributing to a general decline in coral reefs (Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task 
Force 2000; Lieberman and Field 2001 p. 19). There are several sub-trades in various types of 
organisms, each for different purposes and each with its own demand and supply dynamics. 
One such trade is that in curios. Although many types of marine animals besides corals are collected, 
including conchs, snails, clams, starfish, seahorses, fishes, sea fans, sea whips, sand dollars and sea 
urchins, there is little data available on this trade (Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task 
Force 2000 p. 12). More is known about the trades in live coral and marine ornamentals, which 
burgeoned after advances in the technology of tropical marine aquaria. Development of self-contained 
I World fisheries are estimated to have changed from being an estimated 60 percent unexploited in the immediate 
post-war period to being 60 percent either fully or over-exploited by the early 1990s (FAO 1997). Expanding sea 
food markets, open access fisheries, technological innovations, government subsidy programmes and the 
opportunities created by the legal regime agreed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) are all considered contributing factors (Hanna 1999 p. 46). 
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'mini-reef' systems, complete with adequate lighting and bio-filtration to maintain a colourful range of 
corals, fish, invertebrates and algae, spawned a huge increase in tropical marine aquaria in private 
homes in North America, Europe, Japan, Taiwan and Australia (Holthus 2001 p. 17). Collectors select 
small pieces of coral, keep them alive in tanks, then air freight them to their destination (Lovell and 
Tumuri 1999; Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000 p. 12). They may also 
grow these on, exporting second generation pieces. 
These technological advances also spurred a huge increase in demand for live rock, which provides 
biofiltration in home aquaria and it gives a three-dimensional look (Lovell 2001 p. 10). Collected in 
small pieces from the edges of reef flats and patches of reef, live rock is a composite of skeletal 
material of algal or coral origin covered with coralline algae; it often has small plants and animals 
attached (Lovell 2001 p. 10). In 1997, ninety percent of world live rock exports came from the Fiji 
Islands and Tonga, and almost all went to the US (Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task 
Force 2000 p. 25). CITES treats live rock as coral, restricting its trade in the manner of species listed in 
Appendix II of that convention. In the late 1990s, a WCMC publication (Green and Shirley 1999, 
compiled from CITES data) spurred international debate when it highlighted how global trade in live 
corals and live rock trade had expanded over the past five years. 
In total, over 1000 different species of reef organisms, including around 300 species of marine 
invertebrate, are being traded internationally for this industry, almost all taken from reefs rather than 
being cultured (Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000 p. ii, 7). As well as 
the hundreds of thousand of kilograms of corals and live rock traded internationally each year, an 
estimated 15 to 20 million coral reef fishes (possibly far more) are traded for use in home aquaria. 
Actual catches may be far higher because of significant mortality (Sadovy and Vincent 2002). The data 
on the total quantities of fish exported in this trade is unreliable, although the volume does seem to be 
steadily increasing (Holthus 2001 p. 17). The trade's annual retail value in the 1990s was estimated at 
somewhere between USD 90 and USD 300 million (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 400). 
Around80 countries export marine aquarium fish. By far the largest suppliers of marine aquarium fish 
worldwide are Indonesia and the Philippines (Holthus 2001). Significant numbers also come from 
Australia, Hawaii and Florida, and the greater Caribbean (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 396-397). In the 
Pacific, the trade is growing (Chapter Twelve). Worldwide, over 1000 fish species from 50 families are 
traded. Most of the species traded are from just seven families (angelfish Pomacanthidae; wrasses 
Labridae; damselfishes Pomacentridae; surgeonfishes Acanthuridae; butterfly fishes Chaetodontidae; 
gobies Gobiidae; and groupers Serranidae) (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 394). Most of the fish sought 
are small, often juveniles, sought for attractive colour and physical shape; when males are more 
brightly coloured (as with some wrasses) they are preferred over females. Hobbyists often pay high 
prices for rare fish (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 395). 
The trade in live reef fish for food also concerns reef scientists and environmentalists. Live fishes are in 
high demand in Asian restaurants where diners select their meal from a display tank (Sadovy and 
Vincent 2002 p. 391). Hong Kong imports most of these fish, re-exporting considerable volumes to 
other parts of Asia. There is also a growing market amongst Chinese communities in Australia and the 
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US west coast (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 396). Originally based on a small supply from the South 
China Sea, the trade grew significantly in 1980s when Indonesia and Philippines became suppliers, 
then expanded further into the Indo-Pacific in the 1990s (PINA Nuis Online 2002; Sadovy and Vincent 
2002 p. 395-396). Fish are now sourced from more than 20 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 
including Australia and various Pacific Islands (Muldoon et al. 2005 p. 35 and see Chapter Twelve 
following). Accurate statistics of the trade's size are not collected; best guesses suggest it is in the order 
of 30,000 to 50,000 tonne per year (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 399-400; Muldoon et al. 2005). 
The trade is susceptible to the economic environment in Asia and both prices and volumes traded have 
declined since the late 1990s, but appear to have since stabilised (Muldoon et at. 2005 p. 35-36). A 
recent estimate placed the retail value of trade into Hong Kong at around USD 350 million (Muldoon et 
al. 2005 p. 35). This stabilisation is not the full story however. One study has estimated that demand 
for live reef fish exceeds sustainable production in the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia by 2.5 to six 
times (Warren-Rhodes et at. 2003 p. 481). Hong Kong, southern China, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Malaysia consume more seafood taken from coral reefs than can be sustainably generated, and are thus 
depleting reefs in a widening semi-circle extending into Oceania, where reefs are being targeted 
increasingly (Warren-Rhodes et al. 2003 p. 484). Since 1995, volumes being exported from Oceania 
have risen rapidly (Johannes and Riepen 1995; Gillett 2002 p. 18; PINA Nuis Online 2002). 
Another of the concerns about this live reef food fish trade is the threat it poses to several targeted 
species-large, relatively slow reproducing groupers and wrasses such as the humphead wrasse 
Cheilinus undulatus, along with snappers (family Lutjanidae). While only a few species are sought, 
they are sought in high volumes; consumers value rarity and prefer certain sizes and colours especially 
red (Sadovy and Vincent 2002 p. 393). Moreover, there is high mortality during holding and transport, 
and probably around twice as many fish are caught as successfully traded and consumed (Sadovy and 
Vincent 2002 p. 400). The practice of fishing aggregations of spawning fish adds to the risk of 
extinction. Because fishers move from one area to another, as fish numbers drop too low to be worth 
the effort to catch, there is also the risk of serial depletion. Some fishers are known to have targeted 
remote, otherwise pristine reefs. Because the trade is in live fish, these can be caught and stored in 
cages or tanks until sufficient are collected to justify arranging transport. This allows remote 
communities to participate; in some locations ships with built-in tanks periodically visit such 
communities to buy suitable fish. 
The use of cyanide and of explosives in the live fish capture for the ornamental and food trades is also 
of concern because these practices damage reefs (TRAFFIC 1999). Use of fishing methods that are 
physically destroying coral reefs (drag nets as well as explosives and poisons), is believed to have 
become common, particularly in Southeast Asia, because fishers find these methods more profitable 
and competitive than traditional hook and lines, set nets, and traps (McClanahan 2002 p. 464). One 
biologist has estimated that roughly a square metre of reef is destroyed for every live reef fish caught 
with cyanide (Pearce 2003). Such disturbance may change the type of reef (Le. the dominant species). 
According to an article in New Scientist, in the Philippines cyanide fishing has turned many 
biologically diverse reefs on the planet into marine deserts (Pearce 2003). These practices have 
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attracted the attention of several NGOs, mostly North American such as the one described in the box 
below. 
INTRODUCING THE ACTORS: 8. INTERNATIONAL MARINELIFE ALLIANCE (IMA) 
A NGO founded in the US in 1985, IMA focused on exposing and combating the widespread use 
of cyanide to capture live reef fish in the Philippines. Working with \VRJ: and TV media outlets, it 
documented the spread of cyanide fishing and associated problems with this trade-and IlVL-\.'s 
approach in the Philippines-in a series of publications and television documentaries. 
Subsequently deluged by requests for information and assistance from government fisheries and 
environment agencies, donor groups and other NGOs throughout Asia-Pacific, IMA collaborated 
\vith WRI, launching in 1998 a regional initiative to reform destructive fishers. 
Charles Barber of the Philippines' \V'RI office helped IlVL'\. raise over USD 3 million funding in 
only two years, much of it from the East Asia and Pacific Environment Initiative, a USAID and 
State Department partnership. Barber subsequently joined IlVL'\. in 2001 as Vice President and 
\Vashington DC representative. The Packard Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, The Nature 
Conservancy, and \'\!WF also contributed funds to its programmes. Expanding rapidly between 
1998 and 2001, IlVL'\. established field programs in Indonesia, Fiji Islands (see Chapter Twelve), 
Hong Kong, Marshall Islands, Vanuatu and Vietnam and a regional research programme at the 
University of Guam. Then as quicldy as it had risen, IlVL'\. contracted. Paying high salaries to US 
senior staff and employing hundreds of workers in Southeast Asia, it was relying on further US 
funding applications. In the aftermath of September 11 (2001), when funding for marine 
conservation became difficult to obtain. IlVL'\. scaled down its field offices and programmes. 
Sources: IlVL'\. web site at ; Barber's biography on 
web site http://hiodivcrsitycconomics.org/busincss/020831-m.htm; EAPEI web site at 
http://eapei.home.att.net/; Ken MacKay, C-SPODP coordinator, Suva,pers. COItJ/JI •• 
There are also concerns about the international beche-de-mer fishery, which dates back hundreds, 
possibly thousands of years. This multi-species fishery has largely been unmanaged, even though 
production has escalated in the last fifteen years, partly as a result of the liberalisation of trade with 
China, the main market (Preston 1997 p. 20). The fishery has several environmental side effects. Some 
sea cucumber species play an important role in recycling marine sediments; if too many are removed, 
areas can turn into a type of marine desert (Warwick Nash, WorldFish Centre, pers. comtn.). Smoking 
the sea cucumbers is often done using mangrove wood from areas close to fishing grounds and this has 
caused extensive mangrove destruction in some places. The waste water from boiling beche-de-mer is 
toxic to marine life including corals, if disposed of in the sea as often happens (Preston 1997 p. 20). 
115 
lOSS OF BIODIVERSITY ON CORAL REEFS 
Since the CBD was created in 1992, the loss of biological diversity in various ecosystems has become 
an international concern, due largely to the work of international conservation NGOs and the IUCN. 
Attention has focused on coral reef ecosystems because of their high biodiversity of both species and 
genes (see text box on the following page). Of all the planet's seas, highest biodiversity exists in 'the 
coral triangle' encompassing reefs around northern Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua 
New Guinea, to which the Solomon Islands were recently added. Since 2000, conservation NGOs 
identifying biodiversity 'hotspots', areas with large numbers of species and/or many endemic species 
have concentrated on reefs in this triangle. Around 25 hotspots are now recognised, most are in tropical 
regions with their species-rich rainforests and reefs (Society for Conservation Biology 2003). As a 
result of Conservation International (CI) surveys in 2001 and 2004, the two spots vying for the greatest 
marine diversity are in Irian Jaya and the Solomon Islands (pers. obs., 10th ICRS). 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 9. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (CBD» 
Signed by 150 government leaders at the 1992 Earth Summit, this convention entered in force in 
late 1993. It is dedicated to promoting sustainable development but is largely silent about marine 
biodiversity. Nevertheless the CBD became interested in coral reefs in 1998 when severe 
bleaching in the Indian Ocean prompted some delegates to raise this topic at the fourth CoP. The 
CoP requested its Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) 
(mandated to provide advice on all aspects of the Convention's work) to analyse dle bleaching 
phenomenon and report back. It also instructed the Executive Secretary to express its concern to 
the Framework Convention on Clinlate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Wedands. 
SBSTTA subsequently decided that, in addition to coral bleaching, physical degradation and 
destruction of coral reefs posed a significant threat to the biological diversity of coral reef 
ecosystems and asked dle CoP to expand its sphere of interest accordingly. 
Source: web site Secretariat of dle Convention on Biological Diversity (1999); 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice (1999); ENB (1999) 
Since biodiversity became a popular notion in the early 1990s, concerns about overfishing of reefs and 
practices that destroy reef habitat have expanded to include concerns about biodiversity loss. 
Organisms considered under threat include turtles, some of the larger fish species (the bumphead parrot 
fish Bolbometopon muricatum, humphead wrasse, and some groupers), sea horses, and several large, 
sessile molluscs, particularly green snails, giant clams and trochus. There is also concern that some 
coral species extremely sensitive to bleaching may be lost (McClanahan 2002 p. 475). Naturally-rare 
coral species sought by the aquarium trade are also attracting conservationists' attention (Doug Fenner, 
Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources, American Samoa, presentation at IUCN side event, 
Initiative on Extinction in the Sea, June 29 2004 at 10th ICRS, Okinawa). 
THE BIODIVERSITY OF CORAL REEFS 
The long separation of evolutionary pathway among marine lineages-many extant marine animal 
phyla originated or diversified during the Cambrian era more than 500 million years ago but plants 
and animals only invaded land in the Paleozoic, 200-400 million years ago-has resulted in a 
greater variety of body plans, greater functional and chemical diversity, and greater 'endemism' in 
major groups of marine compared to terrestrial animals (Reaka-Kudla 1997 p. 86). Coral reefs are 
particularly diverse, their structural foundation supporting so many species they have been 
portrayed as oases of biodiversity and biomass in an oceanic desert (Done et al. 1996 p. 417). The 
most depauperate reef is likely to be more diverse and structurally complex than any adjoining 
benthic community (Done et al. 1996 p. 396). Yet, researchers are just beginning to understand 
reef diversity, processes, and the basic biology of corals themselves (Sebens 1994 p. 116). 
No comprehensive biodiversity inventories covering all coral reef taxa have been made but it 
seems likely this is extremely high (Reaka-Kudla 1997 p. 87-88). Although total coral reef species 
diversity has been difficult to quantify, it seems that thousands of species are yet to be recognised 
and described (Sebens 1994 p. 117; Reaka-Kudla 1997 p. 89-91). Most visible on reefs are the 
sessile epibenthic organisms that provide its complex structure (hard, and soft corals, sponges, 
coralline and fleshy algae) and the suprabenthic reef fishes, the latter one of the most diverse 
vertebrate assemblages on the planet. Yet much of the diversity and biomass of coral communities 
is in cyptofauna-animals that bore into the substrate (e.g. sponges, polychaete and sipunculan 
worms, and bivalves), sessile encrusters living\vithin holes and crevices (e.g. bryozoans, sponges, 
tunicates, polychaete worms) and motile nesders inhabiting those (e.g. polychaete and sipunculan 
worms, echinoderms, molluscs, and crustaceans (Realm-Kudla 1997 p. 87). 
On biogeographic scales, reefs exhibit huge differences in species composition and diversity. Coral 
diversity is highest around insular Southeast Asia and it is much lower in the Adantic than in the 
Indo-Pacific-there is one-tenth the number of Scleractinian corals in the Adantic dlan in the 
Indo-Pacific region. Another major diversity gradient occurs moving away from high diversity 
centres, one in the Pacific, one in the Red Sea and one in the Philippines, New Guinea and 
surrounding area (Sebens 1994 p. 116). Coral diversity declines eastward across the Pacific Ocean 
as do reef fish (Sebens 1994 p. 116). There are close to 900 species in the western Pacific but only 
half that number in the eastern Pacific and a third in the Adantic (Thresher 1991). Other reef 
fauna follow this diversity gradient (Sebens 1994 p. 116). Along the western shores of the 
Americas and West Africa, coral diversity and reef development is very restricted (Spalding et al. 
2001 p. 19-21). The diversity of corals and reef-associated species also declines north and south of 
the equator, dinlinishing fairly rapidly along latitudinal clines; high latitude reefs are dominated by 
a few species able to survive periodic \vinter chills (Sebens 1994 p. 116; Spalding et al. 2001 p. 19). 
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A Worldwide Crisis 
RECOGNITION OF A WORLDWIDE CRISIS FOR CORAL REEFS 
During the 1990s that idea that coral reefs are undergoing a crisis worldwide gradually gained 
credence, coalesced by several assessments of the state of coral reefs worldwide. Table 8, below, lists 
the various pronouncements mentioned in this chapter. By 2000, some were saying that it was now too 
late to save the coral reefs of the planet even if greenhouse gas emissions could begin to drop 
immediately (UNESCAP 2000). By 2001, the idea that coral reefs were in crisis was both widely 
accepted amongst coral reef researchers, and was shaping the work agenda of policy organisations and 
NGOs. Several recent authoritative scientific publications contemplating the future of coral reefs and 
their vulnerability to environmental change have emphasised the inescapability of the crisis, including 
Hoegh-Guldberg (1999), Knowlton (2001), McClanahan (2002), Hughes (2003), and Buddemeier 
(2004). By mid-2004 the coral reef crisis was an accepted part of scientific papers in both Science and 
Nature journals and in articles in the New Scientist magazine. 
TABLE 8: SITES OF KEY PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE GLOBAL STATE OF CORAL REEFS 
Year Assessment 
1985 A gamble on tbe iutllre (Dahl c.1985) 
1988 Coral Reeft of tbe World (UNEP and IU CN 1988) 
1991 j'vIiami workshop sponsored by Sea Grant (D'Elia et al. 1991) 
1992 Wilkinson (1992) at 7th ICRS in Guam 
1993 NIiami workshop on Global Healtb of Coral Reeft (Ginsburg 1993) 
1994 UNEP-IOC-ASPEI-IUCN Global Task Force on Coral Reefs (\Vilkinson and Buddemeier 1994) 
1995 Jameson et al. (1995) for ICRI workshop 
1998 First GCRlvlN global status report (\Vilkinson 1998) 
Reeft at Risk assessment (Bryant et al. 1998) 
1999 Climate cballge, coral bleat'bing and tbe jttfure of tbe IVorld's coralreeft (Hoegh-Guldberg 1999) 
2000 Second GCRlvlN global status report (\Vilkinson 2000) 
2002 Third GCRl\lN global status report (\Vilkinson 2002) 
Reef Check five-year report (Hodgson and Liebeler 2002) 
2003 Global trajedories of tbe long-term deditte of coral reif eco{ystems (pandolfi et al. 2003) 
Climate dJaltge, IJtlmatl impacts and tbe resilience of coral reeft (Hughes et al. 2003) 
2004 Coral Reejj alld Global Climate Cbattge (Buddemeier et al. 2004) 
Fourth GCRl\lN global status report (\Vilkinson 2004) 
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In a retrospective analysis of records dating back thousands of years, a group of researchers concluded 
that "Coral reefs have declined over the course of human history, culminating in the dramatic increase 
in coral mortality and reef degradation of the past 20-50 years" (Pandolfi et al. 2003). The rapid 
changes over the past three decades are believed to be on such a large scale that few regions still have 
'pristine' reefs (Jackson 1997). The causes of the current crisis are considered to be a complex mixture 
of direct-human imposed and climate related stresses. Many human influences are implicated in these 
recent changes in reef ecology, which encompass changes to water temperatures, seawater chemistry 
(toxic substances, nutrients, the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels on reef-building activity), 
removal of species, and food web alterations. Also implicated are outbreaks of disease which have 
suspected but unproven connections with both human activities and climatic factors (Buddemeier et at. 
2004 p. 4). Diseases are of concern to coral reef scientists as they appear to be increasing; in the 
Caribbean (and perhaps globally) a combination of warm waters and disease are believed to having 
devastating effects on coral reefs (McClanahan 2002). 
GCRMN AND REEF CHECK GLOBAL STATUS REPORTS 
Both Reef Check and GCRMN continue to monitor the state of reef health worldwide. Between 1997 
and 2001, Reef Check volunteers monitored over 1500 reefs in the Atlantic, Indo-Pacific and Red Sea, 
in 50 countries and territories. In 2001, staff at Reef Check headquarters analysed data from 1107 sites, 
examining spatial and temporal changes in indicator abundance, plus correlations between abundance 
and ratings of human impact (Hodgson and Liebeler 2002 p. 7). Only some of their data was sufficient 
to allow conclusions, which showed that high value fish and shellfish have been fished out in some 
areas; four species of fish are critically endangered: Nassau grouper; barramundi cod, bumphead 
parrotfish, and humphead wrasse (Hodgson and Liebeler 2002). 
Through the GCRMN global status reports, Wilkinson has continued his efforts to quantify the extent 
of coral reef degradation. In the second globalxeport in 2000, in which 97 contributors prepared a total 
86 reports on countries/ states, collated by region, Wilkinson sought to quantify the proportion of reefs 
destroyed in the 1997-98 bleaching, and those still under various degrees of threat. He asked the 
coordinators to examine the predictions that he had made in 1992 and to update those for their region 
(Wilkinson 2000 p. 17-18). From their responses he compiled a table (on page 18 of Wilkinson 2000). 
The data from that table (which included predictions from the Reefs at Risk analysis) is reproduced in 
the first three rows of data in Table 9 below, along with figures from an update Wilkinson prepared for 
the 2004 global status report. 
In the 2000 report, Wilkinson suggested that many of the reefs reported 'lost' in 1998 (estimated at 16 
percent) would recover" except possibly for those in already stressed areas ... there are likely to be 
major changes in the composition of coral communities and reduction in harvestable products" 
(Wilkinson 2000 p. 19). In the 2004 global status report, Wilkinson estimated that 40 percent of the 
reefs damaged in 1998 had recovered (based on figures provided for each region by experts). "Many 
coral reefs continue to recover ... the recovery is not uniform and many virtually destroyed in 1998 
show minimal signs of recovery (Wilkinson 2004 p. 8-9). 
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TABLE 9: GRCMN QUANTITATIVE GLOBAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE STATE OF CORAL REEFS 
Estimated percentage of coral reefs worldwide: 
Analysis Destroyed F acing high risk Facing 
medium risk 
1992 Guam 10% 30% 30% 
1998 ReefS at Risk 27% 31% 
GCRMN2000 
GCRMN2004 
11 % lost due to human causes plus 
16% not fully functioning after the 
1998 bleaching 
20% 
Sources: Wilkinson (1992; 2000; 2004), Bryant et at. (1998) 
14% 18% 
24% 26% 
Wilkinson (2004 p. 8) concluded that: "Current predictions are that the extreme events of 1998 will 
become more common in the next 50 years i.e. massive global bleaching mortality will not be a 1/1000 
year event in future, but a regular event". He has continued to argue that reefs classed as either critical 
or threatened would be irreparably degraded unless the stresses are removed and relatively large areas 
are set aside as marine protected areas. 
CONCLUSION 
This account of concerns about coral reefs has identified a multitude of problems threatening coral 
reefs. In each decade since the 1960s, new environmental problems have emerged, as shown in Table 
10 overleaf, adding to the suite already being faced. Increasing scientific knowledge about coral reefs, 
through scuba, better mapping, monitoring of meteorological parameters and of reefs themselves, along 
with research into symptoms of diseases and coral bleaching have all raised new concerns about their 
health and long-term viability as ecosystems. As coral reefs have been linked to successive 
environmental agendas, new techniques for assessing the state of reefs worldwide have emerged, along 
with means of diffusing the information these produce, this creating the basis for a co-ordinated 
response to the perceived crisis. 
This, then, is the orthodox view of the role of science in identifying coral reef problems. In the next 
chapter I reinterpret this role, by studying how the crisis has been discursively constructed and its 
message disseminated. In doing so, I revisit Wilkinson's contentions about the fragility of coral reefs, 
and analyse conceptual changes in his thinking, reflected in the extracts quoted above. 
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TABLE 10: TIMELINE OF KEY INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF CONCERNS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
Decade Key Concerns of the Decade 
1960s Crown-of-thorn starfish outbreaks, 
Australia and the Pacific 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
2000s 
(first 
half) 
Recovery after 'natural' events 
Further outbreaks of crown-of-thorn 
starfish in Pacific and Indian Oceans 
Fishing and shell collection 
Direct extraction of coral 
Various sources of pollution 
Nuclear detonations in the Pacific 
An expanding list of anthropogenic effects 
Decline in coral cover in the Caribbean: 
shift to algae-dominated reefs 
Sudden death syndrome amongst fish in 
home aquaria linked to cyanide used in 
collecting fish 
A wave of coral bleaching in the late 1980s 
prompts searches for historical records of 
previous bleaching events 
Anthropogenic effects 
1997/98: unprecedented bleaching 
associated with EI Nino/ La Nina events; 
building on earlier debate about the 
potential effects of climate change, concern 
about the effects of widespread coral 
bleaching deepens 
New and expanding international trades in 
reef organisms 
Extensive destructive fishing in Southeast 
Asia 
Continued decline in Caribbean corals and 
recognition of the role played in this by 
microbial diseases 
Further widespread coral bleaching events 
Anthropogenic effects 
Overfishing and destructive fishing 
practices 
Recognition of the role that increasing 
international trade plays in worldwide reef 
decline 
Continued concern about unprecedented 
coral bleaching; consideration given to how 
best to mitigate coral bleaching and aid reef 
resilience 
Possible species extinctions and loss of 
biodiversity in the Caribbean and elsewhere 
Policy Responses (see Chapter 7) 
Scientific meetings including: 
• 1 st International Coral Reef Symposium 
• IBP coral reef theme 
011 PSA coral reef symposia 
CITES listing of black corals 
International Coral Reef Society formed 
CITES listing of hard corals 
UNEP and IU CN publish Cora! Re¢ if the World 
GCRlvIN conceived 
ReefBase set up 
ICRl formed and Cal! to Adioll formulated 
Reef Check started 
US Coral Reef Taskforce established 
World Bank/ GEF reef conservation projects 
CDB workplans on coral reefs 
WRl Re¢ at Risk analysis 
rvIAC's certification scheme for the marine 
ornamentals industry initiated 
CITES focus on the global coral trade 
Large environmental NGOs start campaigns 
ICRAN and ICRlN set up 
UNEP's Coral Reef Unit 
\V'orld Bank/GEF research project on bleaching 
Ramsar and \\1HO interest in protecting reefs 
Species Survival Commission assessments 
IUCN global coral reef portfolio established 
Development of global standards for the LRRFT 
Further campaigns of environmental NGOs 
Partnership established to develop tools for 
encouraging reef resilience 
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Chapter Six 
The Crisis Narrative 
Introduction 
This chapter moves from an orthodox reading to an alternative (counter-) reading of the environmental 
problems prompting international coral reef policy, examining how scientists have discursively 
constructed and disseminated a narrative espousing a state of worldwide crisis facing coral reefs. In 
doing so, it elucidates some of the practices of science/policy, showing how ideas about 'the state of 
the environment' can come into good currency despite a weak basis in systematic quantitative research, 
and describing how these ideas circulate and recirculate, in self-reinforcing ways, through coral reef 
science, international policy reports, speeches at major events, and the media. 
The Shape of the Crisis Narrative 
How the Crisis Narrative has been Constructed 
THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL REEF ASSESSMENTS 
METHODS OF PRODUCING AND DISSEMINATING THE NARRATIVE 
Underlying the Narrative 
A CALL TO ACTION 
CONCEPTS OF ECOLOGY 
Conclusion 
The Shape of the Crisis Narrative 
A simple narrative analysis shows that the notion of a coral reef crisis takes the form of a narrative 
argument. The core message is that coral reefs are in serious decline globally, facing possible 
extinction. Both climate change and 'non-climate stresses' from human activities are implicated, 
'continuing non-climate stresses' will 'almost certainly increase in magnitude and frequency', their 
impact on reefs exacerbated by the stresses associated with climate change (Buddemeier et at. 2004 p. 
iv, quoted in the previous chapter). Reefs already stressed will be irreparably degraded unless the 
stresses are removed and relatively large areas are set aside as marine protected areas (Wilkinson 2000 
p. 18). 
The timing of the demise of coral reefs is still uncertain. Some commentators, including Greenpeace 
quoted in Chapter One, predict demise within 100 years. ICRI's Call to Action states "If allowed to 
continue, this decline is likely to lead to the loss of most of the world's reef resources during the next 
century" (International Coral ReefInitiative 1995). Wilkinson, in the 2000 GCRMN global status 
report (2000 p. 19) predicted that: 
Coral reefs will not become extinct in the immediate future, but there are likely to be major 
changes in the composition of coral communities and reductions in harvestable products ... 
Reefs will probably recover somewhat from the current bouts of anthropogenic and climate 
change degradation, but it is likely that worse is yet to come and we will probably 
experience significant reductions in the cover and health of coral reefs, and major losses of 
biodiversity. 
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The main actors of this story are the reefs themselves, the people charged with managing coastal areas 
(whether in communities, local government, or national government), the coral reef science 
community, the ICRI network and NGOs interested in saving coral reefs, and the human populations in 
developing countries where the majority of reefs occur. Some are the villains causing the demise of 
reefs and some their saviours, as examined in Chapter Eight. 
The narrative has moral implications: everyone who has some say in managing reef areas will be at 
fault if they let this happen. Therefore, they must all follow the prescriptions put forward by coral reef 
science community, gathered together in the statements made in ICRI's Call to Action and Framework 
for Action and the renewed Call for Action made at the International Tropical Marine Ecosystems 
Management Symposium (ITMEMS) in 1998 (all discussed in the next chapter). For if coral reefs were 
to become extinct, their 'ecosystem services' would be lost to millions of people who depend upon 
them, net potential benefits currently estimated at USD 30 billion per year (Cesar et al. 2003). Their 
extinction would imperil the lives of millions of people who rely on reefs for food and income. This 
shows how coral reefs are being valued because of their use to humankind. 
How the Crisis Narrative has been Constructed 
TRACING THE POLICY IMPACT OF GLOBAL CORAL REEF ASSESSMENTS 
This section describes how this narrative has been discursively constructed, referring back to the efforts 
to assess the global state of coral reefs described in the previous chapter: Wilkinson's initial attempt in 
1992, recurrent GCRMN global reporting exercises that he later co-ordinated, Reef Check's efforts 
using volunteer divers, plus WRI's risk assessment of reefs. It is possible to gauge the influence of 
these assessments by tracing the way they have been quoted in the international media and in policy 
documents of international environmental agencies. Here, I cite examples of how the figures Wilkinson 
presented in his 1992 paper concerning the extent of reefs degraded worldwide have been reproduced, 
and I illustrate where figures from the Reefs at Risk assessment have been quoted. I follow this with 
further examples showing how, when Wilkinson revised his assessments in the 2000 global status 
reports, those revisions were also quoted in authoritative sources. This exercise identifies three things: 
how these assessments have been ongoing sources of data about the state of reefs; how they have 
contributed to the construction of the crisis narrative; and how policy processes use this data. 
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METHODOLOGY: TRACING THE ROUTES TAKEN BY DATA 
In September 2002 I systematically searched likely sources for any such statements in both media 
reports and in documents produced by intergovernmental agencies concerned with the environment. 
When I found statements about the state of coral reefs, or predictions about their dire future, I then 
attempted to trace the origins of those back to the various assessments that had been made. Close 
similarity in wording and in percentages quoted provided a clue as to a source of testimony, requiring 
detective work similar to the detection of plagiarism (the latter described in Bonjour 2002 p. 187). 
For news items about the state of coral reefs, I searched Environmental News Network (ENN), BBC 
News Online, and Economist.com, authoritative agencies reporting environmental stories online. 
Looking for policy papers, I searched web sites of international organisations concerned with reefs, 
plus the CBD's (meeting agendas and reports). With the Internet search engine Google, I searched the 
web for material relating to coral reef activities at \V'SSD. Treating the Union of International 
Associations (UIA) databases as authoritative summaries of information about international 
organisations, I sought entries about coral reefs. Subsequently, until the 2004 GCRJlvIN global status 
report was published, I searched sporadically for further policy documents, meeting reports or articles 
quoting one or other of the earlier global assessments. In doing so, I noted the idea of a coral reef 
crisis was strengthening rather than waning. These searches produced articles containing quotes that 
can be traced back to Wilkinson's 1992 paper, the GCRIVIN status reports and \V'R!'s Reefs at Risk 
report. Some are based upon single sources, some combine sources. Almost all are recent, since 1998. 
One should not, however, conclude that there had been little use made earlier of\V'ilkinson's 1992 
paper; the sparsity of quotations from it may merely reflect the way older Internet sites are updated 
,vitll more recent subject material. 
Quotations based on Wilkinson's 1992 paper 
Wilkinson's initial (1992) assessment has been quoted in authoritative policy documents reporting on 
coral reefs, and in 2000was still being quoted occasionally. The United States Coral Reef Task Force 
(USCRTF, introduced in a box below) quoted these figures in its action plan for all US reefs as 
justification that coral reefs are 'in peril'. Although the plan refers to several expert groups who over 
the past decade have exhaustively documented and evaluated the growing number of anthropogenic 
threats to coral reefs, Wilkinson's are the only figures used to justify this contention (United States 
Coral Reef Task Force 2000 p. 3): 
... the value of coral reefs to the nation is matched only by their vulnerability to harmful 
environmental changes, particularly those resulting from human activities. Present estimates 
are that 10 percent of all coral reefs are degraded beyond recovery; 30 percent are in critical 
condition and may die within 10 to 20 years, particularly those near human populations; 
and, if current pressures continue unabated, another 30 percent may perish completely by 
2050 (United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000 p. 3). 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 10. US CORAL REEF TASK FORCE (USCRTF) 
In 1998, the Year of the Ocean, the US government created a taskforce to oversee the stewardship 
of US coral reef systems. TIus arose from comnlitments which President Clinton made during the 
US's first National Ocean Conference. As well signing an executive order (13089) on coral reef 
protection, creating the taskforce, President Clinton successfully sought significant funding in his 
2000 budget request to Congress for coral reef protection, management and restoration. The 
USCRTF is charged with reducing and nlitigating coral reef degradation from pollution, over 
fishing and other causes, coordinating all mapping, monitoring, research and policy matters. Co-
chaired by the Department of Commerce (the department responsible for NOAA) and the 
Department of Interior, it includes 12 federal agencies responsible for reef conservation, seven 
state and territorial partners, and three freely associated states (thus including Guam, Puerto Rico, 
American Samoa, Florida, Hawaii, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the US 
Virgin Islands). The taskforce was formed not only to conserve reefs under US jurisdiction, but to 
support international efforts to conserve and sustainably use coral reefs. The Secretary of State 
and Administrator of the Agency for International Development, in cooperation with other 
members of the Task Force, are required to assess the US role in international trade and 
protection of coral reef species and implement appropriate strategies and actions to promote 
conservation and sustainable use of coral reef resources worldwide. 
Source: Yozell (2001 p. 302); US Coral Reef Task Force (c.2004) 
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ICRI's Call to Action states that coral reefs are in serious decline globally (Chapter Five). Its wording 
draws (unattributed) on Wilkinson's 1992 assessment that ten percent of reefs worldwide were already 
degraded: "Coral reefs are in serious decline globally, especially those near shallow shelves and dense 
populations. It has been estimated that 10 percent of the earth's coral reefs have already been seriously 
degraded and a much greater percentage is threatened" (International Coral ReefInitiative 1995). The 
Executive Secretary of the CBD quoted Wilkinson's figures in a report he prepared for the CBD's 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA, introduced in the CBD 
box below): "By 1992, 10 percent of the world's reefs were lost, and 30 percent were in a critical state" 
(Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity 2000b). 
These uses of Wilkinson's initial assessment by policy agencies have led to further, secondary 
reporting of them. For instance, an article about coral reefs posted on the Sea W eb web site reported 
that according to the IUCN (note, not Wilkinson himself), as much as 10 percent of the world's coral 
reefs have been degraded beyond recovery, and another 30 percent is likely to decline within the next 
20 years. "Those at greatest risk are in South and South-east Asia, East Africa, and the Caribbean. Out 
of 109 countries in which reefs are known to occur, significant reoef degradation has occurred in 93" 
(Mulvaney 1997). 
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Quotations based on the 1998 Reefs at Risk assessment 
The 1998 Reefs at Risk report (Bryant et al. 1998) has also been quoted in authoritative policy forums 
and documents. UNEP (2002a) reported in a news release that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
urged the WSSD in his "Towards a sustainable future" speech on 14 May 2002, to address the threats 
on coral reefs stating that "75 percent of marine fishes are fished to capacity and 60 percent of the coral 
reefs endangered". 
In the same 2000 report to the CBD's SBSTTA quoted above, the Convention's Executive Secretary 
reported that the 1998 Reefs at Risk report suggested that 27 percent of the world's existing reefs were 
under immediate threat of significant damage [the WRI report actually said high threat] and a further 
31 percent under a medium level of risk (Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity 
2000b). Another SBSTTA report the same year stated that "Nearly 60 percent of the world's coral reefs 
are threatened by localised human activities that have the potential to exacerbate the impacts of coral 
bleaching events" (Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice 2000). 
UNEP's 1999 report on the state of the environment in the Pacific, in its only Pacific-wide marine and 
coastal statistic, stated that "Fifty-nine per cent of reefs in the Pacific have been assessed as being at 
low risk, 31 per cent as being at medium risk and 10 per cent as being at high risk" (Miles 1999 p. 16). 
The Union of International Associations in its online databases on world issues stated that "Nearly 60 
percent of the world's coral reefs are threatened by localised human activities that have the potential to 
exacerbate the impacts of coral-bleaching events" (Union of International Associations 2000a). The 
World Atlas of Coral Reefs, reporting on the Reefs at Risk exercise, stated "It was estimated that overall 
some 58 percent of the world's reefs were under medium to high threat" (Spalding et al. (2001). In a 
BBC news item, the atlas's lead author Mark Spalding (UNEP-WCMC) was reported as saying: 'The 
reefs are degrading faster than data can be collected. An estimated 58 percent are under threat from 
human activities, whilst we have no idea how much has already gone" (Kirby 2001). 
The Reefs at Risk assessment was also quoted in various media reports, sometimes indirectly and 
through secondary sources. For instance, the Environment Bulletin reported that: "Estimates of the 
amount of damage to the world's coral reefs vary. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) describes 60 
percent of the coral reefs in the world as in a degraded state" (Stoppard 2000). An Associated Press 
story stated that "nearly 60 percent of the earth's coral reefs are threatened by human activity" (James 
2001). 
Quotations based on the GCRMN 2000 status report: estimate of percent of reefs destroyed 
In this 2000 status report, Wilkinson revised his estimate of the percentage of reefs destroyed or 
degraded (Chapter Five). These revisions were again widely quoted by UNEP and others, as illustrated 
in Figure 3 on the next page. 
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FIGURE 3: QUOTATIONS BASED ON THE GCRMN GLOBAL STATUS REPORT, 2000 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES 
Robert Hepworth ofUNEP, at the 
\Vorld Ecotourism Summit: 
"Scientists have reported that 27 
percent of coral reefs had been 
destroyed by 1998" (Hepworth 
2002). 
A \Vorld Conference on Coasts and 
Oceans was held preparatory to WSSD 
and co-ordinated by the IOC of 
UNESCO and the Centre for the Study 
of Marine Policy, University of 
Delaware. 
The chairpersons reported in dleir 
meeting summary that 11 percent of 
coral reefs were completely destroyed 
prior to the 1998 EI Nino event while 
16 percent were severely degraded in 
1998 alone". 
Wilkinson presented a paper titled The 
world's toral reefi' have declined silJte 1992: 
radical attioll is now reqNired (Bernal et al. 
2002 p. 3). 
Wilkinson (2000) 
concluded dlat dle 
world had already lost 
11 percent of coral ---. 
reefs and a further 16 
percent were not fully 
functional; 40 percent 
were facing high risk 
and 18 percent 
medium risk. 
NEWS ITEMS 
The Economist 
"In 1998, 16 percent of the world's 
coral reefs, in a swathe stretching 
from Brazil to the Indian Ocean, 
were severely damaged by what is 
known as 'coral bleaching'" 
(Economist. com 2000a). 
Environment 2001 
Wilkinson presented his revised 
assessment at the International 
Coral Reef Symposium in Bali 2001, 
prompting a media report that "16 
percent of dle world's reefs were 
destroyed within one year of EI 
Nino. That percentage is in addition 
to the 11 percent that were 
destroyed by human activities prior 
to 1998" (Environment 2001). 
Endangered Species Update 
"An estimated 16 percent of global 
coral was killed with highest 
mortalities occurring in the Middle 
East and wider Indian Ocean" 
Q\;fcl<:ay and Mulvaney 2001). 
The Environment Bulletin 
"\Vilkinson estimated that 27 
percent of tlle world's reefs are 
seriously damaged, but held out 
hope that at least 26 percent would 
recover if given dle chance" 
(Stoppard, Environment BNlletill Oct. 
23 2000.) [It is not clear from where 
the "at least 26 percent would 
recover" came]. 
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Incorporation into international environmental agencies' work 
It is clear, even from my online search concentrated in September 2002 and sporadically updated over 
another two years, that the few efforts to put quantitative figures on the state of reefs worldwide have 
provided material not only for scientific papers and news articles. They have provided material used in 
various conferences, speeches and policy documents. In effect, these efforts to assess the state of coral 
reefs worldwide, and the risk to them, have constructed a narrative-a thesis-of worldwide coral 
degradation that has achieved considerable visibility in the international environmental policy arena. 
The way that various texts quote the numerical assessments and predictions in these various global 
assessments confirms that the latter are major sources of the narrative. 
The global assessments of coral reefs, principally the Reefs at Risk analysis and Wilkinson's various 
assessments, including the sections he wrote for the overviews of the biennial GCRMN global status 
reports, have prompted international policy agencies to adopt the notion that coral reefs are in crisis 
worldwide and to incorporate that notion into speeches and policy documents. The way the news media 
reported the crisis has also helped this happen. The global assessments have been quoted in both 
official documents and speeches from UNEP and the Secretariat of the CBD. For instance, a report that 
the Executive Secretary of the Convention prepared for SBSTTA 6 included this summary of the status 
of coral reefs: 
By 1992, 10 percent of the world's reefs were lost and 30 percent were in a critical state. 
The global 1998 Reefs at Risk analysis from the World Resources Institute suggested that 
27 percent of the world's existing reefs were under immediate threat of significant damage 
and a further 31 percent under a medium risk (Executive Secretary, Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 2001 p. 13). 
In fact, the second part of the statement (by 1992, 10 percent of the world's reefs were lost and 30 
percent were in a critical state) derives from Wilkinson 1992 not the Reefs at Risk report. The report 
from the Secretariat of the CBD goes on to state: 
Assessments to late 2000 now indicate that 27 percent of the world's reefs have been 
effectively lost, with the single largest cause being the massive climate-related bleaching 
event of 1998. While there is a good chance that many of the 16 percent of damaged reefs 
will recover over time, some predict that half will never recover (Wilkinson 1998, 2000). 
The latest global predictions suggest that a further 14 percent of the world's coral reefs will 
be lost by 2010, and another 18 percent in the 20 years following (Wilkinson 2000), without 
reductions in the current human-induced stresses on reef systems from growing populations 
and economies. This means that 59 percent of the world's reefs are under immediate threat 
of loss within several decades (Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity 
2000b p. 13). 
This quotation illustrates how, in reproducing quantitative assessments, policy reports can reduce or 
ignore the degree of uncertainty attached to these. Wilkinson had put some riders on the revised 
assessment he produced in 2000; the Executive Secretary ignored these, and also converted into a 
certainty, the possibility that climatic factors caused widespread death of corals in 1998. 
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Clearly the quantitative figures in Wilkinson's assessments and in the Reefs at Risk report have made 
an impact on those at UNEP and in the Secretariat of the CBD, finding their way in many speeches and 
reports. For example, when the SBSTTA reported to the CoP fifth meeting, endorsing the results of the 
expert consultation on coral bleaching, that report contained the following statement: "Nearly 60 
percent of the world's coral reefs are threatened by localised human activities that have the potential to 
exacerbate the impacts of coral bleaching events" (Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and 
Technological Advice 2000 p. 4). This derives from Wilkinson's assessments. Wilkinson's figures 
have also impacted on UNEP policy. At its twenty-first session, the governing council of UNEP 
adopted a resolution (21112; 9 February 2001) on coral reefs. This included a statement to the effect 
that it supports cooperation with GCRMN "especially in light of the recently published report which 
presents the prospect that 60 percent of the world's coral reefs could be lost by 2030" (UNEP 2001a p. 
48). The text box below shows the various organisations that support the message being disseminated 
in the GCRMN global status reports, by virtue of their top-level staff being part of that network's 
management group. These people added their signatures to the 2004 status report. 
GCRMN MANAGEMENT GROUP ENDORSING 2004 GLOBAL CORAL REEF STATUS REPORT 
Patricio Bernal, Executive Secretary, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, UNESCO 
lUaus Toepfer, Executive Director, United Nations Environment Programme 
Carl Gustaf Lundin, Head, Global Marine Program, IUCN - The World Conservation Union (Chair) 
Warren Evans, Director, Environment Department, The World Bank 
Hamdallah Zedan, Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity 
Ian Poiner, Director, Australian Institute of Marine Science 
Stephen Hall, Director General, WorldFish Center 
Rolph Payet, Seychelles, Co-Chair, International Coral Reef Initiative Secretariat 
Source: Willcinson (2004) 
The prophetic nature of the narrative 
Quantitative predictions that not only emphasise the risks that reefs face worldwide, but prophesise the 
demise of many, are a visible part of this crisis narrative. Both officials of international agencies and 
journalists have used the figures in the various global assessments to shape the predictions they 
reproduce in their reports and articles. For instance, in a report to SBSTTA, the Executive Secretary of 
the CBD interpreted Wilkinson's 2000 predictions to mean that: 
The latest global predictions suggest that a further 14 percent of the world's coral reefs will 
be lost by 2010, and another 18 percent in the 20 years following, without reductions in the 
current human-induced stresses on reef ecosystems from growing coastal populations and 
economies. This means that 59 percent of the world's reefs are under immediate loss within 
several decades (Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2000b p. 
13). 
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The Environment News Service reported that "The United Nations Environment Programme and the 
IUCN-World Conservation Union warn that coral reefs are less abundant than had previously been 
supposed. They estimate that 60 percent of coral reefs could disappear by 2030 without urgent action". 
(Environment News Service 2001) 
Robert Hepworth of UNEP announced that "Scientists have reported that 27 percent of coral reefs had 
been destroyed by 1998 and that within another 30 years a further 32 percent are seriously threatened. 
The most accessible reefs are the most threatened" (Hepworth 2002). 
Officials reporting an international coastal policy meeting in Paris in late 2002 wrote: "SIDS [small 
island developing states] have some of the world's largest reef areas, and have much larger shallow-
water systems, such as sand banks, sea grass beds, and sponge beds at depths less than 100 metres. A 
combination of near-shore pollution and offshore over-harvesting, places the whole of this vast 
ecosystem at risk of collapsing" (Seoung-Yong and Goldstein 2002). "Another 20 to 30 percent are 
threatened in the next 10 years, while current projections indicate possible losses of 50 to 60 percent 
within 30 years" (Bernal et al. 2002 p. 3). 
In its online databases, the Union of International Associations stated that "Scientists predict that more 
than 70 percent of all reefs will be destroyed in our lifetime" and (quoting Bryant et al. (1998) "More 
than half the world's reefs are potentially threatened by human activities, with up to 80 percent at risk 
in the most populated areas" (Union ofInternational Associations 2000b, 2000c). 
The BBC announced, in a side box of a news story on their web site titled Poor prospects for Earth 
Summit that "27 percent of coral reefs are thought to have been lost, with another 32 percent at risk by 
2032" (Kirby 2002a). 
The Economist reported (Economist.com Global Agenda 2001) that some scientists fear that it is 
already too late and that within 50 years most of the world's coral reefs will be dead-bleached to 
barren skeletons from the effects of global warming. 
The Environmental News Network, an online service, reported that "Scientists say that if nothing 
changes, 40 percent of the world's reefs could be lost by 2010" (James 2001). 
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METHODOLOGY: TRACING THE ROUTES TAKEN BY THE CRISIS NARRATIVE 
Having established the direct relationship between the various assessments of the global state of reefs 
and the crisis narrative found in media reports and international policy discourse, I then investigated 
how that crisis narrative has been produced. Not being able to find any published account of the 
methods that Clive Wilkinson had used, I asked him, by email, how he had derived his figures. From 
USP, I obtained copies of the directives Wilkinson had issued about the form the various regional 
reports should take. I also talked to those coordinating the GCRlvIN Southwest Pacific node. Finding 
virtually nothing in the literature analysing the reaction to Wilkinson's 1992 assessment, I discussed it 
,vith Ken Mackay, then C-SPODP coordinator in Suva, a man connected into many international 
marine science policy discourses in developing regions, who recalled criticisms made at the time. 
Observations I made at the 10th Coral Reef Symposium in Okinawa in 2004 also helped me 
understand the process by which the narrative being produced. I was able to observe authors, 
instructed by GCRlvIN coordinating staff to prepare national and regional reports to a standard 
format, delivering their results as papers and posters in sessions set aside specifically for this purpose 
(Chapter Eight explores further the effects of this standard formatting). 
I traced the dissemination of the narrative through scientific papers. Having accumulated, over three 
years, a large pile of scientific papers on the condition and future of coral reefs and on such topics as 
the coral bleaching phenomenon, coral diseases, and the effects of fishing on reefs, I used these to 
trace the emergence and progress of the crisis narrative in this literature. I searched for papers which, 
in their introductions, established their context by describing how reefs are in crisis, in decline, or in 
some way under threat. I concentrated on papers written by scientists who had published ,videly on 
coral reefs-the big names in reef science-surmising that these would be widely read. In reading 
these, I noticed how scientists were quoting other scientists about the extent of reef degradation 
world\vide. Having already investigated the sources of those figures, I was then able to trace the 
origin of those quotations, just as I had traced it in news articles, popular accounts, and policy papers. 
METHODS OF PRODUCING AND DISSEMINATING THE NARRATIVE 
Wilkinson's methodology in producing quantitative assessments 
A perusal of the methods Wilkinson used, a description of which has never been published, suggests 
that his work is science/policy rather than statistically rigorous, quantitatively-based scientific 
observation. Contrary to generally accepted standards for scientific publications, in his published 
papers he scarcely mentioned his methods of data collection (Wilkinson, confirmed to author by email, 
11 June 2003). Being published as stand-alone policy documents, the GCRMN status reports were not 
subject to the scientific peer review that journal articles undergo. Nor was the 1992 conference paper; 
while Wilkinson used 'expert reports' to flesh out his own 'minimal data', many of those experts did 
not want to be quoted (Wilkinson, email to author, 11 June 2003). Their interpretations could not, 
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therefore, be critiqued by their peers. (The other part of Wilkinson's email is reproduced below, in the 
A Call to Action sub-section.) 
Nevertheless there has been some scientific criticism of Wilkinson's methods, including the 
observation that Wilkinson had based this initial assessment (1992) on work primarily in Southeast 
Asia, mentioned in Chapter Five. It subsequently appeared that less than 10 percent of those reefs had 
been thoroughly explored (Birkeland quoted in Pennisi 1997). Another of the criticisms levelled at 
Wilkinson's 1992 estimates of coral reef degradation worldwide was that he took estimates of coral 
cover from Indonesian surveys, then assumed that dead coral or lack of coral cover corresponded to 
degradation, even though there is often considerable dead coral on healthy reefs (Ken Mackay, C-
SPODP co-ordinator, Forum Secretariat, Suva, pel's. camm. November 2003). 
In the previous chapter I described how Wilkinson, in arriving at the figures in his 2000 GCRMN 
summary, asked all regional coordinators to fill out a table detailing for either their region as a whole or 
for individual countries: percentage of reef destroyed before 1998; destroyed in 1998; at a critical stage 
and likely to be lost in 2-10 years; and threatened and likely to be lost in 10-30 years. The only 
contributors to the 2000 status report that were prepared to permit figures in individual country reports 
to be used were those from South Asia, where the 1998 bleaching had impacted (Wilkinson, email to 
author, 11 June 2003; a matter not stated in the status report itself). From the information available to 
him in various contributors' reports, Wilkinson then estimated the extent of degradation for Arabian 
Ocean, Wider Indian Ocean, Australia and Papua New Guinea, South and East Asia, Wider Pacific 
Ocean, and the Caribbean Atlantic (Clive Wilkinson, pers. camm. by email, 11 June 2003). The figures 
for the wider Pacific Ocean would have been an amalgam of those from the southwest Pacific; 
southeast and central Pacific; American Samoa and Micronesia and other US-affiliated and freely 
associated islands; and Hawaii, originally prepared as four separate reports by four different sets of 
regional coordinators. Thus the figures that Wilkinson presented were guess-estimates, generalised to 
either a national or sub-regional level. To obtain global predictions he weighted these according to the 
reef areas calculated in Spalding et at. (2001) and provided to him prior to publication (Clive 
Wilkinson, pers. camm. by email 11 June 2003). In a note added to the table in the 2000 global status 
report, Wilkinson added that the losses in 1998 (which were losses estimated as arising from the major 
coral bleaching event that year) should be regarded as temporary as many of these reefs should recover, 
provided that major bleaching stresses are not repeated frequently. He gave no justification for this. 
To obtain statistics to present at the Okinawa International Coral Reef Symposium and to include in the 
2004 global status report, Wilkinson changed his approach to calculating the extent of coral 
degradation, directing all regional coordinators to use estimates of live coral cover, summarised to 
national level. However, in calculating the percentage of reefs destroyed and under various stages of 
threat (Table 11 in Chapter Five), this new approach entailed as much generalisation and guesswork as 
the previous method of estimating the percentage of reefs dead or dying. It did not prove any easier to 
estimate on a regional scale (Reuben Sulu and Caroline Vieux, Pacific GCRMN coordinators, pel's. 
camlll. July 2004). 
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Wilkinson seems to be of the opinion that, because the figures derived in the Reefs at Risk exercise 
were approximately the same as his own quantitative assessment, this in some way validated his 
calculations (Wilkinson, email to author, 11 June 2003). At the Okinawa International Coral Reef 
Symposium in 2004, he presented both a paper and poster containing a table quantifying the amount of 
reefs lost and predicted to be lost, which contained both GCRMN and Reefs at Risk statistics. This was 
despite the fact that the Reefs at Risk analysts estimated risk from various threats rather than attempting 
to assess actual condition (as described in Chapter Five). 
This brief perusal indicates something of the nature and practices of the international field of 
science/policy as it applies to coral reefs. The way that other scientists have quoted Wilkinson, the 
global status reports and Reefs at Risk, further elucidates this. 
Establishing the global crisis: scientists quoting other scientists 
Several authoritative scientific papers and reports have used Wilkinson's figures to justify the notion 
that coral reefs are in crisis. Used in this way in the papers' introductions, they establish the extent of 
the crisis situation without having to describe any other scientific evidence for it. One example is a 
report from the Pew Centre for Global Climate Change (an American non-governmental scientific 
organisation funded by a charitable trust), concerning potential contributions of climate change to 
stresses on coral reefs; when published, the report's findings were summarised in the international 
media. In their introduction, the three authors, well-known in coral reef research circles, wrote that "B y 
1998, an estimated 11 percent of the world's coral reefs had been destroyed by human activity, and an 
additional 16 percent were extensively damaged in 1997-98 by coral bleaching", citing Wilkinson 
(2000,2002). At no stage do the authors question how Wilkinson's figures were derived and whether 
they are accurate. The 17 authors of a report on climate change, human impacts, and the resilience of 
coral reefs published in the prestigious Science journal (Hughes et at. 2003) took the same approach. 
They began it by stating that coral reefs, although critically important for the ecosystems goods and 
services they provide, are in serious decline: "an estimated 30 percent are already severely damaged, 
and close to 60 percent may be lost by 2030", citing Wilkinson (2002). Science, its referees and editors 
was prepared to accept this quotation, giving it an added authority. 
In a recent paper in Nature about regional gradients in biodiversity (Karlson et at. 2004 p. 869), one of 
the authors of this Science paper along with two other well-known coral reef researchers, justified the 
need for more ecological and biogeographical studies by stating that: "Recent assessments of the status 
of coral reefs verify that they are globally threatened and efforts to manage them will require 
international cooperation". In support of this they cited as evidence the same paper in Science. 
The authors of several other recent scientific papers about the worldwide coral reef decline commence 
their papers in a similar vein, quoting other scientific publications supposedly providing evidence of 
this decline. For instance, in a review investigating whether nutrient enrichment is a major cause of 
coral reef decline, Szmant (2002) started her paper by writing: 
Coral reefs worldwide, and in particular in the Caribbean and southern Florida, are 
experiencing a recent period of decline. There has been a major loss of coral cover and 
diversity (Hoegh-Gulberg 1999; Wilkinson 2000) coupled in many areas with an increase in 
algal biomass and shift in algal community structure (McCook 1999). 
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One of the papers Szmant cites, the widely-cited Hoegh-Gulberg (1999), establishes the worldwide 
extent of the crisis by stating that "Dramatic reversals in their health have been reported from every 
part of the world. Between 50 percent and 70 percent of all coral reefs are under direct threat from 
human activities" quoting Goreau (1992), Wilkinson (1994), Sebens (1994), Bryant et al. (1998), and 
Wilkinson (1999). Only two of these cited references provide any such figures: Wilkinson 1999, which 
quotes both his 1992 figures and Bryant et al. 1998, the latter a map-based risk assessment rather than 
an estimate of actual extent of degradation (as described in Chapter Five). So in effect Hoegh-Gulberg 
is relying on Wilkinson's initial 'guesstimates', supplemented by pieces of information from other 
locales such as Jamaica (Goreau's work), although he does not clarify this. 
The authors of the Pew Centre report on Global Climate Change, Buddemeier et al. (2004 p. 4-5) 
mentioned above, established the notion that coral reefs are in crisis with the following paragraph: 
Coral reefs have declined over the course of human history, culminating in the dramatic 
increase in coral mortality and reef degradation of the past 20-50 years (Pandolfi et al., 
2003). This 'coral reef crisis' is well documented and has stimulated publications on the 
future of coral reefs (e.g. Hoegh-Gulberg 1999; Knowlton 2001; McClanahan 2002) and 
their vulnerability to environmental change (e.g., Bryant at ai., 1998; Hughes et al., 2003). 
The causes of this crisis are a complex mixture of direct human-imposed and climate-
related stresses, and include factors such as outbreaks of disease, which have suspected but 
unproven connections to both human activities and climate factors. By 1998, an estimated 
11 percent of the world's reef had been destroyed by human activity, and an additionally 16 
percent were extensively damaged in 1997-98 by coral bleaching (Wilkinson 2000, 2002). 
Widespread coral bleaching, unknown before the 1980s, has brought recognition that reefs 
are threatened by global-scale climate factors as well as by more localised threats, and that 
different types of stress may interact in complex ways. 
Their citations refers to the same small group of papers as justification that the extent of the crisis is 
worldwide, the authors of those cited papers having in turn depended upon Wilkinson and the GCRMN 
work to establish the extent of the crisis. These estimates remain the only attempt to quantify the extent 
of damage worldwide; Reef Check data analysis concentrates on a few parameters rather than 
providing an overall assessment of reef condition or degradation. Thus, the authors of scientific papers 
who have cited authors other than Wilkinson as evidence of a decline in coral reefs worldwide, are in 
fact citing those who have already made these claims using Wilkinson's work as a base, rather than 
anybody who has substantiated the extent of the decline through alternative research. This is perhaps a 
case of believing that if they cite someone recognised as a coral reef expert, then the statement will be 
regarded as true, whatever the initial, or present, evidence for it. 
Standards of scientific publishing require authors to cite the evidence for various statements by noting 
who first made the statements they quote. This allows readers to find and study the original work. This 
does not necessarily happen in practice however, it being too easy to merely copy citations from other 
papers without checking the original source. Thus scientific myths are perpetuated in spite of the 
scientific refereeing process. Original quotations may be misrepresented or their caveats overlooked. 
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Furthermore, citing other publications as sources is an ambivalent practice. One may be citing the 
author(s) who first presented certain evidence or observations; alternatively one may be citing other 
authors who had previously made the same claims as the author is now making; or one may be citing 
authors of reviews that come to that same conclusion. When the situation is ambiguous, as in the case 
of the citations I mention above, it seems the referees and editors are prepared to give the author the 
benefit of the doubt, contrary to strict scientific standards of publication. 
Generalising the geographical extent of the crisis to a global scale 
Not only has the crisis been discursively established though the practice of citations in published 
papers, it has also been established through the scientific practice of generalising geographical extent to 
the global. For example, in collating information about different locales and making an international 
overview, these exercises (Wilkinson's initial attempt, subsequent GCRMN exercises, the Reefs at Risk 
assessment and Reef Check) purport to cover all regions with reefs sufficient to present a global 
picture. This is reflected in the title of the GCRMN publications: "Status of coral reefs of the world". 
One of the criticisms of these works has been their particular regional bias, namely that they over-
represent results from some areas and under-represent them from others-the way that Wilkinson's 
1992 presentation relied heavily on data from Southeast Asia for example. Checking this, American 
scientist John Connell (1997), aware that popular accounts of the effects of disturbances on coral reefs 
are often anecdotal, attempted to double-check the conclusions being drawn about worldwide decline 
in coral reef health by surveying quantitative studies of coral reef abundance that were at least four 
years in duration. Reporting on his investigation at the 8th International Coral Reef Symposium, he 
explained how he had found only 65 samples in which sufficient data existed to make a judgement; of 
those 65 studies, 47 percent were from Western Atlantic reefs, which collectively form a relatively 
small proportion of reefs worldwide. Furthermore, a high proportion of the examples on which the 
statistics were based came from a very few heavily-studied reefs, over-representing them in the 
analysis (Connell 1997 p. 13). One has to presume also that there were certain biases in the way that 
reefs had originally been selected for study. Perhaps those most studied were easy to visit, being close 
to urban areas or research stations: it is generally accepted that reefs close to urban areas are likely to 
be more degraded than remote reefs away from dense human habitation or coastal agriculture (e.g. 
Zann 1994). Connell's analysis shows how biases are introduced when results from a few reefs or 
regions are generalised into a statement about the state of reefs worldwide. Too much emphasis is 
given to a small number of reefs, from regions that may not be representative of what is happening 
elsewhere. This is a criticism that also applies to assessments in the 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 
GCRMN global status reports. 
But Connell's analysis was not sufficient to de stabilise the narrative of worldwide crisis, then 
developing, indicating another general feature of the field of coral reef science/policy-its tendency to 
generalise from accounts of degradation rather than accounts of a wide range of reef health status. 
Some recent scientific reports have, however, been more cautious in generalising the extent of reef 
degradation, noting for instance that in various regions, the level of damage to reefs is dissimilar (e.g. 
Buddemeier et al. 2004 p. 28 who cite Connell 1997). Buddemeier et al. hedge their bets without 
backing away from the belief that the crisis is global in extent: 
Although this crisis is widespread, individual reefs and even whole regions exhibit 
considerable variation in both health and responses to stresses. The Caribbean region has 
been particularly hard-hit by problems (Gardner et al. 2003), many of which are well-
studied. Caribbean case studies and inter-ocean contrasts help to illustrate both the 
consistencies and the variations in coral reef responses to complex environmental changes 
(Buddemeier et al. 2004 p. 5). 
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This practice of generalising problems geographically underlies the entire crisis narrative. Key 
scientific papers about the ecological problems facing coral reefs generalise from observations at 
specific locales to the universal, thus establishing the coral reef crisis as global in scope and extent. 
Yet, as I described in Chapter Five, many of the coral reef problems now depicted as international in 
scale were initially concerns concentrated in one particular region. In the Caribbean, the issue has been 
coral diseases, the die-off of coral species and the replacement of coral dominated reefs by algal-
dominated ones. In Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia, the problem has been 
a combination of large numbers of fishers, heavy fishing pressure especially for export, use of 
destructive fishing practices, and local pollution which collectively stressed reefs. These concerns have 
been expanded into a universalised narrative emphasising the global nature of the crisis facing coral 
reefs. This narrative overlooks how reefs in different locales differ biogeographic ally, how they may 
have different human and natural histories and be on different trajectories. 
There seems to be an assumption that all reefs will eventually end up in a degraded condition unless we 
do something to prevent this. In summarising regional observations Tim McClanahan, widely 
published in coral reef science and conservation especially about east Africa, concluded (2002 p. 474): 
The current trajectory is from localised small-scale disturbances such as fishing, river 
discharge and pollution towards regional and global-level disturbances associated with 
warm water, diseases and changes in seawater chemistry. There has also been a temporal 
pattern with regional-level ecological change occurring first in the Atlantic and eastern 
Pacific beginning in the early 1980s followed by the Indo-Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
Mechanisms used by scientists to publicise the crisis 
Amongst themselves, coral reef scientists have used further practices to perpetuate the notion that reefs 
are in worldwide decline. The International Coral Reef Symposium (Table Six in Chapter Five) has 
been a key forum for debating the future of coral reefs. So too has ITMEMS. Another method of 
publicising the coral reef crisis has been through ReefBase, the online information system that gathers 
available knowledge about coral reefs into one repository, also described in Chapter Five. ReefBase is 
organised in such a way that one can search for information documenting the status of reefs in various 
locations, or the threats to them. It provides summaries of this, as well as lists of references, many 
online. The attention generated by these and other initiatives have served to bring the crisis to the 
attention of the wider community interested in international environmental matters. The GCRMN and 
ICRI have been key mechanisms; UNESCO's Year of the Coral Reef in 1997 also assisted. 
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'Scientific' reports commissioned by think tanks and NOOs have also served a role. Key reports to 
have received international publicity include the Pew Centre's report on coral reefs and climate change 
(Buddemeier et al. 2004); Oreenpeace's report on the effects of climate change on Pacific reefs 
(Hoegh-Ouldberg et al. 2000); and Reefs at Risk (Bryant et al. 1998). These authors have used has used 
the same tactic of quoting other scientists to establish the authenticity of the crisis, as described above. 
INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF SYMPOSIA: DISSEMINATING THE MESSAGE 
Coral reef scientists from around the world meet in large numbers only once every four years, at 
the International Coral Reef Symposia (Chapter Five). These symposia have grown so popular, 
that in Okinawa in 2004, people were limited to presenting one paper each in order to 
accommodate everyone's work. Held over five days, the symposium included plenary sessions 
with nine keynote presentations, and eight sessions of mini-symposia, during which up to 10 
parallel sessions ran at one time, plus three sessions to show over 600 posters. Some of the most 
popular papers were. the tales of catastrophe. Any expectation of a doom and gloom message 
delivered by a big name in international coral reef science and the room was packed, eg Jeremy 
Jackson's Are coral reefs 011 a slippery slide to slime? and Terry Done's Coral Rep' ill 2050 (pm. obs.). 
Interestingly, neither of these presented new research. Jackson's presented work published in 
S(ilill(e in 2001; Done's paper was a review of past work on how the effects of disturbance 
combine in shaping the quality of individual reefs. 
The role of the media 
The media, both mainstream news organisation and ones concentrating on environmental matters, have 
also disseminated the crisis narrative, as I showed in the first part of this chapter. OCRMN global status 
reports are being extensively quoted in media reports and policy documents. Although media reports 
treat this data as authoritative, they appear less interested in its accuracy. 
In earlier examples cited from policy documents, speeches and news articles, it was possible to clearly 
identify the source of the data being quoted about the extent of damage to coral reefs-the actual 
figures used are recognisable as coming from one of the assessments prepared. This is not the case for 
several other news articles about coral reefs in which the authors have used multiple sources, mixing 
and matching their predictions. In the four examples cited below, I was unable to identify all the 
original sources of the figures, despite my considerable familiarity with coral reef literature. These 
examples show how for the news media, that while quantitative assessments of reef degradation make a 
good story, accuracy is not of paramount importance-at least not sufficient to directly and correctly 
attribute estimates of degradation to the original source. Journalists appear to have mixed their sources. 
Kirby (2002b) on BBC News Online: " ... scientists who had published their finding in 
Science and reported them at the 2001 Bali International Coral Reef Symposium are 
reported as stating that "25 percent of the world's coral reefs have already been destroyed or 
badly damaged by problems arising from climate change. They say 58 percent of reefs are 
reported to be threatened by human activities". 
The Economist (Economist.com 2000b): "Although global warming may playa role, much 
of the blame for the plight of the world's coral reefs, with 30 percent lost already, and 
another 18 percent at risk in the next decade, rests with a myriad local decisions made by 
the 500m or so people who live close to those reefs". 
Mastny (2001) in World Watch: "An estimated 11 percent of the world's coral reefs have 
been lost as a result of direct human pressures. These include fishing and coral mining, 
coastal development, waste dumping, vessel collisions, and inland deforestation and 
farming, which can cause runoff of harmful nutrients and sediments. Such activities now 
threaten nearly 60 percent of all reefs". 
Denecke (2001) in the UNESCO Courier: "Threatened by pollution, overfishing and global 
warming coral reefs-a lifeline for millions of people-are dying off at an alarming rate ... 
in the past few decades, more than one quarter of the world's coral reefs have been 
destroyed by human activity. At the present rate, at least 57 percent will be lost within our 
lifetime." 
Underlying the Narrative 
Having described how the crisis has been discursively created and recirculated as a narrative, this 
penultimate section discusses the call to action this forms. It traces the relationship between this 
imperative for action and the concepts of ecology underlying the narrative. 
A CALL TO ACTION 
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Rather than the objective of extending the scope of human knowledge through scientific research, 
Wilkinson has had another objective, to stimulate international action, as shown in this quotation from 
an email he sent me after I had informed him that I was tracing how estimates had been quoted: 
I often sit in an audience and hear them [Wilkinson's own quantitative assessments of areas 
of reef damaged or lost] quoted back to me by Ministers and Presidents, who have no idea 
where the numbers have come from (which is fine with me) and [who] use them for 
justification for actions to conserve the reefs (which was the original purpose as we could 
not match the numbers that were being used by the forest lobby or mangrove lobby of direct 
areas lost). The numbers from1992/3 have probably been a partial to major catalyst for most 
of the coral reef initiatives since then including ICRI. So I am pleased to see the numbers 
used without attribution or even incorrectly quoted if the objective is to conserve reefs 
(Wilkinson, email to author, 11 June 2003). 
Wilkinson was, in this way, using estimates of degraded reef area, with the intention of saving coral 
reefs by getting people to take notice and do something. In order to stimulate action for what he 
believes is a worthy cause, he presented a sparse amount of data in a way that made it appear as a more 
precise estimate of the reality of reefs 'out there' that it was. Other coral reef scientists have taken a 
similar tack. For instance, in reviewing literature about ecological changes in coral reefs over recent 
years, McClanahan (2002), made a series of predictions about 'the near future' of reefs: 
We can generally expect to see a shift in benthic dominance from late-successional coral to 
algal taxa with higher organic but lower organic production and a consequent loss of reef 
growth and substratum complexity. Losses in coral species at the local level and possible 
extinction in regions with small shelf size are expected to continue. The consumer 
community will shift from large-bodies, edible, slow-growing and ornamental species to 
various unused invertebrates and some fast-growing and colonising generalist fishes. In 
many places reefs will be replaced or colonised by seagrass, rubble, and sand ecosystems 
(McClanahan 2002 p. 474). 
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McClanahan (2002 p. 468) described his predictions as "ecologically conservative" in that "they are 
made to increase awareness and future monitoring of potentially detrimental ecological changes and to 
provoke the application of the precautionary principle". He then used these predictions to justify an 
international approach to managing coral reefs and human impacts upon them (McClanahan 2002 p. 
476). This is a similar motive to that admitted by Wilkinson above. This is science/policy at work, 
promoting pre-selected polices by framing these in ways believed to enhance environmental 
preservation (as Litfin 1994 p. 198 described in her research into ozone discourses). Thus Wilkinson, 
McClanahan and others have responded to Latin's (1992) argument at the 7th International Coral Reef 
Symposium-the symposium at which Wilkinson first presented his quantitative data on the areas of 
reef degraded worldwide-that coral reef scientists should accept more responsibility for the subjects 
they study, get involved in influencing policy even though this meant making political and ethical 
judgements as well as scientific ones. 
WRI, the Reefs at Risk publishers, had an additional intention. Their web site publicised the report as a 
neoliberal project, arguing that it showed the need to remove fishing subsidies. It is, however, a little 
hard to make that connection since the topical debate was about governments needing to stop 
sub sid ising their overseas fishing fleets, nothing to do with coral reef harvesting. 
CONCEPTS OF ECOLOGY 
Those responsible for designing and publishing the GCRMN, Reef Check and Reefs at Risk 
assessments of reef status have kept their assessment processes separate from key scientific debates 
about the future of coral reefs. In doing so, they have limited the potential for those debates to 
de stabilise the narrative. The crisis narrative does not engage with key debates about either the rates of 
natural recovery of coral reefs or about the relative importance of reefal and non-reefal coral 
communities. If it were to do so, this would bring into question whether a crisis exists or, if it exists, 
whether it is of any consequence. I examine each debate in turn, then describe how this illuminates the 
notions of ecology underlying the narrative. 
Ignoring the debate about natural recovery processes and rates 
Within marine ecological science, a body of work explores how coral reef environments are 
characterised by natural disturbance, in an endeavour to understand how natural variability confounds 
studies of the effects of human activities on reefs (the state of knowledge is summarised in the text box 
139 
following). Yet, the analysis used in the Reefs at Risk, Reef Check and (until 2004, as discussed in 
Chapter Eight) the GCRMN assessments fail to take into account the ability of reefs to adapt to 
changing circumstances, or the process of recovery after disturbance. Furthermore, those analyses 
make no serious attempt to address either the natural variation in coral cover or the way that reefs 
recover froIl} both natural disturbance and from short-term disturbances, whether acute or not, or 
whether natural or anthropogenic. While Wilkinson does contemplate the extent to which reefs 
recovered after the 1997/98 bleaching events (see Table 9 and its adjacent discussion in Chapter Five), 
he does not engage with the scientific debate about recovery processes, a point to which I return after 
outlining the nature of the scientific debate. 
The debate about the natural rates of recovery of reefs after disturbance gained some prominence in 
1997, due to Connell's study, which I described above. Of the 65 samples that Connell (1997) found 
with sufficient data to make a judgement, coral cover had not declined in 29 percent; it had declined 
and recovered in 29 percent; and had declined but not recover in 42 percent. Connell concluded that 
based on the assembled evidence, coral assemblages did not appear to be suffering worldwide 
degradation-in 58 percent of the studies surveyed, coral assemblages were relatively stable over 
ecological time scales. Many assemblages showed no decline, while others recovered from acute, 
short-term disturbances, such as widespread predator outbreaks or local episodes of bleaching, severe 
storms, sedimentation or air exposure. There was however, little recovery from chronic, continuing 
disturbances that directly alter the physical or biological environment; also a higher proportion of 
western Atlantic sites were in decline than in the Indo-Pacific sites (Connell 1997 p. 14). 
Scientific perceptions of the fundamental nature of coral reefs, such as those in the text box below, also 
shape debate about whether coral reefs are in decline worldwide and whether this matters. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, coral reef scientists commonly thought that any slight change in coral reef conditions (such 
as temperature, salinity, turbidity, dissolved oxygen) would cause ecological disaster because coral 
species had a narrow habitat range (stenoecious) existing at the boundary of endurance of physical 
stress (e.g. Endean 1976; Salvat 1980 p. 341; Sorokin 1993 p. 407). They believed that when a reef 
community was disturbed or destroyed, then it would likely never recover to its former state. Since 
then mainstream scientific thinking about coral reefs has changed. Over the last twenty or so years, 
many scientists have come to consider that self-replacement and recovery from natural disturbance is 
the norm on coral reefs. Natural disturbances are theorised to play an important role in maintaining the 
diversity of organisms living on a reef. In giving greater emphasis to disturbance, cyclicity and chance 
than those of earlier decades, current coral reef paradigms recognise that coral reef ecosystems are not 
always benign and that popUlation explosions and crashes, notably involving reef-building corals, 
echinoderms (such as the crown-of-thorns starfish) and algae, commonly occur on contemporary reefs 
(Done et at. 1996 p. 396). 
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NATURAL VARIABILITY AND CORAL REEFS 
Recent texts and papers acknowledge coral reefs exist in environments subject to frequent 
disturbances on time-scales from minutes to years; they also acknowledge how this causes 
considerable variation across and amongst coral reefs. Tidal influences and temperature change cause 
daily fluctuations on any part of the reef. Temperature and tidal patterns also vary seasonally: along 
,vith solar radiation, sedimentation regimes, mean sea level, wave energy, nutrient concentrations, 
salinity values, and current regimes. These are known to occasionally damage reefs in several ways: 
wave action, fresh water inundation and decreases in salinity, siltation, exposure during extreme low 
water events, and high and low temperature extremes (pearson 1981; Smith and Buddemeier 1992; 
Glynn 1993; Sorokin 1993 p. 401; Hughes 1993 quoted in Glynn 1996). Overlying this are annual or 
interannual fluctuations in solar radiation, the irregular oscillation of the Pacific's coupled ocean-
atmosphere system, the EI Nino southern oscillation (ENSO) linked the Asian monsoon which itself 
displays significant seasonal variation and interannual variability (Brown 1997 p. 231-238). Reefs are 
subject to other natural disturbances including predatory outbreaks and epizootics. Some natural 
disturbances reach catastrophic levels, causing mass mortality-mosdy passing tropical cyclones, 
accompanied by heavy rain causing decreased salinity and massive siltation of reefs (Sorokin 1993 p. 
401). Earthquakes and volcanic activity have also caused mass coral mortality (Stoddard 1972, also 
Griggs and Maragos 1974 both quoted in Sorokin 1993 p. 404). 
The kinds, scales, duration, and intensities of natural disturbances that damage coral reefs vary not 
only temporally; they can also vary regionally, locally and at micro-scales on an individual reef (Hughes 
1993). For instance water temperatures vary across reefs, those of shallow inner reef flats and reef 
crests being particularly variable (Brown 1997 p. 244). In a review, Brown (1997 p. 272) concluded that 
corals are well adapted to the changing and often extreme reef environment, having an armoury of 
. phenotypic responses at organism, cellular and molecular levels. Throughout geological time, corals 
have responded to fluctuations through a variety of phenotypic and genetic adaptations (Brown 1997 
p. 276). The extensive intraspecific genetic variation of most coral taxa permits rapid local adaptation 
in anyone generation to environmental conditions encountered at a particular site. Corals are also 
capable of rapid phenotypic responses to predictable changes on a day-to-day and seasonal basis 
(Brown 1997 p. 276). 
Scientists have developed various theories to accommodate different scales of ecological change on 
coral reefs. In Grassle's 'temporal mosaic' theory, reef communities are viewed as temporal mosaics in 
space, and reefs as a patchwork of communities in different stages of recovery from various sources of 
disturbance (Grigg and Dollar 1990). Done (1999 p. 76) suggested that Borman and Likens' 'shifting 
steady state mosaic' view of forest ecosystems could be a useful way of viewing reefs. This theory 
suggests that any point in an ecosystem is constantly cycling through changes in biomassand species 
composition and function; over the entire ecosystem over a reasonable period of time, gross primary 
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production equals total ecosystem respiration and there is no net change in total standing crop of living 
and dead biomass; species composition and relative importance of species being fairly constant. These 
theories are variants on the notion of stasis embedded in cybernetic ecology, based on multiple rather 
than single states of equilibrium. They reflect a wider change in ecology towards nonequilibrium 
theory, a shift towards the concept of evolutionary ecology, summarised by Scoones (1999 p. 481-483) 
Today, accepted knowledge amongst coral reef scientists is that coral reefs usually recover from 
damage suffered during these types of natural fluctuations and disturbance, although in severe cases 
this may take many years. When there is significant mortality on a reef, from a hurricane for instance, 
recovery may take many years (Sorokin 1993 p. 401-402). Although individual sites may not fully 
recover after disturbance, at the scale of the landscape there is little overall change (Bythell et at. 
2000). Much still remains to be understood, however. Most reef ecologists have focused on the 
recovery of corals and fishes after disturbances and less is known about the recovery of other groups of 
reef organisms after natural events such as diseases, predator outbreaks, and toxic plankton blooms that 
damage other coral reef organisms (MCClanahan et at. 2002). 
Debate about the process of recovery after disturbance, the ability of reefs to adapt to changing 
circumstances, and how reefs recover from disturbances that have anthropogenic causes remains 
topical. It is found in scientific publications on coral reefs such as those quoted above and in a recent 
review of potential contributions of climate change to stresses on coral reef ecosystems, which the Pew 
Centre on Global Climate Change prepared to help inform debate on climate change (Buddemeier et al. 
2004 p. 28-29). Various papers presented at the four-yearly International Coral Reef Symposia have 
discussed the issue (such as Connell's (1997) paper described above), and there have been debates on 
the electronic Coral-List discussion list maintained by NOAA, a list with international membership. 
(see last accessed 20 July 2005). Yet, none of 
this scientific debate has been included in the GCRMN global status reports. Although the 2004 
assessment gives some attention to the inherent recovery capacity of coral reefs, Wilkinson does not, in 
his analysis of observations from various countries, engage with this debate. He instead assumes that 
coral reefs generally have strong potential to recover from "true natural threats", listed as "tropical 
cyclonic storms, fresh water inundation, geological events, like earthquakes and volcanoes, and low 
levels of plagues and diseases" (Wilkinson 2004 p. 19). Wilkinson cautions that any additional human 
impacts on reefs, or any increase in the level of natural disturbances, will threaten the recovery being 
noted, although he does not cite any scientific evidence for this statement. Wilkinson then brings us 
back to the dire fate facing coral reefs by adding "this, however, is one of the predicted scenarios of 
global climate change. It is predicted that tropical storms could increase in frequency and severity, and 
the major global ocean currents may change" (Wilkinson 2004 p. 19-20). 
Wilkinson's failure to engage with the complexities of marine ecological research and recent theories 
on this subject is interesting. It suggests that the GCRMN does not need such theories to lend it 
authority or credibility. 
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Ignoring the debate about the value of bioconstruction 
Another debate that Wilkinson's GCRMN global assessment summary reports have ignored centres on 
the issue of whether, as a result of changing climate, many coral reefs will eventually be replaced by 
coral communities that do not form reefs-and whether this matters. Current scientific thinking, as 
seen in scientific publications about geo-chemical processes occurring on reefs, is that carbonate 
production is likely to decline in the future either through the removal of reef builders through 
phenomena such as mass coral bleaching, or through depressed calcification rates (Kleypas et al. 2001 
p. 435). BBC Radio's Discovery programme recently discussed this scenario (on 23rd February 2005), 
highlighting coming changes in ocean chemistry and suggesting those impending changes had been 
known about for years but largely overlooked. Instead of explicitly tackling this issue, both the 
GCRMN global status reports and the Reefs at Risk analysis assumed implicitly that reefs, geological 
structures built through biological processes, were valuable and should be preserved as reefal 
communities. 
The issue is confused by the way we choose to define coral reefs. Over the past few centuries, the way 
that scientists commonly define coral reefs has changed from focusing solely on geological structure to 
highlighting the interdependency of biological and geological processes (Kleypas et at. 2001). Recent 
definitions combine biological and geological features, emphasising reef-building corals, coralline 
algae communities, and the accumulation of carbonate matter (see the text box in Chapter Four 
defining what is a coral reef). Some scientists have tried to distinguish between a 'coral reef' as a 
sedimentary structure produced by a living coral reef community-defining 'coral reef community' as 
one which has the potential for reef production-and a 'coral community' that does not have that 
potential (Kleypas et al. 2001 p. 427). Areas where reef-building communities occur and appear to 
function ecologically as reefs but have not produced a coral reef structure are usually called 'marginal' 
reef areas (Kleypas et al. (2001 p. 427). In many ways those coral communities function in a similar 
manner to 'true' coral reefs except that their carbonate budgets are closer to zero (Kleypas et at. 2001). 
Yet, scientists tend to value reef building, preferring reef building communities to non-reef building 
ones or to those in which carbonate consumption exceeds its accumulation (such as algal pavements). 
For instance, in a report published in the journal Coral Reefs looking at ecological criteria for 
evaluating coral reefs, Done (1995), values bioconstruction-which is what creates the topographical 
complexity that provides many different habitats that maintain reef diversity. One reason given is that 
bioconstruction allows reefs to cope with sea-level change, especially on atolls (Kleypas et al. 2001 p. 
430). 
There is a common assumption in the coral reef scientific literature that because coral communities 
presently build reefs, then they need do so. This is largely based on observations of reefs over the past 
few centuries, a period when a set of environmental conditions that are geologically and 
environmentally unusual, has favoured reef building (Kleypas et al. 2001 p. 435). Kleypas et at. (2001 
p. 430) argued that non-reef coral communities are more common than reef scientists generally think. 
They suggested that it debatable whether reef building is an obligatory function of reef communities, or 
merely facultative (ibid). Both corals and reef building algae are organisms that have little internal 
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control on calcification; the degree of their calcification tends to reflect surrounding environmental 
conditions. These organisms therefore form massive reef deposits when environmental conditions are 
particularly favourable, as they have been in recent years (Kleypas et at. 2001 p. 430). Present-day 
coral reefs, on which reef scientists base their definition of reefs, are not the norm in reef ecosystems 
over geological timescales. Present interglacial climate, which appears particularly favourable for reef 
carbonate deposition and preservation, is representative of only ten percent of the past few million 
years. The currently low carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration is atypical for much of Earth's 
history (ibid). For these reasons, Kleypas et at. (2001p. 430) suggested that scientists are biased by the 
tendency of reefs to be preserved in the geological record and by present environmental conditions. 
This leaves wide open the issue of whether we should be concerned about a decline in reef building 
activity. Unlike the debate over coral reef adaptation and selection in response to coral bleaching, this 
debate has not gained much prominence amongst the reef science community. It is a debate over 
values: do we value reefs as three-dimensional carbonate structures or as collections of corals and other 
organisms? This evolutionary view of coral reefs differs from cybernetic ecology's idea of nature as a 
cybernetic system with limits (described in Chapter Two) upon which both ecosystems-based policy 
and the coral reef crisis narrative rest. Evolutionary ecology perceives the management of ecological 
systems as a game (as described in Kwa (1986». But it is cybernetic ecology's representations of 
nature and its notion of managing reefs in order to keep them from exceeding thresholds-a 
relationship resembling that between an engineer and a machine-that have dominated the coral reef 
science/policy found in GCRMN global status reports and in the construction of the crisis narrative. 
In scientific papers about coral reefs, which advocate the protection and management of coral reefs, 
there has been a gradual shift from a perspective based upon cybernetic to one based upon evolutionary 
ecology. This shift recently began to influence GCRMN global status reports. The 2004 report added 
reef resilience to the standard list of management strategies being advocated; this concept derives from 
evolutionary rather than cybernetics ecology as I show in Chapter Eight. Despite this shift, Wilkinson 
avoids engaging with the debate which Kleypas and others are trying to stimulate. While he and others 
constructing the narrative in the form of GCRMN global status reports and scientific papers use the 
authority of science to make their arguments and recommendations appear valid, authoritative, and 
worth acting upon, they do so selectively, for political reasons. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has belied the impression left by the conventionally-styled account of the state of coral 
reefs in the last chapter. It shows how the notion that coral reefs are facing an imminent global crisis is 
not based on careful empirical measurement of trends in the condition of reefs over time, adjusted for 
natural variation- reefs exhibit considerable spatial and temporal variability-as might be assumed 
from its publication in scientific journals. It is, instead, based on collections of observations and 
anecdotes plus some monitoring studies, analysed without any adjustment for the noise provided by 
long-term 'natural' variability. Constructed from these assessments, the narrative has been reproduced 
through conference papers, declarations made at conferences, scientific publications, and popular 
articles. It has been disseminated widely due to the efforts of policy staff employed by international 
organisations, and of scientists, some in research organisations, some employed by NGOs. Those 
disseminating the narrative, and enrolling the media, are part of what can be termed an international 
community of coral reef scientists who share an interest in coral reef science and in protecting coral 
reefs. 
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The puzzle is how, when the empirical evidence for the crisis is less than robust, the narrative has been 
both endlessly repeated and remained largely unchallenged. This may be due to the imperative that the 
concept of apocalypse, embedded in the cybernetic representation of nature upon which the narrative is 
based, has given it. As discussed in Chapter Two, that representation offers two possible future 
scenarios, either sustaining the nature in which we live, or its destruction. Moreover, the fear of 
apocalypse provides the impetus to pursue international cooperation in the mission of saving coral reef 
ecosystems from collapse. 
Although I have shown how the crisis has been discursively constructed and disseminated, this is not 
sufficient to make it unworthy of belief, as some might suggest. Before making any such judgement, 
one should also assess the policy prescriptions based upon that narrative, their inherent power relations 
and political implications. The next chapter begins that, describing and analysing the ICRI network and 
its policy portfolio. 
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Chapter Seven 
The International Coral Reef Initiative 
I ntrod uction 
Whatever is happening in international policy endeavours concerned with coral reefs, it does not 
conform to the orthodox model of policy processes described in Chapter Two, in at least two important 
regards. First, the previous chapter showed science/policy in action-not as the provider of objective 
knowledge portrayed by the epistemological notion of scientific realism but as the creator of policy 
concern, collecting, generalising and reshaping scraps of information from various locations to produce 
the notion of coral reefs in crisis as a call to environmental action. Second, as I show in this chapter, the 
policy responses which ICRI, various UN agencies and NOOs have taken to the crisis have largely 
avoided the route of 'green diplomacy' entailed in formal multilateral negotiations and 
intergovernmental regime formation. Instead, their political assembly has taken the form of a network, 
enrolling people and places around the globe, the network multiplying its sphere of policy influence in 
ways that lie outside formal interstate diplomacy. 
ICRI has expanded its sphere of influence by constructing new sets of connections, acquiring new 
capacities and expanding its agenda; the resultant network coming to represent new definitions of 
interests assembled around the notion of saving coral reefs. Building on the last two chapters, this 
chapter describes how this epistemic community has come into being and investigates its policies. In 
doing so, it sets the scene for understanding not only the hegemonic interests involved in forming ICRI, 
but also for seeing ICRI as a hegemonic network, a political assembly around the idea of worldwide 
coral reef degradation. 
The ICRI Network 
THE SHAPE OF THE NETWORK 
THE ICRI POLICY AGENDA 
Sources of Influence upon the ICRI Network 
THE WORLD BANK AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY 
THE US INFLUENCE 
SCIENTIFIC INFLUENCES 
NGOS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ICRI'S POLICY PORTFOLIO 
Interpreting ICRI's Politics 
THE INTERESTS EVIDENT IN ICRI 
ICRI AS A FORM OF NETWORK: A MODALITY OF POWER 
CONCLUSION 
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METHODOLOGY: RESEARCHING ICRI 
There are few published accounts of international policy initiatives concerned with coral reefs, only 
some about ICRI's creation. In researching the history of these initiatives, I therefore relied on Internet 
sources, particularly the web sites of the organisations concerned. By searching for funding proposals, 
meeting agendas, and reports, I gradually pieced their stories together. Although I used primary sources 
as much as possible, I was occasionally not able to obtain some reports without turning this into a 
major exercise in compiling a historical record. In those cases, I relied on secondary documents (e.g. 
Sapp's history of the crown-of-thorns debate, 1999). 
While drafting the history of international policy responses to worldwide coral reef degradation, the 
realisation of which organisations were key influencers came gradually. First, I noticed that besides 
founding ICRI, US state agencies had funded many other intergovernmental initiatives. To investigate 
whether this is a deliberate US strategy, I looked for written evidence of the US government's intention 
to influence international policy, locating this in documents relating to the US Coral Reef Task Force. 
Considering the history of NGOs working on international coral reef conservation and policy, I 
realised that the \'{1\'V'F organisation was also playing a key, but not always immediately obvious, role in 
coalitions and partnerships conceptualising and developing new ways to address the environmental 
crisis. \'{1\'V'F was bringing new policy ideas to bear on the problems facing coral reefs-from neoliberal 
approaches involving the private sector in conservation to new ways of implementing conservation on 
a large scale. This prompted me to investigate \V'WP's involvement in international coral reef policy 
and the \'{1\'V'F sites from which those ideas were emanating. The idea that ICRI represented an alliance 
of different interests developed out of those investigations. 
The ICRI Network 
THE SHAPE OF THE NETWORK 
The emergence of ICRI 
ICRI emerged from the US, as part of the country's response to UNCED and the integrated coastal 
zone management provisions in Chapter 17 A of Agenda 21. In 1994 the Department of State, when 
formulating the US domestic response, added an international component, an idea promoted at a 
meeting of federal agency representatives, scientists, coastal managers, and NGOs (Mieremet 1996 p. 
306). This proposed international venture should, according to its newly appointed steering committee, 
support and build capacity for coral reef research and monitoring, policy setting and management 
(Mieremet 1996 p. 307, 327). The US sought other government partners for this international coral reef 
initiative, already named ICRI. At a US/Japan Common Agenda meeting on the environment, US 
President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Murayama agreed to cooperate on this. The US 
Government (through the Department of State) then invited other governments to join the ICRI 
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partnership, sending out bulletins, announcing it at the UN's Global Conference on the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States (GCSDSIDS) at Barbados in May 1994 and at the first 
CoP of the CBD held that December. At GCSDSIDS, Pacific and Indian Ocean island nations 
expressed their concern with the deteriorating condition of coral reefs, adding to the international calls 
to address these problems (SPREP 1993; Moses 1994; Morozova 2000). By the end of 1994, six other 
governments had joined ICRI as partners, and other international organisations had lent their support 
(Table 11), making financial commitments to set up an ICRI Executive Planning Committee and a 
supporting Secretariat (Drake 1996; Morozova 2000). Intergovernmental agencies adding their support 
included four UN bodies-UNESCO-IOC, UNEP, UNEP-WCMC and UNDP. The WorldFish Centre 
and the IUCN added theirs, and both the World Bank and Global Environment Facility made 
contributions. 
TABLE 11: INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF INITIATIVE: PARTNERS AND SUPPORTING ORGANISATIONS 
Government Partners Australia, Britain, France, Jamaica, Japan, Philippines, Sweden, 
USA 
Supporting Organisations UNESCO, UNEP and UNEP's Caribbean programme, World 
Bank, UNDP, IUCN, SPREP, Inter-America Development Bank, 
Co-ordinating Body on Southeast Asia 
Source: Mieremet (1996 p. 309-310) 
The Call to Action 
ICRI's policy is officially set out in a Call to Action and an accompanying Frameworkfor Action, 
formulated at an international workshop held at Dumaguete in the Philippines at the end of May 1995, 
and attended by 120 people from 44 countries-a mix of policy makers, managers, scientists and 
private sector interests (Mieremet 1996 p. 312, 319). The Call to Action is based upon the premise that 
coral reefs are "in serious decline globally, especially those near shallow shelves and dense 
populations" (Chapter Five). It describes planning and management of both coastal land use and upland 
activities as inadequate, and states that threats from human-related impacts can be minimised or 
eliminated through improved and sustained management practices. This, it argues, requires an increase 
in political support and in national and local coral reef management capacities. To address those 
threats, the Call to Action seeks a co-ordinated international approach, calling for important and new 
information related to maintaining the health of these ecosystems to be shared. In this call for rational 
planning and international cooperation, the statement echoes the orthodox version of the discourse of 
global environmental policy. 
The Call to Action is eclectic in its approach to saving coral reefs (Table 12). It endorses integrated 
coastal management, ecosystems-based management, and programmes for community-based 
management or co-management of reef resources. It seeks to build capacity through education and 
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information programmes, information exchanges with 'stakeholder communities', regional networks 
sharing knowledge and skills, and through improved access for developing nations to bilateral, 
multilateral and other forms of financial and technical support for reef management. In supporting 
research and monitoring, it endorses the need for a global coral reef monitoring network as discussed in 
the previous chapter, regional networks linking national research programs, and better links between 
regional and global research and monitoring networks. Its eclecticism brings to mind March and 
Olsen's garbage can model of policy-ideas thrown in and stirred together. This mix reflects the 
diverse agendas of organisations which have combined to use ICRI as a platform to get their ideas onto 
the international policy stage, examined later in the chapter. 
The purpose of the longer Framework/or Action is described as being to mobilise governments and the 
wide range of other stakeholders whose co-ordinated, vigorous and effective actions are required to 
implement the Call to Action. It, too, promotes an eclectic collection of tools: an intersectoral systems 
approach to planning and management; a global system of coastal and marine protected areas; the 
regulation of international trade; environmental assessment of development activities; voluntary 
programmes, economic incentives, and management guides for controlling pollution (International 
Coral ReefInitiative 1995b). 
One (orthodox) way of interpreting ICRI's Call to Action is as the collective wisdom of an epistemic 
community sensu Haas (Chapter Two). This is the interpretation which ICRI promoted in its report of 
the Dumaguete workshop, which refers to the "collective deliberation and wisdom of participants". The 
report describes participants as "an extraordinary mix of participants-ambassadors, scientists, 
resource managers, and enforcement personnel, donor, nongovernmental, and private sector 
representatives-all of whom share the same commitment to the conservation, restoration and 
sustainable use of coral reefs and related ecosystems" (International Coral ReefInitiative 1995c). Both 
the Call to Action and its accompanying Framework/or Action are usually referred to in a way that 
implies they were the result of a large group of experts meeting, discussing and agreeing how best to 
tackle a serious and difficult problem-ie a highly analytical, participatory, and democratic process, 
drawing on the "collective deliberation and wisdom of participants" (International Coral Reef Initiative 
1995c). The Call to Action was, however, largely drafted by a small group of people who convened the 
workshop. ICRI's coordinator and secretariat staff, with the help ofICRI's Executive Planning 
Committee (CPC), prepared the draft and presented it to the workshop to consider and endorse 
(Mieremet 1996 p. 312, 319). They selected a 'representative team of participants' to develop a longer 
Framework to Action, intended to provide more in-depth guidance to planned regional workshops 
(Mieremet 1996 p. 311-312). Workshop participants endorsed this second statement as well. 
TABLE 12: THE MEASURES THAT ICRl's CALL TO ACTION SEEKS 
The ICRI governments endorse the following measures, to be implemented through global, 
regional, and national actions: 
Coastal Management 
e Incorporate integrated coastal management measures into local, national, and regional coastal 
development plans and projects, and support their long-term implementation. These measures 
will serve as the framework for achieving the sustainable use of, and maintaining the health of, 
coral reefs and associated environments 
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e Develop coral reef initiatives (regional, national and/or local). These should use an ecosystem-
based, integrated approach that encourages participation and includes programs for community-
based management or co-management of reef resources 
Capacity Building 
e Establish regional networks to share knowledge, skills, and information 
e Develop and support educational and informational programs aimed at reducing adverse 
impacts of human activities 
e Establish information exchanges with stakeholder communities 
e Improve developing nations access to bilateral, multilateral, and other forms of financial and 
technical support for coral reef management 
Research and Monitoring 
e Use regional networks to achieve better coordination and cooperation among national research 
programmes 
e Promote linkages between regional and global research and monitoring networks, such as 
CARICOi'vIP (Caribbean Coastal Marine Productivity), PACICOlvIP (pacific Coastal IVlarine 
Productivity), and GOOS (Global Ocean Observing System) 
e Support research and monitoring programs, projects, or activities identified as essential to 
managing coral reef ecosystems for the benefit of humankind 
e Promote the development and maintenance of a global coral reef monitoring network 
Review 
e Periodically review the extent and success of implementation of actions identified in the 
initiative 
The Nations and organizations supporting ICRI call upon all other relevant international 
entities, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the private sector and 
scientific communities, to undertake the actions above. 
Source: International Coral Reef Initiative (1995a) 
How ICRI operates 
Initially the US State Department supplied a coordinator for IeRI and the secretariat was formed by ad 
hoc assignments from US various agencies, on the understanding that other partners would fund and 
organise these roles later-as eventuated and as shown in Table 13 (Mieremet 1996 p. 311). 
TABLE 13: HOSTS FOR THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF INITIATIVE 
Period Host organisation! government 
1994/96 USA, Department of State 
1996/98 Australia, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
1999/00 France, :Ministry for Environment 
.--------------------------------------
2001/02 Philippines, Department of Environment and Natural Resources; in 
partnership with Sweden 
2003/05 Seychelles, Centre for Marine Research and Technology-Marine Parks 
Authority; in partnership with Britain 
2005/07 Palau in partnership with Japan 
and NOAA's Coral Health and Monitoring Programme 
; Mieremet (1996); Souter and Linden (c.l999) 
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From this a network of linked organisations concerned with international coral reef policy has grown. 
GCRMN, established around the same time as ICRI with funds from various states, principally the US 
plus the GEF (Table 14), immediately became part of the ICRI network. GCRMN maintains close links 
with several intergovernmental organisations through its management committee structure (see text box 
Introducing the Players 4: GCRMN in Chapter Five). Initially a UNESCO-IOC initiative, GCRMN is 
now largely under the wing of the IUCN-the World Conservation Union, part of the latter's global 
coral reef portfolio (Sherwood 2004). The US Department of State, NOAA, and AIMS remain 
GCRMN's principal funders and AIMS provides the coordinator (Wilkinson 2004 p. xii). 
TABLE 14: ORGANISATIONS FUNDING GCRMN's ESTABLISHMENT 
Fuudiug for initial set up and operatiou Funding and support for global coordinator 
US Department of State; National Oceanic US contribution to the IOC Trust Fund 
and Atmospheric Administration 
UK Department of International Co-hosted joindy by AIMS and ICLARtvI (now 
Development known as the World Fish Centre) 
Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA); Swedish Agency for Research 
Cooperation with development countries 
(Sarec) 
Government of France 
Government of Japan 
Global Environment Facility 
Source: Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (1997; 2003) 
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GCRMN is the arm of the [CR[ network committed to collecting and disseminating data and 
mformation ahout the health and ecology of coral reefs worldwide. It provides the justification for 
(CRrs coral reef policy by reporting on the extent of reef degradation and (lack of) protection. 
G CRMN and [CR[ operate separately, under their different governance structures. The opportunity to 
u iscuss their respective efforts as part of an integrated approach to the Call to Action occurs six-
:nonthly at meetings of JCRI. At those meetings, often held in conjunction with international coral reef 
events, representatives of the various arms of the [CRr network report on past work and discuss future 
actions. ICRI operates through a combination of these six monthly meetings and a web site containing 
a bulletin board onto which registered users can log. The latter is used to post meeting agenda and 
linutes, discussion papers and draft proposals . 
fC RI recentl , sought to formalise its policy basis. Over several years it had operated without any 
formal governance structure, many without formal lines of accountability to state policy agencies. Then 
In 2003, at the behest of several CPC members, ICRI adopted formal rules. Any UN member state is 
elig ible to b . ome an ICRI member, as is any spec ialised agency or programme of the UN system or 
ny international, intergovernme ntal or non-governmental organisation with significant national, 
regional, or global coral reef programmes or interests . Now, at [CRI meetings only members are 
:.illowed to v teo The original membership consists of stales and organisations that issued or endorsed 
lhe [CR[ Cal! to Action or the Renewed Call to Action and Frameworkfor Action. New members musl 
J ttend a General Meeting and make a statement 0[' the ir support for the latter two documents 
(lnternation J Coral Reef Initiative 2003). 
Components of the ICRI network 
Between 1999 and 2002, ICRI-CPC members and other interested players established further 
operational ICRI networks (depicted in Figure 4) to co-ordinate work on the Call to Action objectives. 
F IGURE 4: THE leRI NETWORK 
Secretariat 
CPC 
ource: International Coral Reef Action Network (200 I) 
GCR11N: lobal Coral ReeDlonitori.ng 
'etwork 
ICRI: International Coral Reef 
Initiative 
IC~-\N: International Coral Reef 
_-\ction Network 
ICRIN: International Coral Reef 
Information Net\vork 
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International Coral Reef Information Network (lCRIN) 
In 1999, the ICRI-CPC created the International Coral Reef Information Network (ICRIN), to advance 
public awareness goals in ICRI's Framework of Action. CPC members envisaged ICRIN would lead a 
major international public relations campaign, communicate the need to protect coral reefs to senior 
decision-makers and opinion leaders and to the tourism and fishing industries (International Coral Reef 
Information Network 2001). The CPC asked the Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL) a US-based NGO 
(online at that led the public awareness efforts of the International Year of the Reef 
1997, to co-ordinate ICRIN activities, in consultation with the ICRI Secretariat. Initially seeking over 
USD 3 million from the United Nations Foundation (UNF), CORAL was able to raise only USD 
666,000 and the initiative was therefore refocused (International Coral ReefInitiative 2001). Between 
2001-2004 ICRIN operated as a UNEP project (Coral Reef Alliance/ International Coral Reef 
Information Network 2003; CORALIICRIN report in International Coral ReefInitiative 2004). Much 
of the material CORAL produced supported the third component of the ICRI network, the International 
Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN). 
International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN) 
Like ICRIN, ICRAN was set up to implement the Call to Action, integrating international efforts to 
protect coral reefs that previously operating independently (International Coral Reef Action Network 
2001). Conceived by ICLARM and UNEP in the late 1990s, originally as a joint project with FAO, 
ICRAN was to serve as an umbrella for demonstration sites around the world showcasing successful 
marine protected areas conservation projects, and serving as training facilities (International Coral Reef 
Action Network 2001). It then evolved into a fundraising venture to support existing parts of the ICRI 
network (the ICRI secretariat, GCRMN and ICRIN) and to raise funds for new projects proposed by 
ICLARM, WRI, UNEP-WCMC, SPREP and Reef Check-between 20-40 million USD being sought. 
The funding proposal was thus designed to expand the work of international organisations already 
involved in coral reef matters. The United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) co-
ordinated an application to UNF, which subsequently pledged USD 10 million to cover core costs from 
200 I to 2004, during which time ICRAN hoped to raise USD 20 million for an International Coral 
Reef Fund, to expand the network and finance further activities (International Coral Reef Action 
Network 2002). 
Core costs having been met, an ICRAN Board and a steering committee were formed, with UNEP 
providing coordination and administration (ICRAN Board report in International Coral Reef Initiative 
1995a). ICRAN then hired a fundraiser who targeted a long list of foundations and philanthropic 
organisations and private businesses (largely American). The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
USA dramatically changed the funding situation however, and by the end of 2003 ICRAN had only 
managed to raise USD 332,000 for demonstration projects, intended to highlight successful examples 
of coral reef management and to promote good management practices at others (Telekei 2003). 
Although by 2002, ICRAN had 32 demonstration sites in the Caribbean, East Africa, East Asia and the 
South Pacific (six in the latter), many were pre-existing projects brought into the ICRAN fold 
(International Coral Reef Action Network 2002). 
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rCRAN partners are listed in Table 15, below. Within the United Nations system, ICRAN's main links 
are with UNEP, which administers the UNF funding. ICRAN operates through UNEP's Regional Seas 
Programmes and is linked to ICRI through its Board which includes two ICRI Secretariat members. 
TABLE 15: ORGANISATIONS THAT ARE PARTNERS IN ICRAN 
Partner Organisations 
Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL) 
Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRlvIN) 
International Coral Reef Initiative-Coordinating Planning Committee (ICRI-CPC) 
Marine Aquarium Council (iVL'\.C) 
Reef Check 
South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP) 
South Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP) 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
United Nations Environment Programme - Coral Reef Unit 
United Nations Environment Programme - Division of Technology, Industry and Economics 
United Nations Environment Programme - World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) 
United Nations Foundation (UNF) 
WorldFish Centre (formerly ICLARlvl) 
World Resources Institute (\WI) 
World Wildlife Fund (\V'\V'F) 
Source: ICRAN web site at consulted 18 July 2004. 
The ICRI network's policy influence: disseminating the message 
ICRI is at the core of a complex web of international relationships, conduits for the passage of funds, 
information and expertise intended to generate international responses to rising concern about 
worldwide degradation of coral reefs. An alliance of intergovernmental organisations (mostly but not 
exclusively UN ones), a handful of states including the US, and prominent members of the 
international coral reef science community, ICRI represents an attempt to create a top-down policy 
agenda ultimately intended to influence the conduct of a multitude of people in different locales. 
ICRI has expanded at international level because of the efforts of a small group of determined people 
who played a key role in mobilising international interest in coral reef policy. The network grew not so 
much because of growing government interest within the countries forming ICRI but because of the 
networking efforts of those involved in ICRI itself. Using ICRI and OCRMN as a base, these 
networkers made considerable, largely successful, efforts to persuade existing IOOs, including the 
multilateral conventions, to put coral reefs on their agenda, thus drawing those organisations into the 
campaign to save coral reefs. They drew up lists of upcoming international meetings, including those of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), (posted on the ICRI web site) and assigned particular 
people to attend and present the ICRI case. The CPC also publicised ICRI's message at various 
international environmental forums including UNEP's Global Plan of Action to Protect the Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Activities, the Second Conference of the Parties (CoP) to CBD, the 
CoP of the Ramsar Convention, and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). 
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One result of this, which continues today, is that existing MEAs have begun to emphasise coral reefs as 
worthy of protection. When anxiety about coral reefs began to gel internationally in the early 1990s, 
there were no MEAs focusing specifically on reefs. Some agreements, such as CITES (Chapter Five) 
did, however, provide a measure of protection; the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals (CMS or Bonn Convention), which entered into force in 1983, protects some 
sea turtles (UNEP Coral Reef Unit and WWF Coral Reefs Advisory Initiative 2003 p. 14). Since 1975, 
specific coral reef areas have been able to be protected under two international conventions: the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (which promotes international cooperation in the conservation and 
wise use of wetlands and shallow inshore areas) and the World Heritage Convention (which lists sites 
whose outstanding cultural and natural heritage values should be reserved for all humanity, including 
the Great Barrier Reef listed in 1981) (Kurukulasuriya et al. 1998; UNEP Coral Reef Unit and WWF 
Coral Reefs Advisory Initiative 2003). The Great Barrier Reef aside, neither convention paid much 
attention to coral reef decline until the late 1990s, when ICRI members made a concerted effort to draw 
their attention to this. Both now place much greater emphasis on coral reefs, both in seeking to add 
sites to their protected list and in managing sites already listed (UNESCO World Heritage Centre 
Report in International Coral ReefInitiative 2004). 
Between June 1995 and September 1997, ICRI held seven regional workshops, including one in the Fiji 
Islands in late 1995. These helped mobilise various regional groups interested in coral reef matters, and 
several regional initiatives resulted. The largest regional initiative associated with ICRI is CORDIO, a 
programme created in 1999 with the support of the Swedish government and the World Bankl to assess 
the widespread degradation of the coral reefs throughout the central and western Indian Ocean 
(Sherwood 2004 p. 13). Increasingly, CORDIO's research has focused on mitigating damage to reefs 
and on alternative livelihoods for people dependant on reefs. Supported by the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Government of Finland, the Dutch Trust Fund of the 
World Bank, WWF and IUCN, these efforts involve researchers in 11 countries. There are also 
regional initiatives in the Caribbean (the Atlantic and Gulf Rapid Reef Assessment (AGRRA) 
Programme and the Caribbean Coastal Marine Productivity Programme (CARICOMP)), focusing on 
research and monitoring rather than policy matters. 
Despite preparation of a regional ICRI strategy (SPREP 1996), initial attempts to establish regional 
coordination in the Pacific through SPREP failed due to a lack of funds. Instead the US government 
built its own Pacific regional initiative; 90 percent of US coral reefs surround US islands in the Pacific 
and the remainder are located off Florida, Georgia, Texas and the US islands in the Caribbean (US 
Department of the Interior 1999). The US government initially focused on Hawai'i, the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Marianas and the various US ten'itories in the Pacific (see Table 3) as part of its US All 
Islands Coral Reef Initiative Strategy; then, in 2000, it invited Pacific states freely associated with the 
US to participate the USCRTF as non-voting members (United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000b, 
see also last accessed 30 July 2005). 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS. 11: PACIFIC REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (SPREP) 
SPREP is a regional Pacific-wide intergovernmental organisation, founded in the late 1970s. 
Originally called the South Pacific Environment Programme, it dropped the 'South' in late 2004 
but retained the acronym. Created initially as a programme of the South Pacific Commission in 
Noumea (New Caledonia) in the late 1970s, SPREP became autonomous in 1995, having moved 
to Apia, Samoa. SPREP's members are the twenty-two Pacific island countries along with 
Australia, New Zealand, France and the USA. Its principal role is to promote cooperation and 
assist its members ,vith issues of environmental management and conservation. rvIember countries 
express their needs for assistance through national planning mechanisms which are conveyed to 
regional planning forums including the annual SPREP meeting. 
SPREP is UNEP's Regional Seas Programme in the Pacific, a role it has undertaken since first 
created. UNEP was one of two UN agencies instrumental in having the SPREP programme 
created (the other being the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific). It was Arthur Dahl, recently retired manager ofUNEP Coral Reef Unit, who was largely 
responsible for setting up SPREP when he worked at SPC in Noumea in the 1970s. 
Donor funding for projects forms the bulk (90 percent) of SPREP's budget. The remainder is core 
funding from member countries' annual subscriptions and from project management fees, plus 
some discretionary funding from the Australian and New Zealand governments. The US provides 
much of SPREP's funding. 
Sources: SPC (1980); AusAID (2000); Turnbull (2001) 
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In the late 1990s, the French government included other islands in the Pacific-the French overseas 
territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, which collectively comprise 97 
percent of France's coral reefs-in its own national initiative for coral reefs, L'Initiative Fran<;aise sur 
les Recifs Coralliens (IFRECOR). Launched to coincide with the French government's hosting of the 
ICRI secretariat, IFRECOR effectively brought these territories into the ICRI and GCRMN network 
through the local committees established in each territory (Voynet et at. 2000; Ministere de l'Outre-Mer 
and Ministere de l'Ecologie at du Developpement Durable c.2003). 
This left other Pacific states and territories (such as the Fiji Islands, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, and Samoa) outside any of the regional initiatives formed under the ICRI umbrella, a 
situation not reversed until late 2004, when Agence Fran<;aise de Developpement (the French 
Development Agency, AFD) launched the French Regional Initiative for the Protection and 
Management of Coral Reefs in the Pacific (CRISP). This three-year programme of interventions 
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planned for 15 island countries and territories of the South Pacific entails four main contractors (CI, 
UNF, and two French agencies, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and Institute de 
Recherche pour Ie Developpement (IRD» plus 17 operators. The budget, as at 1 January 2005, is 8.7 M€, 
comprising 6.1 M€ from French agencies (AFD, the French GEF, IRD and Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MAE», plus 2.6 M€ from a combination of CI, WWF, 
and UNF (International Coral ReefInitiative 2005b). As part of the programme, the French 
Government and ICRAN have funded ReefBase to step up its activities in the Pacific (International 
Coral Reef Initiative 2005a). The CRISP programme also aims to develop an ecoregional strategy of 
reef biodiversity conservation, set up marine protected areas and support existing ones, and develop 
tools for integrated coastal management. Other parts of the programme focus on monitoring, 
rehabilitation and identifying pharmacologically-active substances in reef ecosystems (CRISP Coral 
Reef Initiative for the South Pacific 2005). 
To recap, ICRI, as a result of its expansion and networking with other organisations, and the regional 
workshops and subsequent regional initiatives, has extensive arrangements for implementing its policy 
agenda aimed at altering the conduct of people living near and using reefs. These include ICRAN 
demonstration projects, various regional programmes such as CRISP, NGO projects, GCRMN training, 
and representatives from MEAs and IGOs encouraging governments to control peoples' conduct 
through legislation, policy, and enforcement. 
THE ICRI POLICY AGENDA 
Even so, ICRI policy remains outside the ambit of international law. The Call to Action was not a 
statement negotiated by official representatives accorded the authority of their government to do so. It 
does not have the status of an 'official' MEA, although both the Governing Council of UNEP and the 
IOC subsequently passed resolutions supporting it (International Coral ReefInitiative 1995c). Rather, it 
is an evolving statement of topical policy ideas drawn from eclectic sources and legitimised by being 
'approved' at international conferences. 
Since the Call to Action was formulated, ICRI's policy has evolved in an ad hoc fashion through 
further conference statements and declarations calling for immediate action to save coral reefs. These 
were made at the inaugural ITMEMS in 1998, at ITMEMS II in 2003 and at the 10th International Coral 
Reef Symposium in 2004 (which produced the Okinawa Declaration, a statement discussed in Chapter 
Eight). In addition, GCRMN global status reports act as a de facto source of international policy, 
summarising recommendations made in various national and regional reports prepared for inclusion. 
These policy statements (ICRI's, ITMEMS and the GCRMN) recognise the need for widespread 
international cooperation to halt degradation to coral reefs and prevent their further demise. They all 
echo orthodox environmental policy discourse (Chapter Two). All are an eclectic mix of goals, 
strategies and tools, both relatively old ideas such as marine protected areas and newer ones including 
neoliberal approaches such as Marine Aquarium Council's scheme, described in the text box below. 
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INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 12. MARINE AQUARIUM COUNCIL (MAC) 
MAC is a US-based NGO created specifically to address the international trade in reef organisms 
destined for home aquaria. ]vIAC is promoting a commercial certification scheme, a type of voluntary 
eco-Iabelling targeting all stages of the industry from collection to sale in retail oudets. TIlis is based 
around global standards for collecting, handling and exporting marine organisms, and on setting up 
quality management systems at each step from collection to ultimate sale to aquarium owners. As well 
as benefiting those in the industry who choose to participate (importers and retailers as well as 
collectors and exporters) by enabling them to label their products as 'green' and capture a bigger share 
of the market and a higher price for their certified fish and corals, dIe scheme is intended to ensure 
reefs are not over-harvested, hopefully driving out of business those collectors and exporters who 
'mine' areas then move on. 
\V\V'F and the [US] Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) spearheaded the efforts to establish 
]vIAC; other NGO and trade organisations included dleir discussions were the American 1hrinelife 
Dealers Association, American Zoo and Aquarium Association, Ornamental Fish Industry Linllted 
(UK), the Haribon Foundation (philippines), International Marinelife Alliance (philippines), Ocean 
Voice International (Canada), Conservation International, Flora and Fauna International (UK), and 
TIle Nature Conservancy. Several organisations funded \V\V'F's efforts to establish ]vIAC, including 
USAID, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation and dIe John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation. Paul Holthus ofIUCN's Marine and Coastal Programme was recruited to run ]vL'\.C and 
develop the certification scheme, which Chapter Twelve describes. Several of the North Americans 
involved in founding IivIA and some from Ocean Voice International's Philippine work (described in 
Chapter Five) were subsequendy involved in developing iVIAC and its scheme. 
Source: SPREP (1993; 2002b); Hauter (1998); Bunting (2001); Bunting and Meyers (2002); Peter Rubec 
and Steve Robinson,pers. l'OJJJtlJs. 
In these statements made after the original Call to Action and Frameworkfor Action, there have been 
some changes in the policy approach sought, listed below: 
G the need to find alternative livelihoods (ITMEMS II) 
e sustainable financing (ITMEMS II) 
e protecting fish spawning aggregations (ITMEMS II) 
G sustainable mariculture to reduce the take of wildfish (ITMEMS II) 
e the need to reduce greenhouse gas production (Okinawa Declaration) 
e a focus on finding ways of helping reefs become resilient to chronic large-scale effects such as 
climate change, incorporating suitable tools (such as MPA selection, design and management) 
into coastal management strategies (mentioned in the GCRMN 2004 global status report and 
discussed in the next chapter). 
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Although there has been no significant shift in policy direction since the Call to Action was drafted in 
1994, there has, however, been a broadening in the approach to development intertwined with the ICRI 
agenda, reflected in the support for alternative livelihoods and sustainable financing (listed above). 
This echoes changes in the direction of the international policy agenda for development aid. 
Additionally, the debate about climate change, lurking in the background of earlier statements, made an 
explicit appearance in the Okinawa Declaration, reflecting the unhappiness of many American coral 
reef scientists with the Bush government's policies on that subject (pers. obs.). 
ICRI's policy as an expression of modernisation 
ICRI's policy agenda represents the technocratic pursuit of knowledge and the search for control over 
nature which typify the discourse of global environmental policy described in Chapter Two. ICRI's 
strategy, along with the work of the various organisations involved in the network, expresses a strong 
faith in the ability and appropriateness of science to identify and solve the problems facing coral reefs. 
ICRI's strategy positions experts through 'expert policy discourses', best understood as technologies 
such as marine protected areas, reef resilience, ecoregion planning and eco-Iabelling. The strategy of 
utilising expert policy technologies expresses faith that the application of reason, exemplified by 
science, enables humans to discover the truth about the nature of reality and thus to understand how 
people are causing coral reef degradation and how this might be addressed and coral reefs saved. 
ICRI's environmentalism is not anti-modern against capitalism, industrialism, modern science and 
technology because of their effects of the environment. Rather, it is a very modern environmentalism. 
ICRI views the institutions of modernity not only as the main causes of environmental problems but 
also as the saviours of modernising countries-just as ecological modernisation sees them as the 
principal instruments of ecological reform in industrialised countries. ICRI's policy agenda reflects 
modernisation theory's confidence in the ability of international efforts to address, through scientific 
reason, instrumental rationality, international cooperation and progress, the challenges posed by 
widespread environmental degradation. 
Sources of Influence upon the ICRI Network 
The ICRI network can be seen both as a way for participating organisations to place their own policy 
ideas onto an international agenda, and as a way for its members, acting collectively, to disseminate 
ideas and to influence policy in far-flung parts of the globe. It is thus both a collecting and a dispersal 
mechanism for policy ideas. There are clearly some key organisations using the ICRI network to place 
their ideas on the international policy agenda. These include, but are not limited to, the US state, the 
World Bank and GEF. I examine each below, as well as the influence of the reef science community 
andNGOs. 
THE WORLD BANK AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY 
The World Bank and GEF are represented in the governance structures ofICRI through both ICRAN's 
Board and the GCRMN management committee. In addition, there has usually been a World Bank 
representative at ICRI-CPC meetings, as the minutes on their web site show. 
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Both the World Bank and the GEF support ICRI (Tables 11 and 14) and both are key financiers and 
managers of coral reef projects around the world, including the CRISP project in the Pacific described 
earlier. The Bank's portfolio of coral reef projects between 1991 and 2001 has been estimated at over 
USD 125 million, the GEF financing over half this. The Bank has programmes focusing on coral reef 
biodiversity conservation, primarily aimed at establishing marine protected areas. These include several 
large regional projects such as the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project in Indonesia 
(COREMAP), the Strategic Action Programme for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and the 
MesoAmerican Barrier Reef System in the Caribbean (International Coral Reef Action Network 2001). 
UNEP-GEF separately finances coral reef conservation projects-18 projects by 2004, so many that it 
has launched a SHARK (SHAring Reef Knowledge) learning network to facilitate information 
exchange amongst participants (United Nations Development Programme - Global Environment 
Facility 2004). 
Latterly, the Bank and the GEF are taking a scientific approach to reef conservation. In November 
2004, they announced a jointly-funded initiative to help protect coral reefs in developing countries: a 
USD 23 million Coral Reef Targeted Research and Capacity Building Project (Global Environment 
Facility 2005). The five-year project is intended to be the first stage of a 15 year research programme 
designed "to bring the best science from around the world to bear on issues related to coral reef 
vulnerability and resilience .... Scientists will translate this knowledge into tools and policies for 
decision-makers" (World Bank 2004). The programme intends to establish "centres of excellence" in 
Mexico, Tanzania, and the Philippines, twinning these with existing centres in Australia (ibid). 
THE US INFLUENCE 
Another key player in ICRI is the US government, which has a policy of providing leadership to reduce 
global threats to coral reefs. Its national coral reef action plan states that the US will continue to 
exercise global leadership in shaping priorities and approaches that conserve coral reefs, through 
international technical and development assistance, capacity building and collaboration (Table 16). 
This plan also states that the US will continue to lead scientific efforts to improve information on the 
causes, occurrence and impact of bleaching and disease throughout the world (United States Coral Reef 
Task Force 2000 a p. vi, 29). 
The US government has been ICRI's main funder. When founding partners made their initial 
contributions, the US' was the largest (USD 175,000) (Drake 1996 p. 283). It also gave USD 680,000 
to coral reef projects in 1994/5, in the hope of encouraging other donor partner countries to follow suite 
(Drake 1996 p. 283). Furthermore, the US government helped fund GCRMN's establishment (Table 
14) and continues to fund the global coordinators' role. It spends approximately USD 2 million 
annually supporting ICRI or ICRI-initiated coral programmes such as GCRMN and local workshops on 
reef protection and management (US Department of State 2004).The government also supports coral 
reef initiatives run by the secretariats of multilateral agreements, through the CITES-US Cooperative 
Fund for example. 
TABLE 16: USCRTF NATIONAL ACTION PLAN TO CONSERVE CORAL REEFS, 2000 
Key elements of the international conservation strategy: 
.. strengthen international conventions and foster strategic partnerships with other countries, 
international organizations and institutions, the public and private sectors, and non-
governmental organizations to address international threats to coral reef ecosystems 
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.. strengthen the International Coral Reef Initiative and implement its Renewed Call to Action; 
support the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network and its linkage to the national monitoring 
effort 
.. provide assistance in managing and conserving reef ecosystems and their watersheds in the 
Wider Caribbean, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, East Africa, and Middle East regions 
ED support the creation and management of coral reef marine protected areas, particularly those 
that contain substantial ecological (i.e., no-take) reserves 
ED strengthen international research, monitoring and assessment efforts aimed at understanding, 
predicting, preventing and responding effectively to the impacts of large-scale phenomena 
such as bleaching and disease, and their socioeconomic impacts 
ED analyse and address unsustainable and destructive fishing practices and unsustainable 
international trade in coral reef and mangrove species 
Recommendations to reduce the impact of international trade: 
.. continue consultations with coral exporting countries and other stakeholders to assess the 
nature and extent of the problems associated with trade in coral reef species, to express US 
government concern about this and discuss possible approaches to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the trade 
.. expand capacity-building efforts in countries with coral reefs to enforce relevant laws and 
regulations, collect trade data, assess the status of reefs, evaluate the impacts of extraction of 
reef resources, develop and implement sustainable management plans 
ED consider developing certification schemes and institute alternative and environmentally sound 
collection practices and alternatives, such as aquaculture and coral farming 
ED improve domestic law enforcement of illegal coral reef species trade 
ED work with various stakeholders to develop public education and awareness materials aimed at 
reducing unsustainable harvest practices 
.. work with the marine aquarium industry and various stakeholders to eliminate destructive 
collection practices and reduce mortality during handling and transportation of coral reef 
species 
.. provide additional measures as appropriate to ensure that US consumer demand for marine 
aquarium organisms does not threaten the sustainability of coral reef species and ecosystems. 
Excerpts from the United States Coral Reef Task Force (2000a). 
Furthermore, the US government has sought to influence coral reef policy through its overseas aid 
programme, spending approximately USD 20 million annually on bilateral assistance for coral reef 
projects. In 2004, USAID was supporting coral reef projects in around 30 countries, mostly in Latin 
America, Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific. These projects aim to establish marine parks and reserves, 
promote sustainable tourism and fisheries, and generally improve reef management (USAID 2004). 
Additionally, USAID's East Asia and Pacific Environment Initiative, which ended in 2002, supported a 
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large programme designed to stop destructive fishing practices in Southeast Asia (which funded much 
of IMA' s work). The US government also channels some funding for international projects through 
NOAA's Coral Reef Conservation Grant programme. 
Despite the papers published about the US role in creating ICRI, and the USCRFT material posted on 
the Internet, it is not clear which individuals within the several government departments involved have 
had key roles in influencing (as opposed to being involved in disseminating) the US government's 
policy on coral reef management around the world. I made a careful but unsuccessful search for 
relevant published articles using the Proquest databases, which suggests there are no published 
academic analyses of US coral reef policy. 
SCIENTIFIC INFLUENCE 
As Chapters Five and Six showed, scientists have been key sources of concern about the health of coral 
reefs and have brought the crisis facing reefs to international attention; they have also been central in 
processes conceptualising and conceiving, framing and advocating international coral reef policy. 
Thus, the division which Litfin (1994 p. 4) and others make between research scientists and knowledge 
brokers (those who frame, interpret and communicate scientific knowledge to policy makers) seems 
irrelevant. So too does any division between science and policy, since scientists clearly undertake both 
roles, both individually and as professional groups, and in their written work and oral statements. 
Statements and briefing papers issued by the ISRS illustrate this. The society has the joint objectives of 
producing and disseminating scientific knowledge and understanding of coral reefs. It has, over the 
years, issued 'scientific consensus statements' on diseases on coral reefs, coral bleaching and 'briefing 
papers' on fishing, water quality and marine protected areas. Although the former summarise 
knowledge from scientific research, the latter clearly combine scientific ideas and policy. The briefing 
paper on fishing for example, summarises what the society believes to be the ingredients of appropriate 
and sustainable fisheries management (ISRS 2004). These briefing papers are one of the means by 
which science/policy experts have sought to link coral reef science and policy. They are, by no means 
the sole tool used however. 
Another method scientists use to try and influence coral reef policy is by publishing scientific (ie 
science/policy) papers, for example Wilkinson's 1992 paper discussed in Chapter Six. In a more recent 
example, Bellwood et al. (2004) published an article titled Confronting the coral reef crisis in the 
journal Nature to coincide with the 10th International Coral Reef Symposium; Nature highlighted the 
plight of reefs on its cover that week. Bellwood et al. make four management recommendations: 
Ell a huge increase in the rate and size of no-take areas; 
Ell improved management measures for the vast majority of reefs heavily affected by people, 
incorporating regional-scale management of functional groups to support reef resilience; 
Ell making reef management more inclusive, proactive, and responsive, using governance 
systems that support ownership and empowerment of users as stewards; and 
Ell reforming markets to incorporate economic incentives that prevent exploitation of species in 
critical functional groups. 
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Some researchers write consultancy reports (e.g., the Pew Centre report on coral reefs and global 
climate change discussed in Chapter Six). Many make press statements about their work in ways 
designed to bring attention to the plight of coral reefs, making specific policy recommendations. I 
describe one such example, concerning a paper in Ecology Letters, in the next chapter. That example 
illustrates how scientists use the media not just to publicise their research but also the mission of saving 
coral reefs. Rather than directing their messages to specific decision-makers, many individual scientists 
use media that make their views available to those interested enough to search them out. 
These science policy/experts are found filling professional roles in various organisations involved in 
policy (whether state, intergovernmental or NGO). They are on the ICRI-CPC; in the IUCN's specialist 
commissions (described in the box below); and involved in forming or running NGOs. For example, a 
small group of scientists created the Society for the Conservation of Spawning Aggregations in 2000, 
to try and improve management of reef fish spawning aggregations, those aggregations being 
vulnerable to overfishing especially if targeted (the society's web site, with its policy statement, is 
located at Some of this NGO's members, scientific researchers, are also members of 
the IUCN's Species Survival Commission, and the society has been able to gain international attention 
for its policies through this link-a deliberate strategy. 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 13.IUCN-WORLD CONSERVATION UNION 
The IUCN was funded in 1948 following an international conference in Fontainebleau, France. 
Neither an NGO or a IGO, it describes itself as a green web of partnerships sharing a vision of a 
just world that values and conserves nature. IUCN has 1000 members drawn from 140 countries; 
these include 77 states, 114 government agencies, and SOO-plus NGOs. Members meet every three 
to four years at the \Vorld Conservation Congress (the Union's General Assembly) to guide the 
Union's policy and approve its programme. IUCN's structures resemble those of 
intergovernmental organisations. Its secretariat, headed by a Director-General, is based in Gland, 
Switzerland. Governance is carried out by a Council elected at the Congress. IUCN has 1000 staff, 
100 at its headquarters, the rest at offices in 42 countries in Africa, Asia, The Americas and 
Europe. St." commissions provide guidance on conservation knowledge, policy and technical 
advice; these consist of expert volunteers entrusted to develop and advance the institutional 
knowledge, experience and objectives ofIUCN. More than 10,000 scientists and experts volunteer 
their services to the Species Survival Commission, World Commission on Protected Areas, 
Commission on Environmental Law, Commission on Education and Communication, 
Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, and dle Commission on Ecosystem 
Management. The IUCN claims that the databases, assessments, guidelines and case studies 
prepared by its members, commissions and secretariat are among the world's most respected and 
frequendy cited sources of environmental information. 
Source: web site at ',men,f) 
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The influence of science/policy experts on international coral reef policy is thus widespread and 
pervasive, even more so than depicted in Chapters Five and Six. These experts work in a variety of 
organisation types, employing a range of tools that marry science with policy. Subsequent chapters 
continue to explore the nature and extent of their influence, particularly Chapter Eight which examines 
expert discourse, and Chapters Eleven and Twelve which examine particular Fiji case studies 
concerning NGOs and CITES. 
NGOS AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON ICRI'S POLICY PORTFOLIO 
When ICRI was being formed in 1994, its steering group held discussions with some NGOs, then 
decided to work with representatives from governments and IGOs since the latter were able to 
contribute to planned international workshops (Mieremet 1996 p. 310). Nevertheless, NGOs have 
become part of the ICRI community. WWF (described below) had been an ICRI member since it 
helped create ICRAN and MAC; in 2004 the ICRI-CPC began deliberately drawing other large 
conservation NGOs into the network, recognising their international influence. 
INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS: 14. WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE (WWF) 
Founded in 1961, the World Wildlife Fund (the organisation's original name) has grown into the 
world's largest privately fmanced international conservation organization, with around five million 
members, and projects in 100 countries. Its purpose, only modified slightly since being laid down in 
1961, is to conserve the natural environment and ecological processes worldwide. It is an 
independent foundation, registered under S,viss law, ,vith a secretariat (W\V'F International) in 
S,vitzerland, and is governed by a board of trustees under an international president. \V'WF 
describes itself as a global organization acting locally through a network of family offices employing 
around 3800 people world, vide. \V'\V'F International includes managers of policy, global thematic 
programmes and geographic regional programmes. \V'\V'F offices around tlle world carry out local 
conservation: practical field projects, scientific research, advising local and national governments on 
environmental policy, promoting environmental education, and raising awareness of environmental 
issues. Each independent office contributes funding to \V'\V'F's global programme. \V'\V'F's 
international budget is equal to that spent by most countries on environmental issues and is more 
tllan three times the size ofUNEP's. Fifty-five percent of\V'\V'F's income is donations and legacies 
from by individuals. The \V'\V'F organisation seeks policy changes at a myriad of levels from 
household and community to state and intergovernmental. It has two specialist policy offices, one 
in Brussels working to influence European Union' policies and one in Washington DC 
concentrating on macroeconomic policy in global institutions such as tIle World Bank. In 2000, 
\V'\V'F spent s1.." percent of its USD 364 million budget on policy, and in 2002 four percent. 
Source Moses (1994); Wapner (1995; 2003); Davis (2001; 2002a; 2002b); \V'\V'F (2004) 
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The GCRMN is also seeking to strengthen its links with international environmental NGOs (GCRMN 
report in International Coral ReefInitiative 2004). Consequently, as well as the states and IGOs 
instrumental in setting up and running ICRI, there have now NGOs in the ICRI network, a key one 
being WWF, an ICRAN partner with over a hundred coral reef projects in more than 30 countries, 
costing millions of dollars US (Davis 2002a, 2002b; WWF c.2003a). mCN acts as a link between 
NGOs and ICRI; IUCN's portfolio of coral reef projects, launched in 2004, helps bring new ideas onto 
the international agenda, such as the concept of encouraging reef resilience, discussed above. 
Of the six NGOs playing active roles in ICRI, three (MAC, CORAL and Reef Check) were specifically 
set up for the purpose of saving coral reefs and three are international environmental NGOs that existed 
prior to recognition of worldwide coral reef degradation (WWF, TNC and WRI). The three NGOs set 
up specifically to address the coral reef crisis have had their particular policy approaches woven into 
ICRI's. WWF has been at the forefront of bringing market-based approaches such as MAC's scheme 
into ICRI's policy portfolio, in the belief that the private sector has a vast potential to become a major, 
if not the leading, force for conservation (Bunting and Meyers 2002). 
Furthermore, NGOs are collaborating in advancing, in new directions, ideas already incorporated into 
the Call to Action, as seen in efforts to develop global standards for the LRRFT (described in the box 
below). In Chapter Twelve, I discuss how the Fiji Government has been involved in this standard-
setting process (out of which IMA subsequently opted). 
GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR THE LIVE REEF FOOD FISH TRADE (LRFFT) 
In February 2001, a group of 17 people from organisations with a broad conservation interest in 
the this trade met in Hawaii to review their efforts to improve that industry TNC, IMA, and \V'RI 
convened the workshop, and the MacArthur Foundation sponsored it. Those present, a mi." of 
scientists, resource managers and representatives from industry and private foundations, sought 
ways of building on their organisations' respective strengths. They synthesised their existing 
strategies into a collaborative strategy to address threats to the trade stemming from destructive 
fishing methods and overfishing. Deciding to develop global standards for this industry 
collaboratively,vith stakeholders, they drew upon lYIAC's experience in developing standards for 
the marine ornamentals trade, and set out to develop voluntary standards covering all aspects of 
the LRRFT including capture and culture. Financial support for this came from the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Fisheries Working Group, the US Department of State, the 
MacArthur Foundation and the Packard Foundation 
Source: Graham (2001 p. v-l); Kusumaatmadja et al. (2004 p. 30) 
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Conservation NGOs are leading the application of expert policy technologies to coral reefs and other 
ecosystems, an example being how the market-based philosophy ofWWF-US's Conservation Finance 
Centre prompted MAC's scheme. Policy ideas developed within conservation NGOs, such as finding 
the root causes of biodiversity loss (Chapter Two), ecoregion planning (Chapter Two, discussed in the 
text box below), learning portfolios and social contracts (Chapter Twelve), are reshaping the face of 
international conservation and are being applied to coral reefs in several parts of the world. Most of 
these have yet to incorporated into ICRI's Call to Action, however. 
WWF AND ECOREGION CONSERVATION 
\'V'\W adopted its ecoregion approach in the late 1990s when all large international conselvation 
NGOs were searching for ways to increase funding. Past approaches-creating protected areas, 
species survival plans, integrated conservation and development projects run as isolated 
units-were delivering small rather than large-scale successes in biodiversity conservation. US-
based NGOs \'V'\W-US, CI and INC decided they needed to scale up to conservation on a 
regional basis in response to the increased degradation of endangered habitats and species. 
Seeking large units on which to focus, they adopted the term ecoregion, already in use in 
American conselvation programmes. 'An ecoregion is a large area ofland or water that contains 
geographically distinct assemblages of natural communities that (a) share a large majority of their 
species and ecological dynamics, (b) share similar environmental conditions, and (c) interact 
ecologically in ways that are critical for their longterm persistence' (Dinerstein et a/. 1995). 
\V'WP incorporated the notion of ecoregion conservation planning based on 50 year biodiversity 
visions into revamped global priorities focused around a combination of global campaigns and 
project networking throughout the organisation (Gawler et al. 2000). It married its Global 200 
priority-setting tool (described overleaf) ,vith planning utilising biological and socio-economic 
assessments. 
U sing current infol=ation, and in conjunction ,vith partners, each [ecoregion action 
programme] establishes a vision for the long-term conservation of the ecoregion's 
biodiversity, and a set of targets which need to be achieved to reach that vision. These 
targets address the full range of socio-economic change necessary ,vithin the 
ecoregion and also in some cases contribute to the achievement of the global TDP 
[target drive programmes] targets. This latter feature-creating synergy between 
ecoregion and TDP work-is where \'V'\W will maximize its impact, institutional 
efficiency and make most progress (Davis 2001 p. 15). 
In marrying conservation and development through ecoregion planning \'V'\W has come up ,vith 
both a new idea about how to 'do' conservation and a new way of setting global conservation 
priorities. Since 2000, \'V'\V'F has applied this ecoregion planning approach to several regions 
including major coral reefs including the Bismarck-Solomon Seas and Fiji Islands (Chapter 11). 
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There has not been much collaboration amongst environmental NGOs seeking to conserve reefs. 
Different groups have different approaches, their targets ranging through species, ecosystems, 
biodiversity, scenery, landscapes, and human behaviour (Redford et al. 2003). This reflects, in part, 
their diverse methods for establishing geographical conservation priorities. CI has concentrated on 
identifying the biodiversity of coral reefs through its rapid area biodiversity assessment programme in 
the 'coral triangle' (Chapter Five) (Global Environment Facility 2005). In contrast, WWF has drawn its 
priorities from the Global 200, a list of 238 priority ecoregions developed by staff in WWF-US's 
Conservation Science Programme. Seeking outstanding examples of the world's ecosystems, these staff 
reviewed literature on regional biodiversity and consulted scientific experts before preparing a list of 
representative ecoregions encompassing all biogeographical realms and ocean basins (Olson and 
Dinerstein 1998 p. 2). Of the 238 ecoregions, 43 are marine, half of those selected for reefs. Chapter 11 
describes how WWF has furthered the conservation of one of those reef ecoregions in the Pacific. 
Interpreting ICRI's Politics 
THE INTERESTS EVIDENT IN ICRI 
There is a degree of self-interest in the construction of the crisis narrative described in the last chapter. 
A group of policy staff employed by international organisations, along with some scientists (some from 
research organisations, some from NGOs), have publicised the notion that coral reefs are in decline 
worldwide and headed towards a crisis. Deliberate propagation of this narrative serves to benefit these 
people professionally, cementing scientists as policy experts in identifying coral reefs problems and in 
recommending ways to address those problems. It justifies further scientific work on coral reefs. 
Mechanisms like GCRMN, Reef Check, and MAC are a way for professional environmental scientists 
to carve niches for themselves in the increasingly competitive world of global environmentalism (cf. da 
Fonesca 2003, Jamison 2001). The professional interests of a small group of people with scientific 
training and a (self-) interest in influencing policy at an international level (a group whose membership 
is not necessarily fixed) are driving the work of those organisations. ICRI has provided an international 
stage for those efforts, in ways explored in this chapter. 
Bureaucratic interests 
As well as the professional interests of experts, a second form of self-interest, that of bureaucracies, has 
shaped ICRI's policy agenda. So too has the view that various US groups hold of that country as a 
rightful global leader in coral reef management. Both are discussed here. 
ICRI provides a vehicle for the efforts of UN agencies to draw developing countries further into their 
sphere of environmental influence. UN agencies, the World Bank and GEF included, appear to be 
using information about the state of coral reefs and the predictions of an impending crisis in order to 
build mechanisms for control over both the ecology of coral reefs and the systems of human 
governance over reefs-control which they consider themselves best placed to manage. They are using 
the crisis to construct a basis for intervention. This role for IGOs, multilateral conventions included, is 
one that the US government has supported, as espoused in the national coral reef plan adopted by the 
USCRFT in 2000 (United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000a). 
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The authority of lOOs is legitimated not just through belief in the appropriateness of the hierarchical 
model of international governance, but also through the provision of technical assistance to the 
populations of those countries, in the form of capacity-building projects and technical assistance. The 
GCRM data collection network is another example of what Miller called the two way street of 
technical assistance (discussed in Chapter Three). The GCRMN feeds back detailed information to 
enable scientists and policy analysts to construct conceptual models at a global scale (albeit 
unsophisticated as yet for coral reefs, concentrating on determining the scale of problems). At the same 
time, this network helps relocalise global knowledge, transmitting and transplanting this locally 
relevant information back to places where reefs occur; helping recipients interpret and make sense of 
information (much as Miller 2004 p. 83 described for meteorological networks). I explore this further 
in the chapters examining policy connections with the Fiji Islands. 
For lOOs, this mode of legitimating their work depends not just on the construction and deployment of 
global imaginaries but also on their transmission, uptake, interpretation and use in local contexts 
around the world (Miller 2004). Even MEAs, which have the legitimacy of their legal status, are further 
legitimating themselves through their capacity-building efforts. In Chapter Twelve, I describe how 
CITES is doing this in its interactions with the Fijian government. 
Another example of how, in shaping international coral reef policy, intergovernmental organisations 
seek to protect their own bureaucratic interest comes from the CBD. The multi-layered organisation 
shaped its own international coral reef policy agenda in order to give primacy to capacity-building and 
technical assistance. In 1999, the year after the CBD's CoP had instructed this Convention's Executive 
Secretary to investigate coral bleaching (as described in the box in the previous chapter), the Secretary 
convened an expert consultation, a mechanism often employed by the CBD (Convention on Biological 
Diversity 1999; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 1999). This consultation 
produced multiple recommendations which the Secretariat formatted and presented to the CoP the 
following year (Convention on Biological Diversity 1999 p. 25-31). Deciding to integrate coral reefs 
into its programme of work on marine and coastal biological diversity (commonly called the Jakarta 
Mandate), the CoP requested the Secretary prepare two workplans, one for coral bleaching and one for 
the physical degradation of coral reefs (Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity 
2000a). In formulating the coral bleaching workplan, CBD staff shifted the emphasis from a scientific 
one to one that better suited the purpose of their own organisation-centralised control of international 
environmental management. 
In the ad hoc expert consultation (a mechanism often used by the CDB), invited experts had made 
several recommendations that highlighted the 'unknowns' about coral bleaching (Convention on 
Biological Diversity 1999 p. 25-31). In the report of the consultation, there are two versions of these 
recommendations. The first is a table of main points and issues, conclusions and recommendations, 
assembled from notes taken during presentations and discussions. In the second, these have been 
rewritten as a set of general conclusions and recommendations, compiled into an issue and response 
format. The second version appears to have been reworded and reordered by CBD staff. In the official 
documentation (available on the CBD web site), it is not clear if the experts endorsed these 
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changes-nowhere in the CBD report does it say that they do. This is noteworthy because several 
specific scientific recommendations about information-gathering are omitted from the second 
summary, subsumed into general recommendations about the need for targeted research programmes, 
baseline assessments, long-term monitoring, along with a 'rapid response capability' to document coral 
bleaching and monitoring in developing countries and remote areas. Recommendations omitted 
include: 
.. monitoring crustose coralline algae and other macroalgae as indicators of reef status and 
resilience 
.. investigating the role of coral reefs as critical habitat for other species 
.. investigating if previously stressed reefs are more or less likely to be susceptible to bleaching 
e determining ecological and socio-economic indicators of stress for use as 'early warning 
signals'. 
The Executive Secretary presented the edited recommendations to the fifth meeting of the SBSTTA in 
Montreal, 31 January- 4 February 2000 (Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological 
Advice 2000 p. 20-5). In the SBSTTA's subsequent recommendations to the CoP, the specific 
scientific recommendations of the experts are subsumed even further. The emphasis of the SBSTTA's 
recommendations is as much, if not more, on international liaison, partnerships, community 
participation, planning, finding appropriate policy responses, capacity-building, and public education 
as it is on scientific research and monitoring. The sense of coordination that the experts sought in their 
recommendations is watered down to joint actions between MEAs-CBD, UNFCCC and Ramsar. The 
sense of coordination needed to address the 'unknowns' is lost; it is transformed into coordination on 
matters of policy, capacity-building and financing. As a result, there is a considerable difference 
between the tenor of the SBSTTA's recommendations and the original conclusions and 
recommendations of the expert group. In effect, the CBD staff through their drafting of reports and 
briefing papers, altered the recommendations of the experts to make them express the need for 
international liaison, partnerships, planning to find appropriate policy responses, capacity-building, 
public education, and community participation. Interestingly, this list of functions in the CBD 
workplan parallels those identified in ICRI's Call to Action as needed to save coral reefs. These are 
functions which, in this system of governance, are best carried out by formal intergovernmental 
organisations, agencies able to co-ordinate cooperative efforts across national boundaries. As such, 
they accord with the belief in the hierarchical notion of policy based upon centralised role governance 
as a territorial matter (Chapter Three). In that conventional understanding of the global governance 
system, only intergovernmental organisations are placed to co-ordinate international efforts 
encompassing education, awareness-raising, and capacity-building, research and monitoring. 
The bureaucratic interests that large international organisations involved in coral reef policy matters, 
whether within or outside the UN system, have in preserving their ability to operate in a world of 
competitive funding for efforts to transfer western-style environmental policy to developing countries 
can also be seen in the way that various organisations used the vehicle of ICRAN to bid for funds from 
the UN Foundation. Moreover, the argument that bureaucratic interests are shaping ICRI's policy 
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portfolio is as applicable to international NGOs as it is to IGOs such as the CBD. ICRI has provided a 
stage for organisations outside the formal intergovernmental system, enabling them to gain or cement 
an international profile as significant players in conservation and sustainable environmental 
management, helping assure their funding base and thus their self-preservation. 
leRI as a stage for new ideas 
In the work of NGOs on coral reef matters, there is clearly another type of interest shaping policy 
approaches, that of the professional expert. The policy ideas of experts working in NGOs reach the 
international policy agenda relatively quickly. There is, in the way that those organisations operate 
outside the formal state and IGO system to promote new ways of doing coral reef conservation and in 
the way that they seek to maintain this role, an element of both bureaucratic (organisation) interest, and 
of the professional self-interest of the experts working in them. This is somewhat paradoxical. NGOs, 
rather than IGOs have been the source of new ideas about 'doing' coral reef conservation, precisely 
because they lack the bureaucratic interest of IGOs. Their less formal organisation allows professionals 
to push their ideas onto international policy agenda far more quickly than if they worked in UN 
agencies. 
In developing new approaches such as ecoregion planning, and in using these practices at multiple sites 
around the world, WWF and other major US-based conservation NGOs are making their organisation 
not just a significant but an indispensable player in the race to save coral reefs and other endangered 
ecosystems (much as Brosius 2004 discussed-see Chapter Three). By establishing themselves as 
experts in those policy technologies, and ensuring they are taken for granted as methodological 
gatekeepers, they consolidate WWF's authority over global conservation practices. ICRI provides a 
stage for some of those ideas. 
But, while MAC with its certification scheme, the WorldFish Centre with its global database ReefBase, 
and WRI with its risk assessment tool Reefs at Risk, have all relied on the ICRI network to legitimate 
their particular technologies, the older conservation NGOs have not. With their international profile, 
substantive funding bases, and favourable media profiles for their environmental work, they have able 
to do this themselves. Thus, some of the expert policy technologies which NGOs are designing and 
using have yet to become part ofICRI's policy platform, even when the NGOs responsible are part of 
ICRI. This reflects how major conservation NGOs have sufficient funding bases and authority to 
propound these new policy technologies without needing to draw upon the authority of ICRI. To them, 
ICRI is a useful, but not a key, platform for their policies. I return to this phenomenon in Chapter 
Eleven, which examines conservation NGOs working in the Fiji Islands. 
US interests 
By funding ICRI, the US government has been able to get its policy ideas onto the international 
agenda; claiming itself as a world leader in coral reef policy, a position not supported by the small area 
of reefs under its governance. As the following text box shows, the US government has sought to 
remake, in its favour, definitive figures on the proportion of the world's coral reefs that occur within 
the waters of each country, thus increasing the legitimacy of its self-assigned role of world leader. 
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The government, in its national coral reef action plan, attempts to legitimate its interests in leading 
world coral reef policy, asserting that the US has "strong political and economic interest in protecting 
international coral reef ecosystems": 
Healthy marine ecosystems are critical to US diplomatic and development strategies to 
promote economic and food security, social stability, democratic governance, improved 
human health, disaster and climate change mitigation, and biodiversity conservation in 
many countries (United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000a p.1). 
The plan goes on to link the ecological health and economic benefits of US coral reefs directly to reef 
habitats in other countries, suggesting that the currents bathing the Florida Keys originate in the wider 
Caribbean and along the Central American coast, and (more tenuously) that the coral reefs of many of 
US Pacific territories are connected to other Indo-Pacific reefs (United States Coral Reef Task Force 
2000a p.l). If this is an unconvincing argument about why the US should take an interest in global 
coral reef policy, then efforts to justify this on the basis that the US administers significant areas of 
coral reefs comparative to other countries are patently overblown, as the following text box illustrates. 
Within the US there are multiple groups interested in coral reefs, multiple policy agendas, and 
conflicting views on several issues including climate change and the acceptability of the marine 
aquarium trade (Best 1999, also pel's. obs. at the 10th International Coral Reef Symposium, Okinawa, 
and also on Coral-List). Also, as Miller (2001) noted, over the past fifty-plus years, the State 
Department has lost much power and authority over the conduct of US foreign policy, with 
international politics becoming the domain in which a wide range of experts from numerous 
government agencies. These experts have created opportunities for the development of transnational 
communities (Miller 2001 p. 210-212). This situation has provided an opportunity for scientific experts 
working in certain government departments (such as Andy Bruckner (a coral trade expert in NOAA) 
and Barbara Best of US AID) to become part of the international political assembly around coral reefs 
without having to be part of 'official' State Department foreign policy diplomacy. 
It is not clear how those tensions play out in efforts to make the US a global leader in coral reef policy. 
This is a matter deserving of analysis, but beyond the resources of this particular study. Rather than 
treating the US as a single bloc of political interests, those interests should, at some stage, be identified 
and their interplay described, taking in account the retreat of President George W. Bush's 
administration from the business of global environmental protection. 
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THE US: REWORKING THE STATISTICS FOR THE AREA OF CORAL REEFS IN ITS JURISDICTION 
It is a difficult to determine the actual extent of coral reefs. UNEP-WCMC's World Atlas qfCoral Reefs 
(Spalding et al. 2002), as the only published source of comparative data on reef area in each country 
and region, has considerable authority in this matter. A press release accompanying the atlas's 
publication ranked the US as having the 16th largest area of reefs worldwide, a total of 3,770 square 
kilometres constituting 1.33 percent of tile world total (including Florida and Gulf of Mexico, 
Hawaii, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, and Guam) (UNEP 2001c). The press 
release lists Indonesia, followed by Australia and the Philippines as having the most reefs by area, 
while France comes in fourth. The Republic of Fiji has the sixth largest area; 3.52% of the total. 
Even the UK, through its overseas territories, had more reef area than the US (5,500 sq kID). Yet, 
NOAA is distributing a brochure that records the US share of all tile world's reefs as 10 percent (I 
picked tills up at the International Coral Reef Symposium at Okinawa in 2004). The brochure states 
the extent of US coral reefs as 7,577 sq nllles (19,624 sq kID) (US Department of Commerce National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2002 p. 1). In deriving these figures, NOAA appear to 
have calculated the extent of US reefs using a different method to that used in the lf70rld Atlas, 
without giving the same attention to recalculating reefs in all other jurisdictions. Much of the 
difference between the lf70rld Atlas' and NOAA's figures appears due to a massive increase in the 
estimated area of reefs in the nortllern Hawaiian Islands described in NOAA's 2001 'state of the 
coast' exercise. 
Several factors may have contributed to these very different calculations of reef area. First, lack of a 
single, uniform definition of what constitutes a reef is the primary problem plaguing attempts to 
quantify the area of reefs worldwide. Spalding and Grenfell (1997, p. 228) estimated that reef area 
statistics could vary by an order of magnitude depending on the definition used. A second difficulty 
is that of scale, especially combining information from maps created using different scales and 
formats. Spalding and Grenfell (1997 p. 228) found that using maps at different scales greatly 
affected calculations of reef area statistics. Large-scale, high resolution data are likely to show a 
greater number of small reefs, increasing total reef area. Maps prepared at smaller scales show less 
small reefs, simplify reef demarcation and underestimate area (Spalding and Grenfell 1997 p. 226). 
A tIllrd problem arises because many coral reefs on shelf areas do not break tile sea surface, and are 
difficult to detect and to map (Snlith 1978; Moses 1994; Munro 1996). Different detection methods 
therefore produce different area calculations. There is some evidence that coral communities are 
widespread on continental shelves, some being known only because of bottom sampling or material 
caught in nets or dredges (IVIcManus 1997; Munro 1996). \V'hat proportion of these deeper water 
corals photosyntllesise is not known and there is no easy way to distinguish this when mapping the 
extent of coral reefs. Yet most definitions of coral reefs exclude non-photosynthesising corals. This 
was not a problem until improved sensing and scientific techniques pernlitted these deeper reefs to 
be located (Kleypas et al. 1999). \V'here exactly does one define the linllt between photosynthesising 
and non-photosynthesising corals, in order to map them? For all these reasons comparative figures 
produced using a consistent method have far more meaning than any single estimate of the extent of 
reefs in any particular locality. 
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Control over environmental terms of trade 
US economic interests in coral reefs centre on trade, shown by the prominence this was given in the 
USCRTF's investigations (see the policies in Table 16). During the USCRTF investigation in 1998, it 
became clear that the US market has driven the rapidly expanding international trade in live coral and 
live rock (Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000 p. 5). Other key markets 
are in Europe and Japan (Chapter Five). Yet, in most of its own waters, the US either prohibits or 
strictly limits the harvest of corals because of the key role these play in the ecosystem and because of 
widespread concern that the organisms are vulnerable to exploitation (Bruckner 2000). 
In effect the US, in alliance with other key importers and Canada, is seeking to control the 
environmental terms on which international trade in coral reef organisms is conducted. By providing 
the largest slice of funds for GCRMN and ICRI, the US government maintains a strong grip on 
international coral reef policy, which is advantageous in addressing future tensions that may threaten its 
economic interests in this international trade. The US government, through the US Technical 
Cooperation Trust funding for CITES, has funded much of that convention's work on bringing non-
complying countries with a significant trade in corals into line with the convention's requirements 
(Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
2001 p. 9). It has also funded much of the work on destructive fishing undertaken in the Philippines 
and Indonesia (as described in the box introducing IMA in Chapter Five). There is, in effect, a western 
bloc (including Japan and Hong Kong) which is ensuring that international trade in coral reef 
organisms is conducted on environmental terms which allow the trade to continue (Le. on an acceptably 
'sustainable' basis) and continues to profit those who have invested in it. Chapter Twelve investigates 
this further. 
ICRI AS A FORM OF NETWORK: A MODALITY OF POWER 
To recap, this analysis has highlighted how IGOs, NGOs and the US government have different but 
overlapping agendas; it has shown how ICRI is an expression of the bureaucratic interests of IGOs in 
preserving their ability to operate as well as a stage for new ideas that experts have about 
environmental protection and conservation. ICRI is also a way for the US to assert leadership in 
international environmental policy, a dominance which France is beginning to challenge as it 
establishes large multi-agency programmes in its overseas territories. One can understand ICRI as a 
coalition of these interests, a concept that combines the idea of policy being produced by communities 
of experts with Dobuzinskis' notion of it being the outcome of multiple self-interested decision-makers 
seeking to maximise power and influence, plus March and Olsen's notion of policy as a garbage can, 
ideas thrown in and stirred together (Chapter Four). 
But ICRI is not simply an alliance emerging out of a disparate set of agendas, interests and agencies, a 
tool legitimating pre-existing political agendas. ICRI is a new form of network: groups of people have 
sought to construct new sets of connections, to enrol actors from around the world, and to multiply the 
network's sphere of influence. As a result, the network has expanded in several facets. It is, for 
instance, gradually incorporating not just conservation NGOs, but the expert policy technologies they 
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invent and deploy through projects in various countries. As the network's policy agenda has expanded, 
so too has its capacities, its means of shaping policy around the world. 
Furthermore, creating ICRI has created new modalities of intervention. Morozova (2000) argued that 
creating ICRI was" ... the only plausible solution for overcoming the 'disjointed incrementalism' in 
international policy-making, which is insufficient to deal with the complexities of international 
problems on the agendas of national decision-makers". Morozova saw ICRI's power lying in its ability 
to co-ordinate extensive international activities across national lines, in its capacity to co-ordinate and 
inform decision-makers across regions, and to gather and collate information about what is happening 
in various regions. According to Morozova, ICRI was organisationally effective because of its focus on 
action (providing information and monitoring rather than enforcing policy), and because it was 
relatively flexible, able to locate relevant players at local and national levels and to direct their efforts 
towards achieving a set of core goals. This interprets ICRI as an informal way for these agencies to 
further their work without requiring another formal convention or agreement to do so. ICRI's informal 
organisation gives them more flexibility in how they act; it involves far less bureaucracy than if an 
intergovernmental agency was attempting it. 
This interpretation is simultaneously insightful and weak. It is an orthodox interpretation, resting on the 
norm of effectiveness, an expression of postinternationalism (the latter discussed in Chapter Three). As 
such it is a functional, and therefore weak, explanation of why groups cooperate in arrangements such 
as ICRI. At the same time it focuses attention on how, even though the interests involved appear much 
stronger than the organisation they jointly create, creating a network such as ICRI is a strategic action 
designed to take advantage of the political power that such networks have. 
For ICRI is more than a coalition of interested parties who act in a mechanical way to attain status, 
enhance symbolic capital, protect their interests, or gain and maintain power (cf. Hess 1997 p. 162). 
ICRI is collaboration in the form of a network. Within networks, interests are dynamically constructed; 
actors do not come into networks with pre-existing interests that simply 'play out' (Holm and Kendall 
2002 p. 43). Networks have their own politics. There is also a strong element of indeterminacy in 
networks; they contain within them possibilities or unexpected consequences (Holm and Kendall 2002 
p.56). 
CONCLUSION 
Networks are political as Latour (1999 p. 2) concluded, their strength coming from their links and 
connections with that outside the network, from their heterogeneity and from "the careful the plaiting 
of weak ties". They create strategies of power, as Morozova's interpretation ofICRI highlighted. 
Furthermore, as the ICRI network extends its sphere of influence, enrolling IGOs and MEAs, NGOs 
and projects, philanthropic funders and UN funds, reefs and people from a variety of locations around 
the world, it redefines interests. Network politics are not merely alliances, and network interests not 
merely the pre-existing ones of alliance members. Here, Latour and Weibel's (2005) descriptions of the 
nature of politics and political assemblies in contemporary society are helpful. ICRI is a political 
assembly around the notion of a crisis facing coral reefs worldwide. The ICRI network connects people 
in a political assembly "no matter how much they don't feel assembled by any common politics" 
(Latour and Weibel 2005). 
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But, as I emphasised in Chapter Four, it is important to look at international policy both as the output of 
networks and as part of discourse. In the next chapter I return to the latter concept, analysing the 
narratives and metaphors shaping international coral reef policy. Building on the insights in this chapter 
and the preceding two, this gives a rich, nuanced picture of how the 'international' component of coral 
reef policy arises. 
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Chapter Eight 
Narratives and Metaphors Shaping Coral Reef Policy 
Introduction 
Having analysed the ICRI network as a political assembly around the notion of a coral reef crisis, I now 
examine how 'expert' discourse constructs the survival of coral reefs as being dependent on the 
interventions of those forming this assembly. Interrogating standard storylines and metaphors found in 
expert-produced coral reef texts, I show how these discursively create the need for such intervention in 
developing countries. This interrogation also reveals the efforts of coral reef science community to 
maintain a sense of hope for and control over a natural world comprehended as complex, by advocating 
policy prescriptions based on exceedingly simplistic notions of the human world. 
Binding Coral Reefs into a Universal Problematic State 
METAPHORS USED TO DESCRIBE CORAL REEFS 
SCIENCE: GENERALISING IMPACTS ON CORAL REEFS 
GLOBAL ASSESSMENTS: DRAWING THE FIJI ISLANDS INTO THE PROBLEMATIC 
Allocating Blame for Coral Reef Decline 
THE CAUSE OF OVERFISHING: THE POPULATION GROWTH ARGUMENT 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBSISTENCE FISHING AS A PROBLEM 
BLAMING A LACK OF CAPACITY AND POLITICAL WILL 
Discussion 
POLICY AT THE INTERFACE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE AND POLITICS 
A HEGEMONIC VIEW OF THE WORLD 
Conclusion 
Binding Coral Reefs into a Universal Problematic State 
A key characteristic of global environmental policy discourse is the way in which it portrays the 
environment as a problem of global scale. The crisis narrative does this for coral reefs, enrolling all 
reefs into a single universal (global) problematic state, thus necessitating a global-scale effort to 
address the problems facing them. There are other discursive mechanisms common in expert-produced 
texts that serve the same purpose and these, too, are characteristic of the discourse of global 
environmental policy described in Chapter Two. 
METAPHORS USED TO DESCRIBE CORAL REEFS 
Recurring representations (metaphors) create coral reefs as problematic ecosystems worth focusing 
attention and resources upon. These metaphors follow the central idea that reefs are 
valuable-treasures that are the common heritage of humankind-yet vulnerable and/or fragile and 
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therefore in need of protection from and by humans. These metaphors serve to bind all coral reefs, 
regardless of biogeography, history and degree of human impact, into a universal state. They are found 
in a range of sites including popular articles, news reports, NGO literature, conference speeches and 
declarations and are commonplace in scientific writings. 
One metaphor commonly used to describe coral reefs is the notion they are the 'rainforests of the sea' 
(e.g. Mulvaney 1997). This comparison appears to have originated in a paper that Connell (1987) wrote 
for Science, titled Diversity in tropical rainforests and coral reefs, comparing rates of ecosystem 
productivity. Coral expert Charlie (JEN) Veron, author of the most comprehensive texts on coral 
taxonomy, biogeography and evolution, also mentions this comparable productivity. "Most coral reefs 
exist in environments poor in inorganic nutrients such as phosphates, nitrates, and iron, yet they have a 
productivity that is similar to rainforests" (Veron 1986 p. 46). There is a second reason coral reefs have 
been called 'rainforests of the sea'. This reflects the idea that rainforests and coral reefs are both self-
sustaining ecosystems. As Veron (1986 p. 30,46) explained, although reefs import and export nutrients 
(e.g. as fish), trade with surrounding sea is small compared with their own internal recycling. Coral 
colonies and their zooxanthellae may absorb dissolved nutrients from seawater or obtain them from 
food captured by polyps. Since the reefs themselves only receive low levels of these nutrients from the 
surrounding ocean, they must have a great capacity to conserve and recycle nutrients, involving many 
self-regulating processes that make up the nutrient cycle of reefs. In an article in Ecology Letters, 
Dulvy et at. (2004 p. 415) sought to extend the metaphor by comparing the rate of decline of coral reefs 
worldwide with the rate of felling on rainforests. "The rate of coral reef loss at least in some parts of 
the world, is proceeding at a rate similar to or in excess of the rates of rainforest clearing". 
This analogy between rainforest and coral reefs conveys the basic message that both are diverse 
systems suffering from human impacts, and are worthy of protection and conservation. But as 
contributors to a discussion on this subject conducted on Coral-List pointed out, when specifics of the 
two ecosystems are compared, the differences begin to outweigh the similarities. For instance, tropical 
rainforests are richer in species and have higher canopies but reefs have a greater gross productivity. 
Species diversity and interaction are different between the two ecosystems, as is recruitment. In a reef 
environment, broadcast spawning ensures widespread dispersal of coral larvae. In a rainforest 
environment, however, successful seed dispersal and germination is dependent on a number of 
sensitive circumstances. Reefs and tropical rainforests also differ significantly in taxonomy (Coral-List 
2000). What is interesting is that scientists seriously entertain the validity of this analogy, in spite of 
those differences; the metaphor is a catchy 'sound bite' meant to garner attention from a public more 
aware of rainforest degradation than threatened coral reefs-an educational tool (Coral-List 2000). 
Highlighting the biodiversity of coral reefs by labelling them the rainforests of the sea is an attempt to 
establish the value of coral reefs. So too is the label 'treasure'. "Coral reefs and associated ecosystems 
are invaluable human resources"-so begins the Okinawa declaration on conservation and restoration 
of endangered coral reefs of the world, prepared by participants at the 1 Olh International Coral Reef 
Symposium. (The declaration was drafted by a small group, made available on a table in the display 
area throughout the conference and 'approved' by those remaining at the very end of the final plenary 
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session). This metaphor also appears in a World Bank press release in November 2004, announcing a 
USD 23 million dollar project to create three centres of excellence in coral reef science: "These Centres 
will serve as regional hubs .... To improve the management of these beautiful, economically 
viable-and threatened-treasures" (World Bank 2004). 
The notion that coral reefs are fragile has been one of the most persistent representations of coral reefs 
in the last thirty or so years. In the 1970s and 1980s several well-known coral reef scientists, Johannes 
(1975), Endean (1976) and Salvat (1980) included, suggested that coral reefs are stable communities in 
delicate balance with nature. To these scientists, coral reefs were stable and predictable biotic 
associations because of the presence of a variety of buffering systems that protect the community 
against large scale destruction (Endean 1976). To them, coral reefs were also fragile, for two reasons. 
First, because of specific trophic relationships, any species injured was believed to have an immediate 
effect on all others. Second, because species have a narrow habitat range, any slight change in 
conditions such as temperature, salinity, turbidity, or dissolved oxygen was thought likely to cause 
ecological disaster (Salvat 1980 p. 341). Sorokin (1993 p. 407) wrote in a scientific text on coral reefs: 
"reef ecosystems exist at their boundary of endurance of physical stress". 
This concept of coral reef ecosystems is based upon equilibrium theory favoured by ecologists at that 
time (Chapter Six). It incorporates cybernetic ecology's notion of a system with negative feedback 
loops, and its notion of threshold limits, beyond which is disaster (Chapter Two). Both Johannes and 
Endean suggested that when a reef community is disturbed or destroyed, then the reef would probably 
never recover to its former state. This is cybernetic ecology's notion that apocalypse results when we 
fail to maintain the delicate control mechanism and cause breakdown. 
In both scientific literature and in the science-based policy literature, this dominant representation of 
coral reefs is in the process of undergoing a shift. Coral reef ecosystems do not seem as fragile to 
scientists as they once did and according to MCClanahan et at. (2002), the concept of a redundancy 
amongst species maintaining ecological processes when individual species decline is widely accepted 
amongst the coral reef science community. In the absence of human impacts, coral reefs are regarded 
not as fragile but as naturally resilient; in the face of anthropogenic activities and climate change, they 
are now labelled 'vulnerable' and in need of managing for this 'resilience'. Moreover, policy attention 
is shifting towards finding ways of managing reefs that strengthen their resilience to the increased 
frequency and intensity of pressures arising from human activities (MCClanahan et at. 2002). Among 
the organisations now seeking to encourage reef resilience are the World Bank, IUCN, NOAA, 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), The Nature Conservancy, and the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Authority (Sherwood 2004; World Bank 2004). In the 2004 GCRMN global status report, the 
concept was added to the standard GCRMNI ICRI prescriptions for saving coral reefs (Chapter Seven). 
In this concept of resilience, nature in still need of rescue but we have concrete proposals about how to 
rescue it, reflecting faith in humankind's capacity for controlling nature and keeping ecosystems below 
the thresholds for breakdown. This concept of resilience derives not from cybernetic ecology's notion 
of a single state of equilibrium but from evolutionary ecology's theory of multiple equilibria (Scoones 
1999). It comes from the work of CS Holling who has concentrated on changing how humans manage 
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ecosystems. Holling aims to foster a wider appreciation of complex dynamics, uncertainty and surprise, 
and advocates 'adaptive management' (see text box following). 
THE 'NEW ECOLOGY' AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
TIle representations of nature underlying this shift towards reef resilience derive from 
evolutionary ecology, in which the human relationship with nature is not the instrunlental one of 
cybernetic ecology but a strategic one; management of ecological systems becomes a matter of 
strategy or even tactics (I<::.wa 1986 p. 181). These representations also derive from CS Holling's 
work on adaptive management. Holling ( quoted in Kwa 2002 p. 40) sought to promote a 
particular view on the management of natural systems, one which allows persistence by 
maintaining flexibility above all else. This is the basis of the theory of adaptive management of 
ecosystems, now seen as an alternative to the standard managerial approaches to intervention 
favoured by cybernetics and equilibrium ecology. 
Holling's work dates back to the 1970s, but came to prominence in the 1990s (Scoones 1999). His 
view of ecosystems was inspired in part by French mathematician Rene Thorn's theory of 
catastrophes (which Thorn drew from chemical reaction kinetics). In this, a slight change in a 
single variable of a system can, under certain circumstances, give rise to sharp, discontinuous 
change. Holling argued that strategies to lock a system in a supposedly advantageous equilibrium 
can be counter-productive and produce the catastrophe they tried to prevent (I<::.wa 2002 p. 39). 
He advocated incremental responses to environmental issues, \vith close monitoring and iterative 
learning built into the process, enabling managers to respond to thresholds and surprises (Folke e/ 
al. quoted in Scoones 1999). 
This strategy of encouraging resilience is premised on the belief that the ability of coral reefs to return 
to a pre-disturbance state (ie its ability to remain a coral-dominated reef) should not be taken for 
granted (Nystrom et at. 2000 p. 413)-compare this to the adaptations to variable conditions described 
in the text box on p. 140. This belief is based on evidence for phase shifts occurring in the Caribbean-
Atlantic region described in Chapter Five. The fear is that, in recent decades, shifts from one stable 
state to another might have become more frequent and less reversible (in other words that fear is that 
algal-dominated reefs will not revert to coral dominated ones sometime in the future), and that human 
impacts are influencing, maybe even driving, these shifts (Nystrom et at. 2000 p. 416). 
Human modification of the marine environment might result in loss of diversity within and 
among functional groups (e.g. reef framework builders and grazers), leading to 
simplification of coral reef habitats, reduced functional plasticity and decreased ability to 
buffer disturbance. Coral reefs with decreased diversity within functional groups might still 
maintain ecological functions, but when faced with an additional disturbance they might 
reach a critical threshold and shift into another stable state in which large-scale degradation 
and loss of essential ecosystem services could occur (Nystrom et al. 2000 p. 416). 
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Despite this shift towards using the metaphor of reef resilience in expert-produced texts, the fragility 
metaphor still commonly appears in popular articles (ie those written by journalists). This accords with 
Hellsten's (2002) observation that the media are conservative and slower to change their metaphors of 
nature than are scientists. For example, Harder (2001) wrote in the on-line National Geographic News: 
"Although many corals look bony and durable, reefs are highly fragile ecosystems, sensitive to human 
disturbance and environmental stress". Chadwick (1999) in National Geographic Magazine referred to 
coral reefs as fragile but biologically resilient; James (2001) in an Environmental News Network story 
described them as fragile; Denecke (2001) in the UNESCO Courier called them complex and fragile 
webs of biodiversity. 
SCIENCE: GENERAlISING IMPACTS ON CORAL REEFS 
The universal nature of scientific reviews 
Accounts of coral reefs published as scientific papers bind all coral reefs into a single problematic state 
through a second mechanism. They use the impersonal, abstracted, agent-absent style of rhetoric, and 
make factual claims of universal applicability regardless of human action and belief. This device can be 
seen in scientific reviews of the effects of certain types of events and activities upon reefs, such as 
fishing. These reviews generalise site-specific scientific accounts, thus creating a universal story 
encompassing all sites, exceptions sometimes being noted. In the last decade, there have been reviews 
published on several types of impact on coral reefs including the effects of fishing on reefs 
(summarised in the following text box), nutrient enrichment (e.g. Szmant 2002), and coral bleaching 
(discussed in Chapter Five). 
Reviews such as Roberts (1995), quoted in the following text box, present a generalised argument 
about how overfishing changes reefs, drawn from observations and studies at specific sites and 
universalised to treat all coral reefs as potentially subject to the same problem, fishing. The review 
process operates as a prediction, suggesting that if reefs are fished, this is what will happen-this is 
Latour's "science looking forward", described in Chapter Four. There is here the same sense of 
inevitability found in modernisation's meta-narrative-inevitably modernisation leads to 
environmental degradation (Chapter Two). Other scientific reviews of coral reefs contain the same 
sense of inevitability (e.g. MCClanahan 2002; McClanahan et al. 2002). 
THE EFFECTS OF FISHING ON CORAL REEFS 
There is a substantive body of scientific literature discussing the evidence for various changes that 
fishing may cause to coral reefs. It covers such matters as the way fishing reduces the abundance 
and mean size of target species and causes changes in size classes. Some species may be 
exterminated locally, some even globally. Fishing can change the relative abundance and diversity 
of reef species other than those targeted (Roberts 1995). Sustained fishing with a variety of 
relatively unselective fishing gears can cause progressive changes in reef fish community 
composition, some species being more 'catchable' than others. Fishing may result in the loss of 
keystone species, which could lead to major effects on reef process (Roberts 1995 p. 989). Because 
many fisheries target carnivorous species, the abundance of whole groups of fishes such as 
invertebrate-feeders is thought to be sensitive to exploitation; fishing could lead to loss of entire 
functional groups of species (IvIcClanahan et al. 2002 p. 7). Although theoretically this should 
impair potentially important ecosystem processes facilitated by those groups, the significance of 
dlls removal is still under debate (Roberts 1995 p. 991). 
In a recent review in Sdelli'e, a suite of authors suggested that 'dramatic' phase shifts in dominant 
species seen in some coral reef ecosystems (e.g. in the Caribbean, Chapter Five) are due to 
intensified human disturbance from previous centuries, particularly overfishing 0 ackson et al. 
2001). Pandolfi et al. (2003) added a further historical dimension to the narrative by using historical 
records to show the degradation of coral reef ecosystems began centuries ago, the trajectories of 
decline being remarkable sinlllar worldwide. Large animals declined before small animals, and 
Adantic reefs declined before the Red Sea and Australia, extending back thousands of years. The 
audlors suggested the cause was overfishing, although odlers believe that the release of nutrients 
and sediment as rising sea levels flooded coastal areas, from centuries to nlillennia ago, also needs 
to be considered as a possible contributory factor (Aronson et al. 2003). 
Reports summarising the environmental impacts of trade in coral reef 
organisms 
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There is the same sense of inevitability underlying reports about the environmental effects of global 
trade in coral reef organisms. Rather than explicitly calling upon the worldwide coral reef crisis, those 
running international projects aimed at controlling the environmental effects of trade on coral reefs 
generally draw upon stories outlining the adverse effects of that trade on coral reef organisms. This was 
the case with the two reports in the late 1990s which drew attention to rapid expansion in the 
international coral trade, mentioned in Chapter Five. The authors of both the WCMC report (Green and 
Shirley (1999)) and that of the Trade subgroup of the USCRTF (2000) drew conclusions about the 
sustainability of the worldwide trade. Yet neither set of authors had any data assessing the ecological 
effects of the trade on specific reef systems, or any monitoring data investigating its long-term 
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sustainability. Quoting mainly the Green and Shirley report, the USCRFT Trade subgroup (2000 p. 4) 
described the effects of harvesting thus: 
Commercial harvest causes localised destruction of coral reefs, including increased erosion 
and loss of critical fisheries habitat. Live rock is essential for the reef because it provides 
important habitat for motile fish and invertebrates; it provides vital substrates for the 
settlement and recruitment of benthic organisms; and it contributes to the structure of the 
reefs and to total reef biomass. The taxa harvested for curios are primarily branching corals, 
many of which suffered catastrophic mortalities during the unprecedented worldwide coral 
bleaching event of 1997-1998. In addition, coral collection for aquaria and jewellery targets 
a small number of species that are often rare, slow-growing and long-lived. 
Overexploitation of coral species could result in loss of diversity and severe localised 
extirpations (Green and Shirley 1999). Studies have shown that unsustainable extraction 
and destructive collection practices of coral and other organisms can lead to phase shifts 
within the coral reef ecosystem resulting in the decrease in survival or extinction of coral 
species. 
To justify the last sentence quoted above, the authors cited papers from Maldives and the Philippines: 
Ross (1984) and Brown (1988). What is notable about the USCRFT Trade Group's description of 
environmental concerns about coral harvesting, apart from the paucity 0 studies quoted, is that it 
presents a worst case scenario as if that is the norm in all countries and localities from which corals are 
harvested for export. It reads as if all harvesting practices and all levels of harvesting intensity will 
have these effects, if not now, then eventually. The scenario it paints is presented as the inevitable 
result of an unregulated industry at each and every harvesting location. This overlooks the essential 
nature of human impacts on the coral reefs: each harvesting act has a specific impact with a specific 
geographical sphere of influence. The sum of impacts does not average out over the planet's surface, 
nor does it accumulate somehow into one mega impact; some systems may be connected through 
currents or larval flow, many are not. Impacts often remain localised to particular reef systems, or parts 
of those systems. Logically, the question should not be whether international trade per se is 
unsustainable but what level of harvesting at what places is unsustainable. The Trade Group's scenario 
also overlooks the various controls already in place in various countries, such as those described in the 
next chapter's account of reef governance in the Fiji Islands. 
GLOBAL ASSESSMENTS: DRAWING THE FIJI ISLANDS INTO THE PROBLEMATIC 
These metaphors, scientific reviews of types of impacts on reefs, and reports summarising the 
environmental effects of trade in reef organisms, serve to enrol coral reefs in various parts of the world 
into a single universal (global) problematic state. The initiatives collecting data on the state of reefs 
worldwide, described in Chapter Five, have the same effect. They take information from discrete sites 
and generalise it to create a picture encompassing all reef systems worldwide. In doing so, they depict 
places such as the Fiji archipelago as part of the global problematic. 
The data on which these reports are based may be minimal, as the following example shows. The 1998 
Reefs at Risk report judged two-thirds of Fiji reefs to be at risk from overfishing, coastal development, 
logging, and agricultural erosion (Bryant et at. 1998 p. 27). The authors suggested that, as in other parts 
of the Pacific, those areas near population centres face significant human pressures. Although not 
explicitly stated, the information used in that report to assess the reefs in the Pacific Ocean was 
182 
extremely sparse, predating efforts to accumulate data on Fiji reefs for the GCRMN status reports. The 
authors state that "Estimation of threats to reefs was particularly difficult for remote areas in the 
Pacific, which are less visible and for which global data sets tend to be less complete" (Bryant et al. 
1998 p. 51). They do not, however, acknowledge the same difficulty exists for many less remote parts 
of the Pacific. They had made no effort to collect and analyse the type of information, which the 
authors of the first GCRMN national reports for various Pacific Island countries subsequently used. 
Instead, the Reefs at Risk authors largely derived their judgement about Fiji reefs from proxies (e.g. 
land cover; the location of ports, settlements, shipping lanes; plus estimates of GDP and fish 
consumption) and written papers. 
Of the 100 references cited in Reefs at Risk, only two relate specifically to the Pacific Islands: these are 
Zann (1994) and Johannes and Riepen (1995). The latter is not relevant to the Fiji Islands, and the 
former is a short overview of reefs in the Fiji Islands, Tonga and Samoa, concentrating on 
anthropogenic effects and major issues in marine management, based on the author's unpublished 
studies over a fifteen year period, plus a few specific local studies of water quality and fisheries issues 
(Zann 1994 p. 52). The latter had not unsurprisingly concluded that, for the Fiji archipelago, the scale 
of impact was low in the outer islands and ocean reefs (the major proportion of reefs); low to moderate 
in medium density rural areas (a significant proportion of reefs on the major islands); and locally 
severe in urban areas (a small proportion ofreefs on major islands) (Zann 1994 p. 55). This was a 
coarse assessment; Zann did not map population density and only mapped reef location in a cursory 
fashion. Thus, in relying only on Zann' s paper and on proxies, the WRI assessment made the same 
generalised type of statement about impacts on coral reefs as did the reports on trade examined above. 
Global data collection initiatives in the Fiji Islands 
Not only do global assessments serve to draw places such as the Fiji Islands into the global problematic 
despite a paucity of data, they also serve to shape the local picture, as this examination of the GCRMN 
process shows. GCRMN is the main international initiative gathering data about the state of reefs in the 
Fijian archipelago. It is organised through a node at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva 
(since 2000, the Institute of Marine Resources, formerly the Marine Studies Programme). The Institute 
operates as both the regional Southwest Pacific node and the Fiji country node. GCRMN status reports 
have rated the reefs around Fijian urban centres as significantly degraded from a combination of 
causes, stocks of certain favoured fish and invertebrates in the Fiji Islands being depleted, and 
destructive fishing causing serious damage in some places (South and Skelton 2000 p. 162-163; Sulu et 
al. 2002 p. 185; Lovell et al. 2004340-341). Moreover, the 2000 GCRMN reportlisted several species 
endangered or threatened in the Fiji Islands: the bumphead parrot fish and various invertebrates-four 
species of giant clams Tridaena sp., blacklipped oyster Pinetada marginifera, three species of 
holothurian (Holothuriafuseogilva, H. seabra and H. nobilis), and the giant triton Charonia triton is 
(South and Skelton 2000 p. 169). The 2002 report stated that the bleaching episode in 2000 affected 
most of the archipelago's reefs and that, in 2002 there was some intense bleaching of very shallow 
areas (South and Skelton 2002 p. 185). These reports did not, however, quantify damage to Fiji reefs in 
terms of either its geographical extent or its effect on organisms or habitat. 
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METHODOLOGY: INVESTIGATING REEF CHECK AND GCRMN IN THE FIJI ISLANDS 
I investigated the GCRlvIN and Reef Check initiatives in the Fiji Islands through a combination of 
interviews, discussion and observations, a process assisted when my husband assumed co-
management of the Southwest Pacific node in 2001. Prior to this, I had gained considerable insight 
into how the GCRlvIN format structured ways of thinking about coral reefs, by voluntarily editing 
the first Solomon Islands national report largely compiled by Reuben Sulu. Furthermore, when 
attending the 10,h International Coral Reef Symposium in 2004, I observed how various regions were 
encouraged to present information in a certain way, both as oral papers and as posters; I also 
observed first-hand how Clive Wilkinson publicised the GCRj\/IN mission at an IUCN side event 
and during plenary sessions presenting GCRlVIN reports from various regions. 
The GCRMN approach to problematising Fiji reefs 
Since GCRMN seeks information from as wide a range of sites and sources as possible, and accepts 
data obtained using a variety of methods, university staff gather data from various agencies monitoring 
Fiji Island reefs. These contributors include NGOs conducting community conservation initiatives 
concerning reefs (such as WWF which has both a regional South Pacific and a Fiji country office in 
Suva), and from local consultants and resort operators. 
They include Reef Check, which in the Fiji Islands operates through a local co-ordinator and a small 
group of contributors, a local biological consultant administering the Fiji data collation. Apart from this 
coordinator, those who contribute to Reef Check are associated with the tourist industry, mainly dive 
operators associated with tourist resorts and the Coral Cay and Greenforce scientific tourism 
operations. Each Reef Check contributor surveys or monitors an area using standard Reef Check 
methods, enters the data onto a spreadsheet, then emails this to the local coordinator who checks it and 
passes it onto Reef Check headquarters where scientists analyse the data by region rather than country 
(Ed Lovell, Biological Consultants, Suva, pers. camm.). 
Some other international initiatives gathering data on Fijian reefs are concerned with the aquarium and 
coral trades, described in Chapter Twelve, and only collect data for sites at which harvesting occurs. 
There are, in addition, some academic researchers studying the health of Fijian reefs, including a group 
from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne workers, under Professor Nicholas Polunin, who in 2004 
was President of the International Coral Reef Society. 
The information incorporated into Fiji's GCRMN country report for any given biennial report is 
subsequently summarised in a South West Pacific assessment, which is sent to the GCRMN office in 
Townsville to be collated into a global status report (Wilkinson 2000,2002,2004). Officially all 
GCRMN data are entered into ReefBase, the database run by the World Fish Centre, an international 
scientific organisation (Oliver and Noordeloos 2002). In practice, the node coordinator usually keeps 
the raw data, only passing on synthesised reports (Reuben Sulu, IMR, USP, pers. camm. 2003). Some 
of the GCRMN data for the Fiji Islands derives from community-oriented initiatives and some from 
scientifically oriented institutions without any strong link to the people of any particular qoliqoli. 
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Only two GCRMN assessment of the state of Fijian reefs have been completed, one in 1999 and one in 
2004. Another national report was started in 2002 but never completed, although elements of it were 
included in that year's regional report (Reuben Sulu, IMR, USP, pel's. comlll.). The 1999 national 
report combined data and anecdotal evidence from a variety of sources, noting that most studies had 
been descriptive and ad hoc (Vuki et at. 1999 p. 14). It cited 41 reports on aspects of Fijian reefs and 
reef organisms and anthropogenic effects on those reefs (see Vuki et al. 1999 p. 14-16). There is no 
estimate of the percentage of Fijian reefs from which the data comes, although I suspect it was 
relatively small. Nor is the reliability of its scientific information discussed. 
The authors of the 1999 status report for the Fiji Islands wrote it in the format required by regional 
node coordinators. It was arranged in certain categories of information: it started with a description of 
the country's reefs and their biodiversity, human uses, followed by a description of threats, then of 
conservation, monitoring initiatives and capacity, current management followed by recommendations. 
The emphasis was thus on identifying issues and inadequacies in current monitoring and management. 
This format assumes a desire to preserve reefs-to identify threats and gaps in management and 
monitoring and to do more to address those. In adopting the conservation ethos, it also adopts the 
preoccupation with preserving species, especially the larger, visible ones. 
Compared to scientific reviews discussed above, the GCRMN format imposes a different sort of rigour 
on reports, one based more explicitly on the value of preserving coral reefs as a unique marine 
ecosystem. The status report format provides a snapshot of the state of reefs rather than a framework 
for identifying changes over time or trends. This makes it easy for the report's compilers to regurgitate 
existing stories, rather than conduct any fresh analysis into factors causing changes in coral reefs (pers. 
obs.). So too does the lack of any specific standards of acceptability for data, which allows the 
compilers to use an eclectic range of information when synthesising an overview of the state of the 
country's reefs. They are able to incorporate anecdotal evidence and observational material from 
various reports that may not have not been peer-reviewed and may not conform to general standards of 
scientific publishing. This gets around the problem of the scarcity of systematic surveys and monitoring 
studies, a problem in the Fiji Islands as in many other developing countries. 
In 1999, the lack of scientific studies pushed the Fiji authors to use whatever literature was available, 
which in this case was mainly various anecdotal reports about overfishing-there have been few 
attempts to assess the status of fisheries through stock assessments, and catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
monitoring, the standard tools of fisheries scientists dealing with single species fisheries. There are no 
stock assessment data for coral, aquarium fish, or lobsters for instance, although giant clam stocks were 
assessed in the mid-1980s and pearl oysters in the 1990s (Richards etat. 1994; Kailola 1995 p. 11). 
The Fiji national report drew, instead, upon a general anxiety about fish being harder to catch (as 
reported in Fong (1994) from interviews in Bua, and in Muller et at. (2000 p. 180) from six Fijian sites. 
This anxiety is pervasive in national policy circles in the Fiji Islands. Government Fisheries' staff often 
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express the fear that increased monetarisation of rural Fijian society will cause overfishing as people 
seek to turn their marine resources into cash (pers. obs.). 
But, in synthesising various pieces of information about reefs in the Fiji archipelago, the GCRMN 
reports tend to overlook how the scale of effects of fishing on reefs in a particular country or region 
depends upon factors such as the amount of reef area, the numbers of fish species and individuals 
present, the relative fishing pressure. Furthermore, they do not place their concerns within context of 
the biogeography and diversity of reef organisms in Fiji Islands. In this, GCRMN lacks the rigour of 
comprehensive scientific reports. The technical practices of the GCRMN thus differ from those of 
biogeographical studies. 
By including the Fiji Islands in reports discussing the global state of reefs, and specifying how reefs 
were to be described, these data gathering exercises make Fij i' s reefs part of the complex of reefs 
covered by crisis narrative. It does not matter that Pacific reefs are described generally as being 
relatively intact, they are now recognised as part of the international system that is in decline, the 
assumption being that it is now only a matter of time before they become as degraded as reefs in the 
Caribbean of Southeast Asia-unless the solutions on offer are implemented. 
This is the broader argument within which the crisis narrative is operating. The crisis narrative itself, as 
outlined in Chapters Five and Six, is a story of decline, but one which scientists believe can be solved if 
people follow their recommendations. This crisis narrative is situated within a broader narrative in the 
form of an argument, of modernisation as the cause of environmental degradation (Chapter Two): if 
scientists' recommendations are not followed, then apocalypse looms for coral reefs and for the 
millions of people in developing countries that depend on those reefs. 
Allocating Blame for Coral Reef Decline 
Recreating coral reefs as global problems, these discursive mechanisms draw countries with reefs 
within their territories into a glob ali sed sphere of policy concern. Other discursive mechanisms, 
considered in this section, specifically draw in developing countries by assigning blame for the decline 
in coral reefs to that category of country. These mechanisms blame either the people harvesting coral 
reefs organisms and/or the state for inadequately managing the environmental effects of this harvest. At 
the same time, they construct those groups of people as being in need of assistance, and then assign 
responsibility for providing this to developed countries and western institutions, in much the same 
manner as the capacity-building discourse discussed in Chapters Two and Three. In this section I 
analyse several examples, ranging from arguments about Third World population growth, the use of 
scientific research to construct subsistence fishing as a problem, and representations of developing 
countries as lacking capacity and political will. 
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THE CAUSE OF OVERFISHING: THE POPULATION GROWTH ARGUMENT 
Many of the scientists and commentators vocal in the debate about the future of coral reefs have 
attributed pressures on coral reefs to increased human populations and economic activity in the tropics 
over the past 50 years (e.g. Wilkinson 1998 p. 6). "Unless these threats [due to human activities] are 
managed and mitigated, reefs will continue to degrade with the inexorable increase in human 
populations and pressures" (Wilkinson 2000 p. 18). ICRI's 1995 Call to Action suggests that 
population growth, along with increasing pollution and increased uses of reef resources will accelerate 
the decline in coral reef ecosystems (International Coral Reef Initiative 1995). In a text on reef 
fisheries, WorldFish Centre scientist John Munro (1996) contends that two factors largely govern coral 
reef fisheries, the first being population density, and hence demand for seafood; the second is distance 
from human centres of population (which affects fishing as well as access to markets l In the 1998 
Reefs at Risk exercise, the authors assume that high populations were threats to coral reefs, and that 
large cities have larger zones of potential effect than smaller ones, irrespective of income level or 
sewage treatment. In the same vein, Wright (1993 p. 250) argues that there is ample, largely anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that reef resources close by most urban centres suffer from growth 
overfishing-the progressive removal of most large individuals from a population, resulting in average 
fish size of catches decreasing over time. 
Just as the popUlation explosions of crown-of-thorns starfish in the 1960s had prompted dire 
predictions of the demise of coral reefs (Chapter Five), as knowledge of the anthropogenic impacts on 
reefs grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s so too did fears that growing human populations in 
developing countries would cause such a demise. This statement in an article by a well-known coral 
reef scientist, published in the Coral Reefs journal, expresses this fear: 
The knowledge that coral reefs have survived several hundred million years through bolide 
impacts of meteors or comets, through partial extinctions caused by all manner of 
catastrophes, through 20 or so ice ages, may prove that coral reefs are robust ecosystems. 
But that proof may hold little consolation to a world undergoing a human population 
explosion .... for either of us to survive, mankind must discover a way to control human 
population growth (Grigg 1992 p. 183). 
Although the scientific literature about the effects of fishing on reefs, described earlier, and this expert 
argument about its causes, are often found in the same articles they do not intersect analytically. One is 
based on scientific marine research on coral reefs; the other is based upon observations and theories 
about human society. Although much of this argument about population growth as the cause of 
overfishing is presented as being scientific in nature and scientifically-based, it is also a policy 
argument with a political basis. 
This fear of population increase in developing countries has Malthusian overtones. Indeed, the term 
Malthusian overfishing has entered the terminology of fisheries management (e.g. Pauly 1994; Roberts 
I If an area is very remote it may subject to a different type of fishing: distant-water fishing vessels target 
particularly valuable species such as lobsters, giant clams, groupers and snappers on remote, sparsely popUlated 
atolls in the Pacific (Munro 1996 p. 8). 
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1995; MCManus 1997). One of several types of overfishing described in fisheries management 
literature, the term was originally introduced by fisheries scientist Daniel Pauly (see Pauly 1988; Pauly 
et ai. 1989). It hypothesises a situation where poor fishermen, faced with declining catches and lacking 
any other alternative, initiate wholesale resource destruction in an effort to maintain their incomes 
(MCManus 1997 p. SI27). Pauly introduced this concept to describe how, in tropical developing 
countries when small-scale fishers, poor and lacking alternative employment opportunities start fishing, 
they are forced to continue. Over time the number of fishers increases, natural reproduction rates being 
exacerbated by the numbers of landless farmers turn to fishing. Faced with declining catches, fishers 
are forced to induce wholesale resource destruction in their effort to maintain their incomes (Pauly 
1994 p. 10). Pauly (1994 p. 12) suggested that, over the long-term of this scenario, total production 
would fluctuate and eventually gradually decline as fishing effort increases and biodiversity is reduced. 
Pauly drew his examples from Asia (India and the Philippines). He intended this concept of Malthusian 
overfishing to describe a small-scale fishery with a large adjacent sector, generally agriculture, 
generating surplus labour which the fisheries resource system cannot absorb without damage (Pauly 
1994 p. 8). The term has, however, been used in a more general sense to describe situations with 
stagnating overall catches, decreasing catch and income-per-fisher, use of destructive fishing 
techniques and a breakdown of traditional management systems, or merely with rapidly increasing 
popUlations and heavy reef fishing pressures (e.g. Roberts 1995 p. 989). 
Coastal resources have increasingly been exploited beyond their sustainable limits as 
popUlations in the region have skyrocketed. Much of this growth is occurring among people 
living at subsistence levels. For example, small-scale operations contribute about 95 percent 
of total marine fisheries production in Indonesia ... Coral reefs are capable of supporting 
low levels of fishing sustainably, especially when the fishing is done with nondestructive 
gear and effort is spread among several species of carnivorous fishes. Fishing effort on any 
given species should not cause it to decline or make it vulnerable to natural fluctuations in 
survival rate. However, widespread poverty and the generally open-access nature of coral 
reef fisheries in the region can cause people to enter or remain in reef fisheries until the 
average fisher makes no net profit owing to high effort and low catch. If stock levels are 
low enough, fishers may shift from high-valued fish to less valuable species (Chapter 4 in 
Bryant et ai. 1998). 
The belief that popUlation growth is a cause of overfishing is remarkably similar to the views of Paul 
Ehrlich and EO Wilson (1991), who maintained that in "poor nations", any more or less pristine 
ecosystems ('virgin areas') could only be saved if "birth-rates can be dramatically lowered" (a point 
made by Flitner and Heins 2002 p. 330). While this perspective at first appears to be a distinctly neo-
Malthusian view of modernisation, it is not, however, expressed in the Malthusian terms of population 
growth threatening political stability. It may, instead, simply be reviving a longstanding debate about 
the population-conservation nexus that is infused with the colonial and postcolonial legacy of 
discriminatory land policies and coercive conservation (cf. Flitner and Heins 2002 p. 331). The 
metaphor of 'spaceship earth' describes this scenario well. This is a special kind of metaphor, a 
variation on that depicting nature as a machine found in cybernetic ecology (Chapter Two); a 
spaceship's problems are of a mechanical kind and can only survive if controlled by technocrats; 
moreover, a spaceship's carrying capacity is strictly limited (Mtihlhausler 2003 p. 135). Spaceship 
earth is also a metaphor for the need for experts to be in charge, here the experts being coral reef 
scientists and western-educated fisheries managers. 
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Commentators postulating increased population as a cause of reef degradation differ in whether they 
believe it is economic growth, or a lack of it, that is exacerbating the degradation. Some commentators 
have linked the decline in coral reef health to poverty (e.g. McClanahan 2002 p. 476). MCManus (1997) 
suggested that poverty is destroying Southeast Asian reefs. Others blame economic growth, particularly 
the globalisation of the economy, for the degradation eg Wilkinson (1999 p. 867). In each case, there 
is, implicit in the narrative, the same assumption that coral reef degradation that has happened in 
Southeast Asia will eventually happen in other areas, described earlier. Here, again, is the fear of the 
inevitable march of modernisation throughout the developing world. The fear of increasing popUlations 
in tropical, developing countries is the same fear that propelled the development of modern fisheries 
management-a fear that the race to fish will destroy every last fish in the sea (described in Holm 1996 
and discussed earlier, in Chapter Two). In coral reef fisheries the villain is not industrial capitalism but 
the peasant fisher in Asia, the Pacific Islands, and other developing regions. 
An extensive World Bank study of Pacific Island coastal communities demonstrated that this is not a 
universal perception. Titled Voices from the Village, this study was conducted in 31 communities in 
five countries including the Fiji Islands, in 1998-99. Quantitative data analysis showed that perceptions 
of success in coastal resource management were not necessarily influenced by population growth rates; 
to the contrary, several sites where resource trends were perceived to be worsening were relatively 
isolated and had low populations (Muller et al. 2000 p. 179, 180). The analysts obviously found this 
result troublesome despite its apparent statistical robustness, trying to explain it away as "capturing 
other site characteristics" such as the level of technology used in fishing (Muller et at. 2000 p. 179). 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBSISTENCE FISHING AS A PROBLEM 
In stories about the decline of coral reefs, commercial fishing is usually blamed for reef degradation. 
Here, I present a short study of how subsistence fisheries were recently constructed as problematic. The 
story concerns reefs in the Lau Islands, a remote eastern part of the Fiji Islands, where small groups of 
indigenous Fijians live in small villages on small islands, in a close relationship with coral reefs (as 
described in the next chapter). Across the world, in a British university, researchers brought these 
villagers to international attention by attributing to them, a decline in the health of their reefs caused by 
their fishing for subsistence. They did this by releasing a press statement at that same time as their 
research findings were published in the scientific journal Ecology Letters (May 2004). The press 
statement, which quoted Professor Nick Polunin, the research leader and one of the paper's authors, 
was widely reported in the British news media. It highlighted their findings in a controversial way, 
which differed from the more measured tones of the scientific paper. 
This research is the latest in a series of studies by University of Newcastle upon Tyne researchers, 
which Polunin, as President of the International Coral Reef Society as well as research leader, 
described in his keynote presentation in Okinawa at the 2004 ICRS. The research was conducted in the 
Lau Islands because these have no industrial development or non-domestic sources of pollution within 
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150 kilometres radius; Lauan villagers practise subsistence agriculture is a manner considered unlikely 
to significantly affect the state of reefs (Dulvy et al. 2004). By selecting these sites, researchers were 
endeavouring to minimise any effect on reefs attributable to any cause other than subsistence fishing. 
METHODOLOGY: TRACING THE PROBLEMATISATION OF SUBSISTENCE FISHING 
\'V'hen searching for scientific papers on coral reef research on the Fiji Islands, one of the lines I 
took was to find the publications resulting from the series of studies undertaken by researchers 
and students from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, spurred partly by hearing Polunin's 
keynote address at the 10th International Coral Reef Symposium which focused on his groups' Fiji 
research. Using Google to locate these in May 2004 (using Polunin's name as a keyword along 
with Fiji and coral reefs), I came across several media articles about the damage that traditional 
fishing was supposedly causing coral reefs, quoting Polunin. From this I was able to locate the 
press release that spawned these, as well as the citation for the scientific paper reporting the 
research discussed in the press release. Obtaining the paper, I was then able to analyse the 
different constructions of cause and effect (amongst fishing intensities, removal of predatory fish, 
outbreaks of crown of thorns starfish, and phase shifts in coral reef communities) used in the 
scientific publication, the press release, and the subsequent media reports. 
The way that subsistence fishing is implicated in the degradation of coral reefs differs between the 
scientific paper, the press release, and the subsequent media reports. The paper in Ecology Letters, 
titled Coral reef cascades and the indirect effects of predator removal by exploitation, examined 
ecosystem-scale biodiversity consequences of predator removal, documenting predatory reef fish 
densities, coral-eating starfish densities and coral reef structure along a 13-island gradient of 
subsistence exploitation (Dulvy et al. 2004 p. 410). In drawing conclusions about the effects of 
subsistence fishing, the authors wrote. 
Our data suggest that predator removal by subsistence exploitation may be sufficient to 
allow outbreaks of the crown-of-thorns starfish indirectly resulting in cascading changes in 
ecosystem structure and function. The higher densities of the coral-feeding starfish 
associated with subsistence fisheries exportation have resulted in repeated shifts [number 
not specifiedJ in benthic community structure from that dominated by carbonate accreting 
reef-building organisms to domination by non-reef-building organisms (Dulvy et al. 2004 p. 
413-414). 
The authors then caution that they concluded this by using correlation. Since in ecology, causality can 
only be determined through experimental manipUlation, this raises some doubts about their 
conclusions. The authors also noted that they observed crown-of thorns starfish at only six of the 13 
islands in the study, adding that, on some of the other seven islands, the intensity of fishing estimated 
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and the density of predatory fish measured, overlapped with islands where the starfish outbreaks 
occurred (Dulvy et al. 2004 p. 414). These cautionary statements, included in the scientific paper, are 
not repeated in Polunin's press release. In that, Polunin confidently wrote: 
Scientists previously thought that diverse ecosystems such as coral reefs would be resilient 
to the impacts of predator removal ... this study suggests that even low levels of fishing 
may cause ecosystem meltdown ... We were very surprised our research showed such light 
levels of exploitation by subsistence islanders fishing for food could cause such profound 
ecosystem changes (Polunin 2004). 
The subsequent media reports (e.g. Reaney 2004; Tighe 2004) go even further, highlighting this as a 
case of traditional fishing damaging reefs. One article in the Guardian-UK (Wainwright 2004) 
headlined subsistence fishers "wreaking havoc on reefs in Fiji". There is no doubt or caution in these 
media accounts. In the online Financial Times Tighe (2004) wrote "Their findings ... conflict with the 
previous assumptions that commercial fishing, not subsistence fishing, poses the greatest risk to the 
reefs, which are found in more than 100 countries and cover almost 300,000 square kilometres". 
Interestingly there is a different version of the paper's abstract on the web site of the Centre for 
Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Research (part of the UK Government's Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). Unlike the abstract in Ecology Letters, this database reference 
presents the work not as a study focusing on the consequences of predator removal on coral reef 
ecosystems but as one examining the effects of subsistence fishing on coral reefs-something which . 
suggests that, in conducting the study, the researchers had an interest in demonstrating whether and 
how subsistence fishing affects coral reefs in the Fiji Islands. This abstract states that: 
We show that coral reef phase shifts may result from subsistence levels of exploitation. 
Ecosystem state was measured along an island-scale gradient of fishing pressure in Fiji. The 
density of a keystone coral-feeding starfish (Acanthaster planci) [crown-of-thorns starfish] 
increased along the fishing gradient resulting in large-scale mortality of reef-building corals 
and subsequent phase shifts. Predatory fish density declined in response to exploitation 
suggesting the starfish, checked by a predator-controlled Allee effect at the most lightly 
fished islands, is released from predatory control even by subsistence levels of exploitation3. 
A simple predator-prey model shows how exploitation can reduce coral-reef ecosystem 
resilience (Dulvy et at. 2004). 
They had chosen the Lau Islands for their research because they regarded them as "relatively pristine" 
ecosystems, disturbed only by subsistence fishing. They thus set up subsistence fishers as the likely 
causes of any degradation observed, even before commencing the field research. 
As well as having an interest in demonstrating whether and how subsistence fishing affects Lau coral 
reefs, the researchers appear, from their paper's conclusions, to believe that subsistence fishing 
damages coral reefs even though their scientific evidence is weak. These weaknesses are worth 
pointing out. First, the study was based upon an index of fishing intensity previously calculated, which 
2 Allee's principle recognises an intermediate optimal population density, in which groups of organisms often 
flourish best if neither too few or too many individuals are present (McGraw-Hill DictiollaJY of Scientific 
Technical Terms, 6th ed.). 
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needed further verification of its accuracy as it was a key part of the correlation. Second, surveys were 
small in number and temporal replication and they were not designed to follow coral recovery after a 
crown-of thorns outbreak-the authors merely assumed that a phase shift was occurring because there 
were three features of the data consistent with thresholds and phase shifts (see Dulvy et al. 2004 p. 
414-415). These weaknesses should have been apparent to the researchers. Third, the paper made no 
mention of the live reef food fish trade which had been operating sporadically in Lau, in the years 
before the study (according to Peter Sands, industry representative at a workshop on the live reef food 
fish trade, Suva, 2001). This could have confounded the researchers' conclusions at one site at least. 
Furthermore, in examining the effects of removing predators from coral reef ecosystems-how 
predator removal influences ecosystem structure and function-the researchers assumed that all 
removals of predators occurred through subsistence fishing, yet made no attempt to verify this, beyond 
casual observations that the communities appeared to be consistent with this observation (Dulvy, pers. 
cOlnm.). 
Polunin appeared keen to publicise this 'finding' that subsistence fishing was degrading reefs, thus 
enrolling the Lau Islands in the global coral reef crisis. The researchers also do this in the final 
paragraph of their Ecology Letters paper, writing: "These findings provide an additional challenge [the 
impacts of fishing predatory fish] for biodiversity protection and coral reef management strategies", 
suggesting that the maintenance of a minimum level of predators across reefs would be a useful 
management approach, and recommending marine protected areas for protecting reefs from pest 
outbreaks (Dulvy et at. 2004 p. 415). 
BLAMING A LACK OF CAPACITY AND POLITICAL WILL 
In texts about coral reefs, found in the international sphere of policy, there are some very common 
rhetorical devices that blame the coral reef crisis on a lack of capacity in developing countries and a 
lack of political amongst their politicians. In their policy statements, both ICRI and the USCRFT depict 
developing countries, where most reefs are situated, as needing capacity building, as shown in the text 
cited in Tables 12 and 16 in the previous chapter for example. These two bodies blame developing 
countries for the worldwide decline. So too does the GCRMN, in its global status reports, the summary 
chapters of which function as informal policy statements. The 2004 GCRMN report notes, under "Poor 
capacity for management and lack of resources" that "most coral reef countries lack trained personnel 
for coral reef management, raising awareness, enforcement and monitoring; also a lack of adequate 
funding and logistic resources to implement effective conservation" (Wilkinson 2004 p. 19). The 
reports suggests: 
1. assisting in the training of environmental resource managers and ensuring that they are provided 
with in-country employment; 
2. assisting countries in the development of alternative livelihoods to combat poverty and reduce the 
need to over-exploit coral reef resources; 
3. assisting developing countries design, implement and manage networks of marine protected areas 
to conserve their resources; 
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4. consolidating the training provided by UN agencies and MEAs to ensure that they are targeted on 
resources, issues and problems relevant to conserving national resources; 
5. providing adequate and long-term financial and logistic resources for developing countries to 
undertake environmental planning for the longer-term, rather than the three to five year funding 
cycle of projects; 
6. assisting in the recognition of appropriate traditional knowledge and methods of environmental 
management and help governments harmonise these with state and national laws; 
7. developing the "capacity to build capacity", and using "train-the-trainers" and peer-to-peer 
exchanges as low cost mechanisms to ensure that capacity building is as a self-sustaining 
mechanism (Wilkinson 2004 p. 39). 
In the section of the US coral reef plan dealing with international trade, there is another such example 
of the way blame is generally assigned to developing countries rather than developed ones. Although 
the USCRTF does acknowledge the need to ensure that US consumer demand for marine aquarium 
organisms does not threaten the sustainability of coral reef species and ecosystems, it largely allocates 
the fault for the coral reef crisis not to consumers but to exporters. Of the seven actions in the national 
coral reef plan recommended to reduce the impact of international trade, six concern the countries of 
origin, and only one concerns the demand created by US consumers; unlike the previous six 
recommendations, the latter recommendation is not explicit about the measures to be taken, merely 
recommending calling for "additional measures as appropriate to ensure that US consumer demand for 
marine aquarium organisms does not threaten the sustainability of coral reef species and ecosystems" 
(United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000). In this way, the plan skirts around the part played in by 
American lifestyles that feed the desire for pretty corals and reef fish in domestic aquaria. It, instead, 
frames the issue in terms of the sustainability of the trade and lays the largest portion of the blame on 
exporting countries that fail to enact and enforce adequate legislation to control exports at a sustainable 
level, and on international regulatory agencies (i.e. CITES) for failing to ensure this. In doing so, it 
positions developing countries as needing capacity-building. 
A lack of state capacity in fisheries management 
In the literature claiming overpopulation as the cause of overfishing, several explanations are proffered 
for insufficient or inadequate attention being paid to the state of these fisheries. One specified reason 
postulates a chronic shortage of human and other resources in developing countries-the lack of 
capacity argument. More specifically, a lack of expertise in managing coral reef fisheries is given as a 
reason. This argument takes two forms. First, there is the suggestion of a widespread failure among 
professionals to realise that most tropical coastal fisheries are fundamentally different from the capital-
intensive, large-scale, commercial/industrial fisheries of northern seas. Second, managers are accused 
of basing their actions on ecological principles for which there may be scant scientific justification, 
particularly in the case of complex tropical communities (Pauly 1995; Munro 1996 p. 8-12; Sale 2002 
[1991] p. 361). These explanations portray state fisheries management agencies as incapable of 
adequately managing coral reef fisheries, resulting in degraded coral reefs. Similar criticism can be 
found in literature about fishing in the Pacific Islands. For example, this quotation, from a recent 
review of the region's coastal fisheries, commissioned for the GEF-financed International Water 
Programme, depicts these small island developing states as lacking in capacity, and the fisheries 
managers within it as incompetent: 
In the face of mounting foreign debts and budget deficits, most island governments simply 
lack the fiscal and administrative resources to effectively implement and enforce legislation 
aimed at environmental protection and resource management. Central authority is weak and 
limited in scope in some Pacific island countries, particularly in areas remote from the seat 
of government. The fishery regulations implemented by bureaucrats residing in urban 
administrative centres are often based on an incomplete understanding of the ecological and 
social realities in outlying communities. Such regulations tend to lack legitimacy in the eyes 
of the residents of those communities and they are evaded at every opportunity. Typically, 
government-management consists of a proliferation of regulations that government fisheries 
departments do not have the resources to enforce. In short, governments in the region may 
be empowered to exercise some degree of jurisdiction over coastal fisheries, but in reality 
their effective control is often negligible ... At best the majority of governments have 
resorted to crisis management, usually in response to the boom and bust cycle of a coastal 
fishery producing an export commodity (Dalzell and Schug 2002 p. 10)4. 
193 
This is one example of a suite of similar critiques of state fisheries management in developing 
countries. Those critiques implicate, in the declining state of coral reefs, the governance systems used 
in tropical developing countries to manage coral reef fisheries. Lamenting the demise of traditional 
community-based management systems that once protected the resource, they criticise modern state-
run management of coastal fisheries in these countries as being inadequate, often poorly implemented. 
It is uncommon for these texts to analyse the merits of the management that is taking place; instead 
stories make general claims that insufficient or inadequate attention is being paid to the state of coral 
reef fisheries in various developing countries. 
In characterising state fisheries management agencies in developing countries as needing assistance to 
deal with the environmental problems facing their reefs, this criticism enrols them into contemporary 
international efforts to manage coral reefs as a global problem. It gains added credence when combined 
with arguments constructing reefs as a global problem, and narratives about the causes of coral reef 
degradation worldwide. 
Poor governance and a lack of political will 
Another criticism thrown at developing countries is that they lack the political will to address 
problems. In the Executive Summary to the Status of the Coral Reefs of the World: 2004, Wilkinson 
wrote: 
Many coral reef countries lack the resources of trained personnel, equipment and finances to 
effectively conserve coral reefs ... this ... is often exacerbated by a poor awareness of the 
problems facing coral reefs and their significance in local economies, and inadequate 
political will to tackle difficult environmental problems (Wilkinson 2004 p. 8). 
3 I have omitted the five citations used in the original text, since these citations are not the only instances of such 
statements and cannot be relied upon as being the original sources of such ideas. 
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This is a classic statement of the lack of capacity argument (inadequate trained personnel, equipment 
and finances), extended to implicate the governments as incapable of recognising that coral reefs are a 
major problem they should be tackling. The expression 'lack of political will' conjures the idea of lazy, 
perhaps corrupt politicians, not doing their job adequately. Adding the phrase "to tackle difficult 
environmental problems" suggests those politicians have deliberately turned a blind eye to the 
problems facing reefs, rather than that they have decided to allocate limited resources to issues they 
considered more pressing. Later in the same executive summary, Wilkinson attributes the problems 
facing coral reefs to increasing population pressures in tropical countries: 
There are many explanations for the poor governance and low political will to conserve 
coral reefs. Most tropical countries have rapidly increasing coastal populations, consequent 
rising levels of poverty, which put increasing pressures on coral reefs to provide food and 
other resources; usually beyond sustainable limits. These pressures have caused, and will 
cause, collapses of coral reefs and phase shifts towards algal dominated reefs at the expense 
of corals (Wilkinson 2004 p. 31). 
Of many possible explanations for poor governance and low political will, Wilkinson offers only one, 
increasing human populations. His argument is highly generalised. Not only does it implicate most 
tropical countries, it implicates all layers and types of governance found within those countries, from 
the national government through local government and any form of community or household 
governance. It also stretches scientific reasoning; no formal link has been established between rapidly 
increasing populations and the phase shifts seen in the Caribbean over the last quarter century. 
The possibility of future degradation as a justification for expert intervention 
Wilkinson allocates the responsibility for fixing the problems facing coral reefs in tropical countries 
and for rectifying poor governance, to the international agencies, national donors and NGOs currently 
assisting those countries to protect and better manage coral reefs. He suggests how they could be more 
effective in providing that assistance. He thus uses an argument about the causes of phase shifts on 
coral reefs to justify those organisations intervening in developing countries in the name of saving coral 
reefs. This is the same argument used by that those advocating management strategies for reef 
resilience on a regional basis (e.g. Nystrom et at. 2000; Bellwood et at. 2004). 
There has been a temptation to attribute human causes to coral bleaching and to use this to further 
justify certain policy interventions in developing countries, as in World Bank research project into 
coral bleaching and NGO projects that link marine protected areas and resilience to bleaching. There is 
an ongoing debate about whether coral bleaching is a cause or a symptom of coral reef decline and 
whether it is a sign of global warming causes by increased greenhouse gases. Do recent patterns (e.g. 
increases in sea surface temperatures) reflect the natural variability of the system or the effects of 
greenhouse gas-induced warming? A recent contributor to Coral-List (researcher and engineer John 
Ware, 8 June 2004) pointed out that no work has attempted to determine a direct link between putative 
warming and coral bleaching and reef degradation. Nevertheless, in much contemporary coral reef 
literature, coral bleaching is widely regarded as a manifestation of global warming. Since many believe 
global warming is due to enhanced greenhouse gas production by human popUlation on Earth, coral 
bleaching is widely seen as another result of this. This, as Ware pointed out, is a leap of faith rather 
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than a leap of science. Yet it, too has been used as a justification for intervention-assuming that ways 
can be found to encourage reef resilience in the face of both coral bleaching and the various damaging 
activities listed in Table 7. 
Discussion 
POLICY AT THE INTERFACE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE AND POLITICS 
Universal problematisation of reefs 
Coral reefs are being discursively created as a single universal problem through multiple mechanisms: 
through OCRMN, scientific reviews, policy reports, even the construction of single research 
programmes. Along with the process of disseminating the crisis narrative described in Chapter Six and 
the process of preparing global status reports described in this chapter, these discursive mechanisms 
recreate coral reefs as a series of problems that can be addressed through planned and co-ordinated 
responses, and through efforts to encourage the resilience of reefs in the face of climate change and 
anthropogenic impacts. These devices portray coral reefs as a problem to be rescued and managed lest 
they become extinct and their environmental services and economic benefits are lost to humans. This 
universal problematisation is one of the characteristics of the global environmental policy discourse 
reflected in common metaphors and storylines and arguments about coral reefs. 
Both the fishers and those trying to manage fisheries in developing countries (whether state or 
traditional) are being blamed for a global decline in coral reef health. Not only coral reefs are imagined 
as a problem, so too are increasing populations in tropical countries, reflecting Western fear of 
destabilisation (Chapter Two). 
Capacity-building as a political response 
As well as reinforcing the legitimacy of those intervening in developing regions to save their 
environment, the capacity-building storyline engenders the cooperation of people and institutions of 
developing countries, by positioning them as in need of help. Through discursive devices, developing 
countries have been recreated as sites for expert intervention by coral reef scientists, managers and 
other environmental specialists representing the organisations constituting the ICRI network and 
associated NOOs. Through repeated use of such stories and arguments, a case for global coral reef 
management (or regional management combined under a global strategy as advocated by Nystrom et 
al.2000 and Bellwood et al. 2004) is being built discursively. This reflects modernity's faith in 
humankind's capacity for planning and control, and in international cooperation as an appropriate and 
effective way of addressing global environmental problems. 
The solution is considered to lie in the funds, technical expertise and organising ability of industrialised 
states (North American, European, Australasian or Japanese) and their agents, both intergovernmental 
and nongovernmental. This reflects faith in the superiority of the Western-trained expert, characteristic 
of the global environmental policy discourse-the implicit belief in the superiority of western skills 
knowledge, western achievements, and western institutions which underlies modernisation theory and 
the post-war project of development. 
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Underrating the complexity of human social systems 
In refocusing strategies to save coral reefs on encouraging reef resilience, experts are trying to maintain 
a sense of control and of hope in a world which new ecological ideas are portraying as complex, even 
chaotic. An explosion of interest in the 1970s in mathematical ecology and the instability properties of 
both model and real systems has produced new ecological concepts of nonequilibrium, focusing on the 
nonlinear nature of systems especially those with high levels of temporal and spatial variability 
(Scoones 1999 p. 482). These new concepts include the idea of ecosystems having multiple rather than 
single stable states; the recognition of chaotic dynamics where nonlinear interactions have sensitivity to 
initial conditions and lack long-term predictability; and stochastically-dominated systems without any 
simple regulatory feedback mechanism (ibid). This explosion of interest in nonequilibrium ideas has 
produced not just a new wave of empirical inquiry but also a wave of theorising over the implications 
of nonequilibrium dynamic change. The idea of a world of natural chaos belies belief in an infinitely 
wise plan in which everything functions with perfect harmony (Worster 1993 p. 169). The concept of 
adaptive management attempts to maintain a sense of control in this world of natural chaos, also a 
sense of hope that we can somehow manage to avoid what would be catastrophic for human life and 
can retain a sense of what natural, healthy, beautiful ecosystems are. 
Although there has been a trend over the last few decades for coral reef scientists to recognise the 
increasing complexity of the biophysical world of coral reefs (e.g. Knowlton 1992; Hughes 1994; Done 
1999), this trend has not translated to recognition of the complex nature of the social world of those 
people who use and govern reefs. Rather, insights from complexity theory and the 'new ecology' have 
been confined to the non-human components of coral reef ecosystems. Arguments that attribute 
'failures' to utilise data on the state of reefs as being due to a lack of political will and capacity are 
positivist. They espouse a simplistic cause and effect relationship in a complex world. In relying on 
arguments about lack of capacity and political will, these texts proffer a caricature of people in 
countries like the Fiji Islands. Furthermore, in concentrating on the supposed failings of only one side 
of the developed/ developing country dichotomy, the explanation of coral reef degradation is biased. 
Even the concept of adaptive management (mentioned earlier) is designed to address the complexity of 
natural systems rather than human ones. 
A HEGEMONIC VIEW OF THE WORLD 
Professional experts working on coral reef policy that impinges on the Fiji Islands and other developing 
countries mayor may not intend to exert western domination over those countries. But this is certainly 
the overall effect of the various common narratives, metaphors and arguments about coral reefs 
encountered in scientific papers and texts, policy papers and other expert-produced documents. 
Through data-gathering projects, the GCRMN global status reports, and through scientific papers such 
as Dulvy et al.' s Coral reef cascades and the indirect effects of predator removal by exploitation, sites 
such as the Fiji Islands are deliberately being re-imagined as sites of degraded coral reefs. The 
archipelago (and other locations around the world) are deliberately being drawn into universalised 
stories and arguments about the extent of degradation and its causes, and into normative espousals of 
what needs to be done to redress this. This is occurring without extensive data on the state of Fijian 
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reefs. Embedded in these expert-produced texts about coral reefs, there is a relationship of western 
domination over Third World societies, the same expression of Western superiority found in 
modernisation theory. Although these texts do not actually constitute domination, they facilitate it, 
being "intimately rooted in discourses of presumed superiority, mission, and negative essentialisations 
of the Other" (Slater 1999, quoted in Chapter Three). These texts, through their pervasive and 
persistent positioning, set the scene for domination of developing countries. They do so, in part, by 
claiming to provide the 'one true reality' about coral reefs in developing countries rather than a 
perspective built on particular epistemological and ideological preconceptions (to borrow a point which 
Fry (1997) made about contemporary Australian representations of the South Pacific). 
Repetition of standard storylines is akin to the repetition of commonsense, a view so thoroughly 
diffused that it has been internalised as commonsense. These standard storylines act as hegemonic 
commonsense, institutionalised through expert but everyday practices of those involved in 
science/policy. Repeating these standard storylines, experts create situations for expert intervention and 
international cooperation on environmental matters. 
How experts contribute to this hegemonic view through habitus 
Yet, even though scientists and others in the coral reef science community repeat the metaphors and 
storylines standard to these texts, most appear to have no strategic desire to dominate those in 
developing countries. Rather they act through habitus (explained in Chapter Four). A storyline of a 
crisis requiring expert intervention forms the habitus of individuals and organizations that operate in 
the transnational environmental policy field. 
Wilkinson serves as an example of how individuals and organisations in the field of international 
environmental policy vacuum up various metaphors and storylines, and put these to use in justifying 
themselves, their activities and their claims for resources and support. In his everyday work, Wilkinson 
reproduces the properties of the field in which he works. As a creative human agent immersed in the 
field of international environmental policy through his work as global coordinator of the GCRMN, a 
position he has held since its inception in 1995, Wilkinson is able to employ his knowledge and skills 
to maintain and advance his position in that field (cf. Swingewood 2000 p. 215 quoting Bourdieu and 
Wacquant). His social location as the holder of a professional position in national (AIMS) and 
international (GCRMN) organisations funded to solve coral reef problems, and his social status as an 
international expert in coral reefs, would predispose him towards certain arguments and storylines that 
support the expert nature of the process of saving coral reefs. The liberal, institutionalist politics of 
cooperative security which dominate many countries with which he deals-Australia as his place of 
employment, the US as funder, various European countries as the base for key multilateral agencies 
with which he negotiates-would predispose him to believing that global environmental problems must 
be managed through trust and cooperation amongst states, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
agencies. 
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Patterning texts as a way of generating consensus and maintaining order 
There is another equally insightful explanation to be found in the patterning of documents (described in 
Chapter Three), as a way of maintaining legitimacy and generating consensus. In Riles' study of Fiji 
Islanders preparing national and regional documents to take to international conferences on women, 
she described how, when the aesthetic of design, the pattern of the text being produced becomes 
important, then orthodox discourse can be reproduced without analytical or political engagement 
(Chapter Three). She recounted how a Fiji Islands delegate had explained to her that their Pacific 
platform "solidified" through the process of transposing language from one document to another 
through quotation (cutting and pasting) (Riles 2000 p. 89). From her study, Riles concluded that 
international law and politics, in the mode of information, represent not so much a revolution of norms 
as a perfection of terms in which form generates consensus where content and doctrine could never do 
so (Riles 2000 p. 182). "Both perfectly complete and utterly vacuous, forms such as facts and matrices, 
brackets full of text, or numbers and networks enable viewers to share everything and nothing, as does, 
for example, 'knowing the facts'" (Riles 2000 p. 184). A similar preoccupation with the form of texts, 
with consolidating consensus through quotation, cutting and pasting-a similar disengagement from 
the analytical-is shaping coral reef policy texts such as the GRCMN global status reports, thus 
contributing to the reproduction of orthodox discourse. 
Experts may reproduce patterns in texts as away of furthering consensus. Kanak leader Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou is reported to have explained that "the Kanak discourse is not a thesis, antithesis, synthesis. It 
consists of repeating to convince" (Waddell 1984 p. 82). In Melanesian culture, repetition may serve 
the purpose that logic serves in Eurocentric culture. Furthermore, patterns in texts repeated over time 
can have the comforting appearance of legitimacy. Repetition in texts also creates a certain order, a 
sense of certainty. The regional action plans, which the SPREP secretariat has produced every four 
years, follow the same model, some new parts added each year but certain themes, chunks of text, and 
policies repeated each time. Thus each new document looks similar to that approved previously, 
generating for its authors the confidence that it, too, will be acceptable to the governing council of 
Pacific environment ministers who set the organisation's strategy and budget. Repetition in texts 
creates a certain order, a sense of certainty. Yet, even as the reproduction of discourse pursues a 
pleasing pattern and generates consensus, this patterning has the potential to reproduce a relation of 
domination, as I explore further in later chapters (Chapter Thirteen pulls these insights together). 
Conclusion 
Whether, in this analysis of hegemony, experts act through habitus, commanding expert discourses and 
repeating them to demonstrate their command of policy prescriptions suitable for addressing the coral 
reef crisis, or whether they repeat standard arguments as a way of plaiting weak ties, helping to 
generate consensus and maintain order, matters not. In either case they are constructing the survival of 
coral reefs as dependent on expert intervention-on the intervention of those forming an assembly 
around the notion of a coral reef crisis. Moreover, they are reinforcing the relationship of First World-
Third World domination embedded in those expert discourses, even when this is not a deliberate 
intention. 
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At this point I move from the international sphere of policy to that connecting with the Fiji Islands. The 
standard narratives, storylines, metaphors and practices of international coral reef policy, described in 
the previous chapters, are not the only storylines about coral reefs to be found in Suva. To study the 
connections between the international sphere of policy and the Fiji Islands, requires some awareness of 
those other storylines, and how they intersect-as the next chapter discusses. 
Part III 
Interrogating the Local 
MAP 3: CORAL REEFS OF THE FIJI ISLANDS 
Source: Spalding et al. (2001) FR = forest reserve; NR = nature reserve; WS = wildlife sanctuary 
177" 
176"54' 177' 00' 177' 6' 
16" lliIIlna 
12'30' 
U .. 
.,;----Hon, .. ', \ 
1 1 12'~' 
17" 
18" 
19" 
21 '~ 5' 
21'50' 
176° 
Rotuma 
8 12 km 
Yasawa 
Group 
F,th,IReef ~' 
(1'./. " 
:ra '" ~ .-." , 
Novil l ,.- ~ 
ViwI'" 1 
W. ya ~ 
~ Mamanuca 
Group .. ~ 
c-o 
MaIolo Barrier Reef 
1'13\'1111 Reef (\, 
~ 
174'35' 
o 
Viti l evu 
Group 
174'40' 
Conwav Reef 
(Ceva~i-Ra) 
6 !I ton -
177" 
Round Island 
, Passage 
178" 
Nai ... . 
YIWIWlI t. 10 - ~.., Yac/ua Taba Island " ~~ 
Crested Iguana 'J'bakau " ,' ' 
N..:uI! Reserva WS I.e ... Reef '" _ •• 
Bligh Water 
l' . . .. 
F i J ' 
.' 
VplU 
Ira" 
Channel 
o 
179" 
VanuaLevu 
Group 
~ 
\", 
~ ?-" 
Vanua Levu Group 0 
Namena/a{a 
" Is/and NR 
· N""""" Vlll1ualAvu Barrler lUef 
Bam ... R",r 
·O .... l1~ 
KOTO 
Lomaiviti 
Group 
FDI 
.. 
Tbikornbi. I 
Cobu 
C~ VualVuoo 
M.smcucu _ 
• Vmwa 
... 
Fi' 
Nuluscmanu 
RL.-efs 
(J 
Ringgold Isles 
o Hc"C!llSlo:rcq 
I Budd Reer. 
Reef 
179" 
Qeld~'O 
Nallulu Reef WailongiJal. 
QamaI 
.... uni 
Ravilevu NR 
yac;ua 
Votu Vm 
Nalluku 
Channel 
,...., 
v 
Duff Reef 
Th' 'UIh<i 
178' 
N 
+ 
P ACIFIC O C E AN 
Exploring 
Isles 
Malevuvu Reef 
Katafaga 
Lau 
Group 
T!mb.u"I!IIlb-J 
Citia ( Viti Levu Ii 
lAkemoo Pa.'tSage 
KORO SEA Thak.au l...Mc:O),illll\\''\;j," ~ 
Vuo Island NR 
DraunibOla and 
Labiko Islands NR 
J, H, Garrick" 
Memorial FR NR" -.... 
Coral C0i8.S1 
Valulete 
Ikqa 
-Be,!, Bani« R""f 
Kaduvu 
Passage 
Kado\'\J 
Ono 
... 
North Amolabe Reef 
Ci=1 
Astro1ab< 
Reef 
'\ 
Nliiuti 
, 
Ga. 
Mabulica Ked 
M()IJa v 
Moala 
Group 
~. .;;::, 
Kaduvu 
Group 
MwuIcJ { ) 
P A CI F I C O CEAN 
o 30 60 90 120 150 km 
1780 1790 1800 
T olO)"J. 
No""u ,,") Reid Re.:f 
Laktba 
Van ... Vatu 'J 
Lau 
Group OneaJa, Passage 
N .. ";\! u Ree[ 
Tavtmasid 
Vuanggava 
Kambo{a .... 
Moce 
~ a.lIlub I..lau 
TbaJaw 1.c,'u 
NaV'Ut'u Uotm 
FLlWlga 
179"00' 178'50' 178' 40' Og .. u N~Reef 
2D'<IO' 
2l)' SO' 
2" 00' 
'C)) ~CJnj'i'La 
J VUBlIIOno 
8 16 24 km 
-==-
Tuvana·i-Ra 
U Tu::;"",,-Colo 
Ong .. Ndriti 
ValO~ 
VlJ,;;:t:i, Vatoo 
179" 1780 
16· 
170 
180 
19" 
203 
Chapter Nine 
Coral Reefs in the Fiji Islands: a 'Local' Perspective 
Introduction 
Having described the international sphere of coral reef policy, this chapter moves to the local, 
specifically the Fiji archipelago. There, the narratives, arguments and metaphors about coral reefs that 
Wilkinson and others reproduce in policy documents, in scientific texts, and media articles are not 
simply accepted and reproduced. Rather they meet other storylines and discourses, including some 
about Fijians' special relationship with reefs and indigenous rights. Here, I begin to explore how the 
intersection of various discourses shapes local policy. 
INTRODUCING THE FIJI ISLANDS 
Social, Cultural and Economic Significance of Fijian Reefs 
REEFS AND REEF FISHING IN FIJIAN CULTURE AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION 
CONTEMPORARY REEF ASHEmES 
TOURISM BASED AROUND CORAL REEFS 
The Evolution of Coral Reef Governance 
INDIGENOUS CONTROL OF FIJIAN COASTAL FISHERY RESOURCES 
THE EVOLUTION OF STATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
State Policy on Coral Reefs 
FISHERIES POLICIES AND CONCERNS ABOUT OVERFISHING 
CORAL REEF CONCERNS IN OTHER GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter Eight depicted Fiji reefs in a certain way, part of the declining state of coral reefs worldwide, 
although maybe further from crisis than in many countries. In various texts to be found at USP 
however, there is an alternative, much more optimistic view of coral reefs as part of vanua in which 
Fijians are bonded to land and sea, intimately bound into the lives of Fijians; these texts tell of how the 
state is helping Fijian communities to address localised overfishing. This alternative view reworks 
traditional accounts into the design of academic reports and adds descriptions of modern fisheries 
management techniques. So this alternative view is itself the product of international-local connections 
and intersecting discourses. 
In the first part of this chapter, I present this view, summarising published material and government 
reports. The final section examines the content of government policy on coral reefs up until the time 
when GCRMN node in Suva became active in 1999. This highlights some of the discourses influencing 
those government policies. 
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A DISCOURSE OF ACADEMIC AND POLICY CIRCLES 
TIlls is not an anthropological study of the role that reefs play in the lives of Fiji Islanders. \V'hat I 
have written in this chapter, about how Fiji Islanders use reefs and how reefs are important to them, 
is a summary of what one can ftnd in publications and unpublished reports. TIllS is the sort of 
account that any policy analyst wanting to know about the use of coral reefs in Fiji could establish 
through a good literature search, especially with access to USP's library catalogue, since the majority 
of source materials are produced in the Fiji Islands and many are catalogued in that library. In sum, 
this is the knowledge that can be found by reading. So, in this sense, this is an account biased 
according to the type of knowledge that is being published or being produced in consultancy 
reports. These accounts present themselves as being as politically neutral. Although each has been 
written to answer particular kinds of questions set by the circumstances or comnlissioning agencies, 
none describe the political ideology or agendas of either the author(s) or comnlissioning agents. 
This is the knowledge available to outside observers: the acadenlic commentators, the 
environmental advocates and the political decision-makers. We-I include myself in that 
category-know Fiji's reefs through accounts of their use, mainly in ftshing, of their role in Fijian 
culture, social organisation and resource management, and of their scientiftc character, functioning 
and health and their value to tourism. Many of the people involved in international policy processes 
do not have fIrst hand experience of Fiji's reefs. Instead, they probably rely on written accounts-
general accounts about the reefs of the world generally, or of the Paciftc region if that is their 
interest. They may also rely on oral accounts presented at meetings. It is not unreasonable, 
therefore, to presume that the account in this chapter is broadly sinlllar to the knowledge that non-
Fiji Islanders would acquire of the reefs of the Fiji Islands, should they be interested in doing so. It 
is sinlllar to that taught at USP in Suva, in the Marine Studies Programme. It is, in effect a 
discourse-a way of thinking about the relationship between Fijians and coral reefs-found in both 
acadenlia and in policy circles. The sources from which this chapter's story about Fijian reefs has 
been constructed are themselves a melange, where accounts of the traditional have been couched in 
the modern design of acadenlic literature. 
INTRODUCING THE FIJI ISLANDS 
In Chapter One I described the location of the Fiji archipelago, shown on Maps 1 and 2. Extensive 
areas of coral reef have formed on the two relatively shallow shelves on which this archipelago sits; the 
Fiji Platform comprises the main islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, together with many smaller ones 
while, to the east, other small islands top the Lau Ridge (Zann 1992; Nunn 1998; Vuki et ai. 2000 p. 
756). On these shelves, the living reefs are generally younger than 10,000 years; they cap older reefs 
mostly formed during interglacial periods more than 120,000 years bp (Zann 1992). All known types of 
reefs are present: fringing, platform and patch reefs, barrier and oceanic ribbon reefs, atolls, near-atolls, 
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and drowned reefs (Zann 1992). Individual reefs range from patches a few metres across to fringing 
reefs a hundred or more kilometres long (Zann and Lovell 1992). The largest, a 370 kilometre broken 
barrier reef encompassing the Mamanuca and Yasawa islands and the Great Sea reef of Vanua Levu, 
does not fit any reef classification systems (Andrefouet 2004). This diversity of reef types reflects 
geomorphological influences: oceanic volcanic history, tectonic uplift and submergence in the 
Pleistocene and Holocene, erosion of limestone cliffs during interglacial periods of emergence, and 
rapid vertical growth during sea-level rise (Zann 1992; 1994 p. 53). Map 3 shows the general location 
of these reefs (this map from Spalding et at. 2001 mixes archaic and modern Fijian spellings; it uses the 
archaic 'th' for 'c' (in Thakau Vau and Thikombia for example) and the modern c (in Cicia for 
example). 
The Fiji Islands were first settled by humans about 3500 years ago, probably by people from New 
Caledonia and Vanuatu, island groups to the west settled earlier by Austronesian speakers from the 
New Guinea region. Some of these migrants to the Fiji Islands then moved eastward to the Samoan and 
Tongan groups, where they developed the social and cultural patterns known as Polynesian. The Fijian 
archipelago subsequently received waves of people from western Melanesia, and as a consequence, 
many Fijian people, especially in the hinterland of the two main islands, exhibit the physical 
characteristics and social organisation regarded as Melanesian. In contrast, in the eastern part of the 
archipelago where Polynesian influences are evident, the inhabitants of the many small islands 
maintained regular contact with their Polynesia neighbours over the centuries (Lal and Fortune 2000 p. 
567). The people of Rotuma, an outlier 5000 km north of the archipelago are unique within Fiji; their 
language has traces of Fijian, Polynesia and Indonesian (Lal and Fortune 2000 p. 569). Much of the 
country's population, totalling around 830,000, lives on the four high islands of Viti Levu, Vanua 
Levu, Taveuni, and Kadavu; about half live in urban centres on Viti Levu, principally the capital Suva 
(Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1997; South Pacific Commission 1998; Lal and Fortune 2000 p. 567). 
Indigenous Fijian comprise around half the total population, and constitute virtually all the population 
on the smaller islands. The remaining popUlation is mostly Indo-Fijian, descendants of Indian labourers 
that British colonial administrators brought in to farm cane (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1997; South 
Pacific Commission 1998). Other Pacific Islanders and people of European and Australasian extraction 
add to the contemporary ethnic mix of the Fiji Islands. In accordance with 'official' (state) semantics, I 
use the term Fiji Islander to encompass all inhabitants of these islands, and the term Fijian to refer to 
those of indigenous descent. I also use the term Fijian as a general adjective for non-human items. 
Although classified as a 'small island developing state', the archipelago is one of the most developed 
Pacific island groups, although development is largely confined Viti Levu, particularly the capital 
Suva. In early 2003, per capita GDP was estimated at FJD 4020 (USD 1766) (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2003). The principal industries are tourism, sugar and molasses, gold, fishing, timber, 
garment manufacturing, and ginger farming (Lal and Fortune 2000 p. 566). 
The country is an ex-British colony that became independent in 1970. It has a bicameral Westminster-
style system of parliament, both houses racially weighted in favour of indigenous Fijians (Lal and 
Fortune 2000). Since independence the country has had a democratically elected government apart 
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from two periods-1987 to mid-1992 following two military coups, and from mid-2000 until August 
2001 during which a caretaker government held power following another coup. In 1987 coup leader 
Rabuka declared the country a republic. It was readmitted to the Commonwealth in 1997, after 
returning to democratic government, and shortly afterwards adopted a non-discriminatory constitution. 
As the capital of the Fiji Islands and the largest city in the Pacific Islands, Suva is a hub of connections 
with the world. There are, based in the city, diplomatic missions, the regional headquarters for several 
aid agencies, and NGOs as well as offices of several regional Pacific agencies-the headquarters of 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), USP, plus 
an office of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC, formerly the South Pacific Commission). 
Social, Cultural & Economic Significance of Fijian Reefs 
REEFS AND REEF FISHING IN FIJIAN CULTURE AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION 
In the culture of indigenous Fijians and in their traditional belief system, reefs (cakau) are part of the 
vanua, the concept that coalesces around the central idea of a bond between people and the land and 
resources linking these in a triumvirate of respect (Batibasaqa et at. 1999 p. 100-102). The vanua 
encompasses the environment in its totality, both human and natural elements. At its heart are the earth, 
forests and sea that have sustained human life in the Fiji Islands for centuries (Batibasaqa et at. 1999 p. 
101). Vanua includes not only the land and sea-to Fijian communities, nearshore areas are seen as an 
extension of the land-but also the people, their traditions, customs, beliefs, values, and the various 
other institutions established to achieve harmony, solidarity, and prosperity (Ravuvu 1983 p. 70). 
In traditional thought, Fijians believe they are bonded to land and sea through their ancestors and 
guardian spirits. They 'inherit' the land from their ancestors and pass it onto succeeding generations 
(Batibasaqa et at. 1999 p. 101). The environment is thus an integral part of one's self, providing the 
physical manifestation between the living and the dead; it contains the history of one's ancestors in 
nature (Siwatibau 1984; Batibasaqa et at. 1999 p. 101). Traditional Fijian beliefs recognise the 
existence of invisible supernatural powers in the form of spirit gods of a cosmological nature, as well 
as spirits of dead ancestors and other kinsmen. Land and sea are associated with the spirits that protect 
it; the spirits that are part and parcel of the mortal world, watching over, guiding and controlling 
people's activities and all other earthly things (Ravuvu 1983 p. 35). The threat of the omnipresent gods 
is a continuous reminder to the people to treat their resources properly (ibid). Reefs are thus places 
linked to the supernatural and other beliefs. Some were sacred places-sacred fishing grounds to which 
special rules applied and strictly adhered to. The dead whose spirits inhabited sacred areas showed 
offence when customary taboos and rituals were not adhered to in a particular area. The sanctity of 
some areas was such that people were barred from them (Matthews et at. 1998 p. 209). 
Many Fijian communities are coastal, and for them hunting and gathering of food for subsistence was 
and still is focused on the sea (Kunatuba n.d.-a p. 3). Coral reefs are places for collecting food and fish. 
Before motorised boats and ice-making machines, people fished nearby areas-estuaries, shallow 
intertidal flats, mangroves, lagoons, and reefs (Veitayaki 1995 p. 35). Mostly they fished shallow, 
intertidal areas inshore of inner reef slopes. Less routinely, they fished reefs, both the submerged coral 
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outcrops of fringing reefs, and the barrier reefs, from the outer part of the lagoon to the outer reef slope. 
Both men and women would fish reefs at any time or tide for all kinds of fish. At low tide they would 
glean the reefs (vakacakau) for fish and for shellfish such as clams and Trochus; at high tide they 
would handline (siwa, siwa tutu; siwa nunu) and spearfish (nunu) on the reefs. For most fishers this 
reef zone is the furthermost fishing zone they would visit (Veitayaki 1995 p. 35). Areas seaward of 
reefs, which played a relatively unimportant role in contributing to people's food supply, were not 
owned by any specific group or subject to any specific restrictions (Veitayaki 1995). 
Fishing is a link with the past in two ways. First, there are traditional customs associated with fishing, 
including reef fishing. These include the ritual of serving yaqona to gonedau (master fishermen who 
fished for chiefs and to fulfil traditional obligations) just before they set out on their traditional function 
and on their return; the belief that one should not sleep with one's wife the night before a fishing 
expedition; and the fear that a secretly pregnant woman would affect the success of fishing (Fong 1994 
p. 36). People in some areas have special relationships with a particular fish, as totems (Veitayaki 
1992 p. 7; Matthews et at. 1998 p. 209). These totemic and other taboos restrict particular clans, 
families, age groups and genders from eating certain types of marine food; for instance in Qoma in 
Tailevu north of Suva, people do not fish for or eat their totem (Veitayaki 1995 p. 143). 
Some of the knowledge about traditional roles is being forgotten; some communities are no longer 
aware, for instance, of who has the role through their genealogy, of the gonedau or master fishermen. 
But coral reefs are sites to which traditional sanctions may still be applied; a tabu may be placed on an 
area for instance, preventing fishing for a certain period for various reasons, including the death of a 
high chief and/ or to allow fishing stocks to build up for the magiti (feast) (Fong 1994 p. 37). Although 
many traditional customs are no longer practised today, elements of traditional practice continue to 
influence the contemporary resource-use system-contemporary practices include features that were 
once part of the traditional system (Veitayaki 2000a p. 116). 
Contemporary Fijian communal ownership of fishing grounds and the right to fish reflects traditional 
social organisation, another way in which fishing is a link to the past. Traditionally, clan claims and 
occupation determined ownership of nearshore areas including reefs (Fong 1994). Communal 
ownership of fishing grounds (to the outer part of reefs) provided food for daily sustenance, plus that 
needed for obligatory levies paid to chiefs. Owning fishing grounds was also a means of cementing 
alliances, and a historical record and reminder of those. It was customary to transfer ownership of 
fishing grounds, particularly isolated reefs, sandbanks or lagoons, to another tribe as a gift for helping 
in battle, or when highly ranked women married into a neighbouring tribe (Waqairatu 1994 p. 79). 
Unlike some Fijian beliefs, a traditional system of resource use and ownership persists (its details are 
explained later in the chapter). While the ownership of land is vested in mataqali and tokatoka (terms 
explained in Table 17), the ownership of fishing rights was vested in larger groups, usually at the vanua 
level but occasionally individual yavusa or groups ofyavusa. This was to ensure that small groups who 
did not customarily use fishing grounds because of their traditional duties elsewhere as warriors or 
carpenters for instance, or those who live in the highlands, had the same rights as other members of the 
vallua (Waqairatu 1994 p. 82). Thus the system of fishing rights reflects and perpetuates a specific 
notion of equitable access to subsistence resources. 
TABLE 17: GLOSSARY OF FIJIAN TERMS CONCERNING RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 
Term 
Vanua 
Yavusa 
Mataqali 
Tokatoka 
I Qoliqoli 
Explanation 
The confederation of Fijian tribes or yal!l/sa (also the environment in its totality) 
The largest social unit for Fijians, a tribe of people who share a common 
deified ancestor from the original migration to the Fiji Islands. In some areas 
this is a landowning unit. A Fijian village is usually made up of severalyavtlsa. In 
a fully developed yavtlsa, there are several mataqali, each custodian of a particular 
task. 
Clan, extended family unit; the most common type of indigenous landowning 
unit. 
Family unit made up of closely related families widl the same blood relative as 
their head; a recognised landowning unit. The smallest unit in a Fijian village. 
Customary fishing areas (areas that groups have rights to fish) 
Source: Derrick (1950); Native Land Trust Board web site 
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This system is, however, as much a legacy of British colonial rule as pre-colonial indigenous social 
organisation. Pre-colonial traditions of most parts of the archipelago indicate incessant warfare 
resulting in constant reshuffling of groups of people, some going off to establish independent 
settlements, some seeking refuge among more powerful groups and some submitting to the rule of 
more powerful conquerors (France 1969 p. 13; Nayacakalou 1975 p. 41; Nation 1978 p. 19; Routledge 
1985 p. 28). The colonial administration established after cession to Britain in 1874 required land titles 
to be registered and land use to be controlled, Governor Gordon elicited the consent of the Council of 
[Fijian] Chiefs to the notion that Fijian land was inalienable and that there had to be an authentic land-
holding unit (McNaught 1982 p. 9). France (1969) describes how the colonial government applied the 
same rigid kinship/landowning system throughout the islands and established a permanent leadership 
around land right. But Fijians had 'owned' land not permanently but on the basis of use; they had not 
lived permanently in villages on one site. France (1969 p. 13) notes the unceasing occupation and 
vacation of lands was a consistent feature in all the recorded tukutuku raraba, the Native Lands 
Commission's records, in which the tribal history of all Fijian was narrated and preserved. By 
prescribing and freezing land titles, this codification favoured the largest political confederations 
(which at that time were in the east and north-east), and strongest chiefs of the time, particular chiefly 
titles thereafter being associated with particular areas. The legacy of this shapes contemporary Fijian 
politics. It presumably affected the way that qoliqoli were codified after the Native Fisheries 
Commission was established in 1941 for this purpose; I return to this process later in the chapter. 
CONTEMPORARY REEF FISHERIES 
The modes of fishing and fishers 
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Early colonists reported that Fijians lacked the tradition of offshore fishing found in many Polynesian 
and Micronesian communities, all fishing being from the shore (Hornell 1940; Zann 1992). This is no 
longer the case (if it ever was). Although not confined to shore fishing, most contemporary coral reef 
fisheries in the Fiji Islands are still small-scale, low-technology operations however. The most common 
method of fishing the inshore areas is handlining. Gill nets are also commonly used, and spearing and 
reef gleaning and skin diving (especially for shellfish and sea cucumbers) are common. Also used are 
fish traps, fish fences, seine nets, hand nets, fish drives, poisons, and line trawling (Zann 1992; Yuki et 
al. 1999 p. 5). Nowadays, it is not only indigenous Fijians who fish Fiji's coral reefs. In a survey of 
coastal fisheries in rural Viti Levu, the most populous island in Fiji, a quarter of those fishing were 
Indo-Fijian (Rawlinson et at. 1995). 
Women as well as men fish coral reefs. In Fijian communities, labour has traditionally been organised 
in accordance with gender, with women engaged in domestic duties and fishing and foraging the areas 
closest to shore, and men responsible for farming and for fishing deeper areas (through diving for 
instance) (Vunisea 1997 p. 15). The organisation of fishing in contemporary Fijian life still largely 
reflects these gender roles. As in other Pacific Islands, women in the Fiji Islands dominate shallow 
water fishing, both for subsistence and, increasingly, for commercial purposes. They tend to fish with 
other women rather than in mixed-gender groups. Their major fishing activities, both in rural areas and 
in semi-urban ones, are gleaning and collecting. Women also provide the necessary post-harvest 
activities for men's catches, whether cooking, smoking, drying and salting. They are the main informal 
traders, dominating municipal markets and informal outlets (Vunisea 1997). 
Women's fishing activities are more common in indigenous Fijian society than in Indo-Fijian society. 
In a survey of a survey of 2,252 households (representing 13,200 people) in rural Viti Levu in 1993, 
Rawlinson et at. (1995) found that Fijian adult females were the most active group fishing (45 percent 
of all those fishing). Few Indo-Fijian females fished (less than two percent of all those fishing). More 
Fijian men fished than Indo-Fijian men. Little else is recorded about the social or cultural importance 
of fishing in the lives of the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji; it has not the subject of any specific 
published studies. 
Fijians consider fishing to be a valued artistic activity. Skilled fishers and seafarers are highly regarded. 
Fishing is also an important social activity (Veitayaki 1995 p. 1; 2000a p. 116). In a study of Fijian 
women in her village (Nadali near Nausori on Suva's outskirts), Vunisea (1997 p. 16) found the 
majority of women saw fishing as a social activity rather than as work-an opportune time to spin 
yarns and catch up with the news while doing something useful. While fishing is an important part of 
Fijian village life, it is never the exclusive economic or social activity of the village. Rather, it is 
conducted sporadically, when there is a need to fish or when an opportunity such as good weather 
permits. On particular occasions, a whole community will partake in fishing, men, women and children 
fishing together (Veitayaki 1995 p. 12). 
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Reef organisms as food 
The food items that rural Fijians harvest from coral reefs are multitudinous, and include fish, molluscs 
(cephalopods included), crustacea, echinoderms, seaweeds, and turtles. A large variety of fish are 
harvested (Richards et al. 1994; Rawlinson et at. 1995; Veitayaki 1995; Kunatuba n.d.-b p. 9; n.d.-a p. 
15). In Rawlinson et al.' s 1993 survey of rural Viti Levu, researchers listed 109 species of fish taken 
from fringing reefs for subsistence and commercial purposes, along with crabs, 14 species of other 
invertebrates, and 14 specimens of 'others'; they recorded an additional 31 species of fish and 11 
species of other organisms taken from lagoon areas (Rawlinson et at. 1995 p. 49-54, 58-91). At least 
another 20 fish species associated with outer reefs are fished, including trevallies (Carangidae) and 
barracudas (Sphyraenidae); these species are generally considered to be in 'less close association' with 
reefs, are less likely to have been fished traditionally, and are now purchased and eaten, along with 
tuna (Richards et al. 1994). This illustrates the general scientific view that the catch from coral reefs is 
frequently composed of species of generalists that are only weakly associated with coral reefs, or of 
species more frequently associated with other ecosystems of food sources such as plankton, sandy 
bottom, or seagrass meadows (MCClanahan et al. 2002 p. 7). 
Fijian fishermen target different food fish, depending on whether or not they intend to sell them. 
Commercial fishermen target white-fleshed carnivorous species such as cods, emperors or snappers. 
Subsistence catches tend to contain a higher percentage of herbivores such as parrotfish, yellowfin 
surgeonfish (balagi), and rabbitfish (nuqa) (Richards et at. 1994 p. 39-40). The size of individual catch 
items taken for sale is generally larger than of those taken for consumption; some of the latter are 
extremely small and well under recommended size limits (Rawlinson et al. 1995 p. 2). Zann (1992) has 
suggested that almost any fish or shellfish above a few centimetres in length and non-toxic in nature is 
likely to be eaten. 
Not only food items are harvested from coral reefs. Coastal villages have also harvested Scleractinian 
corals for 'quite sometime' to use in constructing seawalls and to fabricate ornaments to sell as curios 
(Vial a 1988 p. 1). Coral boulders have also been used in the construction of drains and soakage pits for 
septic tanks since at least 1965, as required by Suva City Council regulations (Viala 1988 p. 1). More 
recently, harvesting of corals, reef rock, fish and other reef organisms for the aquarium trade has 
become a major activity for many costal villages on Viti Levu, a trade discussed further in Chapter 
Twelve (Vunisea 2003). 
Fiji Islanders eat a lot of fish. Recent reports of annual per capita fish consumption vary from 44 to 62 
kilograms, much higher than the world average of 13 kilograms (Gillett and Lightfoot 2002 p. 52). 
Contemporary newspaper stories about Fijian soldiers serving overseas often mention the way they 
miss having fish as a daily dietary item. "Sunday is not Sunday in a Fijian home without fish" (Fong 
1994 p. 40). But quantities of various seafood items consumed throughout the Fiji Islands have never 
been accurately surveyed, only surmised from the occasional small survey as mentioned above and 
from estimates of nationwide domestic sales. 
For coastal communities, reefs and the shallow inshore areas traditionally provided the bulk of animal 
protein that Fijians consumed (Kunatuba n.d.-b p. 3; n.d.-a p. 2). In rural areas, few Fijian households 
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possess refrigeration so fish is eaten the day it is caught. When available, it is eaten at both lunch and 
dinner. Not all fish eaten come from inshore fisheries. In some rural areas cultured fish such as milkfish 
and tilapia are now a significant source of protein. Tinned fish, locally canned tuna (caught offshore) or 
(imported) mackerel, is commonly eaten in urban households, and occasionally in rural ones. In a 
survey of 50 households in three rural Fijian villages, Rawlinson et al. (1995 p. 66-67) found 58 
percent of meals included fresh fish and seven percent tinned fish. In Suva, fresh tuna is also available, 
usually as second grade chilled tuna, in fish and chips for example (pers. obs.). 
As many Fijians now live in urban centres, and/or work as paid labour, proportionately less of the 
popUlation engages in fishing on a regular basis than when the popUlation was predominately rural. 
With this increase in urbanisation and paid employment, demand for fish has increased, along with fish 
prices (Fiji Fisheries Division statistics quoted in Jennings and Polunin 1996 p. 102). 
Reef organisms as economic resources 
The most recent estimate of national annual subsistence catches of finfish, shellfish, seaweed and other 
marine invertebrates is 21,600 tons, valued at FJD 48.6 million (Gillett and Lightfoot 2002 p. 35, 148). 
Much confusion arises over what exactly subsistence might be and what exactly are subsistence 
requirements. In noting that the distinction between subsistence and commercial fishing is becoming 
increasingly blurred, Gillett (2002 p. 4) cited two phenomena that he considered responsible for this-
the increasing monetarization of rural economies, and similarities in production (catch methods 
perhaps) for some species that are both exported and used for subsistence purposes. Certain fisheries in 
the Fiji Islands are routinely labelled as subsistence fisheries despite the fact when describing fishing 
practices within a certain household or village, it is difficult to isolate the subsistence component from 
the commercial one. Furthermore, most women fish without licences and are largely categorised in the 
subsistence sector whether or not they sell their catch (Vunisea 1997 p. 14). 
In many coastal villages and also some inland ones, fishing is the main source of income (Rawlinson et 
at. 1995 p. 1; Veitayaki 1995 p. 12). Much of this coastal fishery is centred on coral reefs and the outer 
slopes of these. (There is also an offshore tuna fishery in the Exclusive Economic Zone). Artisanal or 
small-scale commercial fishing within the country has increased rapidly in the last decade or so (Gillett 
2002 p. 16). Although in the past, fish and fishery products have constituted an important medium of 
exchange between communities, Rawlinson et al. 's 1993 survey in rural Viti Levu suggested that, 
although the sharing of catch between Fijian families has not ceased completely, the increased 
emphasis given to generating cash from selling fish is leaving less fish to share with others (Rawlinson 
etal. 1995 p. 71; Veitayaki 1995 p. 12). 
In their 1993 survey of rural Viti Levu, which covered both coastal and inland communities 
irrespective of ethnicity, Rawlinson ef at. (1995 p. 1) estimated that 16 percent of households sold 
marine products for income, mostly fish but also shellfish and shells. Almost nine percent reported it as 
their major source of income. Far more Fijian households (36.7 percent) sold marine products than 
Indo-Fijian ones (5.2 percent). Most of the households selling marine products did so regularly, more 
than once a week (ibid). Artisanal fisheries products are sold as fresh or frozen through municipal 
markets, hotels, restaurants, cafes, butchers, fish merchants, retail shops and supermarkets, road and 
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riverside stalls, and the national marketing authority (Veitayaki 1992 p. 6). Income from the sale of 
marine products is as important in the outer islands as in rural Viti Levu (Rawlinson et at. 1995 p. 73). 
Certain export fisheries provide a steady income for some rural villages in the Fiji Islands (and 
elsewhere in the region): beche-de-mer, live rock, and trochus shell fisheries, along with fish and other 
reef organisms destined for aquaria. About 20 species of holothurians (sea cucumbers) are processed 
and exported from the region, mostly to Asia. Villagers in remote locations harvest and process the 
animals, drying them into a non-perishable product, beche-de-mer, which can then be stored while 
waiting transport to the market (Gillett 2002 p. 17). Live rock is exported for use in home aquaria 
(described in Chapter Five) The shell of the gastropod Trochus niloticus is a product which villagers in 
remote locations can harvest and store until suitable transport is available to take it to market (Gillett 
2002). It is exported to factories in Asia and Europe, either whole or first processed in Fijian factories 
(Gillett 2002 p. 50). The national scale of those trades in considered in the next sub-section. 
Export trades in reef organisms and reef material 
Amongst Pacific Island groups, the Fiji Islands, Papua New Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Tonga and the Cook Islands have the largest commercial coastal fishery sectors (Gillett 2002). The Fiji 
Fisheries Division reported the total export value of inshore fishery products in 2002 to be FJD 26 
million but detailed export statistics in its annual report suggest this could be higher, as summarised in 
Table 18 below (Fiji Department of Fisheries 2003). By value, the country's main reef products 
exported are beche-de-mer, various other marine invertebrates, shells (either unprocessed, as button 
blanks, or as buttons), coral (both live and dead), ornamental fish, and live rock. Shell exports are 
mainly Trochus niloticus and pearl oysters, either raw shell, button blanks or processed buttons or 
cleaned shells destined for use in furniture inlays and other decorative items (TRAFFIC 1995; Preston 
1997 p. 20). 
TABLE 18: ESTIMATED EXPORT EARNINGS FROM MAJOR INDUSTRIES USING REEF RESOURCES, 
20021 
Industry Export Number of major 
earnings F JD exporting companies 
Beche-de-mer 11.7 million Seven 
Aquarium products 10.2 million Five 
Button blanks (pearl oyster, 5.7 million Three 
trochus) and trochus shell 
Live reef food fish 1.8 million Two 
Source: Fiji Department of Fisheries (2003 p. 3-4,44). 
I In 2002, the exchange rate was around 2.1869 Fijian dollars per US dollar; in 2003 it was 1.8958 and in 
20041.7331 (CIA 2005). 
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DETERMINING THE SIZE OF EXPORT FISHERIES 
There are no reliable data of the quantity or value of exports of reef products from the Fiji Islands; any 
reported data should be viewed with some caution (Gillett and Lightfoot 2002). The Fiji government's 
export statistics are unreliable and independent estimates of some export commodities are markedly 
higher than official government figures. There are many incentives to under-report (officially report as 
exported an amount less than actual quantity exported), and the Customs Authority reportedly regards 
the official recording of fisheries exports as a mere formality (Gillett and Lightfoot 2002 p. 149). Many 
of the categories under which the Fisheries Department collects data are confusing, with some 
products (such as beche-de-mer and giant clams) lumped together; sometimes live and dead specimens 
are not distinguished. 'Official' estimates about the size of the coral export industry, whether live rock, 
live coral, or curio coral, also appear to be unreliable, at least up until late 2003 when they were 
retrospectively reconstructed from industty records, as described in Chapter Twelve, to meet CITES' 
requirements. Curio coral, live coral and live rock were sometimes lumped together in departmental 
statistics, and sometimes separated, without this being specified. In the export statistics, sometimes 
products from different trades are combined (e.g. curio and live corals); sometimes products for one 
trade are differentiated and sometimes they are not (e.g. coral, fish and invertebrates all destined for the 
aquarium trade). There is no consistency. 
This has two implications for this thesis. First, because there is no consistency in reporting, all such 
statistics as quoted in Table 18 and in the text below are difficult to interpret and compare. Such 
statistics give, at best, some idea of the relative size of each export category. Second, this raises the 
issue of how important the accurate use of statistics is to those employing them to justify policy 
interventions-in making a case for the global management of a particular environmental problem such 
as the effects of coral harvesting for instance. This issue is addressed further in Chapter Twelve. 
Coral exports 
Initial exports of coral from the Fiji Islands were of dead specimens destined for the curio market in 
decorative and ornamental items made from coral. This export trade commenced in 1984, and the 
amount exported has steadily risen since, most of the trade being with the US (Viala 1988 p. 1; Lovell 
and Tumuri 1999 p. 30, 39-40). An export trade in live corals, which also commenced in the mid 
1980s, now provides considerably more revenue than the curio coral trade (Ed Lovell, Biological 
Consultants, Suva, pers. comm.). Although revenue figures are not readily available, the live coral trade 
was estimated to have returned around FJD 12 million in 1999 (Smith 1999 p. 8). This trade is targeted 
at the home aquarium market, corals from Pacific Island waters considered to be some of the most 
beautiful specimens available because of their bright colours. At least 56 species of coral are collected 
in the Fiji Islands for live export (Baquero 1999 p. 6). 
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In 2002/3 there were seven companies approved by government to export coral, two concentrating only 
on curio coral, one of which ceased operating around that time (Ed Lovell, Biological Consultants, 
Suva, pel's. comm.). Corals are also exported occasionally for medical purposes and scientific research, 
but only in relatively small quantities (e.g. an estimated 15t in 2001 (Lovell 2001 p. 21; International 
Coral Reef Action Network c.2002)). 
Exports of live reef fish 
Fish are exported live for both the aquarium trade and the trade in food fish, described in Chapter Five. 
Aquarium fish have been collected along the Suva-Beqa-Serua coast of Viti Levu since 1976 (Richards 
et at. 1994 p. 60). The industry has grown steadily since then, with a rapid leap in both quantity and 
value since the late 1990s (see statistics in Richards et at. 1994 p. 60; Fiji Fisheries Division 1998; Fiji 
Department of Fisheries 2003). All aquarium fish operators are based on Viti Levu (Sovaki 2001, also 
statements made by industry people at a Marine Aquarium Council workshop in Suva, May 2002). The 
fish are air-freighted to the west coast of the US and to Europe (Gillett 2002 p. 50). In 2002, an 
estimated 252,525 fish were exported, with a value of FJD 1.2 million (Fiji Department of Fisheries 
2003 p. 44). In 2002-3, there were four companies involved in exporting aquarium fish, another two 
had relocated elsewhere in the Pacific in the late 1990s when it appeared that the Fiji government was 
going to place further controls on the collection and export of marine ornamental fish trade, moves 
discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
In 1998, the Fiji Fisheries Division, as part of their commodity development framework, identified the 
live reef food fish trade (discussed in Chapters Five and Seven) as a potential income-earning project, 
and commenced a trial in conjunction with one overseas operator (Yeeting 1999; Arritt 2002). The 
initial (1998) export of 17,088 live food fish in 2000 was valued at FJD 50,161 (Fiji Fisheries Division 
1998 p. 45; Arritt 2002; Gillett 2002 p. 48). By 2002-3, two licensed operators in the Fiji Islands were 
exporting a total of about 26 tonnes per annum, half from Lau and half from Vanua Levu (Ledua Ovisi, 
Fiji Fisheries Division, Suva, pel's. comm.). These annual exports were valued at around FJD 1.8 
million (Table 18). 
Other reef organisms and material exported for the marine aquarium trade 
Although the worldwide marine aquarium trade included invertebrate species-clams, sea anemones, 
sea stars, sea cucumbers, sea urchins, plus a few other species-it is not clear how many of those are 
exported from Fiji. Presumably amounts of invertebrates exported are small compared to the export of 
ornamental fish; in 2001 the estimated quantities of exports were of 40,000 cultured clams (Tridacna) 
and 22,000 other invertebrates (International Coral Reef Action Network c.2002). 
There is also a thriving trade in the export of live rock chipped from reef flats, usually exported in 
pieces of 15-35 cm diameter (Lovell 2001 p. 10). Although started in 1984, quantities exported have 
risen significantly since 1995 (Sovaki 2001 p. 28; Smith 2002). Live rock is bought and sold by weight 
and for villages participating in the marine aquarium trade, it provides a higher income than exports of 
corals or other reef organisms (Smith 1999 p. 10). In 2000, there were four companies exporting it 
(Sovaki 2001 p. 28). In 2001, an estimated BOOt was exported (Ed Lovell, Biological Consultants, 
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Suva, pel's. comm.). Live sand, composed of carbonate material, is also exported in small quantities for 
use in aquaria, an estimated 63t in 2001 (Lovell and Tumuri 1999 p. 14; International Coral Reef 
Action Network c.2002). 
Fresh and frozen reef fish, shellfish, and beche-de-mer 
The commercial export of shallow water reef fish is not a major industry in the Pacific (Gillett 2002 p. 
17). In 2000 there was a deepwater snapper fishery on the outer reef slopes in Fiji but this appears to 
have since ceased (Gillett 2002 p. 48, Johnson Seeto, lecturer, Marine Studies Programme University 
of the South Pacific, Suva, pers. comm.). Fiji is, however, a significant supplier of beche-de-mer to 
Asia and has been for many years (Preston 1990 p. 401). The trade peaked in 1988 when over 700 
tonnes were exported to China, dropped off, then rose to about the same level in 2002 (Gillett 2002 p. 
50; Fiji Department of Fisheries 2003). These production booms are a response to prices generated by a 
growing demand for the product in Asia (Gillett 2002). Besides beche-de-mer and cultured clams, Fiji 
exports a range of (dead) shellfish and other marine invertebrates including sea crawfish, crabs, 
octopus, oysters, and the adductor muscles of giant clams (Fiji Fisheries Division 1998; Gillett 2002 p. 
17; Fiji Department of Fisheries 2003). In Fisheries Division export statistics, it is difficult to determine 
which fish are from reefs and which are deep sea species. 
TOURISM BASED AROUND CORAL REEFS 
These exports of reef organisms, particularly those of aquarium fish, have been subject of opposition 
from the tourist industry. In 2004, over 480,000 visitors were expected to inject more than USD400 
million into the Fijian economy (FijiSUN 2004). Coral reefs playa significant part in this industry, 
much of which is based around coastal resorts, where snorkelling and diving are key attractions on 
offer. A small but high profile part of the industry is based around live-aboard dive boats. Two British-
based operators, Greenforce and Coral Cay, offer scientific experiences to overseas tourists who pay to 
come to the Fiji Islands and participate in dive surveys monitoring the state of reefs. In addition, a few 
resorts concentrate on surfing reef breaks and have built an international reputation around the quality 
of those breaks. 
The Evolution of Coral Reef Governance 
INDIGENOUS CONTROL OF FIJIAN COASTAL FISHERY RESOURCES 
Having considered the local significance of Fijian coral reefs, I now describe systems of reef 
governance, and the manner in which these evolved. Both land ownership and customary fishing rights, 
as they exist in the Fiji Islands today, reflect traditional and social organisation of Fijian people as 
codified by the British colonial government (Waqairatu 1994 p. 79). These rights are thus a link to a 
pre-colonial past, although not a direct continuance of it. Traditionally, Fijian management 
arrangements for fishing grounds, reefs included, were embedded in the wider social system in which 
traditional Fijian authority is based-a hierarchical system of chiefly authority. The customary 
understandings of resource use that persist, allow access to and ownership of fishing grounds and rights 
(Veitayaki 1995; Vunisea 2002). Large-scale indigenous groups, usually encompassing several 
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villages, retain traditional customary fishing rights over sea, rivers and lakes; in some cases, a tribe 
recognises that certain reefs, lagoons or specific spots belong to a certain sub-group; often a coastal 
village would have its fishing grounds immediately adjacent to the land it owned, for instance 
(Waqairatu 1994 p. 82). Not all those with fishing rights are coastal dwellers however; inland villages 
may have rights to fish a particular area. In the sea, these rights extend from the intertidal to outer reef 
slopes (Veitayaki 1995; Vunisea 2002). Although the state has ownership rights of marine waters up to 
the high-water mark, since these were included in the 1874 Deed of Cession to the British Crown, 
customary owners have legal, proprietary fishing rights over their I qoliqoli (fishing areas), as 
guaranteed under that Deed and assured in later fisheries legislation (Waqairatu 1994). 
The above explanation does not do justice to the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the extent of 
Fijian sovereignty over the sea that has existed since the Cession. Under Clause 4 of the Deed, the 
islands, waters, reefs and foreshores not properly alienated and not needed by Fijians were vested in 
Her Majesty and her successors (Pule a 1991). That established Crown ownership over all reefs and 
territorial waters that contained traditional fishing grounds. At the same time, under Clause 7 of the 
Deed, 'Tui Viti and other high Chiefs' retained their customary fishing rights over their islands, island 
waters and foreshore (Waqairatu 1994 p. 80). After Cession, there was some uncertainty as to the 
ownership of reefs and fishing grounds that were traditionally the property of Fijian communities and 
were required for use and sustenance (Pulea 1991). Traditional owners were, according to some 
reports, baffled by the dual systems that had been established, and the way that modern law and alien 
authority challenged the total authority they previously had over resources (Lagibalavu 1994 p. 270). 
Consequently, the British Governor assured those at a Great Council of Chief meeting on 5 November 
1881 that "measures will be taken for securing for each mataqali the reefs that properly belong to it, in 
the same way as the rest of their land will be secured for them" (reported in Waqairatu 1994 p. 80). 
Such legal measures were subsequently taken during the time of colonial rule lasting until 
independence in 1970, but only slowly. In 1894, Fisheries Ordinance No. III recognised mataqali's 
rights of exclusive fishery on certain reefs and made it unlawful for any other person to fish without 
obtaining a licence. A similar measure was included in the Birds, Game and Fish Protection Ordinance 
of 1923 which stated "it shall be unlawful for any person to fish ... in any water forming part of the 
customary fishing ground of any mataqali unless he shall be a member of such mataqali or shall have 
obtained a licence from the Colonial Secretary". The same provision was subsequently included in 
Section II of the Fisheries Ordinance 1942 Cap 154 (Hornell 1940; Waqairatu 1994 p. 80). In effect, 
this gave the government the right to manage the resources and to permit non-mataqali members to 
exploit the resources. But the 1942 legislation also restricted the powers of the state to determine the 
use of fishing rights by allowing the owners of customary fishing rights to advise the District 
Commissioner and the Fisheries Division about which commercial fishers should be allowed to fish 
their area, also allowing them to impose restrictions on the licences issued by the state2. 
2 An Act to make provision for the regulation of fishing [1 January 1942] Cap 158, s13(2). 
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In 1941, Ordinance No.4 established a Native Fisheries Commission, with the duty to ascertain what 
customary fishing rights were the rightful and hereditary property of native owners and to establish title 
of all customary fishing rights. This provision was subsequently incorporated into the Fisheries Act of 
1942 (Pulea 1991). Thanks to the Commission's work, marine tenure is now well defined and 
registered in most cases (as described in Waqairatu 1994). There are 270 coastal I qoliqoli surveyed 
and registered to Fijian communities (Native Lands and Fisheries Commission, pers. comm. July 
2003). Over the years, the fishing rights of one island only have been alienated (Waqairatu 1994 p. 
79l Those from particular mataqali, yavusa, or any subdivision of these, have the right to fish their 
own area-the area registered by the Native Fisheries Commission in the Register of Native Customary 
Fishing Rights. 
The communal ownership of many I qoliqoli is complex and often disputed (Vunisea 2002 p. 7). Their 
sizes vary tremendously, from one to 5000 square kilometres, but size does not necessarily have any 
relationship to the number of people with rights to fish (Cooke 1994b). Some groups have exclusive 
rights to territories far from their adjacent waters and sometimes separated from rights-holding 
communities by waters belonging to other Fijian groups (Ruddle quoted in Johannes 2002). I am not 
aware of any analysis of the effect that the codification of land rights almost a century earlier had on 
the assignation of I qoliqoli, but I assume there was some impact. 
A report on fisheries management in the Fiji Islands, prepared by the Forum Fisheries Agency (one of 
several Pacific regional intergovernmental agency), sets out one view about who has the right to grant 
approval to fish certain areas, a view that privileges modern law, and the roles of the state and 
government. Referring to provisions in the Fisheries Act that prohibit the taking of fish for commercial 
purposes without a licence, it states that: 
Although the seabed is Crown [sic] property, the Fisheries Act recognises the Fijian 
people's customary right to fish in traditional fishing grounds (qoliqoli), generally from the 
outer edge of the reef to the shore .... All Fijians have the right to fish in their own qoliqoli 
to catch fish for their own consumption. The Act also allows the owners of customary 
fishing rights to advise the District Commissioner and Fisheries Division which commercial 
fishermen shall be allowed to fish in their area and to impose restrictions on commercial 
fishermen. The customary fishing rights law is executed by the Native Lands and Fisheries 
Commission, District Administrations, and Fisheries Division (Richards et al. 1994 p. xix). 
Other descriptions of how this approval system works in practice place more emphasis on the authority 
of Fijian chiefs relative to the government' licensing agents. These alternative descriptions emphasise 
how district commissioners (who are part of the indigenous provincial administration system) issue a 
licence for commercial fishing only after a custodial chief has granted approval (e.g. Yabaki 1994; 
South and Veitayaki 1997 p. 302; Veitayaki 2000a p. 122). The person wishing to fish must first get the 
written consent of the registered qoliqoli owner. The District Commissioner then translates that into a 
written permit to fish, which is redeemable for a licence to fish commercially in that area, issued by the 
Fisheries Division (Cavuilati 1992 p. 50). In order to seek approval from the custodial chief, an 
3 In 1861 the Tui Cakau sold the island of Mago near Vanuabalavu to a European married to his nephew; at the 
same time he gifted its bays, waters, lagoons and even turtles (Waqairatu 1994 p. 79). 
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individual or company approaches him-occasionally a woman is a chief-with a traditional sevusevu 
(presentation ceremony) of yaqona (from which kava is made) or a tabua (a sperm whale tooth), both 
valued items (Yabaki 1994; Bowden-Kerby 2003; Vunisea 2003). This occurs even though the 
Fisheries Act specifies not that fishing rights owners must consent, but that the permit is at the 
discretion of the commissioner who must consult with the customary owners and the Fisheries Division 
(Fong 1994). Because the fisheries legislation states that licences are needed to take fish for trade or 
business, or take fish with other than a spear or portable trap, all Indo-Fijians wishing to fish 
commercially or from a boat must obtain a licence, and in practice, obtain approval from the respective 
chiefs of the areas they wish to fish. 
In addition to the licence fees payable to the Fisheries Division, a system of goodwill payments has 
developed; commercial fishermen wanting access to I qoliqoli are required to pay these to the relevant 
chief each year before he approves a licence (Veitayaki 2000a p. 122). This practice is believed to be 
widespread, with payments ranging up to several thousand dollars, and including liquor, cigarettes and 
other items in some cases (Fong 1994; Pass field 1994; Cooke 1994b p. 63; Bowden-Kerby 2003). In 
1974 the Attorney General declared this practice to be illegal and possibly criminal, although there has 
not been any convictions since that decision (Lagibalavu 1994 p. 271). In 1980, however, the Great 
Council of Chiefs decided that chiefs were justified in demanding payments and the practice continues 
(Cooke 1994b p. 29). 
As well as the power to restrict the number of licences issued to commercial fishermen, the I qoliqoli's 
head also has the power to prevent fishing for certain species or in certain areas, preventing the use of 
certain types of fishing gear, and generally protecting the fishery for the benefit of his own people's 
subsistence needs (Cavuilati 1992 p. 50). In Lau for example, the paramount chief of the province in 
the late 1980s banned the commercial exploitation of fisheries in his domain, arguing that commercial 
fishing makes a mockery of customary marine resource use and promotes a system of resource use 
detrimental to his people (Veitayaki 2000a p. 123). 
Thus, despite the Deed of Cession and despite the Crown assuming ownership of marine waters and 
seabed, there is strong, ongoing expression of indigenous fishing rights and of indigenous control over 
all resources that can be fished from inshore waters and reefs. In practice it is the chiefs-and not all 
chiefs, as only some seem to be giving approvals-who exercise the right to control fishing access to 
areas. 
Since independence, successive Fijian governments have supported this style of governance. For 
instance, when in the 1980s, Cabinet approved guidelines for various fisheries (aquarium fish, bikhe-
de-mer, giant clams, lobsters, and corals), these had a common intent of restricting fishing to Fijian 
nationals as far as practicable, ensuring the fisheries only operated with the approval of resource 
custodians; involving village fishermen as much as possible, and directing fishing first to uninhabited 
islands and reefs (in order to save the reefs for use by villages). The current government's policy 
regarding fishing within any customary fishing rights area is that no commercial fishing activities 
should be undertaken there unless the consent of chiefs and the people having the right to fish is 
obtained (Government of Fiji 2002a). In 1982, the Great Council of Chiefs requested new legislation to 
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clarify the situation and avoid future arguments about ownership of land beneath seas bordering Fijian 
land. Based on this long-standing request from the Great Council of Chiefs, recent governments have 
vowed to ensure, that in law, indigenous Fijian have full ownership rights over customary qoliqoli. The 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) government, elected in 2001, has also made this pledge 
(Pacnews 1999; Pareti 2001). In 2003 this overwhelmingly indigenous SDL government, elected after a 
caretaker government held power for a year after the 2000 coup, announced its intention to prepare 
legislation to transfer full proprietary rights for traditional fishing grounds to indigenous Fijians, to 
remove the confusion over resource ownership. The government began this process shortly afterwards 
(Radio New Zealand 2004). In mid-2004, Cabinet approved, for public consultation, a draft Customary 
Fisheries Bill, intended to confer proprietary ownership of foreshore land, within customary fishing 
rights areas, on the traditional owners of such rights. At the time, MFAT (2004) quoted the Attorney 
General, Senator Qoriniasi Bale, as saying, that "The right conferred does not grant exclusive 
possession to such traditional owners since it will not interfere with the right of public access or the 
right to innocent free passage recognized under international law". Earlier discussion around the bill 
had evoked expressions of concern from the private sector, especially in the tourism industry, which 
fears that access to the foreshore will be affected (ibid). 
Day to day management responsibility for Fijian reef fisheries 
As in many other Pacific Islands countries, local Fijian communities have continued to manage local 
fisheries despite government regulations and the establishment of fisheries departments (Dalzell et al. 
1996). The majority of reef fisheries in Fiji Islands are managed under an approach mixing traditional 
methods with state involvement through a system of honorary fisheries wardens (Cavuilati 1992; 
Jennings and Polunin 1996). The Fisheries Division appoints honorary wardens nominated by the 
qoliqoli owners. These unpaid, part-time wardens are responsible for implementing national fishing 
laws and any restrictions placed on permits. Some wardens receive training from the Fisheries Division 
or from NGOs such as WWF (Matthews et at. 1998 p. 325). 
National regulations are not necessarily enforced or respected (Kailola 1995 p. 4). For instance, 
Jennings and Polunin (1996) found that seasonal closure of the turtle fishery and bans on the collection 
of turtle eggs were sometimes ignored. On some reefs adjacent to urban areas, traditional management 
practices no longer operate, fish yields have decreased and habitat-destructive fishing methods such as 
the use of explosives have been adopted (Jennings and Polunin 1996 p. 102). In national fisheries 
legislation, mataqali members may take fish from their own qoliqoli but need a licence to sell fish as a 
business; these licences are personal to the holder (Kailola 1995 p. 4). There seems, however, to be a 
tendency for indigenous Fijians to regard fishing in their own qoliqoli in order to sell that fish as much 
their right as fishing for subsistence food. Kailola reported that fishing activities of women in particular 
are regarded as subsistence whether or not they are commercial in intent eg fishing for mangrove crabs 
(Kailola 1995 p. 5). Bidesi (1997) reported that Fijian women did not seem aware of the need to have a 
licence for commercial fishing (see also Vunisea (1997 p. 14». 
There are several different types of management method documented in the literature describing 
community fisheries management in the Fiji Islands. These include the banning or placing taboos on 
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certain methods eg dynamite fishing or spearfishing with scuba and fishing gear, often gillnets (Fong 
1994; Veitayaki 2000a). Areas may be closed to fishing (declared tabu), usually for a specific period of 
time, occasionally indefinitely, for the reasons discussed earlier (Veitayaki 1995 p. 142; 2000a p. 124). 
There are several documented instances of Fijian chiefs or communities adopting specific measures to 
address perceived overfishing or declines in catches, summarised in Johannes (2002) and in Veitayaki 
(2000a). For example Fong (1994) described a variety of measures instituted in Macuata Province 
between 1989 and 1994, including beche-de-mer closures, restrictions on gillnet use and on 
spearfishing using scuba. Matthews et al. (1998 p. 223) described how the villagers of Kaba Point, a 
relatively isolated village near Suva, concerned that their fishing catches had declined to a quarter over 
five years, decided to restrict the use of efficient gear such as gillnets, to ban the taking of coral, and to 
protect mangrove forests. Cooke (1994a p. 181) mentioned how communities near Ba in northern Viti 
Levu had closed areas of reef from fishing for a year of more, and placed taboos on dynamite fishing, 
also in response in declines in fish stocks. A World Bank study of six villages listed various restrictions 
made locally (on areas and species able to be fished, days of fishing, techniques, or whether outsiders 
would be allowed to fish) (World Bank 1999). It is possible that many other Fijian communities have 
adopted similar measures, since many of the 270 coastal qoliqoli are unstudied. Other traditional 
practices, although not ostensibly methods of managing fisheries, may also contribute to conservation. 
While these traditional methods are used in some places to restrict the total amount of fish caught by 
limiting the number and types of approval granted, in other places qoliqoli members have disagreed 
with their chiefs over 'excessive' granting of approvals and have cited conflicts between subsistence 
and commercial fishing. This is one of the issues which the Fiji Locally Managed Marine Area 
(FLMMA) initiatives, discussed in Chapter Eleven, seeks to address. (It also aims to stop traditional 
owners passively allowing national officials to make most of the management (as opposed to 
allocation) decisions about fisheries; the extent to which fisheries management decisions are made 
locally occurs varies from qoliqoli to qoliqoli). 
Traditional management arrangements are enforced through traditional authority which means there are 
protocols to follow. The social structure and close-knit units in Fijian communities demand that people 
strictly follow tradition and respect each other. The marine resources are collectively owned, and in 
most communities, management decisions and policies are based on consensus, which ensures the 
cooperation of everyone on the community. The rights of individuals within their collectively owned 
fishing area are related to the groups' consensual position (Veitayaki 1998 p. 51-52). The traditional 
system is an effective way of ensuring compliance. Nonconformists are harshly treated and this is an 
effective deterrent to others in the community (Siwatibau 1984). 
THE EVOLUTION OF STATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
Although interested in protecting rural Fijian's rights to maintain their subsistence livelihood, British 
administrators of the Fiji colony were largely indifferent to fishery marine issues, apart from some high 
value exports of invertebrate species (Adams 1993; Adams 1998 p. 129). In the early years of British 
administration, they passed some fisheries legislation to give a measure of basic protection to stocks of 
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food-fish and shellfish (e.g. The Pearl-shell Ordinance of 1899 and The Trocas Shell Fishing 
Ordinance of 1919), but failed to employ fisheries officers to enforce these (Hornell 1940 p. 1, 45-46). 
To better control professional fishermen, including 'aliens' fishing in Fijian territorial waters, they 
passed legislation in 1942 requiring vessels to be licensed (since customary shore fishing practices did 
not involve boats) (Hornell 1940 p. 19-20). 
Over the years, as problems were perceived the colonial administration added other bits and pieces of 
legislation to protect specific resources (Adams 1993). The Fisheries Regulations Cap 135 1966 
restricted acceptable fish sizes and fishing equipment, licences, and periodic seasonal restrictions. In 
1970, further regulations prohibited the taking, sale, or even possession of triton shells and giant helmet 
shells, a measure arising out of the crown-of-thorns starfish scare in the 1970s (see Chapter Five)-
these shellfish are predators of the starfish. 
It was not until two years before independence in 1970 that a Fisheries Department was established 
separately from the Department of Agriculture (Van Pel 1956; Veitayaki 1995 p. 17). After 
independence, the government focused almost exclusively on fisheries development, set out in national 
five year plans (Veitayaki 1995 p. 17). In 1977 it extended its legislative responsibilities to cover Fiji's 
newly declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), adopting the Marine Spaces Act-Fiji was the first 
nation to sign UNCLOS (Cavuilati 1992p. 45; Adams 1993). Like other post-independence Pacific 
Island state fisheries department, the Fiji Islands government has spent much of its time promoting 
fisheries and aquaculture development, dealing with problems in the commercial export fisheries, and 
managing foreign investors and other externalities (Adams 1998 p. 129; Veitayaki 2000b). 
Today, the Fisheries Division within the Ministry of Fisheries and Forestry administers virtually all 
policy and environmental matters related to oceans and coastal areas; it also issues collecting licences 
for harvesting live coral and any other organisms living in aquatic ecosystems, mostly to Fijian 
villagers rather than to coral traders or companies (Sovaki 2001 p. 27-28). The Department of Lands 
(in the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources) has a minor role concerning licences to extract sand, 
gravel and dead corals plus foreshore occupation licences4. The Department of Environment has a role 
in policy development on environmental matters including biodiversity, as described below. 
State Policy on Coral Reefs 
FISHERIES POLICIES AND CONCERNS ABOUT OVERFISHING 
Fisheries policies, some embodied in legislation, some in guidelines approved by Cabinet, form the 
bulk of the Fiji government's policies about coral reefs. These policies cover export trade in coral, 
marine ornamentals and reef fish exported live for food consumption. They provide for indigenous 
management of coastal fisheries, place regulatory control on some fishing practices, seek to control 
4 Under the Crown Lands Act 1946 Cap 132, the Director of Lands and Survey is responsible for issuing licences 
to extract sand, gravel and dead corals. The Lands Department uses this legislation to issue mining licences to 
those harvesting boulder-like colonies of Porites coral from Suva Harbour, for use in septic tank systems-even 
though these are colonies of live coral (Lovell and Tumuri 1999 p. 37). 
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commercial investment in most reef and lagoon fisheries, and provide for government control over 
exports of fish and fisheries products (Cavuilati 1992 p. 51-52; Gillett 2002). The Fisheries Division 
regulates inshore fisheries, addressing user conflicts and controlling the exploitation of fishery 
products. Its goals are to increase production to satisfy local demand; maximise yields through 
improved regulation, optimising distribution of effort and controlling destructive fishing practices; 
generate employment opportunities through fishing and fish processing; and to add market value to 
marine products for export through improved handling and further processing (Cavuilati 1992 p. 38). 
Current fisheries legislation contains the following centrally-administered state controls on reef 
fisheries, some dating back to colonial days, other added by post-independence governments, and 
consolidated into Fisheries Regulations in 1992: 
e requirements for commercial fishers to be licensed each year; 
e bans on taking of turtle in certain months; and on the taking of triton, helmet shell and porpoise; 
• bans on the export of certain products such as giant clam meat, turtle meat and shell; 
• minimum size limits on several reef fish, trochus, pearl shell, turtle, beche-de-mer and mud crab; 
• gear restrictions on coastal gill nets (minimum net sizes); 
.. bans on certain fishing methods: the use of dynamite and chemicals for catching fish, on driftnets, 
and on gillnets in rivers (Cavuilati 1992 p. 51-52; Gillett 2002 p. 52). 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the Fisheries Division has undertaken little stock assessment. Rather 
than controlling commercial fisheries on the basis of biology, it has largely left their control to 
economic factors (cost of harvesting, purchase, freight, handling costs etcetera) (Kailola 1995 p. 11). 
Stock assessment only became a significant issue in the 1990s when accounts of overfishing 
burgeoned. In the early to mid-1980s reports about Fijian reef fisheries stated that overfishing was 
generally not a problem, although reef fish stocks were under heavy pressure near main population 
centres. Since then both the subsistence and commercial fishing pressure has increased, and there have 
been reports of local depletions of some species and species groups- reports reproduced in the 
GCRMN national status reports summarised in the previous chapter. While there is some concern about 
certain fish species, some species of sea cucumber collected for the beche-de-mer trade, and turtles, the 
prime concern is the depletion of the larger, sedentary invertebrate species. The latter are easily 
collected and an export demand exists (Zann 1992; Fong 1994; Richards et al. 1994 p. 40, 104-109; 
Adams et al. 1996). The gold-lip pearl oyster (Pinctada maxima) and two species of giant clam 
(Tridacna gigas and Hippous hippopus) are already extinct and stocks of another clam species 
Tridacna derasa are considered depauperate (Richards et al. 1994 p. 159; TRAFFIC 1995). According 
to Richards et al. (1994 p. 155), few black-lip oysters remain because of a combination of heavy 
fishing pressure in some places, and land-based pollution in others. Additionally, stocks of trochus 
appear to have steadily declined under exports demands, first for raw shell in the late 1980s, then for 
button-blanks (Richards et al. 1994 p. 149). 
The Fisheries Division has tackled the over-exploitation of sedentary species (mainly giant clam, 
trochus and sea cucumbers) in several ways, including seeking to strengthen the role of traditional 
fishing rights owners, and through publicity to increase awareness about the vulnerability of these 
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species (Cavuilati 1992 p. 46-47). Other strategies have included the culture and export of giant clams; 
restocking areas which have been overexploited (beche-de-mer and pearl oysters); encouraging 
alternative sources of income (e.g. cultured seaweed, milkfish, and tilapia) and diverting effort to 
offshore areas, supplying fish aggregating devices for instance (Gillett 2002). As well as controlling 
some exports through legislative means, it has encouraged the establishment of exporters' associations 
prepared to take a responsible attitude towards fishery exploitation. 
CORAL REEF CONCERNS IN OTHER GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Environmental policies 
As well as fisheries legislation, the Fiji Islands has a suite of laws concerned with environmental 
management. Most of these are a relic of the colonial period when environmental issues were sectoral 
and, compared to today, of limited scope. At least 25 Acts, administered by 14 different ministries, 
government or statutory agencies contain environmental management provisions. Most of these laws 
are either old or ineffective in the modern context, or are not enforced for various reasons (Pulea 1991; 
Government of Fiji 2002a). The government of the Fiji Islands has signed many international 
conventions relating to environmental matters (listed in Appendix II of Turnbull 2001). Several, some 
regional and some more truly international in scope, contain provisions concerning the coastal and 
marine environment, although none relates specifically to coral reefs. The government has yet to meet 
many of its obligations it undertook when signing those agreements (Turnbull 2001). 
It has, however, adopted a (non-statutory) national environmental management strategy, prepared by 
Asian Development Bank consultants in an effort to rationalise and modernise the country's 
environmental management, and approved by Cabinet in 1993 (described in Turnbull 2001). Much of 
that strategy is yet to be implemented, although the government drafted a Sustainable Development Bill 
which, after several drafting changes, severe editing over almost ten years, and a recent name change to 
the Environment Management Bill 2004, has been approved by Cabinet and is scheduled to be tabled in 
Parliament (Kumar 2004). The downsized, redrafted and renamed bill requires certain national 
environmental reports and plans, amends the current system for environmental impact assessment of 
development proposals, and adds a permitting system for pollution control and waste management 
(Kumar 2004 p. 150-151). 
Although coral reefs occupy an important role in the lives of Fiji Islanders, the state did not accord 
them a significant place in policies developed in order to bring the Fiji Islands into line with 
international environmental standards, at least until 2003 and the events described in Chapters Eleven 
and Twelve (concerning locally-managed marine areas and the control of trade in reef organisms, 
respectively). For the government, reefs are a key political resource in its efforts to cement its electoral 
support amongst indigenous Fijians. Perhaps for this reason, most of the state governance arrangements 
covering reefs were (and indeed still are) targeted at fisheries, a legacy of the colonial administration 
which initiated fisheries legislation. In seeking to ensure that legal ownership rights of customary 
coastal fishing areas reside with indigenous Fijian qoliqoli members, the government is planning to 
reduce the state's governance role in reef fisheries to an advisory one. The responsibility for setting 
policy would, presumably, then reside entirely with the qoliqoli owners. 
The SDl Government's development policies 
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The SDL government, under the leadership of Laisenia Qarase who had also headed the previous 
caretaker government, prepared two mEUor strategic planning documents that collectively contain its 
overall policy framework. One is the 20-Year Development Plan (2001-2020)for the Enhancement of 
Participation of Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the Socio-Economic Development of Fiji, 
commonly referred to as the blueprint for affirmative action, which Qarase and his SDL team promoted 
extensively during the 2001 pre-election campaign. The other is the Strategic Development Plan: 2003-
2005 (respectively Government of Fiji 2002b; Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2002). 
The sections on fisheries in these documents express the government's goal of sustainable utilisation 
and development of fisheries and marine resources and contain policies to support development of the 
sector, promote production and export of value-added fisheries products, and provide appropriate 
institutional and physical infrastructure. The blueprint also expressed the government's intention of 
promoting indigenous Fijian participation through ownership in/of marine resources and marine 
resource processing companies (Government of Fiji 2002b; Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
2002). As general aspirations for coastal fisheries, these differed little from the government fisheries 
policies during the 1980s, except the explicit desire to see more indigenous ownership of processing 
companies as well as of marine resources. What was new, however, is the way that the government's 
commitment to the state's obligation to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of indigenous 
Fijians and Rotumans share the stage with its aspirations for 'proper' environmental management and 
sustainable use of natural resources, as expressed in the section on environment in the strategic 
development plan. That section was derived in part from the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
adopted at WSSD, which the Prime Minister and a government delegation attended. 
Neither strategy document directs much attention to coral reefs, although the strategic development 
plan does acknowledge that some reefs are under threat from pollution, erosion and mining. It also 
states that unsustainable use of resources in the artisanal fishery is becoming a concern, and that 
crustacean, mollusc and beche-de-mer fisheries are under "considerable management pressure" 
(Government of Fiji 2002b p. 7.4). But the only specific commitments to addressing these impacts are a 
proposed moratorium on reef mining and national controls on coral harvesting. There is a general 
commitment towards having provisions related to fisheries resources in the Sustainable Development 
Bill (now superseded by new legislation explained in Chapter Twelve), plus a commitment to preparing 
a management plan for customary fisheries rights. 
Biodiversity policy 
Since 1997, the government has been developing a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, in 
accordance with its obligations under the CBD. A Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant 
administered by UNDP funded this initiall/ . The SOL Cabinet reviewed progress in 2003, and 
allocated the task of supervising implementation of the plan to the Department of Environment, 
al though not approving the strategy as government policy (Department of Environment 2003). 
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The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) is a list of 104 planned actions, designed 
to give effect to 27 objectives. It ma kes no specific mention of coral reefs; these are encompassed with 
provisions about marine resources. The strategy provides for the effective management of both 
threatened species and spec ies of cultural significance, and of invasive species. It seeks to establish a 
omprehensive and representative core protected areas system supplemented by conservation areas set 
up by lando\ ners and traditional fishing rights owners (Government of Fiji c.2003;. Running through 
Lhe strategy is the notion that communities have an important role to play in the management of 
qoliqoli and : hould be treated fairly, and supported and assisted to conserve biodiversity and to 
preserve traditional knowledge, innovation and practices. 1t encourages traditional I~shing communities 
10 actively manage their qoliqoli and to establish or reinforce protected areas through appropriate 
traditional conservation measures (Action 20 in Government of Fiji c.2003) . This echoes the same 
preoccupat ion with indigenous rights seen in the SDL government's development policies. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has begun to explore, not just the relationship between people and coral reefs in the Fiji 
[slands, but the various stories, narratives, arguments, and discourses that shape those perceptions and 
influence pol icy. For Suva, as a meeting place for those storylines and discourses, is the place where 
lhe international meets the local in matters of policy. The international environmental policy discourse 
i pervasiv> in the city-in documents of agencies concerned with environmental and development 
matters, in the everyday talk of those working in agencies (state , non-governmental and 
In tergovernmental) , and in the media. Yet there are other discourses present, influencing policy, as the 
expression of indigenous rights in the government's environmental and fisheries policies illustrates. 
There is a g p between the pressing political concerns of the Fiji government and the discourse of 
global envi ronmental policy . The exigencies of electoral competition are driving forms of devolution, 
privileging some local interests , and pushing national environmental policy in a particular direction. At 
the same time, the state bureaucracy, agency by agency and institution by institution , engages in 
international environmental policy relations on the one side and relations of local control and 
governance on the other. This then is the backdrop for recent efforts to enrol the Fij i Islands into the 
imagined crisis facing coral reefs worldwide, explored in the next three chapters. 
~ Project FIJ/97/G31: budget USD 197.925 (www.u ntl p.~lrg . 1j1 Tll!rgy.En\irunmenl.GEF.i1lm accessed 15 June 
2001) 
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Chapter Ten 
The Role of Local Agency in Determining the Fate of 
'Foreign' Discourses 
Introduction 
In the sphere of international policy, Suva is a moment in which the global is being invented afresh, 
akin to Amin's (2004 p. 43) "forcing ground for challenges that are thrown up when difference is 
gathered so visibly in one place and when a globality of myriad flows and connections is temporarily 
halted in one place". Here, different discourses, narratives and expert policy technologies meet and 
mix. The discourse of global environmental policy meets development discourse meets a discourse 
about indigenous rights with its storyline of rightful Fijian ownership of reefs. Stories about the 
uniqueness of Fijian culture and the close relationships of Fijians to land and sea, summarised in the 
last chapter, mix with environmental narratives about the need to protect coastal and marine 
environments and the coral reef crisis narrative. The result is a melange, a messy reality. 
Continuing from Chapter Eight's descriptions of how GCRMN national reports are constructed and 
Fijian reefs incorporated into the global crisis facing coral reefs, this chapter examines how, in Suva, 
local agency at the intersection of various discourses, shapes local policy. Establishing a theoretical 
argument about how local agency co-opts and uses environmental discourses of foreign origin, it 
discusses three examples: the ideas of sustainable development and vulnerability, and the crisis 
narrative. 
The Nexus of Agency and Discourse 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DISCOURSE IN SUVA 
HABITUS 
The Fiji Islands and the Crisis Narrative 
TEXTS ON CORAL REEF DEGRADATION: SITES OF ENCOUNTER IN SUVA 
GCRMN IN THE FIJI ISLANDS 
CONCLUSION 
The Nexus of Agency and Discourse 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DISCOURSE IN SUVA 
In Suva, links with 'the outside' through foreign aid and diplomacy are strong, providing a conduit for 
discourses of 'foreign' origin to reach the Fiji Islands. This is especially so in environmental matters. 
The Fiji Department of Environment relies heavily on overseas aid, using aid funds to undertake almost 
all its programmes (Bhaskaran Nair, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Housing and 
Environmentpers. camm. July 2001, quoted in Turnbull 2001). The NBSAP and the Sustainable 
Development Bill (in the form it was before being shortened and redrafted as the Environment 
Management Bill 2004) were two outcomes from a raft of environmental aid projects directed at the 
Fiji Islands over the last twenty-five years (Turnbull 2001). As a result, the Fiji Islands has been 
incorporated into the sphere of the discourse of global environmental policy. 
Sustainable development 
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The concept of sustainable development is particularly visible. Almost everyday, Suva's daily 
newspapers run stories about one or other initiative designed to deliver sustainable development. In a 
previous study of environmental management techniques in the Fiji Islands, I showed that elite in 
government have co-opted the concept of sustainable development for the purpose of promoting 
indigenous peoples' rights to development. As a result, those practices have far less rational and 
democratic bases than one would expect either from the underlying logic of the techniques used (such 
as environmental impact assessment and environmental planning), or from the way those techniques 
are applied in western, industrialised countries (Turnbull 2001; Turnbull 2004 p. 64). 
The chiefly elite have much to gain from promoting, on one hand, the communal ownership 
of native land and fishing rights, and chiefly income from this and, on the other hand, 
further economic development in Fiji in which they invest (Ward 1995: 247-8). They 
actively promote the state-led model of development, involving the government in attempts 
to control the course of economic development. Ward (ibid) suggested that it does not 
matter that these ideas (communal land ownership and economic development) may be 
antipathetic, so long as they are kept on separate levels-achievable provided the Fijian 
elite continue to control both the discourses and the political stage. Western methods of 
environmental management have been applied in the Fiji Islands state sector in ways that 
avoid bringing these different discourses-that of economic development and that of Fijian 
communal land tenure and leasing-into conflict. This can be seen in the way government 
is using conservation to divert attention from the differences between the lifestyles of urban 
political and social elite and those in rural villages, by offering development, including 
access to overseas funding, and development through conservation and ecotourism 
initiatives. It can be seen in the practices of environmental impact assessment, 
environmental planning and protected area practices. This pattern is clear even though 
various parts of the state apply these three environmental management techniques in ways 
that are poorly co-ordinated, without any overall statutory framework for environmental 
management. It has been achieved through the way the state refrains from developing policy 
about appropriate environmental quality (since any national standards developed should 
also be applied to apply to native land); restricts and avoids public participation (since this 
would give others a chance to comment on practices of indigenous Fijians); generally 
avoids assessing threats to the environment, native flora and fauna except in the context of 
hotel investments and some industrial developments (overlooking indigenous use of native 
land and coastal areas); and steers away from monitoring changes in environmental quality 
especially on native land. Governments have refrained from implementing plans prepared 
on their behalf when these do not give adequate consideration to Fijians' rights to use native 
land-the national environmental management strategy, for example (Turnbull 2004). 
These elite are cooperating in international ventures such as aid projects and capacity-building not 
because they may have been socialised into the discourse of global environmental policy and thus into 
thinking cooperation is appropriate and good for all. Instead, as this example shows, people are co-
opting key storylines reflecting discourse to suit their particular, local situation and interests. These 
dynamics and interests are driving the way the state interprets and applies the concept of sustainable 
development. This is why the state's use of these environmental management techniques does not 
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appear to be sustainable development as it is more widely known: a way of involving the citizenry in 
decisions about the desired quality of that environment, allied with a precautionary use of state 
regulation and ecological controls to prevent environmental damage before it occurs, both combined 
with the pursuit of economic growth. This realisation, that an elite cadre are employing a combination 
of storylines as political as well as economic resources, is important in understanding the connections 
between the international and Fiji Islands on matters of coral reef policy examined here and in the next 
two chapters. 
An example: the vulnerability argument 
The storyline about the vulnerability of small island developing states is another example of how, in the 
Pacific Islands, local agency is co-opting and transforming the discourse of global environmental 
policy. This is an outwardly-directed argument, found in policy engagements where the Fiji Islands are 
connected to the international sphere of policy. It has become routinely espoused in many political 
settings both within and outside the Pacific. Although sometimes centred just on environmental 
vulnerability, it generally concerns various types of vulnerability, and is applied not just to Pacific 
Islands but to small island states around the world. In part, this concern about vulnerability derives 
from fears of impending climate change, backed by the scientific predictions summarised in the text 
box below. 
Despite uncertainties in the predictions for the region, mentioned in the text box, Pacific Island 
governments view climate change as a major disaster and have openly and repeatedly criticised the 
industrial nations for failing to take definitive steps towards abating pollution of the global atmosphere 
(UNESCAP 2000). In particular the governments of Tuvalu and Kiribati, along with the Maldives in 
the Indian Ocean, whose nations are entirely based on extremely low-lying coral atolls, have been 
calling for international action to slow climate change (WWF c.2003b). The Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) has been particularly vocal in forwarding this argument. AOSIS was formed at the 
Second World Climate Conference in 1990, in response to concerns about impending climate change 
on the small islands. It was formally convened as a negotiating group in time for the first meeting of 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, held 
in early 1991 (AOSIS c.2002). AOSIS ensured some basic positions and concerns of island states were 
reflected in the convention. The alliance continues to playa significant role in negotiations, pushing its 
policy agendas at WSSD, and at the Barbados Programme of Action Plus Ten meeting in Mauritius. 
CLIMATE CHANGE PREDICTIONS FOR PACIFIC ISLANDS 
Predictions about climate change in the Pacific Islands region, based on the four climate change 
models used by the IPCC plus a few more intensive studies, suggest that there will be significant 
changes in mean climate and increases in sea-level in the region. According to the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report Oil Imparts, Adaptatioll, and Vulllerability, the projected increase in mean annual 
temperatures for the Pacific Islands region to the 2050s is 1.6 degrees Celsius; to the 2080s it is 
2.5 degrees Celsius. Sea levels are likely to rise, region-wide sea-levels continuing to track global 
trends in the longer term. These predictions are presented with less certainty than the IPCC's 
global predictions, regional trends being are less clear than global ones. 
In the Pacific Islands region, concern centres not so much on slow trends in mean conditions, but 
on the effects of more frequent extreme weather and climate events. There is already large 
interannual variability induced by the EI Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon. \Vhile 
the IPCC report suggested that there is likely to be little change or small increases in the 
amplitude of EI Nino events over the next 100 years, more recent trends indicate that surface 
temperatures in the tropical Pacific are becoming more EI Nino-like, a trend that many models 
project will continue. The combined effect of a predicted increase in the intensity of cyclones 
(increased maximum tropical wind speeds and lower central pressures) and sea-level rise are 
considered a major threat to the region. 
There is, however, still considerable uncertainty over how climate may be changing and how this 
will affect the Pacific Islands. There is, for instance, some doubt about whether the intense EI 
Nino events of 1982 and 1997 resulted from a natural variability in global temperatures, rather 
than from human influences (such variability being discussed in Cobb et al. 2003, for instance). 
Natural shifts in sea-level associated with the recurring ice ages complicate predictions about how 
severe any sea-level rise associated with global warming might be. There are also difficulties in 
predicting sea-level changes at local level. Regional trends in sea-level rise are complicated by 
geological processes that cause land to uplift or subside; there is also some debate over the 
appropriate timescale at which to monitor sea-level changes. 
Source: UNESCAP (2000); Hay (c.2001) 
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The argument about the vulnerability of Pacific Islands states is being derived from a much broader 
spectrum that just climate change, however. The texts of AOSIS are full of references to various types 
and sources of vulnerability: vulnerability to natural disasters, ecological and environmental 
vulnerability generally, economic vulnerability, vulnerability to exogenous economic and financial 
shocks, and to globalisation generally. Their basic argument is that as small island developing states 
seek sustainable development, they face disadvantages, some geographical, some economic, some 
environmental. They therefore require special attention to ensure their unique concerns are taken into 
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account. They need assistance to "build and retain the capacity to achieve sustainable development and 
a degree of self-sufficiency" (AOSIS 2002). They need "the right technology, information and capacity 
training to undertake adaptation strategies ... [and they need] access to adequate and predictable sources 
of financial assistance so they can effectively undertake adaptation activities" (Slade 2002). SPREP has 
played a key role in getting small island developing states recognised as a special case for environment 
and development, first as part of Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit in 1992; then through the Barbados 
Programme of Action which elaborated upon this in 1995, and at WSSD in 2002 which re-accepted it 
(Tutangata 2002; AOSIS c.2002). SOPAC has developed an environmental vulnerability index, 
comparing countries, first within the Pacific then around the world (Kaly and Pratt 2000). Vulnerability 
has thus become a comparative measure, a way for governments to measure their vulnerability relative 
to others, and thus to judge whether they should receive international priority for special attention and 
what degree of assistance they deserve. 
This notion of the fragility and vulnerability of the Pacific environment requiring special care recurs 
throughout the regional environmental plans prepared by SPREP. In many regional policy documents, 
the adjective 'fragile' is used to describe the Pacific environment as if the two concepts always go 
together (SPREP 1998 p. ii; 1999 p. 1). The concept has become black-boxed-this is a discursive 
mechanism: when an object is black-boxed it no longer needs to be reconsidered or justified and the 
contents of the metaphorical box become a matter of indifference (Hajer 1995 p. 272). The basis for 
describing the environment as vulnerable and fragile is generalised, ignoring differences between and 
within Pacific island countries (as I argued in Turnbull 2001). This supports the implicit argument that 
the entire Pacific Island environment is in need of special care and therefore requires external 
assistance to address environmental problems. The contrasting argument, that Pacific Island socio-
ecological systems are resilient, as argued by Barnett (2001 p. 986-987), could also be interpreted as 
empowering. Yet it barely features in regional policy discourse, occurring only in some documents 
related to climate change, including adaptation assessments and suggestions (such as Hay and Sem's 
(2000) regional synthesis of national assessments of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change). 
By stressing their vulnerability, small island states such as the Fiji Islands are emphasising both their 
moral authority and their demands for special treatment and compensatory counteraction. Victimhood 
can be provocatively empowering, as Chappell highlighted (1995 p. 309-310). Ratuva (1993) has 
pointed out how at USP, perceptions of the smallness, fragility, and vulnerability (geographic, social, 
economic and political) have been emphasised in various disciplines in the social and physical 
sciences, resulting in a burgeoning number of experts in all aspects of Pacific life. "Pacific business, 
Pacific economics, Pacific banking, Pacific cooperatives, Pacific accounting, Pacific management and 
Pacific this and that. They legitimize their existence by capitalizing on our smallness ... in the process 
carving out small empires they claim to be exclusively theirs" (1993 p. 95). This is another example of 
how elite in the Fiji Islands employ concepts (of development and environmental policy) to suit their 
own situation and interests. 
Although the vulnerability argument originated in dependency theory in opposition to modernisation 
theory's view of developing countries, and it underpinned Third World ism as discussed in Chapter 
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Two, it has since metamorphosed into a form of neo-Gramscian consent to modernisation theory's 
domination of the environmental-development nexus in contemporary international policy. Included in 
the argument about vulnerability of small island developing states is an agreement to cooperate in 
matters of international policy, an agreement made without letting hold of the idea that the North is to 
blame for environmental problems (global warming being the classic example) and should therefore 
pay to fix them. In other words, the espousal of island vulnerability has changed from an external 
critique of modernisation theory, to an internal one sensu Banuri, further strengthening that theory. 
Thus, following this line of theoretical argument, the transformation of discourses is not necessarily the 
result of networks of resistance operating perpetually among dominant, hegemonic discourses and 
subjugated knowledges as Bakhtin theorised (as discussed in Litfin 1994 p. 38). It may well be the 
result of employing or co-opting storylines to suit a particular interest group, maybe a professional 
group-but not necessarily a subjugated group or one intending resistance. Rather, it may be a group 
that sees the advantages of certain storylines, co-opts them, and adapts them to suit its own interests. 
The concept of habitus (discussed in Chapter Four) adds another perspective to this. Following 
Bourdieu's concepts, experts and elites have a habitus they use strategically. Habitus gives them 
command of a range of expert discourses (such as sustainable development and vulnerability), their 
expertise being constituted by showing that they can draw on these to 'solve' local problems of 
concern. This, in turn, confirms them as experts in their field. 
In the following section, I employ this concept when analysing the (dis)connections between the coral 
reef crisis narrative, various international efforts collecting data on the state of Fijian reefs, and formal 
government policy. I show how habitus and the strategic use of discourses can entail choosing not to 
reproduce, in local situations, certain storylines that arrive from overseas, or choosing to reproduce 
them selectively. 
The Fiji Islands and the Crisis Narrative 
TeXTS ON CORAL REEF DEGRADATION: SITES OF ENCOUNTER IN SUVA 
Amongst those working on GCRMN matters in Suva, one would expect to hear discussions of the crisis 
facing coral reefs, as imagined in that narrative. In encouraging local coordinators from Pacific Islands 
and other developing regions to attend various international workshops and meetings (such as the 
International Coral Reef Symposia in Bali in 2000 and Okinawa in 2004), and paying the costs of those 
trips, GCRMN has kept those people (such as Reuben Sulu, Chapter One) immersed in the particular 
storylines and arguments that characterise these endeavours. Yet, outside of the national and regional 
reports prepared according to the standard format and sent off to be incorporated into the global status 
report, these connections have not been extended across the city of Suva (pel's. obs.; also interviews). 
In the Fiji Islands, narratives, stories and images about national and global coral reef degradation are 
encountered mostly in Suva. At USP they are to be found in the texts and papers used for courses, in 
the library, and in the physical process of preparing country and region reports for the GCRMN global 
status reports. They are encountered at regional meetings and workshops convened by USP or other 
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regional Pacific agencies such as SPC and SPREP-for example, the ICRI Pacific workshop in 1995, 
SPREP's marine aquarium trade workshop in Nadi in 2001, and a live reef fish food trade workshop in 
Suva in 2002. They are to be found in the documents produced by those regional agencies and sent to 
other regional agencies and to government and academic agencies based in Suva (SPREP's ICRI 
strategy produced in 1996, for example). These narratives, stories and images about coral reef 
degradation are also encountered in documents which local NGO offices obtain through their 
communications with sister offices around the world, with other NGOs, and in meetings amongst NGO 
staff. IGOs and MEAs incorporate those narratives, stories and images about coral reef degradation 
into the text of documents and communications (e.g. the Green and Shirley report on the coral trade), 
which are then sent to government departments, such as the department of fisheries and environment, 
and the Prime Ministers office. 
The notion that coral reefs are a problem is being incorporated into reports prepared for and by regional 
Pacific agencies, including SPREP's state of the environment reports on the Pacific, and consultancy 
papers on climate change such as Hay and Sem (2000),s valuation and regional synthesis of national 
assessments of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, prepared for SPREP. It was incorporated 
into a Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment for Fiji prepared by International Global Change 
Institute of the University of Waikato in partnership with SPREP and the PICCAP Fiji Country Team 
in 2000. That report recommended protecting coral reef systems by reducing coral extraction activities, 
siltation and pollution incidence (Government of Fiji 2004 p. 19-20). 
Although those discussions and texts may refer to coral reef degradation, the crisis narrative, described 
in Chapter Six, is found only occasionally. During four years of research in the Fiji Islands, at a time 
when the notion that coral reefs were facing a worldwide crisis was already topical overseas, it became 
apparent to me that the idea that coral reefs are being degraded around the world to such an extent that 
they are facing a worldwide crisis has not been disseminated successfully to the Fiji Islands. For 
instance, at the Pacific Islands Regional Oceans Forum held in Suva in February 2004, coral reef 
degradation was not considered a significant issue worthy of note: there were no ICRI or GCRMN 
presentations on the state of Pacific reefs. Nor was the coral reef crisis mentioned in the Pacific Islands 
Regional Oceans Policy which the Marine Sector Working Group of the Council of Regional 
Organisations in the South Pacific and which Forum leaders endorsed in 2002 (this is available on 
The coral reef crisis does not feature in the draft 
national assessment report that the Fijian government prepared for Barbados Programme of Action Plus 
Ten; although coral reefs are mentioned a few times in this, there is no sense of crisis (Government of 
Fiji 2004). At a WWF workshop designed to prepare a vision for the conservation of Fiji's marine 
biodiversity (discussed in Chapter Eleven), the facilitators did not cite the global coral reef crisis as 
justification for the process they were asking participants to perform; in justifying the workshop they 
simply referred to general international concerns about the loss of biodiversity. The effects of 
widespread coral bleaching are barely mentioned in any reports on the Fiji Islands or recent 
environmental forums concerned with coral reefs. Although the coral reef crisis narrative is reaching 
Suva, through news items, scientific papers, NGO campaign literature and web sites, policy and 
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meeting papers of IGOs, scientific and ecological text books, it is not being embedded into government 
policy, an active field of endeavour in that city. 
Fiji Islanders are being encouraged into cooperating in international coral reef policy matters by the 
discourse of global environmental policy rather than by the coral reef crisis narrative per se, the 
discourse being pervasive in Suva. The next two chapters examine various examples of this 
cooperation, ranging from NGO conservation projects to government regulation to market-based 
certification scheme. But first, this chapter concludes by re-examining the various initiatives assessing 
the state of Fijian reefs, described in Chapter Eight. 
GCRMN IN THE FIJI ISLANDS 
The data that these initiatives generate and feed into overseas-based databases is potentially available 
to inform Fijian domestic policy. Yet, in domestic policy debates little use is being made of the 
overview of the state of reefs and reef management compiled as part of the GCRMN status reporting. 
Policy analysts and decision-makers in various Fijian government departments generally have poor 
access to the data generated by these international initiatives assessing the state of reef health. There is 
no central data pool or single point of responsibility for reef health within government; and no central 
collection in Fiji of all the relevant data on Fijian reefs or even the collection of all material in a single 
library. Indeed, much of the Fijian material listed in the literature section of ReefBase is not in any of 
the regional or government libraries (in August 2004, there were 178 references on the Fiji Islands 
listed, 20 able to be downloaded in full). Not all GCRMN global status reports are in Fijian libraries. 
Many government staff, unless they are employed on an international aid-funded project or towards the 
top rungs of the Fijian public service, do not have good Internet access or even reliable printing and 
photocopying facilities. Accessing ReefBase, the CITES database of coral exports, and a Global 
Marine Aquarium Database run by WCMC, all of which are Internet based, is therefore problematic for 
many (and impossible and unthought-offor villagers). 
There is little awareness in Fijian policy circles of the data and reports available on the state of Fiji's 
reefs. A topical example of this is the preparation of Fiji's national assessment report for the Barbados 
Programme of Action Plus Ten, a significant international policy process. The National Planning 
Office policy analyst drafting this national report (collating input from various departments) had 
included only a few snippets about coral reefs provided to him and, when interviewed in early 2004, 
was unaware of ReefBase, the GCRMN or its status reports (Josefa Sania, Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning, Suva, pel's. camm.). Yet he was not new to the task, having prepared the national 
report for WSSD. 
None of these international initiatives gathering data of the health of Fijian reefs are organised to 
forward data in a useful form to those parts of government that formulate policy about coral reefs. 
Furthermore, Fijian communities owning the rights to fish reefs do not have access to the information 
being collected for international reports and databases, nor (with the exception of some Coral Cay and 
Greenforce work) is any effort being made to communicate it to them. 
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While the local office of GCRMN collects data from a wide range of sources and sends it to Penang 
(the World Fish Centre) and to Townsville (the GCRMN global coordinator) to be incorporated into 
international reports and databases, this in itself does not make it accessible to policymakers in the Fiji 
Islands. Reef Check and academic researchers do not have any systems organised to forward their 
information on the state of Fijian reefs to policy analysts, nor to the communities with rights to fish 
qoliqoli. Scientific tourism operators do have a direct link to policymakers. As a condition of their 
permits to operate, these operators forward material to the Tourism Department. But those reports are 
not in a format that departmental staff can easily use in formulating government policy (Manoa Malani, 
Tourism Department, Suva, pel's. comm.). They are little more than sets of data, and are not put into a 
context that departmental policy analysts find useful. 
Interpreting the (dis)connection 
As Chapter Eight showed, orthodox accounts of coral reef policy (such as the GCRMN global status 
reports) are couched in the language of capacity building and tend to attribute the fact that information 
on the state of Fijian and other Third World reefs has not been incorporated into government policy to 
local, technical factors such as inadequate technical equipment, poor access to data and no central data 
pool within government; they label those as a lack of capacity, resources and experience. Inadequate 
technical equipment, poor access to data and lack of a central data pool are obviously part of the reason 
why these reef data are not being used to shape national policy. So too are the difficulties posed by 
multiple projects concentrated on the same set of reefs-disparate forms of data held in different 
locations and published in different formats. 
But these difficulties are not the only reason. These international monitoring and assessment initiatives 
do not themselves contain specific mechanisms designed to connect to policy processes within the 
countries where data are collected. Furthermore, nobody involved in the international governance of 
these endeavours seems to be making a conscious effort to remedy this, and those prepared to fund 
international coordination appear reluctant to fund participation in local policy processes. While the 
international managers of the ICRI and GCRM networks have made considerable effort to connect with 
international policy organisations and events, they have not directed the same effort to ensuring the 
local parts of their networks are connected into domestic policy processes. These monitoring and 
assessment initiatives do not themselves contain specific mechanisms designed to connect to policy 
processes within the countries where they collect data. Although the GCRMN is designed to reach out 
to policy makers, it has not had the mechanisms to disseminate any policy messages through its current 
mode of operation in the Pacific. (This may change as WorldFish Centre opens a ReefBase office in 
Noumea, New Caledonia, with French funding; see Chapter Seven). With this potential exception, 
those prepared to fund international coordination appear reluctant to fund participation in local policy 
processes (a view expressed by Southwest Pacific GCRMN node coordinators at USP, Cameron Hay 
and Reuben Sulu, pel's. comms). Instead, they concentrate on funding top-down coordination, assuming 
that governments (ie of those countries with reefs) should take on the role of disseminating their policy 
ideas locally role. In other worlds, they assume that because they (the donors) see this as a priority, so 
too, should those governments. The international managers of the ICRI and GCRM networks have 
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made considerable effort to connect with international policy organisations and events (Chapter Seven). 
They have not, however, directed the same effort to ensuring local parts of their networks are 
connected into domestic policy processes in the Pacific (various interviews and observations in Suva; 
and with Mary Power, Pacific Regional Environment Programme, Apia). 
There has been a tendency in the texts of GCRMN and ICRI to describe any lack of connection, or 
lessons not being taken up into national policy, as a 'failure' and to attribute it to a lack of local 
political will and of 'capacity' (e.g., Wilkinson 2004 p 8, 31). In these orthodox accounts, there is no 
place for explaining this failure to utilise data on coral reef degradation to form remedial national 
policies as a deliberate priority-setting decision on the part of those agencies. While orthodoxy might 
see this 'failure' as part of planned capacity-building projects to be realised when funding become 
available, it cannot, however, see it as directly reflecting these international agencies' political 
priorities and these international experts' professional interests. Orthodoxy cannot perceive of this 
'failure' as deliberate decision on behalf of those managing the international operations of these 
ventures to concentrate on the international sphere of policy from where the professional rewards and 
funding come. 
Nor does orthodoxy conceive of GCRMN node coordinators-the gatekeepers of information on the 
state of Fijian reefs-making a deliberate decision not to pass on the information to government. 
Orthodox, modernist interpretations of agents in the discursive field of international environmental 
policy see local people as either following (and therefore socialised into) the orthodox thinking and 
practices of the field, or as failing to follow proper environmental practices, and therefore lacking in 
'capacity', technical expertise and experience. 
Amongst those in Suva involved in the GCRMN process of compiling the status reports, and in the 
node coordination generally, there has been a reluctance to push the GRCMN message into national 
and regional policy. For the GCRMN node gatekeepers in the Fiji Islands, the local situation makes it 
nonsensical to try and sell to the country's policy makers, ICRI's message that coral reefs are in crisis, 
suffering worldwide degradation. While there is local degradation and depletion of some high value 
species, probably no-one seriously believes that this will extend over all 10,000 square kilometres of 
reef in the next 50 or so years, or that the majority of coral reefs of the Fiji Islands will undergo 
significant changes in community structure, becoming algal dominated. 
This example, the GCRMN, has shown how orthodox, modernist interpretations of agents in the 
discursive field of international environmental policy are inadequate because they see local people as 
either correctly socialised into the orthodox thinking and practices of the field or as failing to follow 
proper environmental practices. The example also shows how habitus can explain policy 
disconnections between the global and the local as well as connections. Locals may use storylines and 
policy processes for their own purposes and not necessarily in ways that a donor or global project 
coordinator might intend-in this case writing the national and regional reports in standard format 
when paid to do so, and engaging with the international for the professional advantage and resources 
that brings. In reading the local situation, they may also choose not to reproduce certain storylines or to 
propound them to government policy analysts and policymakers, or they may do so selectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows agency operating in the international and the local spheres of policy: habitus, the 
co-optation of storylines to suit local situations and advance local interests. This is the same agency 
theorised in Chapter Eight to describe those, such as Wilkinson, operating in the international sphere of 
science/policy (who, of course, are in their own local situations). Yet, just because experts' agency 
operates in much the same way on either side of the oft-supposed divide between developed and 
developing country, with much the same motivations, that does not somehow neutralise hegemonic 
situations. Case studies in the next two chapters illustrate how hegemony exists, even as local experts 
co-opt storylines for their own purposes. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conservation NGOs as Modernisers 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on coastal and marine conservation, encompassing coral reefs. It explores the 
socio-political dynamics of two NGO initiatives, dissecting their expert policy technologies and 
evolving social technologies. This builds on the idea of agency (habitus and the co-opting of storylines 
to suit situation and interests) being the same in both the international and the local spheres of 
environmental policy. Revealing more of the political assembly around a global environmental crisis, 
and of the hegemonic nature of western policies intended to address that perceived crisis in developing 
countries, the chapter shows how ecological politics get built- partly through agency of experts 
pursuing professional advantage and partly through the technical practices of NGOs using policy 
technologies based upon rational planning. The chapter also begins to explore how modernisation, 
effected through these technologies, distances local policy from the local. 
The expert policy technologies examined are ecoregion visioning, specifically the Fiji Integrated 
Marine Ecosystem Initiative (FIME) and the idea of creating Locally-Managed Marine Areas 
(LMMA), which in the Fiji Islands appears as the FLMMA network mentioned in Chapter Nine. The 
processes of applying these two policy technologies in the archipelago involve different NGOs, one 
large (WWF), several small. Some are Fijian, some international. 
Ecoregion Planning: Fiji Integrated Marine Ecosystem 
WWF-SP AS A POLICY AGENCY 
ECOREGION PLANNING FOR FIJI'S MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
ECOREGION PLANNING AND CONSERVATION: CREATING A NEW POLITICS 
Community Empowerment: Fiji locally-Managed Marine Areas 
THE COMMUNITY CONSERVATION PARADIGM 
THE NATURE OF FLMMA 
THE EVOLUTION OF LMMA AND ITS EXPERT POLICY TECHNOLOGIES 
SOCIAL TECHNOLOGIES: WHO IS CO-OPTING WHOM? 
LMMA AS A TECHNOLOGY OF MODERNISATION 
Discussion 
FIME AND FLMMA: A COMPARISON 
WHERE IS THE HEGEMONY IN THIS? 
CONCLUSION 
In the Fiji Islands, WWF (whose nature and governance was described in Chapter Seven) is involved in 
both these policy technologies. WWF has a significant presence in the Fiji Islands, having set up a 
regional South Pacific office in Suva in 1990, then a country programme in 1998. 
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METHODOLOGY: STUDYING WWF AND FLMMA 
This chapter evolved from my decision to study how \v\W influences coral reef policy. I picked 
FIME and FLl'vIlVIA because they seemed to represent different ends of the spectrum: conservation 
from above and conservation from below. I was curious to see if this was a case of irrational 
management, organisational schizophrenia, or part of some greater strategy. These two projects 
involved different alliances outside the Fiji Islands, the local players in each interacting with different 
outside groups. But were the storylines and arguments that local players encountered and used 
different in each case? 
Because of the differing form of these two initiatives, I used different tactics to investigate them. I 
investigated FIME largely through \V\W's visioning workshop (Table 19), as a participant-observer. 
I asked iEI might attend and was invited on the same terms as other participants. \V'hen attending, I 
declared my dual interest to all other participants and constrained my own argumentative input so I 
had no chance of radically altering the outcome. Before and after the workshop, I interviewed 
several \v\W staff about how the organisation functioned, particularly at policy level. In contrast, I 
investigated FLl'vIlVIA mainly by observing, over two years, how its participants portrayed the 
network-in written accounts, at conferences and workshops and in interviews. Having discovered 
the links between FLMrvIA and American NGOs I investigated this, through interviews, Internet 
searches, and by reading the articles the NGO staff had published (e.g. in the journal COIlJerlJatioll 
Biolo.!!J), the latter explaining the paradigms they were seeking to establish. In contrast to FIrvIE, 
FLrvllVIA was not a process of public participation. Although people interviewed readily shared their 
thoughts and documents, I was never invited to participate in any FLrvllVIA processes. 
Ecoregion Planning: Fiji Integrated Marine Ecosystem 
WWF-SOUTH PACIFIC AS A POLICY AGENCY 
One of the main work thrusts for the regional South Pacific office of WWF (WWF-SP for short) is 
conservation policy, on scales from the local to the international (WWF South Pacific 2002b p. 6). Its 
efforts to influence international policy range from encouraging international agencies such as the 
European Union, ADB and World Bank to reduce the environmental impacts of their aid and lending 
processes in the region, to participating in international summits-the preparatory phases of 
international summits (WSSD and Barbados Programme of Action Plus Ten) as well as WSSD itself 
(ibid). WWF-SP endeavours to co-ordinate Pacific Islands 'civil society participation' in major 
international conferences and in key policy areas such as climate change and biodiversity. WWF-SP 
also tries to influence international policy by feeding ideas up through the WWF network (Dermott 
O'Gorman, former head of WWF-SP Programme Suva, pers. c01llm.). 
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In trying to influence policy within the region, WWF-SP works directly with regional 
intergovernmental organisations. WWF staff have participated in several regional policy working 
groups, and assisted in preparing the regional action strategy for nature conservation (WWF South 
Pacific 2002b p. 6). In working with communities, WWF-SP and WWF-Fiji also seek to change policy 
at that level. This can have the effect of changing national policy, as happened recently when, in 
working with a Fijian community on Ono Island, Kadavu, WWF-Fiji helped them set up, and 
convinced the government to gazette, Fiji's first marine conservation area, Ulunikoro (WWF South 
Pacific 2002b p. 8). 
In its Fiji work, WWF draws upon a range of expert policy technologies and storylines. For instance, in 
supporting MAC's instigation of a certification scheme for the marine aquarium industry (discussed in 
the next chapter), WWF draws upon both a neoliberal argument about the value of market-based 
approaches to conservation and one about the value of community conservation. Ecoregion planning 
(introduced in Chapter Three) is another expert policy technology upon which WWF draws. It has 
established a Pacific EcoRegion Centre in Madang (PNG), which WWF Australia, WWF-UK, WWF-
US, WWF Netherlands, and WW-SP jointly fund. 
ECOREGIONAL PLANNING FOR FIJI'S MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
Bringing ecoregion planning in the Fiji Islands 
Of the major conservation NGOs using ecoregion planning, WWF is the only one to have applied it to 
the Fiji Islands. Of the sixteen Global 200 ecoregions in the Pacific, WWF-SP selected five on which to 
work, two forest ecoregions and three comprising coral reefs and associated ecosystems: Bismarck-
Solomon Seas area (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Indonesia); the Fiji Barrier Reef; and the 
coral reefs of French Polynesia and the Cook Islands (WWF South Pacific 2001). (Chapter Seven 
introduced the Global 200 scheme.) The Fiji ecoregion was selected because of its barrier reefs. 
Although originally included in the Global 200 as a region globally significant for its barrier reef, as 
specified in Olson and Dinerstein (1998 p. 17), the area defined for the Fiji Integrated Marine 
Ecoregion (FIME) expanded to include everything between the coastal margin and the outer exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) boundaries-from estuaries to deep water trenches. Although ecoregion 
planning is designed to address transboundary issues-the distribution of (nonhuman) species being 
defined biogeographically rather than geopolitically-in defining boundaries for the Fiji ecoregion, 
WWF matched them to political ones, encompassing the entire Fijian archipelago, Rotuma, plus the 
EEZ around both. 
WWF-SP first contemplated ecoregion planning in 2000, but much of the first three years was spent 
hiring local staff (ie Fiji Islands citizens), familiarising them with the concept and WWF's approach to 
it, then shaping WWF's general approach to the local situation (Dermott O'Gorman, programme head 
at WWF-SP, Suva, pers. comm.). In this WWF-SP and WWF-Fiji staff, under O'Gorman's leadership, 
networked with other WWF offices involved in similar processes. They designed the FIME process in 
accordance with WWF's general procedure for ecoregion planning, aiming to prepare a conservation 
plan for the Fiji integrated marine ecoregion based around a vision compiled in map form. That vision 
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would be produced with consultation with the government, interested agencies, and scientific experts; 
the conservation plan would specify the goals for biodiversity conservation over the next 10-15 years 
and the actions needed to achieve this. As it turned out, WWF staff subsequently refocused the process 
on preparing management plans for the Cakaulevu (Great Sea Reef) off the coast of Vanua Levu and 
the Bligh Waters (Lomaiviti), two areas designed in the Fiji Islands visioning workshop as being 
'globally outstanding' in terms of their biodiversity (Fiji Government 2004). 
WWF-SP began the public phase of the Bismarck-Solomons Seas ecoregion project in August 2002, 
progressing through a series of national workshops to a visioning workshop in July 2003. The Fiji 
visioning workshop followed in December 2003 after a couple of preliminary meetings (Table 19). 
TABLE 19: KEY CONSULTATIONS IN WWF's FIJI ECOREGION PLANNING PROCESS, 2002-04 
Event Date Those involved (besides WWF) Achievements 
Initial 14/5/02 Experts from USP, SOPAC, NGOs Steering group set up; various 
consultation and scientific tourism operators; resource management initiatives in 
government officials (11 in total) the Fiji Islands mapped 
Steering 28/2/03 Experts from USP, NGOs and Group familiarised with \v\'{7F's 
group scientific tourism operators; ecoregion planning process; details 
meeting government officials (25 in total) of process to be used at biodiversity 
vision workshop debated 
Stakeholder 1/12/03 Representatives from government Ideas about how the FIME process 
dialogue departments NGOs, scientific tourism relates to existing government 
operators, USP, and some Fijian policies and plans 
communities 
Visioning 2-4/12/03 Overseas experts in conselvation and 35 areas identified as outstanding for 
workshop coral reef ecology; representatives marine biodiversity; five of global 
from Fijian government departments, significance. Areas needing further 
Fiji-based NGOs and tourism biological reconnaissance and 
operators, USP, the Lau, Macuata and research identified. Suggestions 
Cakaudrove communities and Laje about how to incorporate this 
Rotuma Initiative (about 70 plus information into government 
w\'{7F staff) planning and policy 
Management 17- Conservation practitioners and Draft management plans for the 
planning 18/8/04 scientists, including a few international Cakaulevu (Great Sea Reef) and 
workshop experts on reserve design Bligh \V'aters areas. 
In running this workshop, local staff drew on WWF experiences in similar processes elsewhere 
(particularly the Sulawesi-Sulu Seas ecoregion programme in Indonesia) and their own experience in 
the Bismarck-Solomons Seas programme. I describe the visioning process in some detail here because 
of the insights it gives into how WWF staff deliberately sought to shape conservation policy by 
employing an expert policy technology specifically designed for that purpose. 
The FIME visioning workshop and the map produced; a description 
The FIME visioning workshop brought together more than 70 people over three days to collectively 
consider Fiji's marine biodiversity and ecological processes and collaboratively set priorities for 
conserving these. The introductory material provided to participants described it as a process to: 
".identify and prioritise key areas of Fiji's marine biodiversity. Based on existing 
knowledge and the best scientific expertise available, the workshop will develop a vision for 
marine biodiversity that can guide decision makers, conservation practitioners and key 
stakeholders in the design and implementation of future efforts to conserve marine 
biodiversity across Fiji (WWF 2003 p. 1). 
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Those at the FIME workshop came from a variety of organisations, mostly 'experts' from academic 
and scientific agencies, tourism ventures, and conservation NGOs. There were also a few government 
representatives, mainly from the Fisheries Division, the only Fiji government agency with any 
significant marine expertise. Eight people from different parts of the Fiji Islands, mostly men, were 
invited to be 'community representatives'. The latter were invited in the notion of a trial; participants at 
the Solomon Seas-Bismarck workshop had criticised WWF for excluding communities altogether 
(Reuben Sulu, IMR, USP, Suva, pers. comm .. December 2003). Yet, eight people from six provinces 
do not turn the process into a community planning exercise. These community representatives were 
treated as experts in their communities, segregated into their own group during sessions and producing 
their own 'expert' map which was collated with those from other groups, as described below. So, while 
at one level, this appeared to be a democratic, participatory planning process, people were invited as 
experts rather than as interested parties, suggesting this was technocratic rather than democratic 
planning. 
Introducing the workshop objectives at a preceding introductory session for government agencies, 
Gishlaine Llewellyn, one of several staff that WWF brought in from overseas offices to run the 
workshop, spoke generally about the loss of marine biodiversity and naturalness, trends in degradation, 
and local extinctions. In doing so she gave the impression that, like elsewhere, the seas around the Fiji 
Islands, and the creatures inhabiting them, are at risk. In this manner she justified conservation 
interventions without at any time discussing the nature and extent of degradation in local seas. Instead, 
she evoked whatever vision people held in their heads of change at a particular locality, and invited 
them to use that in forming a vision for Fiji's marine biodiversity in 50 years time. 
Llewellyn described the ecoregion planning process as a bridge designed to feed better science into 
planning and policy processes. She said the intent was to "be pure" about dealing with biodiversity 
first, only adding a layer of threats later (the workshop never reached this stage). She asked the 
participants to keep some general "principles of conservation" in mind throughout the entire process, 
listing these as representation; ecological processes; viable populations and resilient habitats; and 
special elements (including remnants). 
The workshop process took people from a range of backgrounds-everyone had been invited to attend, 
although some (like myself) had solicited that invitation-and required them to work cooperatively for 
three days, to reach consensus over a vision map for the Fiji Island's biodiversity. Over three days, 
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WWF staff directed participants through a series of structured discussions and mapping exercises. They 
kept some measure of control by insisting the groups discuss and address any disagreements; they laid 
down the rules, firmly coerced the groups to complete their allotted tasks, and provided advice on any 
matters that threatened to derail or hold up the process. 
After consulting each participant about their interests, WWF staff had allocated each to one of five 
working groups charged with considering a particular ecosystem type (one being coral reefs and 
lagoons) or in one case, species of special conservation interest. Each group was given a map of the Fiji 
Islands and surrounding seas and asked to discuss and map areas they considered important for that 
ecosystem or species. On the second day participants were reshuffled into six new groups, each 
assigned a particular subregion to consider. These reshuffled groups were asked to use the information 
mapped by all groups on the previous day (digitised overnight by a WWF staff member) to identify, 
rank and map parts of the subregion as being of local, subregional, national or global significance. 
WWF staff encouraged people to draw bold, sweeping lines around areas with some interesting feature: 
"I should think we want relatively straight lines", said Dale Worthington, head ofWWF-SP and one of 
the group facilitators. They encouraged them to generalise one property so that it represented an entire 
area, so enclosed: "It's OK to rank an area internationally significant on the basis of only one species", 
said Bronwyn Goulder ofWWF's New Zealand ecoregion support initiative, the Suva workshop 
facilitator. The participants obliged. 
These maps were again digitised overnight and overlaid to produce a new map, a collation of all the 
group decisions aggregated into large areas deemed significant and thus worthy of protecting. At a 
plenary session the following morning, the workshop facilitator presented this as a draft showing areas 
ranked in relative importance, participants discussing and refining it, producing the map shown here 
(Figure 5). 
Discussion of the mapping process 
Although the instructions sent to participants before the workshop stated there had been an extensive 
literature review and analysis prepared, no such material was provided at the workshop despite requests 
for it. Even when some participants had brought written materials, there was no time allowed for the 
group to read and consider these. The entire mapping was done using whatever knowledge, interests 
and biases existed in people's heads and were articulated around the mapping tables. It was informal, 
anecdotal, top-of-the head stuff, mostly at a very basic, intuitive level. An outsider subsequently 
looking at the final map depicting thirty-five areas as outstanding in terms of biodiversity, would 
probably presume far more analysis and expert scientific research had gone into preparing it that 
actually occurred. 
The final map is assumed to represent the place that Fiji biodiversity occupies in world 
importance-but without any actual comparisons being made with other places, or any criteria for what 
might be of global significance. There was no discussion or guidance given on what might constitute 
global significance; this rating just evolved out of group discussions, allowing parochialism to come to 
the fore. People's personal associations with 'a particular area certainly affected how they rated it (pers. 
obs.). The group I was in acknowledged this but did not know how to balance someone's specialist 
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knowledge of an area with the prejudice that this brought to the ranking. They tended to bow in 
sympathy to the expert, although on one occasion, when someone from another group visited to put his 
opinion about the worth of a particular area, they discarded that as being overblown enthusiasm for that 
area. While within these groups, people talked about some issues fundamental to the mapping and 
ranking processes, including the philosophical basis for scientific conservation values, these debates 
did not reach the collective plenary discussions. 
In its ranking of significance, the mapping process created an opportunity for people to use the process 
for a preset agenda if they wished. At various times, people in my groups spoke of two such agendas. 
David Olson of the Wildlife Conservation Society was thought to be using the process to highlight how 
Lomaivitil Bligh Waters, an area he had been promoting as a World Heritage Area, has international 
significance (something my group rejected but the plenary accepted). Etika Rupeni ofWWF was 
accused of doing the same for Cakaulevu (the Great Sea Reef) supposedly because he wanted funding 
to run an exploratory diving expedition there (Stuart Gow, Resort Support, Suva, pers. camm .. ). 
The workshop process was designed to reduce the complexity of everything in the extensive seas 
around the Fiji Islands to priorities coloured on a simple map. It made the 'marine' legible, by 
homogenising and simplifying it, using technologies of visualisation involving mapping, 
categorisation, and ranking. This involved taking one or two particular pieces of information, 
generalising it over a much larger area, and capturing it by drawing a line on a paper map, subsequently 
digitised into a colourful one on which all the information discussed over three days was reduced to 35 
areas of varying sizes, each circled by lines and allocated a grading. The map and accompanying list is 
complex nature reworked into a set of work priorities for conservation practitioners. It thus became a 
justification for further conservation work, both research and 'policy engagement'. The map is 
simultaneously a current ranking and a vision for 50 years hence. This overlooks how ecosystems 
change with time, they do not all move in the same direction; the map thus decoupled the space-time 
linkages of ecology. 
In this mapping process, the workshop rewrote large areas of the EEZ as important fisheries, ranking 
them as nationally significant in their entirety-sweeping generalisations based on virtually no 
information. It rewrote the coastal strip as a residual, left after past human activity had degraded it. As 
a residual, this strip was deemed worthy of recognition and protection if it had a special feature. 
Enough special features, even one of particular significance (e.g. blue coral on Rotuma, turtle nesting 
on Namena Island, or the long barrier reef Cakaulevu), and it was deemed of international significance. 
FIGURE 5: THE FIJI ISLANDS M ARINE E COREGION MAP PRODUCED BY THE F IME WORKSHOP 
.... . ---.... 
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Reprod uced from an article in South Pacific Currents, WWF-SP' s quarterly newsletter, which 
descri hed the FIME visioning workshop (WWF South Pacific 2003a). 
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Pickles observed (2004 p. 145) that "Maps no longer seem to simply represent territory, but are 
understood as producing it, in important ways 'maps precede territory', they inscribe boundaries and 
construct objects that in turn become our realities". FIME's mapping process produces both 
conservation territories and conservation identities-identities based on relative conservation 
significance. It thus puts a new (conservation) spin on the traditional cartographic function of 
cataloguing the 'important' (Pickles 2004, p. 20). At the same time, it sets out to change how people 
see the world they inhabit, how they see the Fiji Islands, in the manner that Pickles (2004, p. 66) 
comments upon in his discussion on "deconstructing the map". 
Digitising the map legitimates its paucity of content. So, too, does its use of colour; the globally 
significant areas being coloured a bright red to highlight their importance (Figure 5). Having been 
digitised, the map becomes a strategic resource for WWF to use as it wishes (cf. Andrews 2001, p. 23). 
Staff can include it in whatever magazine articles, brochures, reports and web-sites they choose; they 
can email to others to do likewise, further legitimating its content. This brings to mind that process that 
Pickles (2004 chapter 8) calls creating cyber-empires in digital space. One can, for instance, imagine 
the FIME map being added to ReetBase's online geographic information system of all coral reefs in the 
world, sometime in the future. 
Interpreting the FIME process 
Ecoregion planning in general, and the FIME process in particular, has attempted to draw on the 
supposed universality and objectiveness of science. WWF sought to depict the process as being 
scientific in nature, and those involved as scientific experts. They sought to identify the perspective of 
the Fiji Islands as a site of biodiversity of particular significance as scientific, and the process they used 
to rank these as scientific. Yet the process did not meet certain widely accepted scientific standards. It 
did not systematically evaluate existing information about the marine biodiversity of the area. There 
was no opportunity for the final map and list to be peer reviewed. Nor was there any opportunity to 
develop more scientifically robust criteria when it became obvious that the ones participants were 
expected to use were problematic. The process was dictatorial rather than an intellectual exercise to 
improve the scientific basis for such priority setting. It was biased by equating species richness with 
significance, an equivalence not accepted in ecology. The process was not informed by the science of 
evolution or that of ecological processes, despite some effort to think how the latter might be done 
(pers. obs.). The whole issue of spatial and temporal variability was ignored. Terrestrial conservation 
ideas were used (species rarity, charismatic megafauna etc), even though these do not translate well to 
marine ecosystems. 
According science such a central role, acknowledging science as the dominant form of knowledge, is 
one manifestation of cultural modernisation. But was this a deliberate political strategy of WWF or was 
it merely the extension of this western way of thinking? Mostly the latter I think, although there were 
indications that some WWF staff realised that perhaps it was not as scientific as it could be (for 
example, Goulder's comment that there were less scientists at the workshop than there had been at 
previous WWF ecoregion planning workshops held elsewhere). Yet, despite the lack of science and the 
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arbitrariness of the process, WWF facilitators repeatedly characterised the workshop's mapping as an 
expert process, being done by experts (pers. obs.). 
WWF never acknowledged how social dynamics within groups, how a group perceived someone's 
authority, or merely a group's sympathy for a particular person's convictions all coloured the final 
result. Behind the whole workshop process were some vague ideas about its policy implications which 
the facilitators occasionally brought up as determinants of how a group should be doing things, such as 
where to draw lines in a matter under discussion-Bronwyn Goulder was concerned about 'boundaries 
for management'. (WWF-SP staff have subsequently pointed out how information collated into the 
FIME map could be used to set priorities in tuna management and tourism venture planning 
(Tabunakawai and Areki 2004 p. 2-4)). But these policy implications were never openly discussed and 
they confused people. The facilitators actively discouraged group discussions about the possible policy 
uses of the outputs, arguing that this was supposed to be a pure scientific evaluation. This is ironical 
given their process was one of science/policy (as I describe that in Chapter Three). 
FIME as a reflection of orthodox global environmental policy discourse 
FIME is clearly a policy process, designed to develop policy ideas and intended to influence other 
policy processes in the Fiji Islands. It is also part of a political assembly around the concept of a global 
ecological crisis, focused on the loss of global biodiversity. Moreover, FIME, along with other 
examples ofWWF's ecoregion planning, is part of the process of cultural modernisation, the spread of 
western ways of thinking and behaviour throughout the non-western world. Ecoregion planning draws 
upon the technology of rational planning, specifying biodiversity goals then planning, in WWF offices 
in places like Suva, the means to achieve these. From these offices, WWF staff emerge to draw on their 
newly-created local constituency in a series of workshops. 
FIME reflects the international discourse of global environmental policy. Both FIME, and WWF as its 
organiser, clearly see the Fiji marine environment as a problem to be solved. As a policy process, the 
strategic solution (ecoregion conservation) was decided before the problems are identified. The FIME 
process did not identify the threats to biodiversity before analysing ways to address those threats. 
Instead, it ranked biodiversity, on the presumption that the higher the rating the greater the need for 
conservation and protection. The FIME exercise was devised as an exercise in instrumental rationality 
ostensibly drawing on scientific criteria; virtually all attention was given to the means; the ends were 
poorly defined and justified. 
FIME is also an exercise in international cooperation. In forming a vision for the biodiversity of the Fiji 
Islands marine ecosystems, WWF has not relied entirely on local knowledge or solicited only the 
opinions of Fiji Islanders. The Suva office drew from overseas offices the objectives and methodology 
of ecoregion planning and expert knowledge of the process. They brought in staff from those offices to 
run the workshop. And although the majority of participants were from the Fiji Islands, some 
represented overseas organisations (such as Coral Cay). There were also a few foreign scientists 
present. WWF thus drew some of the expert knowledge of Fijian places, ecosystems and species from 
overseas. 
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The FIME process aims to institutionalise a particular view of people's relationships with nature. WWF 
staff encouraged the participants to capture nature and turn it into a set of biodiversity priorities, 
existing separately of any connection with people. In placing the natural above the people, this 
reconfigured Fijian's sense of the vanua in which people are intimately connected with the land and sea 
(Chapter Eight). It codes people as threats, not an integral part of the landscape, shaping it and being 
shaped by it (Brosius 2004 p. 27). It treats the sea as something created in isolation from people, 
something needing to be saved from the degradation that peopled have caused in the last three thousand 
years. There is no sense of the co-evolution of people and nature. The FIME process, instead, viewed 
nature as something that can be ranked internationally, and as ripe for intervention. This is nature as 
written in the history of the modernisation of the western world: a series of resources available for 
human appropriation, degraded by modernisation and industrialisation, now being managed to control 
and avoid these adverse effects (Chapter Two). Nature is being rescued and managed by being 
enclosed into conservation territories, possibly some "fully protected" areas. 
ECOREGION PLANNING AND CONSERVATION: CREATING A NEW POLITICS 
The ecoregion planning efforts of large conservation organisations like WWF differ from previous 
approaches to conservation in being scaled-up both spatially and temporally. The policy technologies 
used in these exercises provide a way of legitimating, for some time to come, interventions by 
conservation practitioners over a large scale. In starting off with a base map of everything within Fiji's 
EEZ, WWF has represented the entire area as a potential conservation site, a place where conservation 
interventions may be carried out in future. Each ecoregion planning programme that WWF and other 
conservation NGOs conduct somewhere in the world enlarges the scale of pre-2000 environmental 
interventions. Each links information created at different scales into a single strategic blueprint for the 
future of a region. Collectively, the various ecoregion conservation exercises being carried out around 
the world will establish a comprehensive set of blueprints for the future of the planet. 
Experience in the Fiji Islands supports Zimmerer's observation (2000 p. 358) that, while in developed 
countries the making of conservation territory has been typically generated through national planning, 
in developing countries it has been undertaken directly by aid agencies, international conservation 
agencies, NGOs and international agreements. These ecoregion planning exercises are doing more than 
just introducing technologies of cultural modernisation and changing the scale of environmental 
governance. They are creating a new form of governance-a new form of expert, professional authority 
with the right to 'save biodiversity'. The process legitimates the right of conservation practitioners such 
as WWF to work across political boundaries (such as qoliqoli and provincial boundaries), protecting 
biodiversity in these areas characterised as important. From proprietary databases and maps designed 
and constructed by a relatively small number of conservation practitioners, mostly in the US, a new 
system of governing developing regions is emerging (Brosius 2004 p. 29). Through its expert policy 
technology, the FIME workshop process enrolled local experts, many of whom are neither Fiji 
Islanders or locally-based, thus creating a new constituency. It created new group of experts (experts in 
Fiji's marine biodiversity and expert WWF facilitators), and structures of deference. 
[These ecoregions] imply non-state management of economic and ecological affairs without 
fully articulating the relationship between these new actors, local communities and the 
nation-state. As well, they leave a question-mark over exactly who has the power to 
determine action, and what the role of a denatured nation-state might be (lnstone 2003, p. 
10. emphasis in the original). 
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This ecoregion planning process is just beginning in the Fiji Islands. If, as Wolmer (2003 p. 6) 
suggests, the next step is for WWF to invite overseas agencies (e.g. bilateral and multilateral donors, 
philanthropic foundations, international NGOs and multinational companies) to invest in saving Fiji's 
marine biodiversity, and if the state cedes some authority and decision-making to these, then WWF 
would be introducing a new layer of accountability to the Fiji Islands. If these agencies choose to work 
with local communities, bypassing the state, then they introduce a direct line of accountability from 
Fijian community to overseas funder. One can guess at the implications but not know them for sure. 
The question of whether the map will gain credence in the Fiji Islands or merely in overseas NGOs 
deserves further (future) study. 
Community Empowerment: Fiji Locally-Managed Marine Areas 
THE COMMUNITY CONSERVATION PARADIGM 
Ecoregion conservation represents a shift toward large-scale conservation. Before it appeared on the 
international conservation scene in the late 1990s, there had been an earlier shift in international 
NGOs' approach to conservation, seen in the Pacific Islands as elsewhere. That earlier shift represented 
a move away from formal protected areas that exclude local people, towards community conservation. 
In seeking to link the goals of conservation and effective resource management with the search for 
social justice for historically marginalised people, conservation NGOs diversified and ostensibly 
moved away from the traditional, top-down exclusionary approaches to protecting natural areas 
(Brosius et at. 1998, p. 158; Brown 2002 p. 6). Instead, they have re-imagined conservation-not as the 
preoccupation solely of state agencies and professional scientific organisations but as the business of 
communities. Since the 1980s, such bottom-up models of conservation have proliferated, claiming to 
incorporate the needs and priorities of local communities; as a consequence, community-based 
conservation and community-based natural resource management have become buzzwords. 
This shift to community conservation mirrors the interest taken in the field of development to 
participatory approaches and community empowerment. The two fields of endeavour, development and 
international conservation, have moved towards each other, debates on biodiversity and development 
becoming enmeshed in wider discussions of globalisation. Both biodiversity and rural people's 
livelihoods are seen as being threatened by the process of globalisation (Brown 2002 p. 6). 
In the South Pacific, the concept of community conservation areas made its appearance in the late 
1980s (e.g. in SPREP's 1989 regional nature conservation strategy). While SPREP has supposedly not 
abandoned the pursuit of strictly protected areas, since 1990, virtually all that organisation's efforts at 
protected areas have been directed into establishing community conservation (Turnbull 2001). In the 
South Pacific, thinking on community conservation has taken a specific form-the renaissance of 
traditional management methods (Johannes 2002). In countries such as the Fiji Islands, where 
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indigenous communities had never renounced their right to certain coastal resources, this has had 
particular potency. In the regional agencies, SPREP in particular, and amongst the conservation NOOs 
operating in the region, there is a widespread recognition that coastal resource conservation and 
management programmes in the Pacific Islands can only succeed where the traditional owners are fully 
involved in all activities. The storylines of conservation and development have blended into a single of 
aspiration of conserving biodiversity and indigenous communities. The latter face significant 
challenges ranging from increasing embedded ness in capitalist society, with the consequent need for 
cash affecting resource extraction, to technological advances in harvesting that make it easier to harvest 
large quantities of resources in damaging ways and facilitate poaching. 
THE NATURE OF FLMMA 
WWF's work in the Fiji Islands embraces community conservation. In 2003, Fiji country programme 
staff were working at five project sites, including Tikina Waisomo on Ono mentioned above, and 
Tikina Malamalo on the Coral Coast where MAC and WWF are cooperating in addressing the effects 
of live rock harvest. (A tikina is an administrative unit comprising several villages). Since 2000, much 
ofWWF's community conservation in the archipelago has been under the umbrella ofFLMMA, a 
network WWF-Fiji helped establish. FLMMA has a dual aim: preserving natural biodiversity and 
providing alternative livelihoods for members of indigenous Fijian communities owning the right to 
fish Fiji's coastal areas (Veitayaki et al. 2003 p. 5). This reflects the marriage of conservation and 
development being attempted by WWF (Chapter Two). Through community-based schemes, FLMMA 
also aims to improve the number and skills of people effectively managing coastal resources (ibid). 
Before FLMMA was created, the various agencies trying to establish community-managed marine 
protected areas in the Fiji Islands were largely working in isolation from each other. WWF joined other 
Suva-based agencies in creating the initiative: the Institute of Applied Sciences (lAS) at USP; Partners 
in Community Development, a Fijian NOO which is part of the Foundation for Peoples of the South 
Pacific network; IMA's Fiji office; and the Waitabu project, an initiative on a small community on the 
island of Taveuni originally funded by New Zealand's Agency for International Development (NZAID). 
The latter was subsequently sidelined by other participants (according to Helen Sykes, Resort Support, 
Suva, pers. camm), with WWF and lAS playing the key roles in designing and initiating FLMMA. 
FLMMA uses a community-based approach to coastal conservation that builds upon traditional 
resource management practices. FLMMA members also provide coastal fishing communities with 
knowledge and training about the best ways to protect and conserve their fishing grounds for future 
generations, its trainers teaching villagers simple scientific monitoring techniques (Koroi 2003 p. 9; 
Veitayaki et al. 2003). When a community invites them to do so, FLMMA members facilitate village 
workshops, using participatory rural analysis techniques to identify issues and threats and a problem-
tree approach to finding solutions. This culminates in a community preparing a management plan for 
specific coastal area, making decisions through consensus (as described in Chapter Nine). FLMMA 
members encourage communities to use their traditional methods, including setting aside tabu (no-
fishing) areas; they teach them to monitor the recovery of stocks of resources they regularly harvest, 
such as the Anadara clam kaikasa (Veitayaki et al. 2003). 
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Officially launched in March 2001, FLMMA has gone from strength to strength, working with 
increasing numbers of communities. By January 2005, 29 coastal districts were in various stages of 
implementing management plans and a further nine were developing plans (Tavola 2005). The SDL 
Cabinet has endorsed its work. The Fisheries Division has become a member of the network, as have 
the thirty or so indigenous Fijian communities with which FLMMA members are working. Other Fiji 
Islands agencies that support FLMMA's work include further government departments and statutory 
agencies (Tourism, Fijian Affairs, Environment, National Trust for Fiji), groups associated with the 
tourism industry (Resort Support, the Coral Cay Conservation Society, Mamanuca Environment 
Association), further USP groups (the Women in Fisheries Network and Marine Studies Programme) 
and international groups with a presence in Suva (Wildlife Conservation Society, Wetlands 
International, and the US Peace Corps programme) (WWF South Pacific 2002a; 2002b; Tavola 2005). 
The thinking behind FLMMA 
In justifying their approach to community conservation, FLMMA members draw upon various 
narratives, as listed below. These excerpts from reports that FLMMA members have written about their 
work set out the thinking behind the network. 
There is a misconception among rural Fijians (perhaps related to subsistence affluence) that, 
since the environmental resources have provided for the people's sustenance in the past, 
they will continue to do so today. Many people have not understood the ecological strain 
and stress that marine resources have been subjected to and the fact that many of the natural 
resources are threatened because of overexploitation (Veitayaki 1998 p. 50). 
Local communities are the most knowledgeable about the changes taking place within their 
realm and how best to address resource management issues in their areas. Local people 
adjudicate on issues such as the use of their resources and their management. However, in 
recent times, local communities are facing escalating pressure to utilise their resources to 
enhance their economic activities as well as improve their living standards. Consequently 
people are lured by commercial cutthroats and advisers whose main aim is to acquire quick 
profit from the utilisation of the resources without any consideration of the associated 
environmental costs. Such liaison has led to the widespread degradation that is evident 
today throughout the Pacific Islands (Veitayaki et at. c.2002 p. 1). 
In many instances the local population is adversely affecting the sustainability of the 
resources. Much of it is not done out of ignorance but more out of economic pressure and 
necessity. Steps have been taken towards maintaining the sustainability of resources 
however this needs to be taken up more actively. If these threats are not adequately attended 
to, the combined effects of diminishing marine resource stocks, a steadily growing 
population and increasing concern relating to climate change will further exacerbate 
existing problems (WWF South Pacific (2003c p. 7) report of a survey at Malomalo). 
The villagers were fascinated by the interrelations within the ecosystems. The interchange 
between the mangroves and the reefs and the interdependence of organisms that are part of 
these ecosystems were unknown to villagers. This was the reason why the people were 
happy at the end of the workshop to declare a protected area that covers the mangroves, 
seagrass beds and adjacent reefs. People realised the protection of their fisheries resources 
required that these intricate interrelationships be understood (a workshop at Votua village, 
Ba described by Veitayaki et at. c.2002 p. 9). 
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There are many seemingly contradictory aspirations in FLMMA's work. Although FLMMA draws 
upon Fijian cultural attitudes towards consensus, conformity and traditional authority, it also seeks to 
empower ordinary members of Fijian communities to be able to speak up against chiefs that allow their 
resources to be over-exploited when they give approval to an 'excessive' number of fishing licences in 
exchange for goodwill payments (the system described in Chapter Nine) (Veitayaki 1998; Veitayaki 
speaking in FIME workshop, pers. obs.). Although FLMMA is a way for the owners of traditional 
fishing grounds and customary fishing rights to stop passively observing national government officials 
making most of the decisions about the management of their resources, and to participate more in 
selecting management tools, the NOOs involved hope that once operational, locally managed marine 
areas will become part of the government work programme (Veitayaki 1998 p. 51; Veitayaki et ai. 
2003 p. 19). Furthermore, they have consciously drawn Fisheries Division staff into the network's 
work and sought endorsement of the department's senior managers. Although FLMMA is a Fijian 
initiative designed to help Fijian communities better manage their marine resources, FLMMA is also 
part of an international learning portfolio designed to test conservation assumptions behind a portfolio 
of small-scale marine reserves in the Indo-Pacific (Parks and Salafsky 2001 p. 40). It has been 
influenced by American thinking about conservation. These seemingly contradictory perspectives 
reflect the diverse influences, aspirations, and motivations amongst the groups of people involved in 
FLMMA. They reflect the complexity of Fijian society, where the traditional meets the 
modern-FLMMA is a site where foreign narratives meet local ones and mingle. 
Some of the storylines that FLMMA members are drawing upon are relatively recent, of foreign origin 
and associated with the business of conservation amongst the international community of conservation 
NOOs. These storylines include one about the value to conservation practitioners of being part of a 
learning portfolio and another about the value of measuring their success. For FLMMA has 
international links to several US NOOs, as the following history explains. 
THE EVOLUTION OF LMMA AND ITS EXPERT POLICY TECHNOLOGIES 
The history and growth of lMMA and FlMMA 
FLMMA is part of the LMMA, a network formed of projects in the Indo-Pacific where conservation 
practitioners are working with local communities to implement and adapt traditional marine resource 
management systems, promoting conservation and resource security. LMMA has been set up as a 
learning portfolio, a network of projects sharing a common conservation strategy, and collaborating to 
increase their own effectiveness. LMMA projects are intended to investigate the conditions under 
which their conservation strategy does and does not work, and to improve the capacity of the members 
of the portfolio to manage projects adaptively (LMMA Network 2004). 
This idea of international conservation projects combining to form a learning portfolio, collaborating 
across national boundaries, first gained prominence during the Biodiversity Support Programme (BSP), 
a large international programme which WWF, TNC, and WRljointly ran from 1989 to 2001 with 
USAID funding (USD 85 million in total). Amongst the various BSP initiatives was the Biodiversity 
Conservation Network (BCN), established to test the idea that if local communities receive sufficient 
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benefits from an enterprise that depends on a healthy natural resource base, then they will act to 
counter internal and external threats to that biodiversity. BCN gave implementation grants to twenty 
community-based projects in seven Indo-Pacific countries between 1990 and 1999. Some of the US 
staff involved in developing the analytical framework for the BCN and in analysing its data, developed 
the concept further into the general notion of a learning portfolio for conservation practitioners working 
in developing countries: a special kind of programme that seeks to achieve specific conservation 
impacts and to systematically test a set of assumptions about the particular conservation strategies and 
tools being used (Parks and Salafsky 2001 p. 2). 
These BCN staff wished to apply this approach to marine systems where adaptive management was 
being attempted (Nickerson et al. 2003). One of the BCN analysts, John Parks, moved to WRI where 
he co-ordinated a project titled Fish for the Future. Parks, with lAS' assistance, convened a workshop 
in Suva in August 2000, inviting representatives from five Pacific Islands to discuss a learning 
portfolio approach (Parks and Salafsky 2001). The Fish for the Future learning portfolio was intended 
to test conservation assumptions behind a portfolio of small-scale marine reserves in the Indo-Pacific, 
to systematically identify and document the specific conditions under which such reserves might be 
implemented effectively (Parks and Salafsky 2001 p. 40). lAS had some experience of this approach, 
having co-ordinated one of the BCN projects involving the Verata community north of Suva in 
bioprospecting. It was out of this WRI workshop that both LMMA and FLMMA were born. (The Fish 
for the Future project also targeted Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia and a second workshop for 
participants from those countries was held a week after the Suva one (Parks and Salafsky 2001).) 
During the 9th International Coral Reef Symposium in Bali in October 2000, most participants in these 
initial two workshops reassembled to formally launched the LMMA Network, which has since has 
evolved into a network of projects in several countries. The network links 'locally-managed marine 
areas' that, although they may vary widely in purpose, target, and configuration, share a commitment to 
fully engaging communities and local governments in all decision-making and implementation of their 
site management strategies. At Bali, LMMA members drafted a social contract, an agreement that 
governs how LMMA functions. The document, since refined, includes a vision statement, outlines what 
the members of the portfolio will do together, and describes the obligations and benefits of being a 
member (Nickerson et al. 2003). During 2001 LMMA participants developed, with the expert help of 
staff from the Foundations of Success (FoS) NGO (described below) a lengthy, detailed framework 
outlining how network members would collect and share information. Project representatives identified 
some of the conditions or factors they believed could influence the success of their projects. They also 
discussed ways in which they could measure project outcomes and progress. Project teams from Fiji 
and Indonesia tested and refined this during 2002; in 2003, it was translated into Fijian and Indonesian. 
In the Fiji Islands, LMMA participants officially launched the learning portfolio in March 2002, at the 
WWF office in Suva, with representatives from IAS-USP; IMA, FSP, Tikina Verata, Ministry of 
Fisheries, and MSP signing the following agreement: 
KEDRA SASALU TA WAMUDU NA NODA KAWAI 
We as members of Fiji Locally-Managed Marine Areas (FLMMA) on this day of 15 March 
2002, believe that by coming together under a shared framework of values, expectations, 
work and learning that as a group we will improve the practice of local resource 
management in Fiji. 
INTRODUCING THE ACTORS: 15. FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESS (FoS) 
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\V'hen BCN was wound up, two of those involved in analysing the BCN data, Nick Salafsky and 
Richard Margoluis, established this American-based NGO specifically to promote adaptive 
management and the use oflearning portfolios in conservation projects. In 2004, there were five 
people on the FoS staff, including Salafsky and Margoluis. They fund their work duough grants and 
consultancies. Despite their initial optimism that they would operate between five to eight learning 
portfolios at anyone time, by 2004 FoS had only managed to establish LMNLA (that being considered 
a single portfolio). FoS staff also work with other conservation organizations to help them develop 
adaptive management systems, facilitate cross-project and cross-site learning, and conduct monitoring 
and evaluation. FoS has spearheaded an effort to draw up professional standards for running 
conservation projects through the Conselvation Measures Partnership, which they facilitated for 
conservation organisations including \V'\W, CI, TNC, and \"X!CS . 
Source: web sites . )Son line.mg; www.conservationpractice.org/CCN/Mission.html 
In 2003, LMMA participants began the process of periodically sharing information gathered from 
participating sites with one another and collectively learning from the pooled results. By 2004, there 
were more than 30 different LMMA project teams in eight countries across Southeast Asia, Melanesia, 
Micronesia, Polynesia, and. Hawaii (LMMA Network 2004). By the end of 2004, LMMA had 4 full 
members including Veratavou in the Fiji Islands, the site which had started a monitoring programme 
when part of the BeN programme. Seven other Fiji sites had provisional membership, including the 
Ulunikoro marine reserve that WWF had helped establish on Ono Island and the Waitabu eco-tourism 
site established with NZAID support (The Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 2005 p. 12). In all 
37 Fijian villages were participating, either as full or provisional members (The Locally-Managed 
Marine Area Network 2005 p. 13). Full and provisional members are those that have signed the 
LMMA network' 'social contract', also known as the network's Agreement of our promises to each 
other, which outlines how members will work together. Participants only become full members when 
have completed a site description, agreed upon a community-based management and monitoring plan, 
and are collecting data on a large majority (80-90 percent) of the 37 'Learning Framework factors' 
(The Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 2005 p. 10). Provisional members are those working 
towards this, and associate members are those interested in the function of LMMAs and community-
driven resource management, but not necessarily participating in a site project (ibid). 
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The LMMA network also involves donors. The MacArthur and Packard Foundations have provided 
much of the network's funding, including the several hundred thousand dollars (US) spent each year on 
travel, workshops, training and (LMMAfFoS) coordination (Salafsky reported in School of Marine 
Affairs 2004). They also funded the first three workshops that WRI ran (Parks and Salafsky 2001 p. 1,3 
and Bill Aalbersberg, lAS, USP, Suva, pel's. camm.) Representatives of these donor foundations have 
participated in the LMMA network, attending regional meetings and the initial workshops at which the 
social contract was drafted and important decisions made on the network's direction. They were asked 
to subscribe to the same learning portfolio principles as other project members (Nickerson et at. 2003). 
They thus become associate members of the network. 
LMMA operates through country network teams. FLMMA was the first country-level initiative to 
operate independently of the overall network and remains one of the most active teams within it (The 
Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 2005 p. 22). In 2004, FLMMA became an 'official' Fiji 
NGO-in the Fiji Islands all NGOs have to be registered as charitable trusts to be officially recognised 
by the government (The Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 2005 p. 23). Fiji also has the most 
project sites within the LMMA network (ibid). 
The government has adopted FLMMA's approach, the Fisheries Division creating a new marine 
conservation division to work with FLMMA. The department is in the process of establishing 'Qaliqali 
inanagement support teams', composed of departmental and provincial government workers, Peace 
Corps volunteers, community leaders and community members trained in LMMA techniques (The 
Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 2005 p. 18-19). Moreover, at the international meeting of 
small island developing states in Mauritius in January 2005 (BPoA+ 10), Fiji's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and External Trade, Kaliopate Tavola, committed the Fiji Islands government to creating at 
least 30 percent of its oceans and coastal waters as marine protected areas by 2020, citing the FLMMA 
model (Pacific Island Broadcasting Association News Services 2005). 
FLMMA has received international recognition. On SPREP's recommendation, ICRAN chose 
FLMMA as one of its demonstration sites (Veitayaki et al. 2003 p. 19). At WSSD in 2002, FLMMA 
won one of the six Equator Initiative Awards presented to community-based partnership initiatives 
aimed at promoting sustainable development (WWF South Pacific 2002a). In 2004, Alifereti Tawake 
of lAS won the annual WWF-sponsored Whitley Award for People and the Environment for his work 
withFLMMA. 
LMMA's expert policy technologies 
The learning portfolio is at the core of the LMMA network concept. Figure 6 shows FOS' s idea of 
what a learning portfolio is. Although the learning portfolio approach derives from BCN, LMMA 
turned around the BCN idea that local communities were a threat to biodiversity, imagining them 
instead as those with the rights to manage and protect these. Rather than being formed around an 
explicit hypothesis as the BCN was, the LMMA network is intended to investigate the conditions under 
which marine protected areas will actually work in practice to help conserve dwindling marine 
resources (e.g. dependence on marine resources; standard of living; leadership; governance; human 
population density etcetera) (Nickerson et al. 2003). Underlying this is the presumption that, by 
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collecting a agreed-upon set of data, sharing stories and experiences, and promoting peer mentoring, 
members of the learning portfolio can improve and learn more efficiently (Nickerson et at. 2003). 
Participants are expected and assisted to publish monitoring results internationally in journals for 
conservation practitioners. 
FIGURE 6: A L EARNING PORTFOLIO 
A learning portfolio 
is defined by projects 
that are using a 
The basic un it in a portfo lio is a common conservation 
project. Projec ts typically try to strategy . A project can be 
achieve c nservation at one or Implemented by l?re 
m~'~ S~~CifiC ~it~s ____ __ _ __ _ \ __ ___ t~a: :n~ orgalllz~l:n __ _ 
1-
The p0l1folio facilitates the exc hange 
of information among members. 
Project are typically implemented 
by partner organization. A 
portfolio ca n include projects from 
only one organization or multip le 
organizations 
The portfolio coordination team (peT) is composed 
of individuals drawn from partner organizations or from 
outside the portfolio. peT members serve as Liaison 
Officers for specific projects. 
ource: web site hllp://rl)sonlinc.orgAYhallsLP.clm, accessed 15 June 2004 
T he learning portfolio approach enables portfolio members to access, at no cost, the support and 
resources from other LMMA participants (LMMA Network 2004). It both encoura"es international 
'ooperation and provides a framework for managing it. In encouraging cooperation across national 
boundaries as the appropriate way of addressing common environmental problems, the learning 
portfolio approach is reflecting the discourse of global environmental policy, even through it uses 
d ifferent language from the examples discussed earlier. 
The LMMA approach is based upon the idea of adaptive management and rational planning. 
If we have learned one thing ... it is that our best chance to overturn our collective sad litany 
of fai lure [of overseas assistance j is to help local people and conservation practitioners use 
scientifi c principles to understand the situations at sites where they are working. With this 
knowlc ge they can then design the appropriate actions and monitor the impacts of these 
actions 0 they can adapt and learn over time (Salafsky and Margoluis 2000 () . 55). 
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Another expert policy technology upon which the LMMA network draws is that of measuring 
conservation success, a technology which FoS and the Conservation Measures Partnership have been 
developing (see text box on p. 255). This concept applies to conservation projects, a development 
project management mentality, that of adaptive project management. In the USA, FoS has been 
instrumental in pushing this idea in the arena of international conservation policy, arguing: 
... we have become convinced that conservation will only succeed if we can help 
practitioners define conservation and objectively measure their success in moving toward 
it. .. [if they use] use adaptive management to make their own maps of the landscape and 
capture the knowledge they have gained in learning institutions (Salafsky et at. 1999). 
The expert policy technology of measuring conservation success carries the instrumental, technocratic 
approach to environmental management to its extreme-all attention on the means and little thought 
given to alternative ends. It moves the goalposts from nature (environmental quality) to learning and 
sidesteps any intellectual debate about the politics, ethics, justice or even the utility of the knowledge 
being acquired. It creates a type of truth regime; if something has been labelled a success, as FoS and 
others have labelled LMMA, one tends not to question whether it is. 
For LMMA, the Learning Framework factors to be measured cover the 'target' (species, habitat and 
ecosystem health), direct and indirect threats, and details of the project and the tools being used (the 
Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 2004 p. 4.2-4.4). Unlike ecological surveys which concentrate 
on ecosystems, species, and habitat, most of these Learning Framework factors concentrate instead on 
perceived threats (ibid). This data has not been incorporated into the GCRMN global status reports and 
little has (yet) been published, only that derived from the BCN-initiated study at Verata. 
SOCIAL TECHNOLOGIES: WHO IS CO-OPTING WHOM? 
The way that LMMA rests upon these expert policy technologies suggests that various Indo-Pacific 
project teams, communities and sites are being co-opted into particular socio-ecological technologies 
that originate in western countries and draw upon orthodox global environmental policy discourse. 
Certainly this is an interpretation favoured by the history of LMMA, but it is not the only interpretation 
as this section explores. 
Foreign experts 
On one hand, the history of LMMA suggests that a very small group of Americans, connected through 
the BCN project, established LMMA as a means of furthering their own professional interests. For 
example, John Parks instigated LMMA when he moved to WRI and managed the Fishfor the Future 
project. When that project finished and Parks moved onto another NGO in Hawaii, FoS staff claimed 
the LMMA network as their own even though they had not been formally involved in establishing it. 
(Nick Salafsky, who founded FoS, had edited the WRI report on the initiation of the learning portfolio). 
Former BCN director Bernd Cordes helped facilitate WRI's Suva workshop as a representative of the 
David and Lucile Packard Foundation (Nickerson et at. 2003). Ex-BCN employee, Michael Guilbeaux 
had attended the Suva WRI workshop as a representative of Community Conservation Network, 
another small US-based NGO that Guilbeaux had set up with John Parks and two others. Guilbeaux 
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went onto become the first coordinator of the LMMA network. Like Salafsky and Margoluis, 
Guilbeaux and Parks had created an NGO as a means of carrying on work begun in BCN. This small 
group of American men have combined the practice of establishing small American-registered NGOs 
with expert policy technologies, forming a vehicle for forging careers in international conservation. 
Although LMMA members publicise their work at meetings such as the 10th ICRS; selling it as a novel 
and successful approach to conservation in developing countries, its expert policy technologies are by 
no means novel. Only the close networking on a relatively large scale is a little unusual and that occurs 
because of the considerable money the donors provide for travel. Rather, LMMA draws on ideas and 
technologies common in other disciplines. The idea of a social contract is an ancient one, introduced 
into political theory by Plato and taken over by Locke (Scruton 1996 p. 511). The idea gained 
prominence in American science in 1997, when the president of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Jane Lubchenco, spoke of the need to form a social contract amongst 
scientists who are committed to helping society move towards a more sustainable future in the new 
'century of the environment' (Stauth 1997). The practice of measuring success is common in 
international development aid, with its use of 'log frames'. (A log frame ("logical framework") is a tool 
for project planning and management widely used by development agencies such as the World Bank; 
developed in the 1970s, it combines ideas from strategic planning with the 'management by objectives' 
models found in management.) The concept of adaptive management also has several decades of 
history in the US, being developed by C.S. Holling and colleagues at the University of British 
Columbia's Institute of Resource Ecology in the late 1960s. Holling introduced the concept into 
scientific literature in 1978, in his book Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. This 
same concept underlies the shift in emphasis towards nonequilibrium theory in ecology and towards 
strategies of encouraging reef resilience described in Chapter Eight. 
local experts 
On the other hand, the LMMA network has created the opportunity for those Pacific Islanders who are 
involved to meet individuals from other projects, to exchange stories, and learn directly from them 
(Nickerson et al. 2003). In meeting other LMMA meetings, and in attending internal summits such as 
WSSD, indigenous advocates such as Tawake and Veitayaki can find common ground outside national 
borders (cf. Brosius et al. 1998 p. 6). Being part of LMMA has meant having access to funds for 
international travel. It offered opportunities for international recognition. LMMA network members 
work hard at promoting themselves and their work, using donor funds to aid this; they nominated part 
of their own network (ie FLMMA) for the Equator Initiative Award, the two nominees being Nick 
Salafsky (ofFoS and LMMA) and Bill Aalbersberg (director ofIAS, USP and a member ofFLMMA). 
LMMA has also created the opportunity for lAS to establish itself as a leader in community 
conservation training. Furthermore, the network has provided a brand that lAS can employ to bid for 
funds from the Macarthur and Packard Foundations, enabling the institute to create itself as a regional 
leader in community-based conservation. 
The professional aspirations of these ex-BCN men have coincided with those of a group of people at 
USP and thus shaped FLMMA. The two groups were able to cooperate in a single programme because 
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FLMMA's diverse linkages and nature were sufficient to satisfy multiple objectives. Those objectives 
included aspirations to be professional conservation practitioners, achievable if they sell their efforts as 
being novel and successful, and if they continue to attract the donor funding needed for travel. 
The Fiji government 
The SDL government's adoption of FLMMA as a way of supporting Fijian communities' qoliqoli 
management and channelling 'livelihood support' suggests that it may, itself, be co-opting LMMA into 
the project of maintaining its electoral base in those indigenous communities (Chapter Nine discussed 
these electoral exigencies). At the Mauritius meeting in 2005, Fiji's Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
External Trade announced: 
The Government of Fiji declares its commitment to initiating the consolidation of its 
national networks of marine protected areas, or Waitui Tabu, as the mainstay for national 
incomes, coastal livelihoods and traditional cultures, hand in hand with the provision of 
alternative sources of livelihood. This is to replace those sources of livelihood that may be 
lost because of complete protection of sections of marine areas. Although I note that in 
some parts of the world, such lost income has proven only temporary, as once MPAs are 
established and fish and other living resources are able to produce new generations that 
disperse to non protected areas, catches and incomes of local people actually can increase. 
Further, by 2020, at least 30% of Fiji's inshore and offshore marine areas, (/ qoliqoli) will 
have come under a comprehensive, ecologically, representative networks of MPAs, which 
are effectively managed and financed. This will contribute to the South Pacific regional 
system and to the global target of 10% of world seas being managed under MP A by 2020. 
This global target is articulated under the WSSD Johannesburg Plan of Action (JPOA) and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), both of which Fiji is a signatory to (Tavola 
2005). 
In effect, the SDL government is using community conservation, and FLMMA in particular, to support 
its decision to formally recognise Fijian ownership of traditional fishing areas. Moreover, in adopting 
FLMMA, the government can now employ it as a means of channelling overseas funds to those 
communities-it is seeking GEF funds for this purpose (The Locally-Managed Marine Area Network 
2005). 
LMMA as a technology of modernisation 
There is, however, another insight into the question of who is co-opting whom which should not be 
overlooked. LMMA is rooted in the discourse of global environmental policy, as I show here, 
suggesting a certain distancing from the traditional management which FLMMA claims to be reviving 
through its use of methods such as tabu. LMMA's assumption that its research is divorced from any 
human attitudes or values about reality is positivist-attitudes and values are not accorded any part in 
revealing the cause and effect relationships which make up reality. This positivist approach echoes the 
instrumentally rational character of the orthodox discourse of global environmental policy. In the 
conceptualisation of the LMMA programme, the positivist character of BCN' s approach to testing 
hypotheses has been toned down; there is less emphasis on ascertaining cause and effect relationships 
underlying reality and more on adaptive learning and sharing experiences. 
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LMMA's work reflects the instrumentally rational character of the orthodox version of the discourse in 
the way it is bringing rational planning to the Fiji Islands and its other developing country members. 
This deliberate process of cultural modernisation is occurring at two sites. One is within the circle of 
professional practitioners: the self-learning within the learning portfolio, the LMMA approach and its 
adaptive management approach, and the measuring of conservation success. The other is the cultural 
modernisation LMMA facilitators bring to local communities by teaching them to identify problems 
and plan how to solve them. FLMMA facilitators are introducing rational planning to indigenous Fijian 
communities, also notions of cause and effect and the idea that communities can do something about 
the stocks of their resources. The facilitators are teaching basic monitoring techniques and encouraging 
the use of tabu areas. FLMMA's community projects are both training projects and planning projects, 
and a way of constructing (common sense) policy. WWF and other FLMMA facilitators such as lAS 
are thus disseminating hegemonic commonsense to Fijian communities. They act as gatekeepers of 
knowledge, selectively imparting a little scientific information to the Fijian communities with which 
they work (Wana Savoy, Partners in Community Development Fiji, Suva, pel's. comm.). Their work is 
giving rise to new subjectivities, their own recreation as local LMMA experts, the eco-rational Fijian 
community, and the LMMA itself-the rationally-managed eco-area. 
FLMMA's work represents the intersection of three disparate storylines. Two of those-the 
environment as a problem to be solved through rational planning and scientific methods and science as 
the property of experts yet a tool able to be taught to communities-are part of the orthodox version of 
the discourse. The other storyline is the right of communities to manage their own resources. FLMMA 
employs the orthodox version of the global environmental policy discourse in conjunction with a 
political discourse about indigenous rights to coastal resources. FLMMA members are creating an 
image of themselves as a new type of expert at the intersection of those discourses, able to bridge the 
gap between the world of international conservation and that of the Fijian village. 
FLMMA actively works to support the political system operating in the Fiji Islands, particularly the 
aspirations of communities to adequately manage their resources by themselves and the efforts of SDL 
government to establish this in national law as a right. There are elements of political modernisation 
incorporated into FLMMA's work. FLMMA practitioners encourage people to stand up to their chiefs; 
they encourage women and youths to talk amongst themselves, segregating them during group 
discussions so they can share their views. In this, FLMMA is only a little radical since FLMMA 
members still draw heavily upon the cultural and political practice of consensus that operates in 
indigenous communities (described in Chapter Five). Although they attempt to give a voice within the 
community to youth and women, this is not a wholesale attempt to change the power relations that exist 
within Fijian communities or the distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation (cf. Zimmerer 
2000 p. 359). It is, in effect, paying lip service to political modernisation, because it is at the same time, 
attempting to retain the culture of Fijian communities. This reflects the FoS' approach: in concentrating 
on measuring conservation success, Salafsky, Margoluis and their collaborators avoid the ethical 
dilemmas confronting researchers and development workers in overseas locations as Wismer (2000) 
observed in her review of their book Measures of Success, a book which describes how to measure 
such success in Third World conservation projects such as FLMMA (which it predates). 
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In bringing cultural modernisation but little political modernisation to Fijian communities, there is a 
paradox for FLMMA members employed in NGOs such as WWF. As MacDonald (c.2003) pointed 
out, if conservation organisations like WWF (and now FLMMA itself as an NGO) are to understand 
the source of their own power through reflections on their own ideological bases and on the 
ramifications of their actions and practices, then they must generate an institutional culture in which 
free debate and dissent are the norm. They must encourage introspection, and respect and value 
tolerance for difference over conformity. In this, there is no place for an organisational culture of 
management by consensus. WWF, in supporting a culture of consensus within Fijian communities, is in 
a paradoxical situation. Should it encourage dissent and free-thinking or merely try to institutionalise 
standardised thinking in line with imported expert policy technologies such as ecoregion planning and 
adaptive management concepts? These two case studies suggest that, at present, the latter strategy is 
dominant. 
FLMMA members legitimise their efforts by asserting they are authentic local efforts at conservation, 
yet these are efforts that draw heavily on expert policy technologies of western origin, with a positivist 
approach redolent of Enlightenment thinking. In this, FLMMA is not all that it claims to be. Yet, it is in 
other ways, more than it seems, not just an indigenous Fijian initiative but a way of shaping the global 
sensu Massey, being a location at which disparate trajectories connect, part of global space comprised 
of many locals. Wherever LMMA members meet and communicate, negotiating differences and 
inventing new forms of collaboration, there is the potential for novelty, transforming the field of 
international environmental management sensu Bourdieu. But there are two constraints on this. One is 
the culture of consensus; the other is the modernist discourse of global environmental policy. 
Discussion 
FIME AND FLMMA: A COMPARISON 
WWF has invested in both FIME and FLMMA and several WWF (and USP) staff are involved in both 
projects. Rather than being planned as part of a grand strategy to tackle marine conservation in the Fiji 
Islands, FIME and FLMMA appear to have developed separately, coinciding in time. FLMMA grew 
out of WRI' s approach, which had grown out of the BeN in which WWF had been involved. FIME 
evolved separately out of WWF' s international efforts to institutionalise ecoregion conservation. These 
two projects happened to coincide in the Fiji Islands and evolved alongside each other. The result of 
this coincidence of projects is that WWF does not appear to be particularly discriminatory in the expert 
policy technologies it draws upon in the Fiji Islands. 
FIME and FLMMA have different policy targets. FLMMA's work is centred on communities. FIME is 
largely bypassing communities, according them a token presence only. In both projects, the Fijian state 
is just one of several players-most of the contact occurs with a few individuals in the Fisheries and 
Tourism departments. Yet both WWF and lAS are endeavouring to use FLMMA to reshape state 
policy. Two lAS and two WWF members wrote a paper seeking cabinet endorsement for FLMMA, 
which the Fisheries Division management submitted in their department's name (Dermott O'Gorman, 
former head of WWF-SP Programme Suva, pers. camm.). 
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FLMMA's Nature is the nature of Fijian villagers, while FIME is concerned with Nature as seen and 
interpreted by experts. In FLMMA's work, conservation is about the species Fijians eat, and only that. 
This is conservation of village food not conservation of an ecosystems and ecoregions to which FIME 
aspires. Yet both FIME and FLMMA approach the environment as a problem to be solved-Nature in 
need of rescue. Rather than the projects being justified by the coral reef crisis narrative, each draw 
upon other narratives of degradation and crisis. FLMMA focuses on problems such as declines in the 
stocks of fish and shellfish used for food, and on local pollution. FIME focuses on biodiversity loss and 
on habitat loss generally. Both are part of global political assemblies around an ecological crisis but 
with subtle differences. 
In FIME, because people do not appear on the maps, the ecoregion planning technology serves to 
distance 'bioplanners' from the effects of their interventions and their responsibilities to people. People 
are just threats lurking in the background, justifying the urgency of the work. In FLMMA, people are 
put back into environment. 
Both FIME and FLMMA accord a central role to experts and both projects train local experts in policy 
technologies imported from overseas. Both create new types of experts. FIME is creating experts in 
Fiji's marine biodiversity and in visioning processes with the authority to save that biodiversity. 
FLMMA is creating experts able to bridge the gap between international conservation and the realities 
of life in a Fijian community, to marry these into syncretised conservation practices and to 
communicate these to the international community of environment and development experts. 
Although FIME and FLMMA may seem very different expert approaches, the policy technologies 
upon which they draw share a culture of modernisation. They share an unscientific optimism about the 
possibilities for comprehensive planning and conservation intervention, carried out as projects, to solve 
the problems of environmental degradation; this optimism borrows the legitimacy of science and 
technology. They seek to address environmental degradation in Third World communities which have 
never been industrialised and in which modernisation is a very slight and partial project: professional 
conservationists are the agents of modernity in the Pacific. The FIME and FLMMA projects share 
another common feature: each involves expert participants learning as they proceed, working out what 
to do next, drawing on experiences and storylines from elsewhere. 
WHERE IS THE HEGEMONY IN THIS? 
The professionalisation of international conservation 
The FIME and FLMMA projects are part of efforts to establish a profession of international 
environmentalism, an expert system of technical accomplishment with concomitant authority, prestige 
and social standing. In the Fiji Islands, the environment is being remade as a site requiring specialist 
knowledge. Conservation is being professionalised and charged with rescuing nature. 
In the Pacific, international conservation NGOs are drawing upon practices of science and instrumental 
rationality as a professional resource. They are using expert policy technologies to consolidate their 
authority over global conservation. In designing and employing specific technologies, they recreate 
themselves as methodological gatekeepers and establish their terms of participation in international 
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conservation (Chapter Three). The expert policy technologies being employed in this manner include 
those described in this chapter-ecoregion conservation, learning portfolios, measuring conservation 
success-also community conservation through PRA techniques and MAC's commercial certification. 
Modes of power 
This is neo-Gramscian hegemony through the professionalisation of international conservation as a 
field of endeavour conducted in developing countries by NGOs. It entails a hegemony of western ideas 
about conservation being exercised through various modes of power: for local NGO employees, the 
inducement of employment, professional status and travel; for villagers, the authority and seduction of 
the expert and the inducement of perks provided by funding; the people from village or tikina acting as 
primary liaison with NGOs, and for the governmental department staff undertaking this role, the status 
and travel. These are part of a suite of modes of power being exercised in the policy practices of WWF 
and other international NGOs working in the Fiji Islands. This chapter has portrayed the seduction of 
being invited to participate in planning processes as an expert: whether in FIME's visioning workshop 
or in LMMA's development of a learning portfolio, social contract, and participatory methods for 
'working with' Fijian communities. Ambitious local actors, allured by the opportunity for professional 
recognition, travel, external funding and other forms of recognition will appropriate abstract modes of 
discourse in order to gain access to these; this illustrates the power of seduction. 
Other modes of power are evident. Both the FIME workshop and the LMMA scheme echo Arendt's 
notion of associational power, people acting together for a common purpose (discussed in Allen 1999 
p. 208-211). But other modes of power are also being exercised in both schemes. During the FIME 
workshop, persuasion and manipulation were also very much to the fore (as described). Yet WWF 
never acknowledged how this exercise of power contributed to the result. They, instead, presented it as 
an expert, consultative process, black-boxing what WWF staff were required to do to shape the result 
towards achieving the sort of result they sought. This is part of the hegemony of expert policy 
technologies used in developing countries such as the Fiji Islands. 
The Fiji government provides another example of power. It has appropriated the FLMMA scheme to 
address its own political exigencies at the same time as it portrays itself, on the world stage, as 
committed to marine conservation. In doing so, it is manipulating conservation paradigm to suit its own 
particular political needs and its desire for international recognition. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the role that the professionalisation of conservation plays in shaping the 
field of international environmental policy. The self-interest that professionalisation fosters at both 
organisation and individual scales is a significant factor in the political assembly being built in the Fiji 
Islands around a crisis in biodiversity conservation. Here, again, is nature in need of rescue-the 
environment as a problem to be solved-and rational planning and science as the provider of solutions 
under the guidance of experts. Here too are further local efforts to co-opt the discourse of global 
environmental politics to local ends, both that of an emerging cadre of environmental professionals and 
of the SDL government. 
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As well as showing how the Government of Fiji (GoF) is using the technologies of marine conservation 
to maintain electoral support, and how ambitious local actors are appropriating abstract modes of 
discourse in order to gain access to material resources and status, the chapter has demonstrated the 
converse-how global actors from the outside attempt to evoke local frameworks and reference-points 
for purposes of scientific, political and commercial infiltration. Through such dialectical 
instrumentalities, local and global language continuously intermingle and shade into one another 
(Hornborg 1994 p. 260). This leads to a central notion of modernity: the adoption of a decontextualised 
discourse that is itself a distancing from place and culture. Through the expert policy technologies 
being employed by conservation NGOs, the discourse of global environmental policy is, effect, 
distancing local policy from the local, something that Chapter Thirteen explores further. 

Chapter Twelve 
Trade in Coral Reef Organisms 
Introduction 
The two previous chapters have highlighted the role of experts, examining how a politics is built 
through, on the one hand, the expert technical practices associated with assessing the state of coral 
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reefs and with conservation and, on the other hand, experts pursuing professional advantage. This 
chapter continues that focus, examining expert policy practice concerned with the environmental 
effects of trade in coral reef organisms. This brings the study back to the suggestion, in Chapter Seven, 
that a bloc comprised of the US, Canada and other industrialised countries which import significant 
quantities of these organisms is seeking to control the environmental terms on which this trade is 
conducted. The chapter focuses on three policy designs aimed at controlling these environmental terms: 
(1) CITES' involvement with the Fiji government over coral exports; (2) MAC's neoliberal 
certification scheme for the marine ornamentals trade; and (3) collaborative efforts to address the live 
reef food fish trade in the Pacific region. Although each of these three schemes operates within the 
outwardly cooperative framework of global environmental governance and policy, each is an inherently 
political enterprise in the sense of being power-filled. In examining tensions amongst the groups 
involved in these efforts, and the modes of power being exercised, I allow these ventures to be seen in 
ways other than that suggested by normative explanations with moralistic overtones found in the global 
environmental policy discourse. This permits their hegemonic nature to be seen, adding to the evidence 
for First World hegemonic control in matters of international environmental policy. 
Exports of Reef Organisms: Diverse Policy Approaches 
CITES AND REGULATION OF CORAL EXPORTS 
MAC'S CERTIFICATION OF THE MARINE ORNAMENTALS INDUSTRY 
GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR THE LIVE REEF FISH FOOD TRADE 
Analysis 
FINDING PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS ANSWERS 
THE NATURE OF COOPERATION 
HEGEMONY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TERMS OF TRADE 
CONCLUSION 
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METHODOLOGY: INVESTIGATING CITES, MAC AND THE LRFFT INITIATIVES 
In the sense that the three examples examined in this chapter are the main efforts over the last five 
years to tackle the environmental problems associated "vith the exports of reef organisms from the 
Fiji Islands, they self-selected. I used several methods to research these: interviews, web and library 
searches for primary material (all CITES notices, minutes and reports are on their web site, for 
instance), and participant-observation at workshops in Suva (a Fiji one run by MAC, and a regional 
one on the live reef food fish trade run by SPC with USP's help). At those workshops, I was able to 
observe and gently test through questions and comments, the political agendas of overseas 
participants and those from Pacific regional intergovernmental agencies; in the same manner I was 
able to examine the extent of local participants' understanding of tllOse agendas. 
Exports of Reef Organisms: Diverse Policy Approaches 
CITES AND REGULATION OF CORAL EXPORTS 
Controlling the environmental impacts of Fiji's coral trade: CITES' role 
Fiji's export trade in corals has attracted the attention of both CITES and several international NOOs 
concerned with the marine ornamentals trade: MAC, WWF-SP, IMA, and TRAFFIC (the latter 
introduced in the text box on the next page). In this section I look at the Fiji government's involvement 
with CITES and TRAFFIC in regard to trade in corals only, and in the next section at its involvement 
with MAC regarding the marine ornamentals trade generally (not just corals). 
I examine the CITES example in some detail because that organisation has had the most significant 
impact on government's policy for the coral trade and because it illustrates clearly the exercise of 
coercive power within the overall cooperative framework of international environmental governance. 
Furthermore, the way that CITES dealt with the Fiji government suggests that accuracy about the scale 
of exports is not of paramount importance in determining CITES approach to (some) member 
countries. In justifying its heavy-handed stance in persuading the Fiji government to conform to the 
convention, CITES staff used inaccurate figures about recent increases in the scale of Fiji's export 
trade. Yet even when more accurate statistics were compiled retrospectively and it was apparent that 
the trade in corals was smaller than thought, at no time did CITES staff apologise for their heavy-
handedness or change their approach. Instead, they further justified their approach in the name of 
capacity-building. This example is also interesting because it illustrates how tensions within the Fiji 
government shaped the way in which departments cooperated with CITES. 
INTRODUCING THE ACTORS: 16. THE TRAFFIC NETWORK 
TRAFFIC is an international non-governmental organisation monitoring wildlife trade, 
endeavouring to ensure this trade is not a threat to the conservation of nature. The IUCN Species 
Survival Commission established TRA.FFIC in 1976, primarily to assist in implementing CITES. 
In 1999 TRAFFIC also took on the role of capacity-building on behalf of CITES, a relationship 
formalised through a memorandum of understanding. TRAFFIC's philosophy is that sustainable 
trade in wildlife that is conducted legally and based upon best available science can benefit local 
communities and national economies. A joint programme of\'\7WF and the IUCN, the TRAFFIC 
network is governed by a committee of eight, four nominated by \'\!\V'P and four by IUCN. Its 
head office is in Cambridge, UK and it has 32 offices, eight of which are regional, including an 
Oceania office in New South \V'ales, Australia. In early 2003, TRAFFIC appointed a representative 
to Suva, reporting to the Oceania regional office. 
Source: TRAFFIC (2003); Rob Parry Jones (TRAFFIC, Suva pm. (omm .. ) 
The Fiji government's control of coral exports 
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In any examination of the approach that CITES staff took in dealing with the Fiji Government's coral 
trade, it is important to be clear that, although Rabuka's Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) 
government was slow in meeting the obligations it took on when it signed the CITES in 1997, it did 
have some controls in place to manage coral harvesting and exporting. Since the trade commenced in 
1984, coral exporters have been licensed by government and subject to Cabinet guidelines (Viala 1988 
p. 3). Subsequent governments have endeavoured to address domestic disagreements about the trade's 
environmental impacts, thus belying any notion that they were totally irresponsible. The Cabinet 
guidelines prohibit the use of scuba gear for collecting corals. They require consultation between the 
collector and Fisheries Division to determine management requirements for particular areas, prohibit 
harvesting in tourist areas, and specify that indigenous custodians of the reefs be involved in harvesting 
as much as possible. The guidelines also specify the need for permits to export marine products 
(Malakai Tuiloa, Fiji Fisheries Division, Suva pers. comm .. at MAC workshop 2002). 
After signing CITES, the Fiji government continued its previous system of managing the coral trade, 
although it delegated the Department of Environment the job of monitoring the environmental status of 
the resources. This system entailed the Fisheries Division issuing permits to exporting companies under 
section 64 of the Customs Act 1986 in an ad hoc arrangement with the Customs Department, 
something it had no legal powers to do but which the local industry had not challenged legally (Lovell 
2001 p. 36). Those wanting to export coral applied to the Fisheries Division for an export permit stating 
the numbers or the amounts of material they anticipated exporting (Lovell and Tumuri 1999 p. 46). In 
granting permits, the Fisheries Division was in the practice of stipulating this amount as a maximum 
permissible to be exported each year. Although the Division had not attempted to assess natural stocks 
in order to establish sustainable levels of harvest, it had a departmental policy that included provision 
for a baseline survey before coral collection commenced in a new area, with occasional follow-up 
surveys (Richards et ai. 1994 p. 105). 
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The system operated unchallenged until early 1999, when as result of USCRTF investigations into the 
coral trade (preparatory work for the national action plan to conserve coral reefs, discussed in Chapter 
Seven), it appeared that the US might close the trade down. Fisheries Division commissioned local 
biological consultant Ed Lovell to investigate the environmental impact of coral harvesting in 
conjunction with a Fisheries staff member. The report, an investigation of industry practices compiled 
with the assistance of exporters (Lovell and Tumuri 1999) was completed mid-year, around the time a 
Labour government was elected, replacing the SVT government. The report made numerous 
recommendations about how the Fisheries Division could better manage the industry, including better 
data collection, forming best practice guidelines, legislative amendments, and requiring the 
certification of all collectors and exporters. 
Cognisant of complaints from the tourism industry, the new Minister for Environment Ganesh Chand 
publicly suggested that the coral and marine ornamentals industry should be closed, reportedly putting 
this in a memo to Cabinet (Ken MacKay, C-SPODP coordinator, Suva, pers. camm. November 2003). 
A Cabinet sub-committee looking at the industry subsequently announced that it was considering a 
total ban and revocation of licences because there was no effective monitoring of the trade (PacNews 
1999). Although the Labour Government sought public submissions, its public inquiry lapsed when it 
was ousted in a civilian coup in May 2000. After the coup, the Fisheries Division continued to manage 
coral exports as before. But concerns about the trade's impact on reef ecology, raised by the Fiji Hotels 
Association, Fiji Dive operators, the Ministry of Tourism and some provincial councils, prompted the 
Department of Environment to take a more active interest. So too did the interest that CITES had begun 
to take in the country's exports, an interest spurred in part by the two reports on the international coral 
trade. In both the Green and Shirley (WCMC) report and that of the USCRFT (reports introduced in 
Chapter Five and discussed in Chapter Eight), the Fiji Islands was cited as one of the countries whose 
trade should be of concern because of its size and rapid expansion since 1994 (Green and Shirley 1999 
p. 13-15; Trade subgroup of the United States Coral Reef Task Force 2000 p. 25 footnote). "The most 
dramatic increase in [international] trade since the mid 1980s occurred in Fiji which exported an 
average of 27t per year between 1990-1994. In the mid 1990s this increased by an order of magnitude 
to an average of 293t between 1995 and 1997" (Green and Shirley 1999 p. 15). 
The Government and CITES 
In 1999, CITES Secretariat staff identified parties to the convention that were engaged in significant 
amounts of international trade in coral specimens of CITES species, yet whose national legislation did 
not meet the requirements for implementing CITES. They identified the Fiji Islands as one such party, 
using the export figures on the size of the trade published by Green and Shirley (1999). When the 
Secretariat brought this list to the attention of its CoP the same year, the latter decided (Decision 11.16) 
that if those parties did not adopt suitable legislation before the end of October 2001, then all CITES' 
parties should refuse to accept exports of CITES-listed species from the offending countries 
(Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
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2003b). The CoP delegated to the CITES Standing Committee the authority to decide appropriate 
measures to bring these transgressors into compliance with the convention (Decision 11.17) 
(Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
2003b). 
The convention covers all species of hard corals (Chapter Six), so when the Fiji Islands acceded to it in 
1997, it was making a commitment to ensuring its coral trade was sustainable. Parties to CITES are 
required to issue a permit for any coral export, proving the specimen has been legally obtained and that 
the export is not detrimental to the species' survival. This is a two-way process. Before accepting 
imports, including any carried by tourists, countries party to CITES require export permits from the 
country of origin (UNEP Coral Reef Unit and WWF Coral Reefs Advisory Initiative 2003 p. 6). 
Furthermore, under European Council regulations, imports into the European Union require 
documentation of the CITES 'non-detriment' finding, (i.e. that the export is not detrimental to the 
survival of the species in question), documentation additional to that required under CITES' provisions 
(FMACC 2003b). 
In 1999, there were two shortfalls in the Fiji government's compliance with CITES. It had failed to 
provide annual reports (which allow the Secretariat to analyse international trade). It should also have 
set up an official authority to manage the trade as well as a scientific authority to ensure it was 
sustainable (it had established neither). Following the CoP's decision in 1999, the Secretariat brought 
these matters to the attention of Fiji's Department of Environment, the defacto management authority. 
In April 2000, the Secretariat officially notified the Department that the Fiji Islands might be subject to 
a recommendation to suspend its coral trade (Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 2003b). At this stage, the Department had been aware for 
at least a year of CITES' concern over Fiji's trade, a year during which a Labour government had been 
elected and threatened to close the industry down. When the Labour government was ousted in a coup 
in May 2000, the CITES Secretariat waited six months before writing to the Department of 
Environment to remind it of its obligations and to impose a deadline of 31 October 200 I for legislation 
to be passed (Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora 2001b; Department of Environment Fiji 2002 p. 4). Over the next three years, CITES 
officials and representatives put considerable pressure upon the Fiji Government, twice suspending all 
trade in corals from the Fiji Islands. As a result the SDL Government passed The Endangered and 
Protected Species Act 2002 and the Endangered and Protected Species Regulations (2003), and set 
annual quotas for each species and for live rock. It established both a CITES management authority and 
a scientific authority. Throughout this period, CITES (particularly its secretariat staff) adopted an 
increasingly heavy-handed and coercive approach to the Department of Environment with whom it was 
dealing. Times between receiving information and seeking further information became shorter and 
shorter-down to a matter of only a day in one case. This heavy-handed attitude is interesting when 
viewed in relation to the inaccuracies and doubt over the actual scale of Fiji coral 
exports-remembering that CITES took an interest in the Fiji Islands ostensibly because it had 
significant coral exports. I document this chronology in Table 20 following. 
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TABLE 20: CHRONOLOGY OF CITES' ApPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FIJI ISLANDS 
Fiji Government response to Date Action subsequently taken by Timing of CITES' 
preceding CITES' action CITES response 
27 Nov. CITES write imposing a deadline of 31 
2000 October 2001 for CITES legislation to 
be passed 
GoF replied they were making January The Secretariat suspended all trade Suspension put in 
progress; subsequently missed 2002 with Fiji in CITES-listed species place 23 January 2002, 
deadline due to need for further (Notification 2002/003) three months after the 
consultation on the bill intended to deadline had passed. 
contain CITES legislation 
Making excuses, including the Mid- Standing Committee temporarily lifted Decision taken at the 
effect of tlIe 2000 coup, a GoF March the suspension in response to GoF same standing 
representative at tlIe 46th meeting 2002 agreement to enact national legislation committee 
of the CITES Standing Committee before year-end and to follow an meeting-deadline for 
sought to have the suspension agreed plan which included setting legislation extended to 
lifted quotas for coral species at 50 percent 31 December 2002 
of previous year's exports 
Supplied a table showing a 18 July Requested copies of 2001 and 2002 5 August 2002 
'Voluntary coral quota 2002', based 2002 permits to verify quotas. Advised that 
on a 50 percent reduction from because GoF had not submitted 1997-
2001 figures 2002 annual reports, Fiji remained 
potentially subject to recommendation 
to suspend trade 
Requested a 6-month extension of November Secretariat informs parties that the Later the same month 
the deadline to enact legislation but and recommendation to suspend trade is 
provided information enabling the December temporarily withdrawn (i.e. trade 
secretariat to verify action plan was 2002 continues) 
being followed 
Advised CITES that the Fiji December Advised Parties that they should not 7 February 2003 
Parliament had enacted The 2002 accept export permits for CITES-listed 
Elldangered alld Protected Species Ad coral specimens from Fiji until the 
2002 on 6 December 2002 Secretariat verified 2003 quotas 
Submitted its 2003 coral export April 2003 Sought clarification regarding the Clarifica tion 
quotas to the Secretariat process oflegislation coming into immediately sought. 
force and development of Visit to Suva took 
implementing regulations. Secretariat place in August 2003 
staff and the Oceania representative to 
the Standing Committee met Fiji 
representatives in Suva. Gave the GoF 
until 31 October 2003 to promulgate 
enacting regulations and provide 
details of coral export quotas or else 
have its trade suspended again 
Despite reminders, GOF failed to August to Renewed recommendation to Parties 31 October 2003 
send implementing regulations or October to suspend all trade ,vith Fiji in 
coral export details 2003 CITES-listed species 
Gazetted the Endangered and 7 Verified quotas and withdrew the A week later 
Protected Spedes Regldatiolls (2003), November recommendation to suspend trade \vith 
sent CITES these and quota details 2003 the Fiji Islands 
Sources: Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(2002a; 2002c; 2002b p. 1-2; 2003b; 2003a p. 1; 2003c; 2003d); FMACC (2003b). 
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The accuracy of the trade statistics 
The accuracy, or otherwise, of coral trade statistics plays an important part in this story. In August 
1999, shortly after WCMC report appeared, coral harvesting in the Fiji Islands was the subject of a 
vigorous discussion on Coral-List (1999). This is an open discussion list maintained by NOAA, which 
judging by the range of contributions over the past four years, is read by people in many countries 
(pel's. obs.). The discussion thread started when a Greenpeace worker, referring to Lovell and Tumuri's 
(1999) report, requested scientists to 'help balance' the debate by providing information and comment 
on the impacts of Fiji coral harvesting. For a month, correspondents debated the acceptability of Fiji's 
levels of coral export. While some questioned the veracity of the figures quoted in Green and Shirley-
these simply looked too big-others were prepared to believe them and took the opportunity to strongly 
oppose the harvest. 
Hindsight showed that there were indeed several problems with the Fiji coral export statistics. Because 
of several administrative glitches including past computer crashes, the figures that Fisheries Division 
had supplied WCMC were inaccurate (Lovell and Tumuri 1999 p. 47; Preti Singh, Fisheries Division, 
Suva, pel's. Gomm.). The extent of the problems only became clear when Lovell, the Fisheries 
Division's consultant, analysed packing lists supplied by the exporters. He concluded that Green and 
Shirley's statements about the quantities of coral exported from the Fiji Islands were inflated, a matter 
he communicated to the authors (Ed Lovell, Suva, pel's. Gomm.). The export figures Green and Shirley 
used were the maximum values permitted by the Fisheries Division, as specified on export permits, not 
actual quantities exported. They were inflated because exporters had, as a matter of convenience, 
applied for a quantity well in excess of the amounts likely to be shipped-between four and ten times 
higher than what had actually been exported (Lovell and Tumuri 1999 p. 47; Lovell 2001; Ed Lovell, 
Suva, pel's. Gomm.). There were other sources of confusion including the way that the Fisheries 
Division's export data had combined curio coral and live coral statistics. Also, live rock lumped 
together with coral vastly inflated the statistics for coral exports, especially after the live rock trade 
grew rapidly in the mid-1990s. The WCMC figures also included significant amounts of coral that 
Fijian exporters had obtained from other countries and trans-shipped (Lovell and Tumuri 1999 p. 46). 
By late 2004, there are still no accurate figures on Fiji's coral exports-I endeavoured to obtain these 
from the authorities over the course of 12 months but no-one professed to have an accurate account. 
The best available ones are those on the CITES web site (maintained by WCMC). These are based on 
figures supplied by importing countries and not those supplied by Fiji; WCMC had found that the Fiji 
CITES Management Authority'S data for 2000-2002 was missing much information and has sought 
further clarification from the Authority (Helen Corrigan, UNEP-WCMC, pel's. Gomm.). There are also 
problems with the statistics in the CITES database. Live and dead corals are sometimes muddled. Live 
rock is included as coral rather than distinguished from it, and is sometimes coded as dead coral and 
sometimes as live coral. Furthermore, it is difficult to get a sense of the total quantities involved 
because the units used to record shipments vary. They are sometimes recorded as pieces, sometimes as 
kilograms, and occasionally as bags or cartons. All quantities must be considered when calculating 
total quantities of exports but the different measurements are not readily equated; some analysts 
including Green and Shirley) use standard conversions for different coral species (pieces to 
kilograms), but the conversion factors used for live rock remains problematic . 
TABLE 21: ESTIMATED WILD-HARVESTED CORAL EXPORTS FROM THE FIJI ISLANDS, 1988-2000 
Year Live coral Raw/dead coral 
kilogram pieces kilogram baglcarton pieces carvings 
1988 0 880 0 0 26752 10 
1989 0 1136 0 0 44864 0 
1990 0 15196 0 4 54238 1026 
199 1 0 12604 0 3 73062 275 
1992 0 741 0 0 57509 2 
1993 2046 2224 0 0 18794 7 
1994 12870 21599 4403 0 25917 1455 
1995 89839 48209 0 0 38380 9 
199 238816 81104 46876 0 49647 0 
1997 356649 131216 250381 0 137365 2 
1998 349396 152525 452179 0 161487 1 
1999 0 282801 883180 0 154100 0 
200 182714 168038 896538 0 20878 1 125 
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Sourc~: net export trade report generated from the CITES web site by Helen Corrigan, UNEP-WCMC, 
in July 2004, subsequently edited to remove coral transhipped through the Fiji Islands. 
FIGURE 7: QUANTITIES OF WILD-HARVESTED CORAL EXPORTED FROM THE FI.lllsLANDS, 1988-2000 
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SourcL!: the data in Table 21 above, utilising standard conversions of 0.5 for carvings; 0.375 for other 
corals and 40 kg weight for cartons. 
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Table 21 contains my best estimate of the size of Fiji's coral trade since 1988, based on the data that 
WCMC supplied in July 2004. This table, and the accompanying chart (Figure 7), show the 
considerable increase in total quantities exported since 1995, the first signs of which (in 1995 to 1997) 
Green and Shirley had noticed. What Green and Shirley did not perceive, however, was that much of 
this increase was due to the export of live rock rather than to particular species of Scleractinian coral. 
Being much heavier than coral pieces, and being exported in full container loads, live rock has made up 
most of the recorded weight of coral exports since 1995. This cannot be seen from the CITES/wCMC 
data because WCMC does not hold accurate statistics on live rock exports and lumps it into the totals 
for coral exported. Although small quantities of live rock had been exported from the Fiji Islands since 
the mid-1980s it was not until 1995 when Walt Smith International started operating in the Fiji Islands, 
that the industry expanded (Smith 2002; Ed Lovell, Suva, pel's. comm.). Since 1995, the company's 
live rock exports have grown steadily to over 500 tonne per annum, collected from several sites in 
rotation (Smith 2002; Wesson 2002 p. 5; Ed Lovell, Suva, pers. comm.). Three other companies also 
export live rock. Although I could not ascertain exact quantities exported each year since 1995, I did 
obtain figures for 2001. That year, Fiji exported BOOt of live rock, of which 561 t came from Walt 
Smith International (Ed Lovell, Suva, pel's. comm.; Walt Smith International's data supplied to Mr. 
Lovell by Tim McLeod of that company). (The previous year, Walt Smith International had exported 
54lt according to Tim McLeod.) 
Thus the overall increase in coral exports in Table 21 and Figure 7 mirrors a dramatic increase in one 
particular trade, that in live rock. It is highly likely that the steady rise in quantities of corals exported 
from the Fiji Islands which Green and Shirley (1999) noted and which was debated on Coral-List, was 
due largely to expansion of the live rock trade. It is less clear whether there has been any significant 
increase in the harvest of particular species of Scleractinia listed in CITES' Appendix II, since the 
relatively huge weights of live rock mask this. Yet CITES treated all Scleractinia species harvested in 
the Fiji Islands as being at risk from overharvesting due to a supposedly dramatic increase in overall 
export quantities. It lacked any species-specific data on this however, and could not statistically justify 
any such assumption. Furthermore, CITES had no evidence that live rock, gathered intertidally, 
endangers particular species of Scleractinia growing sub tidally. 
When this analysis is combined with observations, in Chapter Eight, about the reports on the global 
coral trade, it shows the widespread disregard for accuracy in export statistics held by the various 
groups involved in managing the trade, the CITES Secretariat included. In citing as one of the reasons 
why its suspension of Fiji's trade should continue, despite the effect of the 2000 coup on Fiji 
government' department's ability to conduct their work, the CITES Secretariat stated that the country's 
significant trade in corals was having a detrimental effect on the survival of the species being exported. 
It based this assumption on the export statistics WCMC had produced, which were inaccurate for the 
reasons discussed earlier in the chapter, and which mixed quantities of live rock and scleractinian 
corals together (Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora 2002c). As the Secretariat received further information about the size of the trade, 
particularly the statistics for live rock, it never acknowledged publicly that the way it had depicted the 
seemingly urgent need to address Fiji's trade might have been based on rniscomprehensions about the 
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size of the trade in scleractinian corals. Instead, it re-justified its efforts in terms of the need for 
capacity building. CITES subsequently started a capacity building project in the Fiji Islands, part of its 
efforts to target small island developing states. 
The Secretariat's misunderstanding over the size of Fiji's trade in corals affected the reduction in 
export quotas they sought from the Fiji government. Although there is no specific requirement within 
the text of the convention to establish quotas to limit trade in listed species, annual quotas are a tool 
that CITES often uses (CITES c.2003). Intended to meet the convention's requirement that exports will 
be non-detrimental to the survival of the species concerned, they specify the maximum numbers of 
specimens to be exported in a year, at a level believed not to be detrimental (ibid). Although the 
Secretariat describes quotas as voluntary, they were anything but in this case. 
The policy of a 50 percent reduction was the secretariat's, not a joint decision with the Fiji government 
(FMACC 2003a). Using its suspension of trade in early 2002 to pressurise the government to agree to a 
plan of action, secretariat staff had included the setting of annual quotas for all coral species and for 
live rock in their list of conditions for lifting the suspension. The Fiji government, through the 
Department of Environment and Fisheries Division, acting in consultation with the Fiji Marine 
Aquarium and Curio Coral Council (a government advisory group including exporters and TRAFFIC 
representative Rob Parry Jones) subsequently developed quotas "in good faith, acting upon the 
guidance and interpretation provided by the CITES Secretariat" (Rob Parry Jones quoted in FMACC 
2003b). It was therefore of some surprise to council members that, after verifying and publishing the 
2003 quotas on their web site, the CITES Secretariat wrote to the Department of Environment stating 
that the 2003 quotas should represent a 50 percent reduction in the actual trade in 2001 not, as 
calculated, a 50 percent reduction in the quotas set for 2001 (the latter presumably being a larger 
quantity, based upon the levels at which the Fisheries Division had been issuing export permits). The 
Secretariat subsequently withdrew approval for the 2003 quotas and Jim Armstrong of the Secretariat 
revised these during a visit to Suva a few months later (Preti Singh, Fiji Fisheries Division, Suva, pers. 
comm.). 
Modes of power 
In these actions we see the simultaneous exercise of several modes of power, not just the coercion of 
negative sanctions. The Fiji government conceded to the authority of the CITES regime, yet at the 
same time, Department of Environment staff attempted to negotiate with the CITES secretariat over its 
imposed deadlines. In Weber's terms, the CITES secretariat secured the Fiji government's assent 
within the regime's 'structures of domination'-the institutions by which it controls international trade 
(Allen discusses Weber's interpretation of authority in 1999 p. 206). To span the distance between 
Switzerland and the Fiji Islands, the CITES' regime acted through the Department of Environment, 
enrolling that department in their act of coercion. Department of Environment staff, also Rob Parry 
Jones of TRAFFIC, drew on CITES' authority when they encouraged the industry players to conform 
and Fisheries Division staff to agree-the power of persuasion combined with authority. Given the 
ability of CITES to stop the trade merely by issuing a directive, the department did not need to 
demonstrate its own power, it merely acted as a translator station in the transference of that power. In 
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electing to support CITES' stance, Department of Environment officials chose to drew on associational 
power (in the sense described by Arendt and discussed in the previous chapter). So too did TRAFFIC, 
acting together with CITES in what both parties saw as a legitimate common endeavour. In Allen's 
terms, power was being used not just in a hierarchical, instrumental way but also in a lateral mode in 
order to fix a collective orientation, negotiation sitting alongside coercion and authority (Allen 1999 p. 
210). 
There were clearly tensions within the outwardly cooperative framework within which CITES works 
(described in the text box Introducing the Players: 1. CITES in Chapter Five). CITES' style of 
cooperation features a large dose of coercive power, controlling voluntary action not by force but by 
sanctions on trade. CITES was decidedly coercive not just in threatening to suspend Fiji's coral trade 
then actually doing so, but also in the way it set annual national export quotas. This coercive attitude is 
evident in Table 20. 
In noting this attitude, it is important to recognise that, in dealing with the Fiji government, CITES is 
not a single actor with a single, unified approach. Staff in the Secretariat and those on the Standing 
Committee had different approaches to obtaining the Fiji government's cooperation in complying with 
the convention. The Standing Committee showed some leniency in allowing time and encouraging the 
government to address the various compliance issues. In contrast, Secretariat staff allowed little 
leeway. As, over time, they had more contact with the Department, their distrust of its ability to 
manage the trade appeared to grow. The central issue had changed from concern at the size of the trade 
to concern about the Fiji government's ability to control the trade. On at least three occasions between 
February and April 2003, Secretariat staff replied to evidence of progress sent it by Department of 
Environment (e.g. a copy of the newly gazetted legislation and information about the proposed quotas) 
not with thanks or encouragement but with immediate demands for responses on other matters. 
One reason why senior staff in the Department of Environment appeared willing to put up with the 
heavy-handedness of the CITES staff may well have been because they thought the industry needed 
firmer regulation (Epeli Nasome, Head of the Department of Environment, Suva, pas. comm.). 
Moreover, the Endangered and Protected Species Act 2002 was the first piece of legislation to give the 
Department a legislative role; it was in effect the Department's first step towards having a regulatory 
role in protecting Fiji's environment and as such must have been welcomed. In the Fiji Islands, staff of 
the Department of Environment were not alone in thinking the industry needed firmer controls. Both 
the Tourism Department and some provincial governments wanted to shut the industry down. The 
Fisheries Division, on the other hand, saw its role as being to assist, as well as manage, the industry 
(Department of Environment Fiji 2002 p. 4; FMACC 2003a). Consequently, there were tensions 
between the two departments, seen when Department of Environment staff refused to accept Lovell and 
Tumuri's study as valid on the grounds that the Fisheries Division had commissioned it and the report's 
authors had worked closely with the exporting companies in compiling it. This compromised the report 
in the Department of Environment's view, particularly since the Fisheries Division had forced 
exporters to pay for it on threat of losing licences (Ken Mackay, pers. comm. November 2003). 
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The actions of various CITES groups (mainly the Secretariat and Standing Committee) towards the Fiji 
government between 1999 and 2004 were hardly benevolent towards the Fiji government. While the 
motive of individual CITES staff is not clear (I was not in a position to interview them nor did I meet 
them), Rob Parry Jones of TRAFFIC did reply to a comment from a Fisheries Division staff that 
"Leniency to some parties and not to others would not be beneficial to the overall implementation of 
the convention" (reported in FMACC 2003b). This suggests that because some parties might be rogues, 
all should be treated as if they too might be. Alternatively, the heavy handedness may be the way in 
which Secretariat staff routinely apply the precautionary principle. The CITES strategic plan states that 
"Where uncertainty remains as to whether trade is sustainable, the precautionary principle will prevail 
as the ultimate safeguard" (CITES 2003 p. 1). 
One might assume, from the Department of Environment's distrust of the working relationship between 
Ed Lovell, the Fisheries Division and the operators, that the operators were the villains in all this, 
wilfully overfishing the resource. Yet, even in the late 1990s, when concerns about the increasing size 
of Fiji coral exports were being publicised, Fijian exporters were trying to persuade the government to 
pass regulations in accordance with CITES (Ken Mackay, pel's. comm. November 2003). At times 
there must have been tensions between industry and the Department of Environment, given the 
inability of senior departmental staff to provide the CITES Secretariat with requested details in a timely 
fashion. It was not until TRAFFIC placed Rob Parry in Suva in early 2003 to work with Department of 
Environment staff, that the Department was able to fill the CITES Secretariat's demands and timetable, 
thus averting further sanctions. Funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth office of the British 
government for three years, and supported by TRAFFIC's Oceania office in Australia, Parry Jones 
quickly established cooperative working relationships with both the government agencies and 
exporters. He was able to retrospectively compile Fiji's annual reports to CITES. Nevertheless, the 
exporters had to suffer suspension of trade due to the government's inability to meet the CITES 
Secretariat's timetable, yet they themselves were unable to hurry the government up. They continued to 
cooperate however, to ensure that the industry would not be closed. 
This simultaneous exercise of multiple modes of power evident in this study of CITES control of the 
coral trade illustrates the complexity of the situation. This complexity is further illuminated when other 
efforts to manage Fiji's export trade in coral reef organisms are added to the story. 
MAC'S CERTIFICATION OF THE MARINE ORNAMENTALS INDUSTRY 
How MAC became involved in the South Pacific 
Several of the same exporters (those exporting live coral rather than curios) have been involved in a 
second scheme to manage the environmental effects of exporting coral reef organisms, one with a very 
different policy approach-MAC's commercial certification of the aquarium trade (Chapter Seven). At 
the same time that CITES was leaning on the Fiji government to put controls on the export of corals, 
this second scheme was being introduced to the Fiji Islands. 
As with coral harvesting, the Fisheries Division had been managing the export of reef organisms for the 
marine aquarium trade ever since interested exporters first raised the possibility of live aquarium fish 
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exports in the early 1980s. Although the export of live fish is prohibited under Regulation 26 of the 
Fisheries Regulations (Cap. 158 as amended), the Permanent Secretary had granted some exemptions 
(under Regulation 27) to allow the industry to develop, subject to Cabinet guidelines approved in 1984. 
These specify that licensed operators must be of high international repute with a proven record in the 
trade; also that resource custodians must be involved in the collection as much as possible and must be 
trained for this. Operators are required to ensure collection does not conflict with other uses such as 
tourist diving. They are prohibited from using chemicals or poisons, The regulations also allow the 
Department to place a ceiling on the total number of fish exported each year (Richards et al. 1994 p. 
61). This was the situation when, in the late 1990s, the possibility of instituting MAC's fledging 
scheme (Chapter Seven) was raised. 
While CITES' approach to trade in corals is reminiscent of the Keynesian style of environmental 
regulation typical of developed countries post-war, reflecting the 1970s origins of that convention, 
MAC's scheme is distinctly neoliberal. Rather than trying to improve state regulation of exports, those 
involved in founding MAC had designed a market-based scheme aimed at both harvesters, exporters 
and importers, and regulated by international auditors. They concentrated on those reef organisms 
exported as marine ornamentals but not covered by CITES-mainly fish. MAC's scheme was created 
when neoliberalism was in its ascendance in large multilateral development agencies, a time when 
private sector partnerships for marine conservation had come into favour in North America. It was a 
time when the World Bank had recently launched its Marine Market Transformation Initiative aiming 
to transform unsustainable industries into green ones through partnerships with key stakeholders 
(Global Biodiversity Forum 1997). Around the same time WWF International and Unilever launched 
the Marine Stewardship Council, designed to create voluntary third-party certification of fisheries and 
labelling of seafood products. The IUCN was promoting private sector partnerships in the marine and 
coastal environment, and MAC's instigators promoted their fledging scheme at an IUCN workshop on 
this subject held at the Eighth Global Biodiversity Forum in August 1997 in Montreal, Canada (ibid). 
Although not SUbjected to the same degree of international concernas the country's coral trade, Fiji's 
marine ornamentals industry was caught up in these efforts to take a neoliberal approach to the 
industry. Although concern about the marine ornamentals industry in Southeast Asia provided the 
initial impetus for establishing MAC, once formed, the NGO included the South Pacific in its sphere of 
operations. The Fiji Islands and various other Pacific Islands were enrolled in efforts to get the MAC 
scheme up and running, not as a response to environmental concern expressed in international circles 
as happened over the coral trade, but through a particular a chain of circumstances catalysed by certain 
professional contacts and interests. MAC's interest in the Pacific came about because Paul Holthus, 
appointed to run MAC in mid 1998, had previously worked at the South Pacific Commission and the 
East-West Centre in Hawaii. Another reason why MAC became involved in the Pacific Islands is 
attributable to the Canadian Government, then funding the Canadian International Development 
Agency's Canada-South Pacific Ocean Development Programme (C-SPODP), a programme placing a 
private sector adviser at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in Suva. When, in 1998, the Forum 
Secretariat requested information on opportunities for fish exports to North America, the C-SPODP 
adviser commissioned a Canadian consultant Jamie Baquero to research the potential sustainability of 
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the trade in the Pacific (Baquero 1999a also Ken Mackay, Suva, pers. comm. November 2003). In his 
report, Baquero advocated the MAC scheme, then being developed-Baquero was vice-president of 
Ocean Voice International, active in projects in the Philippines (mentioned in Chapter Five) and a 
member of the MAC working group (Ken MacKay, Suva, pers. comln. November 2003; Baquero 
1999b). 
Following Baquero's favourable report, the C-SPOPD private sector adviser wrote a proposal for MAC 
to run a pilot certification programme in three Pacific Island countries starting with the Fiji Islands 
which had the most established marine ornamental industry in the Pacific, then extending it to other 
islands if successful (Ken MacKay, pers. comm. November 2003). C-SPOPD funded a MAC 
coordinator based at the Forum Secretariat. The project was designed to be implemented in two 
stages-national consultations and workshops to be held first and profiles of local industry compiled, 
following which staff would work directly with companies wishing to be certified. 
Scheme approved with little analysis of the policy options 
Besides the approval of Forum Secretariat and Fisheries Division staff, there were two further 
endorsements of MAC's plans to work in the Fiji Islands. Participants at a national workshop on 
marine ornamentals certification, held to discuss both the certification option and problems with the 
coral trade, voted unanimously to implement certification (Joshua Mael, Forum Secretariat, Suva, pers. 
comm .. ). The workshop was held immediately after a regional marine aquarium trade workshop 
organised by SPREP and funded by USAID's East Asia and Pacific Environmental Initiative. The Fiji 
workshop was the first time that industry people and staff from various departments (Fisheries, 
Environment, Tourism, and Fijian Affairs) had collectively discussed the industry, the stand-off 
between the Environment and Fisheries departments having previously precluded this (Ken Mackay, C-
SPODP coordinator, Suva, pers. comln., November 2003). 
In addition, Fisheries Division staff held a series of workshops with resource custodians, and told them 
about MAC's scheme; the custodians agreed with the department's idea that the scheme should be 
made compulsory (Preti Singh, Fiji Fisheries Division, pers. comm.). Because of the government 
policies stipUlating that only indigenous Fijians can harvest coral in their own qoliqoli, and that that 
resource custodians are to be involved in the collection of aquarium fish as much as possible and must 
be trained for this, village collectors must be involved in achieving certification of ecosystem and 
fisheries management. 
The head of the Fiji Fisheries Division gave the scheme their wholesale approval, announcing to 
operators in mid-2002 that their export licences would not be renewed if they did not obtain 
certification-largely bluff because he had not sought approval from the Minister or Cabinet for this 
(pers. obs. at MAC workshop, Suva). Despite this public expression of approval, it was never clear that 
senior staff who gave the scheme their stamp of approval ever really understood its policy implications. 
Unfamiliar with quality management systems, they were probably unaware of the extent to which the 
scheme takes policy control out of government hands and puts it into the hands of auditors and those 
who formulate the standards. There was, however, considerable willingness to see the scheme's 
implications as at worst benign for the government. 
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Since MAC and the industry had all the work to do in achieving certification, Fisheries Division staff 
probably saw the scheme as a relatively easy way to manage the industry, at little cost to the 
department. The department announced its policy on compulsory certification at the time when it was 
publicly pushing the idea that before the government carried out its stated policy of handing back the 
control of fisheries in the qoliqoli areas back to the customary owners-an approach that would leave 
the department with only an advisory role in inshore fisheries management-there should be resource 
surveys of every qoliqoli area to establish the size of stocks. Having the stock inventory surveys done 
for those areas used by the marine ornamentals trade must have seemed a partial solution to this 
daunting undertaking. 
Underlying the various cooperative relationships needed to implement this market-based scheme, is a 
distinct laissez faire attitude to policy at both regional and government level-a willingness to go along 
with whatever is on offer if it involves aid funding, rather than any conscious commitment to change to 
a neoliberal approach, or any deep philosophical commitment to the latter. Neither the regional policy 
office involved, the Forum Secretariat, nor the Fiji government thoroughly analysed MAC's policy 
approach to the industry before allowing the scheme to proceed. When Forum Secretariat staff initially 
approved this pilot project (one of three items in the package C-SPODP proposed funding), they did 
not analyse the merits of the various alternatives. It was not until 2003, when the MAC project was in 
full swing, that Forum Secretariat staff recognised that it was time to step aside and consider what role 
they should play and what their policy should be (Joshua Mael, private sector adviser, Forum 
Secretariat, Suva pel's. comm .. ). This is surprising considering that the Forum represents itself as the 
primary policy agency in the region. 
Fisheries Division's coercion was one, but not the only, reason why exporters entertained the scheme 
despite the onerous paperwork requirements. The three largest exporters could also see the commercial 
advantage it might bring (Tim McLeod of Walt Smith International and David Oliver of Fiji Fish, pel's. 
obs. at the MAC workshop, October 2002). Their cooperation may also have been a response to the 
fear, circulating in 1999/2000, that the US government might stop the trade altogether. At that time 
MAC lobbied the US government, presenting certification as a suitable way of addressing the trade's 
adverse environmental effects (Ken MacKay, C-SPODP coordinator, Suva pel's. comm. November 
2003). 
The Fiji Fisheries Division's idea of making the scheme compulsory conflicted with the basic premise 
underlying the scheme, that by choosing to join it, exporters gain a commercial edge over non-certified 
operators. Senior MAC staff, present in Suva at that time to run the workshop for exporters, quietly 
concurred with this coercion even though requiring the certification scheme to be compulsory changes 
the whole dynamics of it. They deliberately chose not to discuss those dynamics with industry and 
Fisheries Division staff and by doing so, appeared keener to ensure that the scheme was implemented 
than they were to maintain the integrity of scheme as a voluntary market-based instrument (pers. obs.; 
also conversations with Peter Scott and Razel Kusumaatmadja, MAC, Suva). This suggests the interest 
of MAC staff as another factor driving the scheme's implementation in the Fiji Islands. 
282 
Modes of power 
In MAC's initiative in the Fiji Islands, we see the exercise of a different mode of power from the 
coercion of negative sanctions that CITES secretariat aimed at the Fiji government. Like the FIME and 
LMMA schemes described in the previous chapter, MAC's scheme is based on the notion of 
associational power sensu Arendt, people acting together for a common purpose. Yet, in the design and 
execution of a scheme intended to mobilise people in the pursuit of the common purpose of putting the 
marine ornamentals trade on an environmentally sustainable basis, different modes of power are being 
exercised. Here is the power of seduction: for those MAC employed, the allure of professional jobs, 
salary and status; for the government, the seduction of aid funding, for exporters, the inducement of 
gaining an edge on competitors. There is the power of persuasion: MAC officials endeavouring to 
persuade exporters of the merits of the scheme. There is also manipulation-in the way that the 
Fisheries Division officials portrayed certification as mandatory, and in the way that MAC's overseas 
staff quietly ignored how this rendered their scheme illogical. These are the same modes described in 
the previous chapter, suggesting similar dynamics amongst the NOOs involved. 
The nature of cooperation: multiple actors and tense relationships 
Initial progress on the C-SPODPIMAC certification project was slow (something attributed to the local 
project manager, later replaced) (Ken MacKay, C-SPODP coordinator, Suva, pers. comm.). It was not 
until 2002 that steps were taken towards getting Fijian exporters certified. Through staff in its Suva-
based regional office, MAC worked with three largest of the Fiji exporters, all of whom had signed a 
Statement of Commitment with MAC, to develop policy and procedures manuals and collection area 
management plans, all steps towards certification (MAC 2002). In December 2003, the largest of the 
Fijian exporters, Walt Smith International, received certification for all three core standards (ecosystem 
and fisheries management; collection, fishing and holding; and handling, husbandry and transport) and 
four collection areas. Until the C-SPODP project terminated in late 2004, MAC project staff continued 
to work with other exporters, one of which was nearing certification standard at that time (MAC 2004b, 
2005). 
Obtaining MAC certification for exporters was only one of several steps being taken to put Fiji's 
marine ornamental industry onto a neoliberal footing. Another thread entailed working with Fijian 
collectors, in their home villagers. MAC staff in Suva started training Fijian collectors in both 
harvesting and post-harvest techniques in 2003 (MAC 2004a). WWF-Fiji, in ajoint project with MAC, 
worked with villagers at Malomalo on the Coral Coast of Viti Levu where the villagers have harvested 
live rock for export since the early 1990s and where WWF-Fiji had worked on various community 
projects since 1999 (Owen 2003 p. 38). WWF-Fiji helped the Malomalo community improve 
harvesting practices and develop a collection area management plan, a pre-requisite for certification 
under MAC's fishing and ecosystem standard (Owen 2003). They also encouraged them to designate 
part of their traditional fishing grounds a tabu area where extraction is banned (a FLMMA tool 
described in the previous chapter) (Owen 2003 p. 38). 
Another Suva-based NOO helping Fijian villages implement MAC's scheme is the Pacific regional 
NOO, Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific (FSPI), whose director Rex Horoi has been on 
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MAC's board since the latter's inception. FSPI obtained European Union funding to work with various 
Pacific Island communities, in a project named the Sustainable Management of the Marine Aquarium 
Trade (SMART) initiative, in partnership with Just World Partners, a British member of the 
international FSPI network (Marine Aquarium Council 2003). MAC helped FSPI obtain the funding, 
writing much of the bid but submitting it in FSPl's name (Michelle Lam, MAC, Suva, pers. comm.). 
While MAC sees the project as a way of instituting market-based control on the trade, FSPI, in 
accordance with their mandate and general policy, are focusing on helping communities help 
themselves-alleviating poverty by building a sustainable marine ornamentals industry based upon 
ecosystem management planning. The working relationship between MAC and FSPI staff in Suva was 
at times tense, especially in 2003-4 (Jeff Kinch, FSPI and Michelle Lam, MAC, both Suva, pers. 
comms). One contributing factor has been ill-defined lines of responsibility and accountability where 
the two projects intersect, leading to disagreements who has project oversight, directional control and 
responsibility for monitoring progress (Michelle Lam, MAC, Suva, pers. comm .. ). Also underlying 
this tension is a different approach to community work. The two NGOs have different models for this. 
MAC's approach envisaged education and training for collectors. FSPI had a more empowering 
attitude, helping communities to achieve what they wanted for themselves. This reflects a fundamental 
philosophical difference. 
The situation was not been helped by confusion regarding who needs to be certified, the exporting 
company or the community collectors (interviews with Michele Lam, Hugh Govan and Jeff Kinch, see 
Appendix). This arose in part because the only experience that senior MAC staff had with certifying 
collectors and collection sites was in Indonesia, a different political and cultural situation to the one in 
the Fiji Islands (there being no equivalent of the qoliqoli system or government pressure to respect 
indigenous rights). Also, the local staff MAC employed to manage the project had no experience in 
quality management systems-and this is essentially what the scheme is. The consequence was 
considerable confusion, and 'winging-it' for the community part of the certification scheme. Even as 
some of the exporters prepared themselves for assessment, it was never clear whether the communities 
owning and collecting the organisms would also require certification under the ecosystem standards, or 
whether the exporting companies could do this on their behalf (Michelle Lam, MAC, and Hugh Govan, 
FSPI, both Suva, pel's. comms). Although, in the case of Walt Smith, the company obtained the 
certification, both WWF-Fiji and FSPI are preparing communities to seek certification. 
This confused situation continues to evolve. Rather than seeing the people who are trying to establish 
MAC and its scheme as experts with the knowledge and experience to save the industry that the 
USCRTF had threatened to close down, it is just as easy to see them as people who did not know what 
they were doing and are learning or making it up as they went along. The expert is illusory. 
But it is not just the different conceptual models that cause tensions, as yet another view of MAC, as a 
fraudulent phony, illustrates. Senior members of an NGO engaged in a similar business-IMA, 
introduced in Chapter Five-have propounded this view. In emails to me, Peter Rubec, a key member 
of IMA suggested that MAC had aligned themselves with industry to the detriment of conservation, an 
act he called 'greenwashing'. Rubec was concerned that MAC staff were conducting their certification 
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process behind closed doors, refusing to acknowledge calls for peer scrutiny and debate, and 
stonewalling his and others' requests for documentation such as collection management plans (email 
pas. comm. 31 July and 2 August 2004). In this he implicated not just Paul Holthus of MAC but also 
key contacts in WWF, TNC, the PIJAC, Reef Check and a venture capital firm backing MAC's latest 
international efforts (email pel.s.comlll. 2 August 2004). While these accusations may reflect moral 
concern about possibly fraudulent activity, they may result from tensions generated by the 
competitiveness of NGO fund-seeking and of professional conservation on the international stage. 
Within IMA itself there have been conflicts, shown in the following statement by someone involved in 
original PIJAC 'fact-finding' mission to the Philippines in the early 1980s (Chapter Six) who went onto 
help found IMA: 
I quit IMA over the personal gain, malfeascence embezzling syndrome ... so germane to 
today's eco movements. My writings and photos from a year in villages predates the IMA, 
PIJAC and MAC et al. Instead of joining me in solving the problem there has been one 
attempt after another to cash in on it. That's why a true believer and an honest person has no 
other course but to resign. There has been a 20 year squandering of the issue and the reefs 
are far worse off for it. Ironically though, the issue was sold out by "money grubbing 
environmentalists" of a most elitist orientation. I'm a fisherman ... commercial fish collector 
by trade. And I always wanted the locals to be the centrepiece of the reforms. Eco-
administrators always resented that as they wanted to be the centrepieces of the efforts. The 
real reef environment could've been saved ... the divers could've been trained and put on the 
right track. Anglo money grubbing environmentalists build up and sustained by Packard, 
Macarthur, the WWF, USAID etc. minimalised the fisherman and allowed the prima-
donnas to prevail. Tax write offs may well be their primary aim in all this so-called mega 
funder environmental activity. The environment itself .. .in all the groups and BODs [NGO 
Boards of Directors] I have been privy to was rarely a topic of concern (Steve Robinson, 
email pel.s.comln .• 2 August 2004). 
METHODOLOGY: EMAIL CONVERSATION 
The emails I have quoted from Rubec and Robinson (above) and Why (below) were four of 
several I received after sending an email toRobinsonandtoVaughanPratt.Ii.vIA president, asking 
for a brief account of how Ii'vIA was founded and inquiring about the governance structure of 
IJVIA. I had included an explanation of the nature of my research; that presumably identified me as 
someone who might potentially be interested in 'exposing' JVIAe. Rubec sent me a list of his 
concerns in the hope that I would choose to follow them up. That my simple email query elicited 
such replies suggests the potency of the tensions boiling away, ready to spillover. The only 
connection I had to these people was through my husband who knew Steve \V'hy (whom I had 
met briefly once). I was a virtual stranger yet they chose to share their concerns with me. 
Interestingly, I never did receive any information about IJVIA's history or governance structure 
from those replying to my email, something I did not notice until writing this chapter months 
later. 
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There are also professional disagreements over MAC's efforts to develop standards for the live reef 
food fish trade (Chapter Eight), specifically the standards for live groupers captured and shipped by 
Asian boats to Hong Kong. "I don't believe [these exports] can be done sustainably and, in my 
professional opinion, [this] is not suitable as a subject for MAC standards-reasons include different 
SE Asian consumers and values, for a start (lacking environmental values as we might define them)", 
(Steve Why, IMA, Hawai'i, email pel's. comm., 4 August 2004). In the next section, I examine how 
Pacific players have been included in these efforts to develop global standards. 
GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR THE LIVE REEF FISH FOOD TRADE 
The trade in the Pacific: initial efforts to manage its effects 
Chapter Five described how the live reef fish food trade progressed from Southeast Asia to the Pacific. 
This expansion prompted staff from SPC's Marine Resources Division and from TNC's Asia-Pacific 
Coastal and Marine Programme to suggest the two organisations collaborate and share experiences 
with IMA and WRI, two NGOs with knowledge of the Southeast Asian trade. In December 1999, these 
four organisations formalised their relationship through a three-year memorandum of understanding 
outlining a proposed Pacific regional live reef fish trade initiative (Smith 2003). SPC staff used a 
regional fisheries meeting to obtain from Island representatives a mandate to co-ordinate a Pacific 
initiative providing scientific, policy and management advice about the trade to Pacific Island 
governments and communities. They obtained ADB funding for three and a half years funding for a 
joint SPC- IMA-TNC regional assistance project, starting December 1999. This funding allowed the 
project partners to carry out biological and trade activity assessments in several Pacific Islands 
countries, and to provide policy and technical advice to island government fisheries agencies, develop 
public awareness materials about the trade (TNC's main role), and run a regional workshop, held in 
Suva in 2002 (Yeeting 2003). SPC later obtained further funding from the MacArthur Foundation and 
the Packard Foundation to train fisheries officers and prepare handbooks (Yeeting 2002). 
Development of the trade in the Fiji Islands 
When interest in participating in the live reef food fish trade arose in the Fiji Islands in the late 1990s, 
the Fisheries Division had initiated a trial export (that mentioned in Chapter Nine). The Government 
formally requested SPC's assistance in assessing the trade's potential in the chosen area (the Bua 
province, Vanua Levu), and in drafting preliminary management guidelines (Yeeting 1999). Rather 
than directly cooperating with interested NGOs, the Fiji government has continued to work with and 
through SPC on this issue. In its publications detailing the nature and impacts of the trade elsewhere, 
SPC gave the Fiji Fisheries Division the basic information it needed to develop a precautionary policy 
approach to the trade. 
In the Fiji Islands, the trade has been controversial. In early 2000, the chairman of the Lau Provincial 
Council Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (then prime minister) stopped an Asian company from exporting live 
fish from Lauan waters (Ragogo 2000). Ratu Mara had earlier given the company permission to fish, 
but a group of USP staff from Lau, along with representati ves of WWF-US and of the South Pacific 
Action Committee on Human Ecology and Environment (SPACHEE, a NGO based at USP) lobbied the 
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Lau Provincial Council about the trade's environmental impact (Institute of Applied Sciences 2002). 
When the Lau Provincial Council subsequently requested assistance from the Fiji Fisheries Division, 
the Government again sought SPC help, leading to a survey of the reef food fish resource in the Lau 
Islands in August-September 2001 (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2001). Both SPC and IMA 
were involved, IMA having recently set up a small office in Suva to look at the sustainability of the 
country's live reef food fish and aquarium fish trades (International Marinelife Alliance 2000, 2001). 
In licensing two exporters, the Fisheries Division only allows them to buy fish, not to fish themselves. 
They are required to have a local partner, as well as approval from resource custodians and provincial 
administration. The Department has banned export of live fish by ship, in order to limit the amount of 
fish exported and to reduce the mortality levels (Chan 2001). Although by 2003 the department had 
adopted a policy guideline, it still regarded the operation as a trial subject to further stock assessment. It 
required exporters to have observers with them when harvesting, in order to increase departmental 
knowledge about the industry. Fiji Fisheries Division staff have been following progress of the 
international project team developing global standards for the trade (Chapter Six). When those are 
complete, the Department intends to review its policy on the trade and adopt the standards if they 
appear appropriate (Ovisi Ledua, Fiji Fisheries Division, Suva, pers. comm. November 2003). 
Moves towards global governance of the trade 
Attempts to develop global standards for the live reef food fish trade, described in Chapter Seven, have 
entailed cooperation between NGOs and their funders, APEC, the US government and US foundations. 
A small group of people from three NGOs (IMA, MAC and TNC), along with a member of the Hong 
Kong Chamber of Seafood Merchants, initially drafted standards, which 'experts' from government, 
industry, academic institutions and NGOs then reviewed (Kusumaatmadja et at. 2003 p. 48-49; 
Kusumaatmadja et at. 2004 p. 31). IMA later disassociated itself from the project, believing the trade 
not suitable as a subject for MAC standards because of the different values of Southeast Asian 
consumers (Steve Why, IMA, Hawai'i, emailpers. comm .. 4 August 2004, quoted above)-compared 
to those in the US and Europe purchasing specimens for home aquaria, presumably. MAC and TNC 
continued with the standards development, holding workshops in several countries to validate the 
applicability of the draft standards (Kusumaatmadja et at. 2004 p. 31). The Pacific Islands workshop 
was held in New Caledonia in conjunction with the 3rd Heads of Fisheries meeting at SPC and was 
attended by representatives from some Island fisheries department including two from the Fiji Islands 
(pers. obs.). At this, Geoff Muldoon, an Australian employed by IMA, consulted government 
representatives over the draft standards. He was checking whether these covered the Pacific Islands 
situation, in a technical sense, rather than consulting them about how the approach they might have 
wanted to take to the industry. Observing this workshop, I felt the consultation to be more for his own 
benefit-he appeared to have no experience of how government fishery departments operated in the 
Pacific Islands or of the practical and political factors shaping their work. He was a technical expert but 
not a political one. This reflects the nature of these efforts to develop global standards: they are another 
example of an approach treating environmental issues as technical rather than political matters. 
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Modes of power 
Like MAC's certification scheme, development of the global standards for the live reef food fish trade 
is another effort to design a means of prompting mutual action and building associational power. In 
their allure the standards, like MAC's scheme, draw upon the authority of the experts involved in their 
design. In enrolling people into validating the design at the SPC workshop, the designers are using a 
subtle type of seduction that draws on their expert authority, the opportunity to contribute to the design 
of an international policy, combined with the utopian promise of a unified approach to 'global 
standards' that transcends existing problems. Their allure lies in this promise and the concomitant fear 
that government representatives have of missing out on something of future value by not participating. 
Analysis 
FINDING PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS ANSWERS 
These three initiatives are all premised on the notion that international cooperation is needed to solve 
the environmental problems caused by harvesting coral reef organisms for sale overseas. The scale of 
this cooperation can be seen in the myriad nature of the overseas players concerned about trade in 
Fijian reef organisms. Organisations include NOOs (TRAFFIC, MAC, IMA, FSPI, WWF, TNC, WRI), 
an MEA with all attendant internationals involved in its policymaking (CITES), the European Union, 
and the aid agencies of overseas states (UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Canadian 
International Development Agency as funder of C-SPODP, USAID). Various commentators and 
observers are also interested in the environmental effects of exports from the Fiji Islands, including a 
UN agency (UNEP-WCMC) and the USCRTF. In addition, three regional Pacific intergovernmental 
agencies, SPC, the Forum and SPREP, each with their own blend of Pacific Island and expatriate staff 
and their strong links with international agencies, have been involved. Then there are the funders. 
Through its US Technical Cooperation Trust funding for CITES, the US government has funded much 
of CITES work on bringing non-complying countries with a significant trade in corals into line with the 
convention's requirements; it funded a review of trade in corals from the Fiji Islands (Secretariat of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 200la p.9). The 
Canadian government and EU have funded NOOs working on Fiji's marine ornamentals trade. ADB 
along with the MacArthur and Packard foundations funded SPC's efforts. 
Each of these three initiatives, in its cooperative approach, reflects the global environmental policy 
discourse. Each construes the effects of the trade in coral reef organisms as a global problem requiring 
globally co-ordinated action to solve. Additionally, each accords science the expertise to identify the 
problem. Furthermore the solution in each case-be it national legislation, quotas, and border control; 
eco-Iabelling and certification; or global standards-is pre-selected then 'transferred' to the Fiji Islands 
as one of many problem sites as needing attention. And each finds problems to their selected answers-
rather than vice versa as normally assumed. 
In the case of CITES and the coral trade, Oreen and Shirley's (1999) report identified a problem with 
exports of coral from the Fiji Islands. This justified applying, to the Fiji Islands, the measures already 
proscribed in that convention, also the setting of annual quotas. In the case of the Pacific Islands marine 
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ornamentals industry, it was Jaime Baquero, and later C-SPODP and Forum Secretariat advisers, who 
identified the solution even before a problem had been acknowledged. MAC, and the experts they 
chose to call upon, determined the details of this solution through the process of developing 
international standards, the initial step they took when designing the certification scheme. International 
experts involved in introducing MAC's scheme in the Fiji Islands assumed the problem (reef 
degradation as a result of the marine ornamental trade) would occur sometime later if they did not 
implement the solution (MAC's scheme)-thus justifying its application. In the case of the live reef 
food fish industry, it was the Fiji Fisheries Division which identified a problem that might potentially 
arise, but SPC in collaboration with TNC, ADB, IMA and WRI which told the department the extent to 
which the problem might develop, based upon the worst case examples in Southeast Asia. By 
approaching SPC, the Fiji government became part of a regional project that, like the MAC example, 
was based on the assumption that if what had happened in Southeast Asia would eventually happen in 
the Pacific Islands. Although some IMA staff with economic training were saying that would not 
happen because the economics of the industry were very different (as espoused at the LRFFT regional 
workshop in Suva, 2002), this did not stop others at IMA and at SPC ensuring Pacific Islands remained 
part of an international response to the industry. As with MAC's scheme, it was a group of people 
developing the global standards for this trade who identified the solution and sought to include the Fiji 
Government. The government (Cabinet plus senior fisheries department officials) wanted to address the 
new industry responsibly (both in terms of helping it develop and in managing its effects). 
THE NATURE OF COOPERATION 
The diversity of approaches 
The nature of the policy approach used to address the environmental effects of trade in coral reef 
organisms differs in each of the three cases examined here. CITES used a Keynesian style of regulation 
popular in developed countries post-war. Both MAC's certification scheme and the efforts to develop 
global standards for the live reef food fish trade are voluntarist, neo-corporatist regulatory frameworks 
involving non-binding standards and rules. There is, however, still confusion over how the LRFFT 
standards might be applied-whether governments will use them as regulatory frameworks as the Fiji 
Island government proposes, or whether they will operate solely as a market-based approach. 
No-one is attempting to link these various Fiji Islands endeavours into a single strategy to manage trade 
in coral reef organisms; there is no master plan. In each case, Fisheries Division staff appeared willing 
to adopt whatever policy scheme was on offer. In watching the two efforts to institute market-based 
schemes proceed, the government has not, however, permitted neo-corporatist bodies that act as 
keepers of international standards and rules (i.e. auditors) to take over its present role in controlling the 
trade. To the contrary, the head of the department reasserted his regulatory authority when he indicated 
that the department would link its licensing permissions directly to certification of the marine aquarium 
trade and would adopt the LRFFT standards as national standards, should they prove suitable. 
Furthermore, the Department has retained its licensing and regulatory control over these trades. 
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Nevertheless, in MAC's case, the formal decision to allow the NOO to operate, the point at which the 
government could have called a halt to it, was not made not before MAC started its project but 
sometime later in 2003 (Michele Lam, MAC, Suva, pel's. comfl!.). And the project, once it started, 
would have been difficult to stop, or to alter its approach significantly. But, in waiting to see how the 
MAC certification scheme and LRFFT standards pan out, the Fisheries Division has foregone the 
opportunity to develop its own approaches to controlling the adverse effects of these trades. It allowed 
foreign organisations to take over its role in developing policy for the marine aquarium trade, although 
reserving the right to reclaim this sometime in the future. 
Moreover, neither Fiji government agencies nor the regional intergovernmental agencies involved 
(SPC and Forum Secretariat) analysed the merits of the alternative approaches to address the adverse 
environmental effects of international trade in coral reef organisms. Once it became aware of MAC's 
scheme and the NOOs desire to work in the Pacific, the Fiji Fisheries Division did not consider 
alternative policy approaches to managing the industry. SPC took a similarly single-minded approach 
in deciding to support the development of global standards for the live reef food fish trade. The reason 
why SPC did not analyse the respective policy approaches may be that, until recently, the Marine 
Resources Section of SPC has focused on giving technical rather than policy advice; although it has 
been trying to reinvent itself as a policy agency, this is happening slowly because the agency lacks 
skilled policy analysts (pel's. obs., 3rd Heads of Fisheries meeting, Noumea, August 2003). 
Reasons for cooperating 
These three examples, and the modes of power embedded in them, illustrate a range of relationships 
involved in institutionalising international policy schemes in this particular country. I have included 
these under the word 'cooperation' for want of a better term, even though the various actors have 
different aims and different reasons for collaborating. Schemes such as MAC's offer, to the local 
people employed to institutionalise them, the same sort of professional advantages as participating in 
the OCRMN (status, travel, along with an attractive salary). Furthermore, they provide local NO Os 
such as FSPI with funding to continue their work with local communities. Here, again, is the pursuit of 
professional advantage mixed with more altruistic notions of experts working together, building a 
common will to protect nature and/or Fijian communities. 
Discourse plays a role in encouraging this international cooperation. When environmental policy is 
regarded as a beneficial matter for all involved, small governments such as that in the Fiji Islands are 
often willing to take on board whatever environmental policy schemes are on offer, provided someone 
else is funding them. The Fiji government clearly values 'expert' help from overseas on environmental 
matters. At a MAC workshop in 2002, the head of the Fisheries Division Malakai Tuiloa expressed the 
department's gratitude to NOOs that have chosen to work on marine issues in the Fiji Islands (pel's. 
obs.). He also spoke of the department's reliance on SPC for scientific advice on its environmental 
problems. Thus, the scientific authority of the experts involved in designing the schemes has 
engendered the department's cooperation. 
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HEGEMONY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TERMS OF TRADE 
As close examination of the course of each initiative showed, the spaces in which international policy 
connections are made with the Fiji Islands are filled with tensions and with power of multiple forms. 
Thus cooperation, itself, is a power-filled, rather than power-neutral act. The exercise of power was 
relatively visible in the case of CITES. The government accepted trade on the terms imposed by 
CITES, some parts of government seeing this as a good thing, others acquiescing in the face of this 
local opinion and of CITES' demonstration of its power to stop trade. The exercise of power was, 
however, less visible in the case of MAC and of the live reef food fish trade standards. Yet, as the 
South Centre has observed (as discussed in Chapter Three), this trend towards neoliberal governance in 
environmental matters is making a political issue into a technical one, thus reducing the South's 
political power. The examples of MAC and the live reef food fish trade illustrate how the industrialised 
bloc interested in maintaining international trade in coral reef organisms used everyday norms and 
institutions of international environmental policy-the project formations, regional IGO workshops, 
NGO employment structures and discourse characteristic of that field of endeavour (rather than 
environmental treaty)-to institutionalise its ideology of trade. The bloc did so in a way in which its 
exercise of power was not readily visible. This is neo-Gramscian domination, whereby individuals 
(those working locally for NGOs and government) voluntarily acquiesce but do not experience that 
power as conflicting with their interests. 
Although it seems reasonable to read both MAC's certification scheme and the project of developing· 
global standards for the live reef food fish trade as supposedly environmentally-sustainable schemes 
developed in order to protect the economic interests of northern importers and retailers in the face of 
environmental opposition to that trade continuing, it makes little sense to read CITES in that way; 
CITES was established when the worldwide coral trade was relatively small and before any widespread 
opposition to it. It makes more sense to interpret CITES in terms of the politics of ecologism, as an 
expression of contemporary environmentalism (Chapter One). The environmental effects of trade have 
become a global problem arising out of modernity, something CITES was established to address: a 
supposedly technical MEA based on the spirit of cooperation, it provides a globally co-ordinated 
solution based around science, instrumental rationality. Yet, an analysis of power relations entailed in 
CITES work, undertaken above, suggests that CITES is a political organisation. Furthermore, CITES' 
style of environmentalism suggests capitalist interests determined to preserve global trade, a matter I 
discuss more explicitly in the next chapter. 
Is CITES hegemonic? It certainly meets the description used by Peet et ai. (2003, discussed in Chapter 
Four) when they described the depth of hegemony in policymaking as residing in the ability of a 
discursive formation to specify the parameters of the practical, the realistic and the sensible, limiting 
thought and expression. In dealing with the Fiji Government, CITES (officials, and the Standing 
Committee) brooked no alternatives to their own policy stance and bureaucratic requirements (e.g. for 
voluntary quotas and enforced reductions). They effectively permitted only one discourse and 
dismissed other positions as irresponsible; in this they were as hegemonic as the IMF, World Bank and 
WTO described in Peet et ai.' s Unholy Trinity. For the Fiji Islands, the end result of being part of 
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CITES is much the same as for neoliberal schemes such MAC's certification of the aquarium trade-it 
entails outside experts dictating the environmental terms of trade between industrialised countries that 
import reef organisms, and developing ones such as the Fiji Islands that export them. 
In these three trades (in coral, marine aquarium species, and live reef fish for food consumption), 
experts and technical practices have played key roles in building a hegemonic politics. The technical 
practices of CITES have helped build hegemony-the reliance on data concerning species and amounts 
traded that was compiled through single unverified sources, used a variety of units, and relied on 
species identifications that have been described as notoriously difficult; the exchange of letters and 
faxes along with the prompt responses to information supplied by the Fiji Government, requesting 
further information; and the coercive Notifications to Parties issued by the Secretariat. Moreover, the 
technical practices associated with certification are potentially a source of hegemonic 
control-standards set by experts from outside the region; 'outside' auditing that brooks little dissent; 
the threat of losing one's certification. The same applies to the technical practices of forming global 
standards, which were largely written by someone based in Queensland, who was unfamiliar with the 
situation in the Pacific Islands (pel's. obs.). 
Additionally, Fiji Islanders may be disadvantaged because the standards being applied are not as 
scientifically rigorous as they first appear, as I demonstrated here. While agencies like CITES and 
MAC might portray themselves as addressing the environmental effects effectively, this is not 
necessarily the case; the notion of policy responses being selected based upon rigorous scientific 
monitoring and assessment is an illusion. Statistics are used in a sloppy fashion to justify centralised 
management of the environmental effects of trade. In both MAC and the work on standards for the live 
reef food fish trade, we find, therefore, another concept of an expert in international environmental 
policy: someone who is not sure how to do things but who makes it up as they go along, being able to 
maintain credibility because of the backing of the organisation for whom the project is undertaken. 
There is also an element of hegemonic control in the way that each of the three schemes seeks to have 
any conditions that might be imposed on it for environmental reasons placed by bodies almost entirely 
outside any Fiji's jurisdiction. They remove the authority to set standards from hands of countries like 
the Fiji Islands. Neither the Fiji government or qoliqoli rights holders have been involved in setting the 
rules and standards. They were not involved in drafting CITES or shaping the subtle evolution of its 
approach nor were they involved in drafting MAC standards; moreover, the government had minimal 
input into the live reef food fish trade standards. 
CONCLUSION 
With the three schemes investigated here, there is a certain type of collective hegemony associated with 
having multiple but different policy approaches covering experts of reef organisms being promoted 
simultaneously. The overall effect of CITES' focus on Fiji's coral trade, MAC's certification project, 
and the efforts to include Pacific Islands in global standards for the live reef food fish trade has been to 
deny Fiji Islanders the opportunity to design their own policies concerning the harvest and export of 
coral reef organisms, and its environmental impacts. This has happened because all three initiatives 
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treat the environmental terms of trade as a technical rather than a political issue, denying Pacific 
Islanders the right to participate in setting those terms. I explore this further in the next (penultimate) 
chapter, which reviews the various examples of hegemony revealed up to this point. 
Part IV 
Findings 
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Chapter Thirteen 
The Hegemony of International Coral Reef Policy 
Introduction 
This penultimate chapter returns to the two-fold aim of the thesis, (1) to examine how environmental 
policy arises as an instrument of international governance, opening up space for seeing environmental 
crises as political assemblies; and-the primary aim- (2) to investigate whether the transfer to 
developing countries of Western environmental policy ideas may be a form of hegemonic control. 
Addresses these in turn, the chapter pulls together the picture of international coral reef policy that has 
unfolded through the interrogation of various policy situations and texts in previous chapters. The first 
section describes how, through socio-political interactions across space, international coral reef policy 
arises as an instrument of governance. The second section summarises the hegemonic nature of coral 
reef policy ideas transferred to the Fiji Islands and the policy practices used to enrol those islands. 
The questions listed in Table 5 at the end of Chapter Three were designed as an indirect way of teasing 
out elements of this aim. Previous chapters have largely answered these questions and this chapter 
completes that process. It does not, however, go through each question in turn as that would mean 
repeating material covered in previous chapters. Rather, this chapter concentrates on addressing the aim 
itself. 
How Policy Arises as an Instrument of Governance (Aim 1) 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DISCOURSE: EXTERNALISING THE POLITICAL 
POLICY CROSSING CULTURES: THE ROLE OF UNIVERSALS 
POLICY CROSSING SPACE AND FORGING CONNECTIONS: THE EXPERT'S ROLE 
FORGING CONNECTIONS WITH THE FIJI ISLANDS 
Coral Reef Politics: Interests, Power and Hegemony (Aim 2) 
INTERESTS 
MODES OF POWER EXERCISED IN AN OUTWARDLY COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK 
HEGEMONY AS A RELATIONSHIP OF DOMINATION 
THE ROOTS OF HEGEMONY 
Conclusion 
How Policy Arises as an Instrument of Governance (Aim 1) 
To understand how coral reef policy arises as an instrument of international governance, a focus on 
policy prescriptions is too restrictive. We also need to understand the role that discourse 
(knowledge/power systems) and universals play. In previous chapters I illustrated how a 
discourse-the global environmental policy discourse described in Chapter Two-depicts international 
policy as a cooperative, politically neutral venture employing scientific and technical means to address 
global environmental problems. The account in Chapter Five of the growth of international concern 
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about coral reefs reflected that discourse. The case studies of policy connecting with the Fiji Islands, 
analysed in Chapters Eleven and Twelve, illustrated how various groups' policy practices accorded 
with the discourse. The analysis of common metaphors and storylines in Chapter Eight showed how 
key elements of the discourse exist in texts espousing policy for coral reefs around the world. 
CRITIQUING INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF POLICY 
The highly orthodox and technocratic character of the field of international coral reef policy is 
borne out by my experiences at the International Coral Reef Symposium, a gathering of 1400 
experts in Okinawa at the end of June 2004. Of those to whom I chatted over the course of the 
week, only one came close to understanding the nature of my research. The pervasiveness of the 
uncritical orthodoxy is borne out by the difficulty I had in finding a slot for the paper I wished to 
present. Tided "The (dis)connection between international assessments of the state of coral reefs 
and local policymaking: a Fijian case study", the paper covered the same ground as the second 
half of Chapter Ten. In essence, it suggested that in looking for reasons why ICRI and GCillYIN 
had not been successful in influencing government policy in the Pacific, one should analyse the 
international coordination, not just lay the blame on a lack oflocal capacity and political will. In 
concluding it, I argued that ifICRI and GCRlvIN are to avoid future charges that they merely 
benefit those who coordinate and fund their global coordination, then they must consciously give 
as much attention to forging connections between local monitoring and local policy as they have 
given to those between their networks' global coordination and policy processes at international 
level. Yet, in the detailed programme design, divided into 5 themes and 58 (sub-theme) topics, 
there was no place for such a presentation. In the end, I arranged to present it in a session tided, 
"Critical appraisal of local, customary, participatory and co-management"; there was simply no 
slot in symposium's programme for critically appraising international policy efforts. 
At morning tea following the presentation, the session's chair Professor Nick Polunin, who was 
president of the International Coral Reef Society and whose work I introduced in Chapter Eight, 
gave me another example of the disconnection of which I had spoken. He said his University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne research group had failed to pass onto the Fiji Fisheries Division the results 
of their extensive fisheries management research programme in Lau, because they had not been 
funded to do so. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DISCOURSE: EXTERNALISING THE POLITICAL 
Making the political apparent; counter-reading coral reef policy 
It is difficult to step outside the 'orthodox' version of the discourse and see its political content. So 
omnipresent is the conceptualisation of the environment as a problem, pervading mainstream, popUlist 
and critical environmental thought, that it is difficult to perceive of it as anything else. Furthermore, the 
view of science as advancing knowledge in a politically neutral way combines with the strength of the 
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moral campaign to save the planet, making it difficult to see this discourse as politically motivated. 
Even analysing how power is being exercised within the outwardly cooperative framework of 
international environmental policy is challenging because that exercise is disguised not only by the idea 
that environmental policy is a technical matter but also by its interweaving with development. In the 
Fiji Islands, environmental and development agendas have become enmeshed through the concept of 
sustainable development. Many see development as something desirable, an entitlement even. As a 
consequence, officials, politicians, community leaders and NGO staff generally favour participating in 
environmental policy projects. This notion of consent freely given disguises how power is being 
exercised across space. 
In studying international coral reef policy, I overcame this difficulty by using different analytical 
perspectives (described in Chapter Four) to make the political nature of the discourse visible and show 
political assembly around the concept of an ecological crisis facing coral reefs. I have highlighted that 
which modern thought has rendered largely invisible-the political nature of international 
environmental policy. As well as the influence of discourse, the counter-reading of coral reef policy 
(Chapter Six onwards) uncovered both the political operations that have permitted the discourse's 
formation and the operations exercised by different 'discoursing' subjects. This counter-reading 
examined modes of power being exercised, interests, technical practices of experts and appeals to the 
universal, demonstrating how a global politics is being built around the project of saving coral reefs. 
As well as being enabled and constrained by knowledge/power systems, policy operates through 
universals, in the manner discussed in Chapter Four. The remainder of this first section looks further at 
how, through universals, policy crosses cultures, at the central role experts play in this, and then 
specifically at how international coral reef policy crosses space by forging with the Fiji Islands 
connections that give grip to those universals. 
POLICY CROSSING CULTURES: THE ROLE OF UNIVERSALS 
The nature of universals in coral reef policy matters 
Universal aspirations and universalised knowledge, extended from the local to the global, underlie the 
construction of coral reef problems as global. They assign blame for these problems and identify 
expertise for designing and effecting solutions. International coral reef policy derives many of its 
universal aspirations from a particular set of eco-politics, from science and from capitalism. These 
universals, described below, reflect the global environmental policy discourse, again indicating how 
this discourse pervades the international coral reef policy arena. 
The universal common to all contemporary eco-philosophies and eco-politics is that of environmental 
concern and responsibility, the moral imperative to look after the planet (Chapter Two). Allied to this 
are science-based universals positioning the environment, in this case coral reefs, as a global problem. 
Scientific experts have described coral reefs as a phenomenon, a universal type of nature found in the 
band of tropical and subtropical regions girdling the globe. Taxonomy distinguishes and categorises the 
multitude of families, genera and species while biogeography discerns patterns in their distribution. All 
are universalised into the category of coral reef ecosystems, distinguished from cold-water coral reefs 
296 
and (non-reefal) coral communities. Gathered together, coral reef ecosystems have been specified, in 
the discursive, metaphorical manner described in Chapters Six and Eight, as a global problem requiring 
global solutions. Causes of coral reef degradation have been standardised to certain universal 
categories summarised in Table 7. These categories reflect not local biogeography, history, culture or 
politics but a universal progression from natural to degraded, with phase shifts along the way. 
Amongst coral reef scientists, knowledge is accumulated in order to specify an ideal state for coral 
reefs and to attribute shifts away from that ideal state to particular human actions. For these experts, the 
notion of some ideal, natural state is aesthetically alluring; vistas of living coral in vibrant colours and 
diverse shapes, numerous large predatory fish lurking, and shoals of tiny grazing ones darting and 
hovering around the corals, reef sharks and turtles cruising above-this is the idyll they seek. Acres of 
dead coral covered with lush meadows of fleshy algae are badly tolerated. Flats of coral rubble pecked 
over by parrotfish are considered hellish. In fact, the least disturbance to live corals, the better. This is 
an example of what Dalby (2004 p. 8) calls an aesthetic environmental trope of pristine nature, a trope 
that suggests the importance of minimising alterations to habitats. 
As science spells out the problems facing coral reefs, the universal form judges those problems as 
being of common concern to all humanity rather than as a product of a particular culture that 
understands its reality in such terms. Thus, the problematisation of coral reefs as globally degraded 
relies not only on Nature as a set of universal, orderly and inspiring laws, but on science as being 
outside culture. This is the citadel phenomenon discussed in Chapter Four. 
Faith: its manifestations 
ICRI's strategy manifests a faith in science and instrumental rationality, seen in the operations 
described in Chapters Six to Twelve. In rising concerns about the extent of coral reef degradation 
worldwide, the key investigative tool used to identify, monitor, research and document that degradation 
has been science. WWF's search for the root causes of biodiversity loss exhibits similar faith in the 
ability of science to identify environmental problems. In efforts to address coral reef degradation 
summarised in Chapters Six, Eight and (in relation to Fiji Islands) Ten to Twelve, there are further 
expressions of this faith in science as an appropriate and effective way of addressing coral reefs 
degradation-scientifically based approaches to improve reef resilience, quota-setting for exports, 
scientifically-based ecoregion conservation plans. Furthermore, the belief that scientific knowledge, if 
communicated, will help save coral reefs by putting society onto an ecological sustainable footing can 
be seen in the GCRMN philosophy and texts, in Reef Check and ReetBase, in the World Bank's 
capacity-building efforts, in the scientific tourism of Greenforce and Coral Cay, in WWF's diverse 
efforts, and in FLMMA's work. 
Faith in the practices of instrumental rationality-in the efficacy of conscious reasoning and planning 
of action to define the means of achieving particular ends with anticipated consequences-also 
permeates international coral reef policy endeavours. It underpins the capacity-building philosophy 
propounded by GRCMN and ICRI and features in the texts of the CBD and CITES. The search for 
rational policy solutions, efficacious means to save coral reefs, spawned the plans of ICRI, ITMEMS 
and DSCRTF, as well as various regional ICRI strategies. WWF's ecoregion planning processes 
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provide further examples, as do MAC's management plans and the process of forming LRFFT global 
standards. 
Those who depict the degradation of coral reefs as a global problem, in order to mobilise people to 
address that degradation, are exhibiting not only faith in experts and the practices of science and 
instrumental rationality, but also in the practice of working together across national boundaries. As 
Tsing (2005 p. 89) points out, collaboration is another universal; it constructs universals that would not 
otherwise exist. Here, Tsing uses collaboration as a near-synonym for cooperation, while recognising 
that collaborators may not be working towards the same ends. But the mere act of collaboration, 
suggests at least one shared goal or it would never come about. 
The modes of international interaction that Miller (2001 p. 170, discussed earlier in Chapter Three) 
describes as characterising post-war science and technology-intergovernmental harmonisation, 
technical assistance and international coordination of scientific research-are examples of universals 
exhibiting faith in working together across national boundaries. These typify ICRI's approach to 
science. This faith in international cooperation is not confined to science; it is also seen in the 
universals of capitalism. Global connections upon which capitalism depends are forged through policy 
controlling environmental terms of trade in coral reef organisms and live rock-the efforts of CITES, 
MAC, TNC and others. The previous chapter described how the introduction of particular policy 
prescriptions fro this trade depends on certain groups and agencies in the Fiji Islands cooperating with 
those agencies seeking to have their policies adopted. Some, but not all, of those prescriptions are 
neoliberal. 
The universalising politics of neoliberalism and logic of the market help draw Fiji's reefs into the 
global: MAC's certification scheme, generalised enough to cover any and all countries, and the LRRFT 
global standards. The scientific tourism ventures of Coral Cay and Greenforce operated out of Britain, 
are part of this universalising logic of neoliberalism, seeking alternative, sustainable livelihoods for 
communities in developing countries: ecotourism blended with the technical practices of science in a 
new regime of capitalist investment and accumulation. These neoliberal prescriptions all depend upon 
international collaboration to design, then institutionalise their policy prescriptions in developing 
countries. The logic of the market does not achieve this institutionalisation, it merely serves to keep the 
schemes operating once put in place. 
ICRI's strategy, as well as that of the USCRTF, of CRISP, and of various NGOs whose mission is to 
save coral reefs, exhibits another faith-the belief that controlling nature is both desirable and feasible; 
this requires a concomitant faith in experts' ability to control nature. Conservation endeavours exhibit 
such faith. 
Conservation is a universal aspiration to save a Nature seen as needing to be rescued, to manage natural 
resources in a way that maintains biodiversity. Western notions of conservation cross cultures through 
their own collaboration with development, an example of which, FLMMA, was described in Chapter 
Eleven. In this collaboration, conservation draws on the metaphors of globalism and modernisation. 
The metaphor of globalism sees development as an inevitable, beneficial process for the 'developing 
world', which can be quickened by increasing 'aid' and 'technical assistance' from those already 
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'developed'. Thus conservation also draws on the teleological notion of development process found in 
modernisation theory; the universal aspiration of development helps environmental and conservation 
policy cross cultures; it helps connect the Fiji Islands into international coral reef policy (Chapter Ten). 
As a universal aspiration, development relies on the universal of cooperation. On the one hand, this 
aspiration of development encourages Fiji Islanders to participate in schemes designed to put trade onto 
an environmentally sustainable footing, so that the trade may facilitate development of the 
communities collecting those organisms (Chapter Twelve). On the other hand, the same aspiration 
connects into FLMMA's aspirations to help communities modernise without selling their reef 
organisms (Chapter Eleven). This is the versatility of development, an ill-defined but alluring 
aspiration. 
POLICY CROSSING SPACE AND FORGING CONNECTIONS: THE EXPERT'S ROLE 
While in some other appearances, global Nature facilitates formal international governance regimes, 
here it facilitates the expert intervention of coral reef scientists networking across the globe, identifying 
problems, offering policy prescriptions and technical assistance. In this appearance, those with the 
skills and knowledge to save reefs are the experts, the heroes of the story. They have the expertise to 
solve the problems thrown up by modernisation and therefore (in their view) are legitimately able to 
legislate for the whole of society, both human and non-human. 
The storylines of international coral reef policy are peppered with experts including those identifying 
biodiversity hotspots and establishing global biodiversity conservation priorities (e.g. the Global 200); 
designers of policy solutions such as MAC's scheme and the global standards for the live reef food fish 
trade; experts in community participatory analysis; and locally-managed marine area specialists. A 
person can achieve the authority of an expert by (being seen to be) the designer and executor of modes 
of classification and surveillance, common modes of power exercised in modern society. Thus we have 
experts in assessing the state of coral reefs worldwide: those designing and running GCRMN, 
ReefBase, Reef Check, and WRI's Reefs at Risk exercises. We have experts in communicating science 
to the world of policy: those selling ICRI's message to MEAs and to the media, and those writing the 
overview chapters of the GCRMN global status reports directed at policymakers around the world. 
Experts identify the problems facing coral reefs, assess their extent, design policy technologies to 
address these problems, inform various governmental and intergovernmental organisations about those 
problems, endeavouring to get them to adopt particular policies and policy technologies. Some experts 
produce expert text books and scientific papers reporting on the state of the environment and advising 
what should be done, Some design policy technologies and advise on their implementation; some test 
the effectiveness of different approaches. Expert-produced texts then serve as the basis for policy 
documents and for media reports. Furthermore, ~xperts take their technologies to various developing 
countries, setting up projects, and co-opting local experts to institutionalise them. Other experts arrange 
funding and manage projects for funders such as philanthropic institutions and aid agencies. 
In analysing how the crisis narrative has deliberately been constructed, Chapter Six interpreted those 
scientific experts espousing a crisis not as objective, politically-neutral identifiers of environmental 
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problems, but as people setting out to create a political assembly around the notion of a crisis facing 
coral reefs. In the fluid connections between science and politics on the stage of international 
environmental policy, the authority of science is a resource upon which experts can draw. Those who 
inhabit the zone of science/policy hybridisation bring the authority of science into policy. In 
constructing a crisis narrative, Wilkinson and other experts used a rhetorical device derived from the 
intellectual design of science to blend science and policy-talk. They then used that narrative to 
underpin particular policy approaches seen by themselves as politically suitable. 
Particular styles of rhetoric used to cross cultures 
The rhetorical device that enables science/policy experts to draw from both science and policy with 
ease is science's rhetorical style. This style, commonly found in published scientific papers particularly 
in natural science, derives from science as an impersonal, abstracted, agent-absent discourse making 
factual claims of universal applicability regardless of human action and belief. This rhetorical design 
enables environmental scientists to extend their scientific role to include that of environmental policy 
advocacy and policymaking; it helps science/ policy cross cultures. 
This technical, outside-of-culture style is tailored to suit the specific needs of scientists doing the work 
of generating universally true knowledge-claims. Environmental scientists have employed this design 
to generate 'universally-true' problem framings of environmental policy issues and 'universally-true' 
policy solutions 'needed'. They have been aided in this by the utility of science in constructing a model 
of the general rather than the particular. 
As a strategic argumentative resource, technical discourse is part of the range of resources available to 
scientists, one of the forms in which scientists can choose to describe either their own work or that of 
other scientists (Locke, p. 12-13). Scientists could, instead, choose to employ rhetoric which is 
personalised, localised and agent-centred, making factual claims that are particular to specific human 
actions and beliefs (Locke 2001 p. 13). However, scientific rhetoric, with its technical, impersonal and 
asocial characteristics, is tailored to suit the specific needs of scientists working on environmental 
policy matters (Locke 2001 p. 13). It is a useful resource. Both coral reef and conservation scientists 
have readily adapted its impersonal style to become authorities on coral reef and conservation policy. 
Moreover, using the rhetorical style of scientific discourse helps both scientists and science/policy 
experts resist the potential charge of serving some personal or social interests (as Locke 2001 p. 14 
observed). But science never completely escapes that charge because of the dilemma around which its 
intellectual framework is organised-a dilemma between the universality of knowledge claims and the 
particularity of their production (Locke 2001 p. 13). Chapter Six summarises a debate about natural 
recovery rates that illustrates this. 
Other resources that science brings to science/policy are the devices which give science a global reach, 
especially journals and international conferences-a form of 'virtual witnessing' that allows scientific 
knowledge to be globalised and hence perceived as rational, universal and modern (an insight from 
actor-network theory summarised in Keeley and Scoones 2003 p. 27). In the political assembly around 
the imagined coral reef crisis, several (rather than one or two) journals have played a key role. They 
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include not only scientific ones such as Coral Reefs, Nature, Science, and American Zoologist, but also 
ones more ostensibly conservation-oriented such as Conservation Ecology and Conservation Biology. 
Coral reef science/policy experts use different argumentative resources to suit particular target 
audiences. In connecting ICRI with MEAs, coral reef experts have used the rhetorical device of 
diplomatic statements. The Call to Action mimics an environmental treaty and subsequent statements 
prepared for MEAs mimic the statements produced by intergovernmental meetings of appointed 
representatives. 
Experts' practices and prescriptions: forging connections 
Just as international policy is the realm and language of experts, so expert policy technologies and 
expert practices forge global connections, engaging the universals of policy. Their reach-networks, 
international bureaucracies, international conferences, publications, capacity-building projects and 
conservation initiatives-gives grip to global aspirations. Thus policies travel over space not as 
harbingers of objectively-proven truth as technologies of power (as Peet 2001 described). 
International coral reef policy-the policy being disseminated to developing countries-arises in 
multiple sites in various ways. Small groups of people have deliberately created policy statements in 
tandem with international meetings they have organised (the Call to Action and other statements listed 
in Chapter Seven). They have used the brand of ICRI to add authority to statements written specifically 
for presentation at international meetings (at WSSD and various MEA meetings). The GCRMN gives 
rise to policy through different mechanisms. In the process of requesting national reports on the state of 
reefs, then combining these into a global report, GCRMN coordinators create and shape policy in two 
ways: obliquely through the standard format they specify for each national and regional report, and 
explicitly through the executive summary they draft and place in the front of each biennial publication. 
In addition to these mechanisms, coral reef scientists have endeavoured to create policy through the 
device of scientific papers. From Wilkinson in 1992 to Bellwood et al. in 2004 and many in between, 
scientists have published papers in scientific journals arguing the case for certain policy approaches to 
saving the world's coral reefs. MAC and a small group of other US-based NGOs, prompted and 
assisted by WWF-US's macroeconomics policy unit, have used the device of international 
development-style projects to create neoliberal policy for the control of environmental terms of trade 
for the marine ornamentals and live reef food fish trade. Other mechanisms designed to create policy 
are described in Chapter Seven, from the CBD's expert consultation, to WWF's ecoregion planning. 
The range of efforts is diverse, yet the policy being created has a certain sameness, based around much 
the same standard prescriptions. 
Coral reef policy experts advocate standard policy prescriptions as normative paths to maintain a 
certain vision of a natural world of healthy coral reefs; they also advocate them to effect change 
amongst the human popUlation deemed necessary to maintain that aesthetic. These prescriptions 
include the importance of assessing the state of the coral reefs worldwide to identify the extent of 
degradation; stopping extraction and degradation in certain areas designed to act as both standards of 
naturalness and reservoirs of larvae; plus further research into causes of degradation and solutions. 
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Experts argue for either human population control and/or alternative livelihoods that do not destroy 
reefs but use those resources sustainably. They advocate transforming communities into rational 
planners and resource managers, and the transformation of the state into a modern environmental one 
with the political will to implement modern environmental management. At the same time they suggest 
the state should attach increased importance to market dynamics and economic agents. 
The standardness of the prescriptions is one of the factors giving international coral reef policy a 
coherence despite the diverse sites from which it is arising. The fact that these prescriptions are 
presented as part of a universalised problematic is another factor, as is the practice of glossing over site 
differences (e.g. between the Lau Islands and Jamaica, as discussed in Chapter Eight). The ICRI and 
GCRMN brands also serve to unify various endeavours. 
Policy technologies: lengthening the network 
Actor network theorists see the global reach of organisations such as bureaucracies and corporations as 
depending upon "intricate interweavings of situated people, artefacts, codes, and living things and the 
maintenance of particular tapestries of connections across the world" (Whatmore and Thorne 2004 p. 
236). This resonates with the actions of ICRI members enrolling people and reefs around the world, 
lengthening their networks. According to actor network theory, network lengthening requires the 
mobilisation of larger numbers and more intricately interwoven constituents or mediators to sustain a 
web of connections over greater distances (Whatmore and Thorne 2004 p. 238). Latour (1993 p. 117-
122) showed that as the network lengthens, the significance of technological agents increases: money, 
telephones, computers as objects that "encode and stabilise particular socio-technological capacities" 
and sustain patterns of connectivity that "allow us to pass with continuity not only from the local to the 
global but also from the human to the nonhuman". 
When the originators of a global network want to increase the network's reach, policy technologies are 
as important as socio-technologies. WWF's ecoregion planning processes, GRCMN's preparation of 
nation status reports on coral reefs, CITES collection of expert statistics and setting on quotas, and 
MAC's certification process have all helped lengthen the network assembled around the coral reef 
crisis. 
FORGING CONNECTIONS WITH THE FIJI ISLANDS 
The international players 
A diverse group of overseas agencies connect with the Fiji Islands on coral reef policy matters. The 
long list of those concerned with the environmental terms of trade on coral reef organisms, detailed in 
Chapter Twelve, illustrates that diversity. Add to this various agencies working on conservation and 
community resource management projects (only some of which are discussed in Chapter Eleven), plus 
agencies involved in assessing the state of reefs (listed in Chapter Eight) and researchers from overseas 
universities and research organisations (including but by no means limited to the University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne researchers mentioned in that chapter). There are also agencies involved in 
funding or preparing reports on matters which touch on coral reefs in some way, such as climate 
change (mentioned in Chapter Ten), biodiversity (mentioned in Chapter Nine), and general fisheries 
management (also Chapter Nine). 
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The categorisation into state, IGO or NGO of groups endeavouring to enrol the Fiji Islands in 
international coral reef policy does not reflect the diversity of governance structures revealed in the 
various Introducing the Players text boxes. Nor does it accommodate the structure of organisations 
such as ICRI, GCRMN, IUCN, WorldFish Centre and TRAFFIC. Furthermore, the NGO nomenclature 
disguises the variety amongst agencies so called. How can one compare the structures and governance 
ofWWF, TRAFFIC, Reef Check, FoS, and MAC? To understand these organisations, we need, at a 
minimum, to look at their governance structure and the way, through this structure, they link other 
agencies, firms, states and NGOs; also at their sources of funding; at the way in which they conduct 
overseas operations; their mission and policies; their history and that of their key staff, particularly any 
other agencies with which those staff have been closely associated in the past. 
The network character of connections 
The place in which those organisations connecting with the Fiji Islands are headquartered is significant. 
Despite their diversity, the various organisations are either Pacific-based, or are headquartered in the 
developed, industrialised regions of the world, in various European, North American, and Australasian 
countries-with the exception of UNEP and even that agency moved its coral reef unit from Nairobi to 
Cambridge, England. In this regard, the notion of a centre-periphery model of international policy is 
accurate. It is inaccurate, however, in considering the Fiji Islands as a part of a resistant margin, 
fighting for independence (a general inadequacy of this model identified in Chapter Four). Although 
Islanders appear to be socialised to some degree, into cooperating in international environmental policy 
endeavours, they are neither passive recipients of discourse, nor are they willing dupes. The agency of 
local experts working in the field of environmental policy is the same agency as experts operating in 
the international sphere of policy. Local experts co-opt storylines to suit local situations and advance 
local interests. In the Fiji Islands, the various groups of people adjusting storylines about coral reefs 
and coastal conservation to suit their own political purposes include those working for NGOs and the 
regional university, state officials and government politicians. 
Furthermore, in matters of coral reef policy, there does not seem to be any sustained regional Pacific 
centre of persuasion, in the sense Peet (2001) envisages, a geographically located organisation linking 
the universal and the local, "centres ... with their own interpretive instructors, [which] have locally-
constituted institutional complexes of projecting modified hegemonic discourses into regional 
practice ... formative and translating centres of persuasion and influence, linked by flows of discourse". 
Many links go directly from headquarters in a developed country to the Fiji Islands, rather than being 
routed through a regional organisation that links the universal and the local, and around which specific 
regional discursive formations coalesce, 
Yet, within the Fiji Islands, Suva plays a central role and displays some elements of Peel's concept of a 
regional hub. At the same time, it is a place locked into a multitude of relational networks of varying 
geographical reach akin to Amin's distinctive nodal formation, discussed in Chapter Four. Even so, 
Suva lacks a single distinctive organisational 'centre of regional persuasion' on matters of 
303 
environmental management and policy. Almost invariably however, foreign ideas about environmental 
management entering the archipelago's boundaries coalesce in Suva. The city links to world cities 
where institutional complexes produce the discursive policy formations that influence environmental 
policy around the world. Suva is the South Pacific hub (,nodal formation') for both environmental and 
development policy, linked to smaller hubs in Apia and Noumea. It is a place where projects are 
headquartered and NGO sub-offices established. USP (the regional university) is based there; almost 
all regional Pacific intergovernmental agencies have either headquarters or sub-offices in the city. 
There, overseas agencies make contact with state departments, workshops are held, a vibrant media 
reports daily on such occurrences, national laws are made, libraries operate, where the country's 
telecommunications to the outside world are kept operating. 
While SPREP fills the role of a regional centre of persuasion and influence for international 
environmental matters generally, that agency has only been involved in coral reef policy on the few 
occasions discussed in Chapters Seven and Eleven. Neither ICRI, GCRMN, the US government or any 
other major player in international coral reef policy have funded SPREP sufficiently for it to sustain the 
role of a regional centre of persuasion and influence. The same applies to USP's IMR and Marine 
Studies Programme; although they have operated as a GCRMN node and they provide logistical 
support and legitimacy to overseas researchers such as those from the University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, a lack of sustained funding has impeded them becoming a hegemonic regional link between the 
global and the local. Similarly, although SPC's marine division has shown some interest in coral reef 
fisheries (the live reef food fish trade; aquaculture or enhancement of species such as trochus and giant 
clams; reef fishery surveys), it too has been unable to sustain the role as a regional 'centre of 
persuasion and influence' because of a lack of funding for fulltime 'interpretive instructors'. This may, 
however, be changing, now France is funding a ReefBase office in Noumea and directing the CRISP 
project described in Chapter Seven. 
A relational model, in the sense described by Massey, Amin and Allen and summarised in Chapter 
Four, allows the network character of relationships-Latour' s careful plaiting of weak ties-to become 
visible-not only ICRI's networking efforts described in Chapter Seven but also the networking in 
Chapters Eleven and Twelve. A relational model allows those agencies that dominate by virtue of the 
number of connections they have forged to become visible as hegemons. Thus, we can recognise WWF 
as utilising multiple connections and creating opportunities to influence both government and 
community policy. CITES might be termed successful in influencing policy by virtue of the changes in 
legislation and the organisation of border regulation, which it forced upon the Fiji Government. But 
CITES has not established the extensive network of links with which WWF connects the Fiji Islands to 
the international. In forging these connections and shaping local coral reef policy, WWF has, according 
to this criterion, been dominant among the agencies endeavouring to shape coral reef policy in these 
islands. 
Although the coral reef crisis is reaching the Fiji Islands, principally through written documents such as 
GCRMN global status reports and scientific journals, these have a limited distribution centred on USP. 
In contrast, ideas about an environmental crisis and the need for sustainable development have much 
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wider distribution in the Fiji Islands. Fiji Islanders are rallying around the imaginary of an 
environmental crisis rather than that of a coral reef crisis. Moreover, foreign agencies tend to rally Fiji 
Islanders around the former rather than the latter. 
Processes by which global connections are forged are described in Chapters Six to Eight and, 
specifically in relation to the Fiji Islands, Chapters Ten to Twelve. None of these descriptions resemble 
the ideal-type descriptions of policy processes, encapsulated in the standard models and accounts of 
environmental regimes, which produce policy through democratic participation and rational 
deliberations (Chapter Two). For policy connecting with the Fiji Islands, there are two important points 
of difference, described below. 
The coral reef problematic: solutions preceding problems 
First, the identification of problems does not necessarily precede the selection of policy solution. To the 
contrary, none of the practices conducted in the name of saving Fiji's coral reefs, described in the last 
three chapters, have entailed the clear, sequential linear relationship between recognising problems and 
finding policy solutions postulated by the rational model of planning. In each case, efforts to identify 
problems came after, not before, the basic policy approach had already been selected. For example, in 
the two coral reef conservation initiatives discussed in Chapter Eleven, ecoregion planning and 
community conservation were pre-decided strategies. Furthermore, Chapter Twelve showed how a 
policy solution is pre-selected, then 'transferred' to the Fiji Islands, with little or no preceding 
characterisation or quantification of the nature and extent of the local problem being caused by 
exporting coral reef organisms. 
This suggests predetermined solutions, indicating that Fiji's reefs are constructed as problems not to 
find suitable solutions to those problems but to position those who use and manage Fijian reefs in such 
a way that, in the glare of international focus on environmental issues, they are predisposed to 
cooperate in the policy solutions being advanced for their reefs. Fiji reefs are enrolled into the global 
problematic specifically to bring those reefs, and those concerned about their use, into the political 
assembly around the notion of a coral reef crisis. 
Including Fiji reefs in the global problematic: politics not science 
Through data-gathering projects and scientific papers reporting research, the Fiji Islands is deliberately 
being re-imagined as a site of degraded coral reefs. Along with other countries where reefs occur, the 
archipelago is being drawn into the coral reef crisis made problematic through expert practices. These 
practices include that used in the GCRMN process of compiling global status reports, which produced 
descriptions of the problems facing Fiji's reefs from anecdotes, snippets of data and beliefs, all 
compiled according to a standard format. CITES and WCMC use expert practices to keep track of, and 
publicise trends in, the global trade in organisms considered at risk; in doing so, they generate statistics 
that help enrol Fiji reefs. This enrolment is aided by the expert practices associated with publishing 
scientific work (described in Chapter Eight): not just the construction of arguments around data 
fashioned into an argument judged worthy of publication but also the accompanying press releases 
designed to publicise the work and bring it to international attention, thus increasing the research's 
prestige. Through such practices, the Fiji Islands is cast as one of suite of developing nations where 
fishing is causing the depletion of reefs and the state is inadequately managing coral reef fisheries. 
The data 
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Although specific studies at some overseas sites do show evidence of long-term change in the 
composition of coral reefs (as Connell (1997) found in his review reported in Chapter Six), the notion 
of long-term, unidirectional change on a global scale, a potential slide into extinction, is conjectural 
rather than proven from data gathered from around the world. It appears that, in the absence of accurate 
or reliable data, scientists are prepared to use crude efforts to produce global-scale data; furthermore, 
scientific journals are prepared to publish those efforts. 
Contrary to first appearances portrayed by the technical and impersonal style of scientific rhetoric, data 
underlying the identification of Fiji coral reefs as part of a worldwide phenomenon of coral reef 
degradation are scarce. Even the GRCMN national status reports (Chapter Eight) have little basis in 
survey and monitoring data as opposed to anecdotes and generalisations. Many of the scientific 
assessments and statistics used to justify Fiji reefs being part of the global problematic do not reach the 
standard for survey and monitoring taught in quantitative courses on marine ecology in New Zealand 
and at USP in Suva (and presumably also in America and Europe). Work of this standard, conducted in 
the Lau group, has yet to be incorporated into GCRMN reports of the status of Fiji's reefs (see Dulvy et 
al. 2002; Dulvy et at. 2004). Moreover, the authors' claim of repeated phase shifts has yet to be 
analysed in terms of evidence for global degradation of coral reefs. 
Moreover, policy solutions being advocated on the basis of scientific data appear on closer inspection 
to have little basis in data. Only the skimpiest of scientific assessment is used to justify the 
environmental controls being proffered to control the export of reef organisms from the Fiji Islands. 
The initiatives targeting the export trade in Fijian reef organisms (Chapter Twelve) represent Fiji's 
reefs as being overharvested, without being explicit about which reefs and to what extent. CITES 
Secretariat staff used inaccurate data to justify their efforts to get the Fijian state to apply the rules of 
the convention, and did so without any monitoring data about the environmental effects (on reefs) of 
the harvest of reef organisms for export. In justifying their scheme, MAC staff had some surveys of 
live rock supplies in and adjacent to areas being harvested, plus some quick surveys of sites from 
which fish and corals were being collected. They did not, however, have any long-term studies of 
effects of harvesting. Despite the almost complete absence of any scientific studies specifically 
designed to investigate the impact of harvesting for export on Fiji's coral reefs in a scientifically 
rigorous manner, both CITES and MAC staff proceeded as if existing levels of harvest were a proven 
problem. 
There are technical and economic reasons for this lack of data. In marine science, it is difficult, 
complex, physically demanding and expensive to obtain time-series of data that demonstrates cause 
and effect (Kenchington 1990). Experimental designs and statistical techniques needed to 'prove' cause 
and effect are complicated and must be carefully matched to the situation. Before/After ControllImpact 
studies are a lengthy and time consuming process, requiring surveys before any impact (e.g. harvesting) 
occurs, as well as afterwards, plus spatial controls at sites not being impact/harvested, randomised in 
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time. Science does not provide a cheap and effective way of ascertaining all the effects that fishing or 
other anthropogenic activities may have upon reefs. Reef Check's efforts illustrate this-hundreds of 
volunteer hours over several years has produced global-scale data for few species (Chapter Five). 
Getting accurate time-series data showing, on a global scale, the extent of coral reefs degradation plus 
trends over time, is not something that reef scientists can yet begin to contemplate. Even the extent of 
reefs worldwide is still being mapped. The World Atlas of Coral Reefs (Spalding et al. 2001) was a first 
attempt using existing data, upon which the NASA-funded Millennium Coral Reef Project is currently 
improving, by mapping and classifying reefs using data from space (Andrefouet 2004). 
The logic 
The logic by which Fiji reefs have been constructed as sites with environmental problems is based 
upon the assumption that Fiji reefs are likely to be facing the same problems described in some other 
parts of the world. There is a presumption that what has happened in Southeast Asia (the 'serious 
degradation of many reefs' and their 'inexorable decline' described in Wilkinson, 2000 p. 10, 118) will 
eventually happen in other areas such as the Pacific, given time, as population levels increase-unless 
of course certain steps are taken to avoid this. Yet, nowhere in predictions of a continued decline for 
reefs, is there any analysis of actual densities of people per reef area in different regions, or of 
population trends. 
Simple analysis, undertaken below, suggests this presumption is unreasonable; it is not the logic of 
rational science. As Table 22 shows, the area of reef per person is much greater in most Pacific Islands, 
including the Fiji Islands, than in Southeast Asia. Moreover, population density per unit of reef area is 
not in itself sufficient to indicate where overfishing might occur. One might expect that on the island of 
Tarawa in Kiribati (northern Pacific), the reefs would be overfished because it is one of the most 
densely populated Pacific islands, yet its reef fish populations are relatively healthy because many fish 
are ciguatoxic and therefore not fished (Cameron Hay, ex-IMR director, USP, Suva, pers. comm.). 
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TABLE 22: RATIO OF REEF AREA TO POPULATION FOR THE CORAL REEFS OF PACIFIC ISLANDS 
Island group Reef area Population Ratio reef/thousands of 
(km2) (OOOs) population 
Southeast Asia excluding China (PRC) 89,150 674,91871 0.13 
Islands in the Caribbean 12,510 32,778 0.38 
Australia 48,960 19,165 2.6 
Pacific Islands 
Hawai'i 1,180 2,020 0.6 
Northern Marianas <50 72 >0.7 
Guam 220 155 1.4 
Samoa 490 179 2.7 
Papua New Guinea 13,840 4,927 2.8 
American Samoa 220 65 3.4 
Nauru <50 12 >4.2 
Fiji Islands 10,020 832 12.0 
Solomon Islands 5,750 466 12.3 
Tonga 1,500 102 14.7 
Vanuatu 4,110 190 21.6 
French Polynesia 6,000 249 24.1 
Tokelau <50 2 >25.0 
New Caledonia 5,980 202 29.6 
Kiribati 2,940 92 32.0 
Federated States of Micronesia 4,340 133 32.6 
Cook Islands 1,120 20 56.0 
Palau 1,150 19 60.5 
Wallis and Futuna 940 15 62.7 
Tuvalu 710 II 64.6 
Niue 170 2 85.0 
Marshall Islands 6,110 68 89.9 
Pitcairn Islands <100 c. 50 people >20,000 
Johnston Island 220 0 [meaningless] 
TOTAL for Pacific Islands <67,260 
Source: (Spalding et al. 2001) amended according to Spalding pel's. co/mil. (October 2003) re 'correct' figures for 
Palau and Federated States of Micronesia-in the first print runs of the Atlas some Palau reefs were incorrectly 
assigned to Federated States of Micronesia. 
In the Fiji Islands, population pressure is relatively low. There are 12 kilometres of reef for every 
thousand Fijian inhabitants compared to 0.13 kilometres in Southeast Asia and 0.38 kilometres for 
islands in the Caribbean (based on statistics in Spalding et ai. 2001). Thus Wilkinson's statement in the 
executive summary of the 2000 GCRMN global status report that "unless these [major human] threats 
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are managed and mitigated, reefs will continue to degrade with the inexorable increase in human 
populations and pressures" seems less relevant to the Fiji Islands (Wilkinson 2000 p. 18). That 
executive summary contains the assumption that, unless large marine protected areas are established, 
we will see in places like the Fiji archipelago, the sorts of changes that have occurred on reefs in 
Southeast Asia and the Caribbean (ibid). Yet the types and levels of human activities are not the same 
in all locales; just as they have different histories, they will not necessarily share the same future. 
Furthermore, it is odd that claims of phase shifts on Fiji reefs come from work in areas deliberately 
chosen because it is remote from commercial fishing and industrial development (the Lau Islands), 
while phase shifts in the Caribbean are linked to commercial fishing (especially of urchins) and sewage 
pollution (Chapter Five and Eight). One has to question whether these reported phase shifts are part of 
the same phenomenon. Are the subsistence fishing-related phase shifts reported from Lau (Chapter 
Eight) the same phenomenon as that reported from 'severely overfished' and polluted Caribbean 
(Chapter Five)? For that claim is implicit in descriptions of worldwide coral reef degradation. 
These two examples show how the logic of the GCRMN is not that of supposedly objective science but 
that of politics (i.e. of ICRI' s Call to Action). This logic creates situations for expert intervention 
through the imperatives of precaution (preventing damage before it is too late) and uncertain 
knowledge (are there already significant changes on Fiji reefs as yet unstudied and unreported?). 
CITES' use of data, discussed in the previous chapter, is similarly precautionary. At the 10th 
International Coral Reef Symposium in Okinawa in 2004, I encountered another such situation (below). 
INTERPRETING THE SLOPPY USE OF STATISTICS 
One of the sessions I attended at the 10th International Coral Reef Symposium, held in Okinawa 
in 2004, concerned the marine aquarium trade. The session was co-ordinated by American coral 
reef ecologists Andy Bruckner (NOAA) and Eric Borneman. Both had been involved in 
compiling data on the coral trade for the USCRTF's investigations (Chapter Twelve described 
how those investigations influenced expert control on Fiji's coral trade). Bruckner has also 
published numerous articles about the trade. Having time on his hands when a presenter did not 
show, Bruckner decided to present a case study about the trade. \V'ith a Powerpoint presentation 
already on his laptop computer, he was able to plug into the overhead projection system. During 
his presentation he cited statistics used in preparing the Green and Shirley (1999) coral trade 
report, some SL'{ years earlier. He failed, however, to acknowledge that those statistics had been 
shown to be suspect, in the manner I discussed in Chapter Twelve. I drew this to his attention 
whereupon he then acknowledged that he knew there were problems with the data (briefly 
summarising those problems for the audience)-but he did not provide updated data. Why was 
Andy Bruckner presenting old \V'CMC data as if it were the latest accurate statistics when he knew 
it was not? \V'hy was accuracy of no apparent concern to him? Presumably he, too, was interested 
in creating a political assembly around the notion that coral reefs, Fiji's included, were facing a 
crisis that scientific data did not adequately describe. 
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There is a contradiction here. On the one hand, international coral reef policy exhibits a faith in science 
and instrumental rationality. On the other hand, in the way that the Fiji Islands has been enrolled into 
the global problematic, there is a disregard for the accuracy of statistics and a logic unsupported by 
statistics. Coral reef experts draw on the authority of science to legitimate arguments that lack a firm 
basis in the protocols of quality marine science or in reasoned and verified logic. This is a phenomenon 
that Latour (1993 p. 37-38, quoted in Chapter Four above) called the "invincibility of the moderns", 
shoring up reason with power and power with reason (a process which Latour sees as unconscious). By 
this means, coral reef experts enrol others from around the world in their political assembly around the 
imagined coral reef crisis. This contradiction is significant because it forms the basis for hegemony 
over developing countries. It underlies hegemonic arguments seeking to justify expert intervention in 
those countries, summarised in the next section. This raises the question of whether, in these practices, 
there is an intentional hegemony over developing countries, something which the next half of the 
chapter addresses. 
Coral Reef Politics: Interests, Power and Hegemony (Aim 2) 
INTERESTS 
It is far too easy to explain hegemony as the result of a coalition of interested parties who act in a 
mechanical way to attain status and funding, thus furthering their own interests. To overlook these 
interests altogether would, however, be missing part of the overall picture because it is a useful adjunct 
to an analysis of power and helps reveal the nature of hegemony. In an interests-based interpretation, 
ICRI is an alliance of organisations interested in international coral reef policy and management, an 
alliance that serves to legitimate certain policy approaches to coral reefs while avoiding the protracted 
process of formal intergovernmental negotiations. The Initiative serves the bureaucratic interests of 
IGOs seeking to preserve their ability to operate in a world of competitive funding for efforts to 
transfer western-style environmental policy to developing countries. It also provides a conduit of 
influence for various groups within the US government and the USCRFT wishing to shape 
international policy. Moreover, ICRI provides a stage for organisations outside the formal 
intergovernmental system, enabling them to gain or cement an international profile as significant 
players in conservation and sustainable environmental management, thus assuring their funding base 
and aiding their self-preservation (all discussed in Chapter Seven). 
Viewed in another way, ICRI is an alliance of professional interests. It reflects contemporary efforts to 
establish a profession of international environmentalism around coral reefs, an expert system of 
technical accomplishment with concomitant authority, prestige and social standing, an ecological 
technocracy. The professionalisation of international coral reef policy has an economic dimension, 
manifested through competition for funding. Researchers compete for research funding; NGOs 
compete for funding from philanthropic agencies and corporate sponsors (as well as from individuals, 
who provide a large chunk ofWWF's worldwide funds). 
There is conflict between those trying to embed this emerging profession within the international 
bureaucracies of the UN system, and those trying to bring the prestige of professionalism to 
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organisations operating outside that system, including but not confined to, international conservation 
NGOs working on coastal and marine matters. In Chapter Eleven, the role of conservation NGOs as 
saviours of the planet was re-interpreted to show them as groups of individuals who draw upon the 
practices of science and instrumental rationality to cement their authority in the contested global space 
of professional environmentalism. Through offices established around the globe, dialogue with local 
policy makers, and through local conservation projects, they aim to change local policy. NGOs, 
including conservation organisations, invent expert policy technologies, creating forms of expert 
professional authority that serve their own interests. The design of these technologies, and their 
implementation in developing countries, creates professional opportunities for experts, ways of 
furthering their professional standing, and provides vehicles for attracting funding. These endeavours 
establish new relations of accountability and structures of deference, representing relations of 
hegemony over developing countries-the hegemony of professionalised expertise. 
There is an economic element to the bureaucratic interest that large international organisations, whether 
within or outside the UN system, have in preserving their ability to operate in a world of competitive 
funding for efforts to transfer western-style environmental policy to developing countries, Moreover, 
Chapter Twelve showed how efforts to design and institutionalise ways of putting this sphere of trade 
onto an environmentally sustainable basis are intended to allow the trade to continue to benefit those 
countries which purchase and 'consume' the organisms, not just those harvesting the organisms. These 
efforts reflect the economic interests of an industrialised bloc centred on the US, and including Europe 
and Japan. Economics are central to the bloc's efforts to keep overall control on international 
environmental policy, to allow that trade to continue to benefit capitalist countries 'consuming' those 
organisms. 
In the design of market-based schemes intended to cover species omitted from CITES, there is, 
however, no evidence of collusion. Rather, the situation in the Fiji Islands, with different schemes 
being introduced at the same time, appears to be the coalescence of different interests around the same 
time. Even so, the overall effect is to maintain the bloc's control of the environmental terms of trade in 
coral reef organisms. This smacks of a fear that if control were to shift to developing countries, a whole 
new policy regime might emerge, probably disadvantaging their capitalist interests. This is the fear of a 
new international economic order, long proposed by developing countries (developing countries' 
efforts to establish this are described in Rist 1997). It is also hegemony, residing in the bloc's attempts 
to control of the environmental terms of trade in coral reef organisms-a dominating form of power 
that removes choice from developing states and serves the bloc's interests at the expense of the latter's. 
If the exporting countries were to dictate environmental conditionalities, what is acceptable and what is 
not, and set stricter standards and restrict supply, then the price might rise, to the detriment of 
consumers. This might happen. There are already tensions within the Fiji Islands about whether the 
coral and marine ornamentals industry should continue and whether it is a suitable way for qoliqoli 
rights holders to use their resources. People from the tourism industry and the state Tourism 
Department oppose the industry; the sight of villagers 'attacking' the reef with crow bars conflicts with 
the image of healthy, natural Fiji which they are marketing. The Institute of Applied Science (lAS, part 
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of USP and an instigator of FLMMA, mentioned in Chapter Eleven) also opposes the industry for 
environmental reasons, questioning its long-term sustainability (Bill Aalbersberg, lAS, pers. comm.). 
Amongst those I interviewed, opinions remain divided as to whether the marine ornamentals industry 
should continue. Such uncertainty is not surprising given the lack of long-term monitoring data for 
various species exported. In the meantime however, Walt Smith International are developing a product 
based on pumice, as an alternative to live rock harvested from reefs (Radio Australia 2005). Gathering 
pumice off Fiji's beaches after underwater eruptions in Tonga, they suspend it in seawater until coral 
and algae grow on it, then harvest it for sale as a cultured, artificial bio-rock alternative for aquaria 
(ibid). 
MODES OF POWER EXERCISED IN AN OUTWARDLY COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK 
This is one of several forms of power revealed in the analysis in previous chapters. The allure and 
moral authority of pursuing the common good is used (as in Chapter Eight)-Arendt's notion of 
associational power directed at producing a common will to protect nature (a concept of power 
discussed in Allen 1999). My observations and interviews suggest, however, that rather than being part 
of a collective associational power, for the common good of humankind on a threatened planet, Pacific 
Islanders involved in environmental policy matters are generally more interested in the common good 
of Pacific Islanders, or, on the smaller scale of countries, the common good of their fellow citizens. 
Thus Arendt's notion provides an unsymmetrical explanation, seeing international experts interested in 
protecting nature around the globe, and Pacific Islanders interested in protecting Pacific nature. 
Chapters Eight, Ten, Eleven and Twelve described a complex suite of modes of power-persuasion, 
manipulation, seduction, inducement, and, in the case of CITES, coercion being used in conjunction 
with negotiation and authority. Additionally, the allure of professional recognition has helped enrol 
local professionals, as has the seduction of being part of a global network with its possibilities-future 
funding, making professional contacts, plus the sociality of being part of the reef science community. 
Power is also being exercised through the use of 'sloppy statistics' to support a precautionary approach. 
Earlier in the chapter, I cited examples of how statistics that lack any robust data are being employed to 
enrol the Fiji Islands into the global coral reef crisis, and to justify taking a precautionary approach to 
trade. If indeed this is how the precautionary principle is being interpreted, this gives an international 
regulator such as CITES far more power than any of the players in the developing countries that are 
still putting together a set of modern laws following relatively recent independence from colonial 
masters. This is another example of power being exercised in a dominating manner. 
Latour (1987, p. 2-17, 253) argued that scientists create facts by closing off controversies, and by 
black-boxing uncertainties and assumptions away from further scrutiny while simultaneously 
universalising locally specific knowledge by enlisting the support of institutionalised knowledge 
networks. In both the GCRMN process and in UNEP-WCMC/ CITES concern about the global coral 
trade, uncertainties about the extent of degradation worldwide are being closed off from further 
scrutiny. Moreover, Chapter Six showed how, in the construction of the crisis narrative and its 
repetition as citations in scientific papers, uncertainties about long-term trends, about causative agents, 
even about whether we should be concerned, are being avoided. When statistics are used to support 
certain policy approaches, without acknowledging how these are uncertainties have been closed off, 
this constitutes domination, more so because of the proximity, in this case, of those closing off the 
controversies and those promoting the policies-sometimes the same people (Wilkinson, Hoegh-
Guldberg and MCClanahan for example). 
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Although international environmental policy is commonly regarded as an exercise in cooperation, this 
analysis shows various modes of power employed to get Fiji Islanders to cooperate in coral reef policy. 
Rather than cooperative, international coral reef policy should be regarded as power-filled. As this 
analysis has showed, all players do not cooperate on the same terms in some idealised notion of either 
associational or equal power. Cooperation is not necessarily equally good for all parties; it can even be 
the basis for a hegemonic relation, as the next section affirms. 
HEGEMONY AS A RELATIONSHIP OF DOMINATION 
The developed/ developing country dichotomy is generally regarded as a clue to potential hegemony. 
But if we labelled everything that derives from outside the Islands as being hegemonic, that would 
devalue the term. It is important, therefore, to distinguish different manifestations of hegemony and 
analyse how they build a hegemonic politics-through universals, naturalised discourse, technical 
practices etcetera. The section summarises the various manifestations of a relationship of domination 
revealed in previous chapters. 
In this consideration of whether the transfer to developing countries of Western environmental policy 
ideas may be a form of hegemonic control, I start not from the idea that hegemony has utility in 
maintaining order in the international system or that it delivers aid and funding to help fulfil the 
promise of modernisation. Rather, I start from the premise that hegemony is a form of western 
domination that may appear as a mode of power that subordinates, which needs to be exposed and 
overcome (Chapter Four). 
Western superiority 
The analyses of coral reef policy endeavours in Chapters Six to Thirteen suggest that a relationship of 
domination has been set up around the concept of Western superiority. This relationship occurs widely: 
in matters of governance and policy, in a wide range of professional and technical skills associated with 
marine science, conservation and policy (e.g. survey, monitoring, report writing, research, species 
identification, in the intellectual capacity of the reef science community; in the institutions 'needed' to 
manage coral reefs; and in values, the latter presaged in Chapter Three and demonstrated in subsequent 
chapters. Stories about coral reef degradation based on the Malthusian concept of overfishing, and 
related neo-Malthusian ideas about the cause of that degradation, portray Third World populations in 
this manner (Chapter Eight). So too, in a more subtle way, do scientific texts that portray experts as 
being able to identify degradation, and recommend steps to take to address it, while peasants/islanders 
keep on fishing either in a state of ignorance about the effects this is having, or because they lack 
capacity and political will to address any concerns they may have (Chapter Eight). Fijians harvesting 
reef organisms are seen not as experts in their own culture but as the cause of changes in coral reefs 
(e.g. Dulvy et at. 2004). 
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The inherent relationship of domination over Third World societies found in expert texts on coral reefs 
is the same expression of Western superiority found in modernisation theory. Collectively, the 
metaphors, narratives and arguments recurring in these texts present a hegemonic view of the world in 
which developing countries are recreated as sites for intervention by professional experts. Employing 
concepts such as capacity-building and the marrying of conservation and development, they depict 
western experts as possessing superior intellect and technical skills, and portray people from 
developing countries as lacking skills to address those problems, and in need of expert western 
assistance. 
As Said (1978) pointed out in his treatise on Orientalism, such depictions are problematic not just 
because they inform colonial and neo-colonial practices but because they begin to be taken on as a self-
image by those depicted. In the Fiji Islands, the perceived primacy of western experts in the field of 
environmental policy is encouraging the internalisation of such self-imagery, although some, such as 
Reuben Sulu, introduced in Chapter One, and the indigenous FLMMA experts, actively fight it. 
Although these texts do not actually constitute domination, they facilitate it. They set the scene, 
through their pervasive and persistent positioning. Thus, Fiji Islanders are being subordinated by the 
roles to which they have been assigned-the agents causing coral reef degradation; the villains of the 
crisis narrative; the ignorant and the undeveloped. In creating these villains, coral reef experts position 
themselves as saviours. Just as modernisation is seen as a trajectory along which all societies must 
progress, degradation is a trajectory down which coral reefs in developing countries will slide unless 
those countries (state, local NGOs and local communities) apply the coral reef community's standard 
prescriptions to arrest this and unless they accept that community'S help to climb upwards again. 
This notion of western superiority seems to be accompanied by the assumption of a special right to 
manage. As Fry (1997) observes in his analysis of how, in the heartland of Australian rational thinking 
inhabited by politicians, foreign affairs journalists, and academic economists, South Pacific islands are 
being framed, such assumptions are most difficult to acknowledge, being steeped in old racist premises. 
This analysis of international coral reef policy has revealed the same self-imposed western right to 
manage the environment of developing countries that Fairhead and Mearns (1995) found embedded in 
policies addressing the supposed environmental crisis in western Africa, mentioned in Chapter Three. 
They, too, showed this perceived right to be born of stereotypes from the colonial era. 
In the Pacific region, this notion of western superiority and the right to manage ecosystems such as 
coral reefs is particularly significant when one realises the extent to which reefs occur in territories of 
colonial powers, the US and France in particular (Table 3). In Chapter Seven, I described how the US 
incorporated not just its dependent territories but also those Pacific states freely associated with it into 
its Coral Reef Task Force's initiatives. 
The politics of concern: a bias towards seeing developing countries as the 
cause 
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This bias towards seeing developing rather than developed countries as the cause of the imagined coral 
reef crisis is one of the forms which hegemony takes in coral reef policy. For example, arguments 
about the environmental impacts of trade in reef organisms concentrate on impacts caused by collectors 
not by end-point consumers. International efforts are directed at the countries of export and at technical 
controls on harvesting, handling, transport and so forth. They are not directed at restricting demand. 
Neither ICRI, GCRMN nor the ICRS have decried the consumer demand which perpetuates the bizarre 
trade in organisms for aquaria, or the lifestyles that led to it. There is little outrage directed against the 
consumer lifestyles which have led to the craze for home aquaria, tanks of colourful tropical reef fish 
and corals, brightening living rooms across America, Europe and Japan. In contrast, there has been 
some concern directed at the trade in live reef fish for food-a trade centred on China. Perhaps it is 
acceptable to criticise Asian consumers but not American and European ones. 
An example of blindness to local policy approaches 
The discourse of international environmental policy, with its biased view of western superiority, is 
blind to policy approaches being formed elsewhere. This can be seen in criticism of modern state-run 
management of coastal fisheries in developing countries as inadequate, often poorly implemented 
(Chapter Eight). Such criticism judges the state in small island developing states against some 
generalised model of the state in developed countries. It judges their systems of fisheries governance 
against some idealised notion of fisheries management; finding that these differ, it assesses those of the 
small states as inadequate. But the coral reef fisheries of the Fijian Islands are not the type of fishery 
that modern fisheries resource management aims to control. They are not industrial fisheries, they are 
low-tech ones. They are not single-species fisheries; they encompass dozens of species. These have 
never been open access fisheries-the supposed race to fish phenomenon has never been a threat. They 
have never been under sole management of a central state-the indigenous system has persisted and 
still is a significant component of the governance of the fisheries. 
The role of the state differs in these two situations (the Fiji Islands and an idealised notion implicit in 
modern fisheries management ideology). As well the operations of the Fisheries Division, there is 
another functioning system of fisheries management in the Fiji Islands involving the leaders of Fijian 
communities and the Fijian district administrations (provincial councils). This composite system of 
governance includes constraints (such as taboos) and disincentives such as the fear of physical violence 
(see Chapter Ten). Thus, state fisheries management is only one part of a bigger system. Furthermore, 
when domestic non-governmental agencies or international agencies start fisheries management 
projects in the Fiji Islands, the state cooperates in these; they are not carried out in some non-
governmental sphere that excludes that state, as Chapter Two illustrated. 
In the Fiji Islands, the contemporary system of fisheries management evolved as the country 
modernised, but this does not necessarily mean that the indigenous Fijian elements of the governance 
system are 'weakened' or that the state has failed in its management. What has evolved is a 
functioning, complex system of governance that acknowledges indigenous rights and accommodates a 
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range of commercial uses, and even modern recreational use although in a way that those used to open 
access of countries like New Zealand find cumbersome. There are means of resolving conflicts in 
resource use. The qoliqoli managers have ways of dealing with this, even though one traditional 
approach (physical violence) is anathema to many people in developed, democratic countries, and 
illegal under national legislation. The state also helps mediate resource conflicts. 
This suggests that rather than being a failure, or lacking capacity, the state is one part of a governance 
system for coastal fisheries that is functional and developing to accommodate the specific political 
circumstances in Fiji Islands and indigenous political aspirations. This alternative interpretation 
illustrates the bias of an interpretation following the storyline of orthodox discourse: a bias towards 
western systems of governance as appropriate systems, with an inbuilt bias towards believing that any 
alternatives will necessarily be failures. That bias prevents local efforts to address problems being 
acknowledged; instead, it sees those local efforts as part of the problem being imagined. 
What is being subordinated or lost? 
The accounts of hegemony summarised in Chapter Three suggested that the ventures by which 
international environmental policy is created and disseminated to the Third World are a form of 
cultural modernisation, one that eclipses the local, its knowledge, culture, traditions. Those accounts 
were, however, largely silent about what aspects were being displaced or eclipsed. The methods I have 
used to examine various international coral reef policy endeavours connecting with the Fiji Islands 
have not produced any such illumination either (this was not the study'S aim). 
This lack of illumination may reflect what Latour has called the hybridisation of modern life. When 
culture and nature, facts and values, rationality and irrationality, states of the world and representation 
have been hybridised, it becomes difficult to separate them in order to distinguish a 'pure' state. In the 
modern world, whether in the Fiji Islands or New Zealand, France or the US, the character of the local 
is as elusive as the notion of wild nature (see Bess c.2003 for an explanation of the latter difficulty), 
because the local is already a hybrid created by modernity. 
Nevertheless, in the ongoing process of hybridisation there is a sense of loss. Hornborg (1994 p. 260) 
describes the co-optation of local voices, and the corresponding shift of motives, that occur when 
'locals' enter one of modernity's specialised sectors for identity construction (such as the professional 
fields of environmental policy or conservation). 
If the individual has to choose whether to define himself in terms of local or abstract 
referee-points, the movement from local to global will tend to be irreversible, and there will 
be a continuous co-optation of local voices into placeless, guild-like frameworks. Without 
the constant, experience-near resonance of place, these voices risk forgetting the contexts in 
which they were raised, devoting themselves to the perfection of their own, objectified 
intonation, echoing in the empty labyrinths of disembedded abstraction (Hornborg 1994 p. 
260). 
The local is already part of the global, a relational effect of social interaction where identities are 
complex and historically changing (Doreen Massey's concepts described in Chapter Four). Chapter 
Eleven illustrated how, when international conservation NGOs employ their expert policy technologies 
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in the Fiji Islands, and a decontextualised discourse is adopted, there is a further distancing from the 
local as an isolated archipelago in the broad Pacific Ocean with its unique people, culture and nature. 
The archipelago becomes part of the political assembly around the global environmental crisis, and Fiji 
Islanders working to institutionalise international policy approaches and technologies become part of a 
global profession actively working to enrol others in that assembly. 
Also being lost is the space and time needed to develop for local policy designs and technologies. 
Overseas agencies are saturating the country's resource managers with different policy approaches, 
leaving little space for any local redesign. Time and energy is committed to participating in these 
Western-designed schemes, not in analysing the situation and designing their own style of response. 
Thus, indigenous initiatives such as FLMMA use overseas policy technologies rather than developing 
their own. This is of concern, as are the inefficiencies and confusion likely to result from multiple 
policy approaches. 
This can be seen clearly in the three simultaneous attempts to institute different schemes for managing 
the environmental effects of Fiji's trade in coral reef organisms, described in the previous chapter. Each 
scheme focuses on particular group of reef organisms, and each justifies the trade in that group 
continuing under its own particular style of management. In trying to cooperate with every foreign 
organisation promoting its particular policy scheme, the Fiji Islands state will end up with the harvest 
of organisms from their reefs managed under three very different approaches. Because, in the Fiji 
Islands, the MAC scheme and the initiative to produce global standards for the live reef food fish trade 
are not fully institutionalised, the full consequences may not yet be visible. Thus, there is hegemony 
not just in the individual schemes are discussed in the previous chapter, but in their aggregate. Despite 
the diversity of players, the multiple conduits for policy ideas, the different policy approaches being 
followed in these three schemes are, in a collective sense, hegemonic-domination achieved by 
removing choice (see p. 87). 
Furthermore, in conferring on agencies from developed countries the right to intervene in developing 
countries, without the converse, environmental policy discourse is disadvantaging people from 
developing countries. Insistence that policy solutions have to be those of the west, and western 
agencies have to be funded to institutionalise them, is another form of economic disadvantage, since 
those practices have become a business that benefits western experts more than those from developing 
countries, as Third World analysts of development practice have made known. 
THE ROOTS OF HEGEMONY 
In Chapter Four, I identified how, for domination to be considered hegemonic, two elements are 
presumed: the capacity of a dominant group to exercise control, and the willing acquiescence of those 
subordinated. Without the latter, hegemonic policy does not exist; if beliefs are fall upon stony ground 
or are adapted for local purposes, then hegemony is prevented or limited. Thus the hegemony of coral 
reef policy is limited by the way locals co-opt discourse to suit their own purposes. Nevertheless, when 
it comes to coral reef policy there is sufficient, diverse evidence to suggest those acts of co-optation 
described in Chapters Ten and Eleven do not somehow neutralise the hegemony accompanying the 
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institutionalisation of western environmental policy discourse and policy practices. Asymmetry still 
exists. Hegemony occurs despite the Fiji government's downplaying of national environmental policy 
in the face of pressing political concerns and the exigencies of electoral competition (Chapter Seven) 
and despite the local actors' active co-optation of discourse and discursive devices (Chapters Nine to 
Twelve). Acts of co-optation do not negate the way in which western agencies have so saturated the 
Fiji Islands with policy ideas and schemes, that local actors have little time or energy to develop their 
own approaches. Nor do they completely cancel out the pervasive message of western superiority. 
They have not reworked the economic terms of trade in favour of the country of export as opposed to 
import. 
In regurgitating standard storylines that are intimately rooted in discourses of presumed superiority, 
mission, and negative essentialisations of the Other, western experts appear to have no strategic desire 
to dominate developing countries. Rather, as I discussed in Chapter Eight, in their technical practices 
and talk, experts create the situation for expert intervention for entwined reasons, their motivations 
ranging from the selfish pursuit of wealth and power to the selfless mission of building a common will 
to protect nature. They act to maintain their legitimacy as experts, to pursue professional opportunities, 
and to maintain certainty and order in their world. Chapter Ten showed similar motives and interests 
amongst the groups in the Fiji Islands with whom international connections being forged. 
Aspirations of control 
This desire for certainty and the maintenance of order deserves further attention. Amongst those 
involved with ICRI, ICRAN, OCRMN and various NOOs promoting coastal conservation, it 
materialises as an aspiration to control nature in a world becoming increasingly complex as scientific 
knowledge 'advances'. This aspiration can be seen in the concept of adaptive management discussed in 
Chapter Eight and Eleven. It also appears in the desire to, and confidence that humans can, avoid the 
level of coral reef degradation that could potentially either remove a sense of what, natural, healthy, 
beautiful ecosystems are or could prompt catastrophic extinction. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, this sense of confidence in experts' ability to control Nature is typical of 
the modern age: humankind's capacity for planning and control, predicated on confidence in their 
ability to subjugate nature as an unruly force. Coral reef experts maintain a sense of hope that the crisis 
facing coral reefs can be averted, even as they continually recreate that crisis by adding and 
disseminating stories about reef degradation. They maintain this hope even in the face of growing 
awareness of the complexity of nature, and in the face of a growing body of theory about 
nonequilibrium, even chaos, in natural systems (Chapter Eight). Moreover, they do so by relying on 
simplistic notions of human society, both those using and governing coral reefs locally, and the social 
groups of experts propounding their solutions to the coral reef crisis. If society is 'simple', then experts 
can identify the changes needed to save coral reefs-an illusory argument. 
Although there has been a trend over the last few decades for coral reef scientists to recognise the 
increasing complexity of the biophysical world of coral reefs, these insights from complexity theory 
and the 'new ecology' have been confined to the non-human components of coral reef ecosystems. 
There has been no corresponding trend to recognise the complex nature of the social world of those 
318 
people who use and govern reefs in developing countries. The concept of adaptive management 
espoused by FoS and others (Chapter Twelve)-a process of incremental management responses with 
close monitoring and built-in iterative learning to allow managers to respond to thresholds and 
surprises of reef management (Nystrom et al. 2000)-is designed to address the complexity of natural 
rather than human systems. 
We have, instead, simplistic, positivist arguments about the cause of coral reef degradation (analysed in 
Chapter Eight) and simplistic notions proffered to explain why developing countries have not 
enthusiastically adopted ICRI's prescriptions: a lack of political will and capacity. But more than that, 
there is no attempt to understand the complexity of those societies. ICRI does not call for any such 
studies. Furthermore, the campaign to marry conservation and development, which WWF and other 
NGOs are pursuing (Chapter Two), will not result in any such understanding as long as it proceeds 
from its positivist assumption that the aim of science is to identify causal relationships in an objective 
world. 
Amongst those of the coral reef science community involved in ICRI and those promoting policy 
prescriptions to save coral reefs, this emphasis on understanding the complexity of the non-human 
world of coral reefs, but not that of human world, constitutes a form of domination. Their simplistic 
view of the social echoes what Blaney and Inayatullah (2002 p. 127) call the "global hegemonic 
politics of comparison" found in International Relations theory and incorporated into neo-
modernisation, whereby difference is "almost pre-consciously treated as simultaneous with disorder, 
fear, suspicion and condescension". To paraphrase, in the semantics of environmentalism, Blaney and 
Inayatullah's comments on the campaign to bring liberal democracy to the developing world: the 
cultural conceptions of Western environmentalists are constructed as normal or natural in relation to 
marginalised peoples and regions perpetually on the road to mature environmentalism (ibid). There is a 
direct parallel with the blindness of modernisation theory's metaphor of the process of modernisation: 
as long as there is a strategy for achieving the modernisation (cf. environmentalism) of countries not 
yet in that state, there is little need to understand the intricacies of their society. Instead, simplistic lists 
of failures and shortfalls will suffice, for those are what need to be remedied, to propel those countries 
up the slope to modernisation/environmentalism. 
Western experts bringing environmentalism to countries such as the Fiji Islands seem to equate the 
latter's approach to nature with disorder, and their own mission as one of bringing order and control. 
Modernisation entails universally mandated standards of progress and order, and Western, modernist 
aspirations for certainty and control are flowing over into the arena of international environmental 
policy. Yet, for Banuri (ibid), the primary objective of the modernist hierarchy-the assumed 
superiority of the impersonal over the personal as a way of thinking about the world-is not pedagogy 
but control; not helping to understand the world but rather helping to maintain existing but oppressive 
structures of power. He (1990 p. 89) argues that, rather than expanding human freedom, modernisation 
is legitimising the denial of sovereignty to the populations of the Third World, and to the common men 
and women of Western countries. 
Since it is far more likely that industrialised countries will destroy the biosphere than Third World 
ones, as reflected in the relative ecological footprints, then what is the source of these experts' 
apprehension about Third World environmental practices? It may be a fear of the disruption of the 
international systems; or of diminishing power over the environmental terms of trade; or perhaps a 
general preference for the known over the unknown. 
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Is this modernity as Latour (1993 p. 41) described it-moderns not thinking at all about the 
consequences of their innovations (the creation of society/nature hybrids) for the social order, to such 
an extent they are unconscious of its hegemony? Or is it a more insidious form of political 
manoeuvring and hegemony? A consideration ofICRl's politics suggests the latter. 
ICRI's conservative politics 
ICRl's politics incorporate a general anxiety, not about what industrialised civilisation is doing to the 
planet, but about the effects of the process of modernisation in those countries that are still 
industrialising or yet to industrialise. Although these politics exhibit faith in industrialised nation-states 
and the UN system, they contain doubts about whether developing states are being modified fast 
enough by environmental consciousness. ICRl's strategy is a variant of ecological modernisation: all 
paths out of the environmental crisis are believed to lead further into modernity (cf. Mol 2003). In 
seeking answers to the problems of reef degradation within current systems, this strategy is politically 
conservative. In arguing the need to address coral reef degradation at multiple levels of governance 
from communities up to the UN, the strategy is to preserve the present political order in the 
international system. 
The efforts of ICRI and various NOOs whose work I have described are, in effect, an attempt to 
maintain the established order between industrialised countries (US, Europe including Scandinavia, 
Japan and Australia are all implicated) and the Third World countries where the vast majority of reefs 
occur. Their politics aim to maintain both an existing social order embedded in modernity that is 
focused around expert systems, a professional-laity relationship, and the existing political order 
between industrialised and non-industrialised countries as blocs. Underlying this is the belief that 
modernisation provides the means to control its own environmental effects through specialised 
expertise, also the hope that experts hold of addressing those effects. This is the optimism of 
modernisation, the confidence that international efforts will, through scientific reason, instrumental 
rationality, international cooperation and progress, address the challenges posed by widespread 
environmental degradation. 
Commonsense and technical practices at the root of hegemony 
These experts' efforts to institutionalise a shared sense of the necessary response to the coral reef crisis 
draw upon standard prescriptions such as environmental assessment and monitoring; planning; creation 
of protected areas; market-based prescriptions; improved community resource management; and 
improved state practices. These are 'practical' solutions: accepted as environmental commonsense 
rather than as novel, experimental approaches. A hegemonic politics is being built partly through such 
commonsense science/policy technical practices. Those practices include the rhetorical style used in 
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scientific papers, the practices used in creating global environmental status reports, ecoregion planning, 
and capacity-building projects. These imagine environmental problems on an international scale and in 
such a form that their pre-chosen policy prescriptions appear as 'solutions' to those problems, thus 
providing the basis for expert intervention. In effect, such practices legitimate scientific practice, 
knowledge and activity on an international scale, and authorise the use of science, conservation, 
environmental aid and capacity building in maintaining public order and social trust within an 
international political system. 
Conclusion 
In international coral reef policy, the basis for western hegemony over developing countries arises from 
that way in which the crisis has been constructed and a shared sense of the necessary response to it 
institutionalised. Embedded in these western approaches to coral reef policy is a relationship of 
domination: Technical practices, along with the discourse shaping global environmental policy and the 
universals that through which policy travels the global, create and sustain this relationship. These 
policy-travels are both enabled and constrained by the discourse of global environmental policy. Policy 
works through universals, knowledge that moves across localities and cultures, forming channels of 
communication (Chapter Four). While international policy is, on the one hand, a realm of ideas, on the 
other it is a practical, engaged universality (a concept discussed by Tsing 2005 p. 1). 
The hegemony of international coral reef policy is predicated upon the universal of working together 
across national boundaries (whether this be called collaboration, cooperation or whatever) as much as 
in those of neoliberalism and science. Immersed in orthodox discourse, we generally find it difficult to 
recognise cooperation as a potentially hegemonic universal in matters of environmental policy. It is 
much easier to recognise as hegemonic, those universals that politics creates; since politics is the 
exercise of power, these are routinely labelled as hegemonic to one or other groups or cultures. 
Similarly the universals of capitalism (such as market-based schemes) are routinely regarded as 
hegemonic on economic as well as political grounds, when applied to small and/or relatively 
unindustrialised countries enrolled into a global economy dominated by large national economies and 
transnational firms. The charge of hegemony is less commonly levelled at science's universals, even 
though the act of creating universals is central to the practice of science. This is because science still 
largely rests on the notion that it is objective and apolitical. Yet the roots of hegemony in international 
coral reef policy lie partly in technical practices of science and its hybridisation with environmental 
policy on an international scale. 
As an instrument of international governance, coral reef policy arises at multiple locations in developed 
countries. In these developing countries, various agencies loosely linked into ICRI forge multiple 
contacts in their efforts to extend their political assembly-into state agencies, communities, local 
NGOs and academic institutions. In Fiji, transitory visitors and socio-technologies such as emails, 
faxes and letters playa key role in maintaining the network forged at international meetings and 
workshops; so too do policy technologies. But none of this would happen in the absence of this 
professionalisation of the business of conservation and environmental policy. This emerging 
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professionalisation of international environmental policy and conservation is feeding the hegemonic 
production of expert policy technologies and policy commonsense. The appearance, in developing 
countries, of a suite of recently-established US-based NOOs is a sign of this professionalisation, as is 
the re-orientation of international research agencies such as the World Fish Centre to policy and the 
conversion, in progress, of SPC's marine resources division from a technical to a policy section. The 
opportunities created by this professionalisation attract local policy actors to these manifold 
international schemes to protect the environment of the Fiji Islands, lengthening the network further. 
The next chapter reflects on what these phenomena-western hegemony over developing countries in 
matters of environmental policy, the emerging professionalisation in this field-tells us about world 
history in the making. In doing so, it concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter Fourteen 
Conclusion 
Insights from a Trans-disciplinary Study 
Concentrating on how policies arise as instruments of governance, organising people within systems of 
power and authority, this thesis continues the work begun in Shore and Wright (1997) and Peet (2001). 
It advances anthropological and geographical enquiry into the place that policy occupies in the 
contemporary world, at the same time extending Latour's (2004) insights about the relationship 
between nature, science and society into the field of international environmental policy. Putting back 
together what modern thought commonly separates-politics and environmental policy-through an 
eclectic set of social science theory and analytical perspectives, the study reveals the interests, modes 
of power and the knowledge/power system shaping international coral reef policy. In doing so, it 
provides an alternative to ecologism's orthodox interpretation of the politics of nature described in 
Chapters One and Two. 
In undertaking this research, I intended to create new consciousness about international environmental 
governance and policy (as Chapter One explained). I wanted to challenge the idea that widespread 
environmental degradation in the Pacific Islands is a future inevitability, and to open up space for 
seeing environmental crises as political assemblies sensu Latour. When political and ideological 
projects masquerade as truisms and it becomes difficult to recognise the ways in which power is being 
exercised, then the space for political engagement is severely restricted (Allen 2004). By exposing the 
exercise of power and demystifying how, in drawing Pacific Islanders into their orthodoxy, common 
contemporary policy stances on environmental issues are able to have such power, I have begun to 
open up space for political interventions, so that in future, alternatives may be envisaged not just in 
developing countries but also in international policy agencies. 
I have opened up this space by exposing how contemporary efforts to transfer environmental policy to 
developing countries draw on the theory and ideology of modernisation, yet disguise their politics in 
technical discourse. Using Latour's insight into the invincibility of the moderns accorded by our 
Constitution (discussed in Chapter Four), I have shown the contradictions embedded in western efforts 
to transfer environmental policy, revealing these to be a political assembly around the notion of an 
ecological crisis and not the politically neutral enterprise implied by the orthodox view of science being 
value-free. And I have critically analysed international coral reef policy, something which has been 
sorely lacking, as the text box in the previous chapter, titled Critiquing international coral reefpolicy, 
illustrates. 
In describing how coral reef policy endeavours are largely outside any formal environmental regime 
yet making multiple connections with developing countries, the thesis makes an original contribution to 
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both the geographical study of globalisation and the study of international politics. It shows the 
network character of international policy endeavours. Professional experts are the 'actor face' of 
networks that operate within and around formal state organisation at national and international level, 
yet, without distinction, forge their own connections with what is often taken to be 'civil society'. 
These experts are central to the globalisation of ideas found in coral reef policy processes. Overseas 
specialists forge multiple points of contact with the developing world in order to institutionalise a 
conservative, pre-selected range of standard policy prescriptions. Most of this traffic in policy ideas is 
one-way, directed at developing countries, although some ideas are being exported from countries such 
as the Fiji Islands. There is no overall strategic direction to these efforts to save coral reefs, rather a 
coherence provided by a crisis narrative and an informal document, a Call to Action, both carefully 
constructed by a group of experts. The same group has formed a network under the brand of IeRI, 
under which they continue to promote their mission to intergovernmental agencies and international 
policy meetings and to run the operations that enrol more and more people and reefs around the world. 
Transferred from multiple locations in developed counties, coral reef policy becomes an instrument of 
governance in the Fiji Islands through the framework of a common will to protect Nature. That 
outwardly cooperative framework disguises how international players encouraging Fiji Islanders to 
participate in their endeavours and to adopt their policies are, in fact, exercising modes of power 
ranging from coercion associated with negative sanctions to dilute forms of seduction. Moreover, the 
moral and economic framework provided by a common aspiration to protect nature disguises how 
Pacific Islanders working in local agencies (governmental and non-governmental) co-opt the 
narratives, storylines and metaphors characterising coral reef policy texts for the same purposes as 
those who create these situations for expert intervention in developing countries. Experts in 
environmental policy and conservation, wherever they are based, seek to maintain their legitimacy, to 
pursue professional opportunities, and to maintain certainty and order in their world. But while their 
endeavours to maintain a sense of hope for, and control over, a seemingly complex, chaotic natural 
world drive ecological science to more sophisticated levels, there is no matching effort to incorporate 
into international coral reef policy a sophisticated understanding of a culturally, socially and politically 
complex, interconnected human world. 
I have revealed how a modernist discourse shapes much contemporary thinking about environmental 
governance, by examining how exactly professional experts, both foreign and local, are involved in 
transferring western ideas about appropriate environmental policy to the Fiji Islands, and by analysing 
how those ideas accord with modernist thinking. I have also shown how international environmental 
policy endeavours draw on the aspirations of Fijian communities for development. In doing so, they 
enrol Fiji Islanders as partners in a hegemonic relationship predicated on western superiority. 
In revealing the contribution that experts (policy/science/conservation professionals) are making to 
hegemony in international environmental policy, this thesis makes an original contribution to critical 
studies of international policy in an ethnographically engaged and geographically responsible way, thus 
responding to two separate calls in geography, made in Peet (2001) and Sparke (2004). It extends these 
studies beyond a discussion of neoliberalism to focus not just on experts but on the shaping influence 
325 
of a dominant discourse of global environmental policy and the central roles played by concepts of 
modernisation. Embedded in this discourse is a relationship of domination that portrays people in 
developing countries as the cause of local environmental degradation while ignoring extra-local 
dynamics and the broader context within which local actions occur. Biased towards western systems of 
governance, the discourse fails to comprehend the complexity of local governance systems. 
Hegemony in matters of international environmental policy is not well recognised, in contrast to 
hegemony in matters of development (sustainable development included). In the Pacific region, 
analysis of environmental policy tends to be subsumed into critiques of sustainable development; the 
development component is then the subject of critique while the environmental component is often 
viewed from the orthodox perspective of global environmental policy discourse. The book Strategies 
for Sustainable Development: Experiencesfrom the Pacific (Overton and Scheyvens (eds) 1999) 
illustrates this; it investigates the hegemony of development while generally accepting foreign policy 
prescriptions for conservation as universally beneficial, although cautious over eco-tourism. 
In the conclusion to Strategies for Sustainable Development, Overton et al. (1999 p. 264) suggest that 
the past can complement the present, allowing people the option of combining and adapting what they 
consider to be the best of the old and new (citing several case studies where this is happening), thus 
producing a "more basic and diverse notion of improvement and well-being" (ibid). The same could be 
said about notions of appropriate relationships with nature and of environmental quality. The type of 
critical analysis applied to development could usefully be extended to environmental policy matters. 
Any such analysis must, however, acknowledge how the concepts of development and progress 
embedded in contemporary environmental policy have a particular ideological basis, provide a platform 
of relationships of power, and represent particular political interests. The study has clearly shown this 
to be the case for coral reefs policy. 
This thesis has also cast light upon the relationship between modernisation theory and international 
environmental policy. Modernisation theory, upon which the contemporary notions of development 
found in international environmental policy are based, contains an inherent weakness: the way the that 
modernist thinking, when combined with modernisation theory's approach to developing countries, 
produces hegemonic international environmental policy belies the assumption of universal benevolence 
embedded in it. Incorporating a hypothetical, teleological rationality that configures particular contexts 
as cases within a unilinear, evaluative scale of modern-ness and development, modernisation theory is 
blind to its own simplistic argument, viz. as long as there is a strategy for the modernisation of 
countries not yet in that position, there is little need to understand their societies' intricacies, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The act of revealing international environmental policy as being 
based on this ideology rather than on politically neutral, technical considerations, combined with the 
revelation that it produces hegemonic policy, casts doubt on the ability of international efforts to 
address, through scientific reason, instrumental rationality and international cooperation the challenges 
posed by widespread environmental degradation. Furthermore, modernisation theory's simplistic 
caricatures of the complex social world of those using and governing reefs in developing countries cast 
doubt on the efficacy of framing international environmental policy around modernisation theory. 
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Developmental Environmentalism: Rewriting World History 
The post-Cold War version of modernisation (sometimes called neo-modernisation) focuses on 
diffusing various attributes from western centres of expertise-not just environmental norms but also 
notions of democracy, social justice, gender equity and human rights. Contemporary analysts of 
international environmental policy, concentrating on diffusion through formal environmental regimes, 
have overlooked how the diffusion of environmental policy, often outside of any formal regime, not 
only constitutes neo-modernisation but is further integrating the world. These analysts have failed to 
recognise how such environmental policy networks are deepening the integration of the world in a 
hegemonic way. Moreover, social movement analysts, in equating global civil society with 
emancipation and development, have overlooked hegemony in environmental matters. This is where 
further trans-disciplinary studies will be valuable, interrogating the central place that environmental 
policy has in shaping world history. 
This deepening integration is an important point. In the 1840s, Marx claimed that big industry, 
competition and the centralisation of capital created world history for the first time, "insofar as it made 
all civilised nations and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their wants 
on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate nations" (Marx and 
Engels 1970 p. 78). Now, environmental degradation is writing a new history of world integration and 
interdependence, that of the Anthropocene. Already known as an emergent era of natural history, the 
Anthropocene (so-called by International Geosphere Biosphere Programme and other earth scientists), 
marks a new series of geological, biological and climatological forcing mechanisms in the biosphere 
(Dalby 2004 p. 2). 
We have left the period of the Holocene, the relatively stable period of earth history 
between the end of the last ice age and the appearance of industrial society. Human 
activities have introduced new biophysical factors into the biosphere and begun to change 
the physical parameters that determine the functioning of the major earth system processes. 
Hence a new geological period (Dalby 2004 p. 3). 
The Anthropocene is not just an emergent era of natural history; it represents the deepening integration 
of humankind, an accepted interdependence as humans adjust to the belief they are altering the 
biosphere's functioning, particularly the climatic system. Since the extensive coral bleaching events in 
1997-98, the Anthropocene has been the frame of reference for ICRI's political assembly around the 
image of a coral reef crisis: the idea that by influencing the climatic system, humans are exacerbating, 
maybe even causing, coral bleaching. However, people began assembling around the environmental 
degradation of coral reefs much earlier, as Chapters Five and Six show. ICRI was initiated in 1994 and 
GCRMN in 1995 although the latter had been discussed several years earlier. So while climate change 
provides the reference frame for contemporary coral reef policy, before the bleaching events of 1997-
98 that frame comprised nature in need of rescue, along with the postcolonial legacy of discriminatory 
land policies and coercive conservation with spaceship earth as a metaphor for the need for technocrats 
to be in charge (Chapter Eight). 
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Both frames incorporate ideological statements about how the world is meant to be and about who 
should be in charge of achieving that-science/policy experts who see themselves as ecological 
technocrats. Both frames acknowledge the fear that those in the ICRI network, along with various 
MEAs, and conservation NOOs, have-the fear of the environmental effects of modernisation in the 
Third World, rendered as an inability to step aside and let things take their course. Contemporary 
industrial societies see not just themselves, but the entire developing world as it modernises, as a 'risk 
society'. They fear the consequences of that modernisation even as they acknowledge the right of Third 
World citizens to development. So, Western experts set out to critique and reform not just western 
society but the rest of the world. 
In reforming the Third World, these experts are putting their faith in ecology. Ecology is not only an 
ideological statement about how the world is meant to be as Forsyth (2003 p. 268) suggests, and an 
aesthetic "environmentalist trope of pristine nature" suggesting the importance of minimising 
alterations to habitats, coral reefs included (as discussed in the previous chapter). It has also become a 
model for the practice of development under the control of ecological technocrats. As a strategy for 
humankind's future, development is no longer necessarily progressive and unidirectional, it is 
ecological and adaptive under the guiding hand of experts. 
Yet this is not the frame of reference that predominates in the Fiji Islands, neither in the state nor in 
Fijian communities (Chapter Nine). There, development is viewed as a right, and the practices of 
development an opportunity for advancement (Chapter Ten); the aesthetic environmentalist trope of 
pristine nature is foreign, as is the idea of science/policy experts controlling the environment. Fijian 
communities have charge of their own qoliqoli, and the state intends to confirm those communities' 
proprietary and usage rights over coastal resources in national legislation (Chapter Nine explained the 
current legal ambiguity surrounding this matter). In the Fiji Islands, traditional and modern social 
relations co-exist, as do traditional and modern relationships with nature. The emergence of a global 
ecological society is contemporaneous with a traditional, community-based ecological society and a 
post-colonial national one. There is no paradox in this (cf. Jung 2001); this is the reality of 
modernisation in the Pacific Islands. The theoretical dichotomy between tradition and modern is just 
that, theoretical. 
Experts (the specialists of environmental science/policy and conservation) are connecting these two 
frames of reference in a process of global transformation I call developmental environmentalism. In 
forging this connection, these international environmental experts are writing a new world history, the 
act of connection integrating humankind around the globe at the same time as it further differentiates 
social function (through division into different fields of expertise as Chapter Four discussed). This 
deepening integration of humankind is comparable to Elias's (1994 p. 332) account of the (historical, 
European) civilising process entailing the lengthening of chains of organised social action and "the 
formation of ever-larger units of integration on whose fortunes and movements the individual depends, 
whether he knows it or not". The discourse of global environmental policy enables and facilitates this 
integration by portraying the world as increasingly interdependent (Chapter Two), thus setting the 
scene for expert intervention in the Third World in order to protect the environment. 
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Developmental environmentalism is re-characterising and deepening global society by drawing the 
Third World into First World imaginings of the environmental crisis and by enrolling its citizens in 
environmental policy prescriptions proffered as a cure for the crisis. The world canvas on which this 
environmental reform is happening is not one devoid of history and international norms. Jung (2001) 
has pointed out how the formation of post-colonial states has been heavily influenced by a pre-existing 
international system, that system preventing newly independent states from meeting the dominant 
conception of states as unitary actors. 
In most parts of the globe, state-building has taken place under the normative and power-
related constraints of the international system. The post-colonial state-makers were not able 
to fight those large scale state-building wars [which produced an international system 
shaped by anarchy and self-help] as their European predecessors did. Being from its 
inception dominated by the larger unit of the Western state system, non-European state 
formation has not been operating by the same rules. In pursuing their interests, the political 
entrepreneurs of [Oceania,] Africa, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America have had to 
conform their actions to the already existing norms and power relations of a hegemonic 
international system (Jung 2001 p. 462). 
Post-colonial states are expected to follow a shorter route to development than that of European and 
North American states. In doing so, they are expected to move progressively towards the 
environmental standards and norms of developed countries, and to conform to the relationship of 
domination inherent in those norms. The format of policy processes expected of them are western in 
origin, as are the imported solutions upon which they are urged to rely. Moreover, they are so crowded 
by foreign policy prescriptions there is little time or space to redesign their own relationships with 
nature. 
Developmental environmentalism is a political assembly around the notion of an ecological crisis, and 
as Latour and Weibel (2005) pointed out, each such assembly has its own notions of freedom and 
domination. But, as I have shown for the political assembly around coral reefs, these are not readily 
visible or acknowledged. The notion of freedom is that of cooperation and collaboration and all notions 
of domination are hidden. There lies the rub. 
What hides these notions of freedom and domination is the technical face with which 
environmentalism is presented to the Third World, not merely the centrality of science and rational 
planning but of professionalised expertise. This occurs because the thought that characterises simple 
modernisation persists despite the contention of sociologists (e.g. Giddens and Beck) and development 
analysts (e.g. Shuurman and others (1993» that we have moved on. In developmental 
environmentalism, the concepts of diffusionism, instrumental rationality and functional differentiation 
are all seen as necessary if the Third World is to develop in an environmentally acceptable way. Their 
persistence is not surprising; they survive in the First World environmentalism as well. This can be 
seen in the prominent contemporary controversy that exists because functional differentiation and 
specialised expertise have rendered ordinary people of industrialised countries incompetent in dealing 
with contemporary ecological and technological hazards (Beck 1992 p. 53-55; see Chapter Four 
earlier). 
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Future Critique 
In re-imagining international environmental policy as political, taking into account again what has been 
externalised from modern accounts of environmental policy and making the political apparent, I have 
conducted an external critique of modernisation theory sensu Banuri (Chapter Two). This critique 
undermines the meta-nan-ative of modernisation theory by casting doubt on its embedded confidence in 
the ability of international efforts to address, through scientific reason, instrumental rationality, 
international cooperation and progress, the challenges posed by widespread environmental degradation. 
Such critique is routinely subsumed into orthodoxy. Dalby (2003) observed that when the expansion of 
modernity and the acceleration of global processes of development are seen as the solution to numerous 
global problems, then anything that stands in the way of them is viewed as a threat to modernity. 
Referring to the work of environmental activists and social movements, Hornborg (1994 p. 260) 
expressed this phenomenon thus: 
To confront modernity through public discourse generally means to be absorbed by it. .. 
Self-reflection and self-objectification tend to mould activists according to public images of 
the 'environmentalist' or the 'indigenous' representative. Opposition to the ills of modernity 
is thus subsumed in the creation of a niche for each variant of critique, complete with 
formal channels for complaint and with chances of funding. There is a subtle transformation 
in motives as critique is progressively institutionalised and the focus is shifted from the 
source of indignation to the skills of self-preservation. 
The question remains in my mind, about whether, given the inbuilt defensiveness of modern 
environmentalism, I have gone far enough in revealing and explaining its basis in hegemony, to 
overcome that defensiveness. Will this critique evoke responses based on counter-arguments that shore 
up power with reason or ones that shore up reason with power? To make this subsumation more 
difficult, it has become necessary to separate the critique of international environmental policy from a 
consideration of sustainable development. Sustainable development is itself the product of an' earlier 
critique of modernisation theory (Chapter Two). It is time to make visible the politics of environmental 
policy, unravelling them from those of development. Once the strands are separated and the politics of 
each strand revealed, only then should they be compared. Here, then, is where future critical studies of 
global environmental policy should start. 
In addition, the discourse through which knowledgeable environmental policy programmes combine 
government and science to plan a world rendered intelligible and amenable to rational management and 
save us from further environmental degradation, deserves further inquiry (cf. Simons 1995 p. 24,29). 
My descriptions of this discourse are an invitation to further research rather than an attempt to define 
its rules of formation and conditions of existence sensu Foucault. How this knowledge/power complex 
arose deserves further historical research, as does the means and instrumentalities it deploys, those it 
targets, and the field of operation it actively constructs for its functionality. Scott's (1995) inten-ogation 
of colonial governmentality provides a useful model. 
There is an enormous set of challenges awaiting if we are to understand how, in international 
environmental policy programmes, techniques of government combine with political rationalities (the 
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way of solving problems and arriving at collective decisions) to define the proper parameters of 
political action and the institutional framework to those limits, and to enrol countries and communities 
around the globe. A perusal of the International Institute for Sustainable Development's list of recent 
international meetings on environment and development (available at shows how vast 
and broad-ranging this policy field has become. Yet, there is little research critically analysing this 
burgeoning programme of environmental government. Ooldman (2004; 2005), in a study of the World 
Bank and its water policy, has examined the knowledge production process that has become integral to 
large capital projects and has interrogated the political rationalities distinguishing the universal 
parameters of good and bad by which the Bank is usually judged. This type of scholarship is rare in the 
field of international environmentalism. Other fields of environmental policy besides coral reefs, and 
organisations other than the World Bank, deserve similar study, to understand how global truths are 
created and translated into global plans of action. 
If environmental policy is to be better understood as an instrument of international governance that 
incorporates a relationship of western domination over the Third World, then its relationship with 
scholarship and professional environmentalism (especially in IOOs and in environmental NOOs) needs 
to be studied. So too does the extent of US influence on global environmental policy, which could 
usefully be explored within the concept of US globalisation-the US as a non-territorial empire that 
has its capital in Washington DC and the way that the US state has used other states to promote its own 
interests. Additionally, the various groups in the US influencing international policy and the tensions· 
between these, the power of philanthropic foundations and their approach to the environment, the 
influence of scientific concepts in forming state policy-the way these various factors are shaping 
official policy and policy connections with those operating in the international sphere-all merit 
inquiry. 
Just as the extent of human impact on nature, and the cumulative character of environmental 
degradation deserve further research, so too does the way in which the political rationalities of global 
environmental policy are being constructed. Exposing the relations of domination and hegemony in 
these endeavours should be the central platform of campaigns for international environmental justice. 
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Appendix 
Interviews Conducted, Workshops and Meetings Attended 
Semi-structured interviews 
Name Organisation Main subject(s) Date 
Reuben Sulu IMR GCRMN node co-coordinator 21 February 2003 
SemisiMeo lAS FLMMA project with Yavusa 27 February 2003 
Navakavu 
Alifereti Tawake lAS BCN,FLMMA 3 March 2003 
Sandeep Kaur Singh Department of IWP project in Fiji 5 March 2003 
Environment 
Isoa Korovulavula lAS FLMMA; SPACHEE involvement in 7 March 2003 
BCN 
Bill Aalbersberg lAS BCN, FLMMA; Coral Coast ICM 12 March 2003; 
project 13 October 2003 
Etika Rupeni WWF-Fiji Fiji country programme; FLMMA 18 March 2003 
VeenaNair WWF-Fiji Fiji Barrier Reef eco-region 20 March 2003 
programme 
Helen Sykes and Resort Support Reef Check in Fiji 27 March 2003 
Stuart Gow 
Austin Bowden- PCDF Coral Gardens project 2 April 2003 
Kerby 
Tamsin Vuetilovoni WWF-SP WWF-SP's policy 9 April 2003 
Natasha Stacey SPREP IWP- social aspects 2 May 2003 
Mary Power SPREP SPREP's coastal and marine activities; 6 May 2003 
ICRAN 
Drew Wright SPREP IWP 9 May 2003 
Wana Sivoi PCDF PCDF's work with villages on coastal 20 May 2003 
Issues 
Jackie Frizelle NZAID NZAID strategies 18 June 2003 
Joshua Mae} Forum Secretariat Their marine ornamentals project 26 September 2003 
Ed Lovell Biological Fiji's coral and ornamentals trade 7 October 2003 
Consultants 
Epeli Nasome Department of GoF and climate change 14 October 2003 
Environment '" 
Hugh Govan FSPI SMART and Darwin Initiative projects 19 October 2003 
Michelle Lam MAC MAC certification 24 October 2003 
Rob Parry Jones TRAFFIC TRAFFIC and the coral trade 30 October 2003 
Priti Singh Fisheries Division Fisheries Division: trade in coral and 7 November 2003 
marine ornamentals 
Name Organisation 
Sunia Waqainabete Fisheries Division 
Russell Howarth SOPAC 
Ken Mackay C-SPODP 
Rex Horoi FSPI 
Dermot O'Gorman WWF-SP 
J osefa Sania Ministry of Finance 
and National 
Planning 
Manoa Malani Tourism Dept. 
Discussions 
Name Organisation 
Ledua Ovasisi Fisheries Division 
Ross Macfarlane NZAID 
Nik Kiddie NZMFAT 
Lisette Wilson WWF-SP 
Suliana Siwatibau FSPI 
Ilisapeci Neitoga Department of 
Environment 
Lionel Gibson FSPI 
Seru Batibasaga Fisheries Division 
Lynette Kumar IMR 
Jeff Kinch FSPIIMAC 
Satui Benton SPREP 
Cameron Hay IMR,MSP 
Workshops and meetings attended 
SPC LRFFT workshop, Suva, September 2002 
MAC national workshop, Suva, October 2002 
Main subject(s) 
FLMMA 
SOPAC's work and its role in 
developing regional policy 
C-SPODP; involvement with marine 
aquarium trade 
FSPI; regional Pacific agencies 
WWF culture and policy processes 
National assessment report for 
BPoA+1O 
Coral reef degradation as a policy issue 
Main subject(s) 
Fisheries Division and LRFFT 
NZAID and regional agencies 
NZ foreign policy on environmental 
matters in the Pacific 
WWF-SP's marine projects 
FSPI generally 
Climate change projects and reports 
FSPI and regional Pacific agencies 
ICM and Fisheries Division 
W oridFish Centre workshop on 
ReefBase; GCRMN 
Conservation NGOs 
Availability of environmental 
information in the region 
GCRMN; MSP teaching, coral 
bleaching in Fiji 
Heads of Fisheries meeting, SPC, Noumea, August 2003 
WWF-South Pacific FIME workshop, Suva, December 2003 
Pacific Islands Regional Oceans Forum, Suva, February 2004 
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Date 
18 November 2003 
18 November 2003 
19 November 2003 
11 December 2003 
20 January 2004 
22 January 2004 
10 February 2004 
Date 
21 November 2003 
18 June 2003 
30 June 2003 
5 March 2003 
5 March 2003 
9 October 2003 
Late Oct. 2003 
21 Nov 2003 
Various including 
22 January 2004 
16 February 2004 
AprillMay 2003 
various 
